

Anno 1778.

PHILLIPS·ACADEMY



OLIVER·WENDELL·HOLMES
LIBRARY


per ampliora ad altiora.

HARVARD STUDIES IN
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

VOLUME 67

HARVARD STUDIES
IN
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

VOLUME 67



CAMBRIDGE
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON : OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1963

L
© COPYRIGHT 1963

BY THE PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER 44-32100

MADE AND PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED
LONDON AND BECCLES

180
H26
v.67

PREFATORY NOTE

Since the foundation, in 1957, of the series of two annual lectures in memory of Carl Newell Jackson, Eliot Professor of Greek from 1937 to 1943, it has been customary to print the text of the lectures in the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, the single exception being those of the late Professor Werner Jaeger, which appeared in a separate volume, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*. The present issue of the *Studies* contains the fifth pair of Jackson Lectures, delivered April 18 and 19, 1961, by Russell Meiggs, of Balliol College, Oxford, entitled "The Crisis of Athenian Imperialism."

The *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, published by authority of the President and Fellows of Harvard University on behalf of the Department of the Classics, are supported in large part through the generosity of the Class of 1856. Although established primarily for the graduate students and staff of the Department of the Classics at Harvard, they welcome contributions from any source. Manuscripts should be sent to the Editors, 320 Boylston Hall, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

Wendell V. Clausen

J. P. Elder

John H. Finley

Editorial Committee

CONTENTS

THE CRISIS OF ATHENIAN IMPERIALISM	I
Russell Meiggs	
THE ATHENIAN ANAGRAPHESIS	37
Sterling Dow	
THREE ATHENIAN DECREES: METHOD IN THE RESTORATION OF PREAMBLES	55
Sterling Dow	
THE ATHENIAN HONORS FOR ARISTONIKOS OF KARYSTOS, "ALEXANDER'S ΣΦΑΙΡΙΣΤΗΣ"	77
Sterling Dow	
<i>Res olim dissociabiles: Principatus ac Libertas — LIBERTY UNDER THE EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE</i>	93
Mason Hammond	
THE STRUCTURE OF ARISTOTLE'S <i>Athenaion Politeia</i>	115
John J. Keaney	
PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE: SOME EARLY INTERACTIONS	147
James Longrigg	
ΤΩ ΚΑΙ ΕΓΩ : THE FIRST PERSON IN PINDAR	177
Mary R. Lefkowitz	
<i>Agamemnon</i> 1346–71, 1649–53	255
Garry Wills	
SOME GREEK TEXTUAL PROBLEMS	269
Robert Renehan	
RICHARD BENTLEY: A TERCENTENARY COMMEMORATION	285
G. P. Goold	
AN ARCHAIC BRONZE RELIEF OF A HOPLITE IN THE McDANIEL COLLECTION	303
David Gordon Mitten	
SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D. (1961–62)	307
INDEXES TO VOLUMES 1–67	313
Compiled by Marsh McCall, Jr.	

THE CRISIS OF ATHENIAN IMPERIALISM

By RUSSELL MEIGGS

IN the second year of the Peloponnesian war, according to Thucydides, Perikles could admit to the Athenian assembly that their empire was a tyranny.¹ This language has shocked some modern scholars; it would not have shocked contemporaries. They knew that Athenian rule did not rest on the free consent of the allies, and I suspect that they had known this for a long time. The early stages of the transition from league to empire had probably been gradual; the final stages involved definite decisions deliberately taken in quick succession, in the early forties. These decisions, however, were made possible by developments of the fifties. A reconsideration of Athenian policy in the early forties cannot begin later than the collapse of the league forces in Egypt.

The history of the ten years between the Egyptian disaster and the Thirty Years' Peace is very sparsely fed by literary sources. Hellanikos, Thucydides tells us, was the only writer before himself who had recorded Athenian events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, but his account was brief and his chronology incompetent.² It is intriguing to imagine what Hellanikos would have said had he read Thucydides' account, for this surely is one of the least satisfactory parts of the great history. Though it is not Thucydides' purpose to supply a detailed narrative, we can expect him to mention events which had an important bearing on the growth of Athenian power, for that is his central theme. But while he emphasizes the significance of the crushing of the revolt of Naxos, which provided a pattern often to be repeated, he ignores the transference of the league treasury from Delos to Athens, and the use of accumulated tribute on Athenian buildings. Similarly there is no word of the establishment of Kleruchies in the territories of allied states, and the cessation of hostilities with Persia is passed over. Later writers, notably Plutarch, add a little detail and color to Thucydides' lean summary, but it is not easy to separate fifth century material from later rhetoric. The reconstruction is saved from starvation by a wealth of inscriptions which help to give depth, light, and shade. Few of these documents are free from controversy, and the dating of some of the most important of them is likely to remain in dispute, but

¹*

even on the most sceptical estimate they add considerably to our knowledge. There need be no apology for reviewing the evidence again.³

Diodoros makes the revolt of Thasos the occasion for a brief review of the Aegean, emphasizing the dominance of Athens and the discontents of the allies.⁴ He was probably here, as elsewhere in his account of the fifth century, using Ephoros as his primary source, and we can rarely be certain whether Ephoros is drawing on authentic evidence or his own rationalization. But even if Ephoros had no fifth century source to follow at this point, his reconstruction is plausible. The crushing of Thasos was the most blatant exercise of Athenian power within the league that the allies had yet seen, for the main cause of the Thasian revolt was Athens' economic encroachment on the mainland opposite Thasos.⁵ It is true that the allies were invited to share in the colony that was to be established up the Strymon at Ennea Hodoi, but when the colony was almost at once obliterated by the Thracians any goodwill that the Athenians had won was lost. It would be reasonable to guess that the Thasian revolt had repercussions in the Aegean, particularly in Paros, from which Thasos had been colonized. But though Ephoros may be right in saying that there was much talk among the allies of revolt there is no firm evidence of open trouble, and soon the pattern of events changed radically. By 459 at the latest, Athens was committed to war with the Peloponnesians, and was at the same time fighting Persia in Egypt.⁶ The allies of Athens also fought on both fronts. Contingents from Samos and other allies had sailed into the Nile with the Athenians, and Athens was supported by her allies in the decisive sea battle against Aigina, and on land at Tanagra.⁷ The Egyptian expedition is likely at first to have been popular in Ionia and the islands, for it opened up again the prospect of Egyptian wealth which the Ionians had savored in the sixth century; but fighting against Peloponnesians was more dangerous and less rewarding. When the allies took oaths of loyalty to Athens in 477, they cannot have realized that this would commit them to fighting against Greeks in Greece. How easy it was for Athens to maintain their allegiance we cannot know, for Thucydides' account of the early stages of the first Peloponnesian war is a bare narrative of facts without editorial comment; nothing is explained. It is doubtful whether Athens would have admitted responsibility for the opening of hostilities against the isthmus states.⁸

While there may have been mounting discontent in the Aegean during and after the Thasian revolt, there is no reason to believe that Athens' control of her allies was shaken in the early fifties. Down to 455 all had gone very well. The radical democracy introduced by

Ephialtes' reforms of 462/1 had been consolidated by victories. Korinth had been cowed, Aigina eliminated. The Spartans had won an even battle at Tanagra but had fallen back on the defensive, and Tanagra had been eclipsed by the victory of Oinophyta, which led to the Athenian control of Boiotia and central Greece. Tolmides had demonstrated the striking power of the Athenian fleet on the coasts of the Peloponnese. Meanwhile the league forces in Egypt had won control of the Nile and penned the Persians within the citadel of Memphis. The first serious shock came when Megabyxos, at the head of strong reinforcements from Persia, broke the blockade of Memphis. Eighteen months later Greek resistance collapsed. 'And this is how the Greek cause was lost after six years of war. And of the large numbers engaged only a few made their way safely through Libya to Cyrene; the majority were lost... So ended the great expedition of Athenians and allies to Egypt.'⁹

In considering the effects of the Egyptian disaster on the Aegean, no assumption will be made concerning the scale of the Greek losses. Thucydides implies that more than two hundred ships with their crews were lost; most modern scholars would reject these figures and believe that when the Persians were blockaded in Memphis the greater part of the Greek fleet was withdrawn for service in home waters. The evidence for the late fifties should first be examined without prejudice. Does it suggest serious unrest, or are the repercussions of the Persian recovery of Egypt no more than ripples on the surface?

The most acceptable date for the collapse in Egypt is the early summer of 454, for the Attic year 454/3 marks the beginning of the quota lists, the lists of *aparchai* paid from the annual tribute to Athena. It is logical to infer that this institution reflects the transfer of the league treasury from Delos to Athens, and this in Plutarch is associated with the Egyptian disaster: 'The fairest of excuses, that it was in fear of the barbarian that the common treasury was moved from Delos to the safe keeping of the acropolis, Perikles has now made untenable.'¹⁰ It seems unlikely that Athens would have emphasized the danger from Persia while the Greek forces still seemed invulnerable on the island of Prosopitis. When it was known that the Greek position had been overrun, the prospect of a return of the Persian fleet to the Aegean could have seemed plausible, even if Athens was using the situation as a pretext to gain financial control. Thucydides links to the end of the Egyptian narrative two Athenian expeditions. There was an unsuccessful attempt to restore a pro-Athenian ruler to Pharsalos in Thessaly, and a little later Perikles led a force from Pegai against Sikyon and up the northwest coast where Oiniadai was besieged but not taken.¹¹ What

is important in our analysis is to decide the relation in time between those two expeditions and the Egyptian disaster. Did Athens undertake them after she had heard the news, or was she already committed to them? The Greek does not enable us to decide. The transitional δέ gives no clear mark of interval, and would be consistent with the beginning of these expeditions before the news from Egypt had reached Athens. It is not even certain that Thucydides' text excludes the possibility that both expeditions, presumably in the same season, were completed before the end in Egypt, in 455. In the two previous chapters Thucydides has recorded events in Egypt from the initial successes to the final disaster, a period of not less than two years, without interruption. The use of δέ as a link would be intelligible if the Thessalian and Akarnanian expeditions had taken place during the last phase of the war in Egypt.¹²

The return of Perikles from Akarnania was followed by an interval of three years in which there was no fighting on the Greek mainland.¹³ This is an abrupt change of policy, for the victory of Oinophyta had been followed by a vigorous offensive in central Greece and against the Peloponnese. The reason for abandoning the offensive is surely the Egyptian disaster. From 454 Athens was concentrating her strength in the Aegean and building up her resources in order to reverse the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean. No single event of these years was sufficiently conspicuous to earn a place in Thucydides' brief summary, but the annual quota lists of the *aparchai* and surviving fragments of decrees invite speculation. They suggest that in the late fifties Athens was much concerned in maintaining or restoring her control in the Aegean.

The evidence of the quota lists is particularly tantalizing, because there is so much more that we could learn if they were complete. It is significant that the first list, set up in 453, is considerably the shortest of the whole series, providing space for not more than 140 names, from not less than 170 which could be expected.¹⁴ But such statistics can be very misleading, for absentees need to be weighed rather than counted. What we need to know is how many important cities with high assessments failed to bring their tribute to Athens, and how far below the total assessment the year's tribute sank. This we should know if the total of the *aparchai* recorded for the first year only were fully preserved, but the two first figures are missing; restoration could yield approximately 350 talents or 400 talents.¹⁵ A substantial number of the absentees were almost certainly Karian communities, for this is a logical inference from the Karian names recorded in the first column of the second list of 453/2. None of these names survives in the fragments of the first list, and we

may follow the authors of the *Athenian Tribute Lists* in assuming an Athenian expedition to Karia in the late summer of 453.¹⁶ This tribute will have been collected under pressure and brought back to Athens too late to be entered on the books of the hellenotamiae of 454/3. Two of the absentees, however, were considerably more important. In 454/3 no payment seems to have been made by Miletos, but Milesians from Teichoussa and Leros are recorded in the list; it is inferred that Miletos was in revolt but that league loyalists were in control at Leros and Teichoussa in Milesian territory. A Milesian entry is included in 452/1, inviting the conclusion that Athens had regained control of Miletos between the spring of 453 and the spring of 451.¹⁷ The parallel history of Erythrai may help to give a closer date to Athenian intervention; for Erythrai also seems to be outside the league in 454/3, and the abnormally high payment of Boutheia in 453/2 is most readily understood if she represented the league loyalists of the peninsula. Boutheia, required to pay only 1000 drachmas in the late forties, pays 3 talents in 452. There is no evidence for Erythrai or Boutheia in the lists of 451 and 450, but in 449 the Erythraian assessment is 9 talents and the smaller states of the peninsula are not separately recorded. It is an economic hypothesis that an Athenian expedition won back Miletos and Erythrai in the summer of 452.¹⁸

The nature of the trouble at Erythrai is explained in an Athenian decree copied by Fauvel at the beginning of the nineteenth century but now lost. This decree provides regulations for Erythrai following a political upheaval. Tyrants have been in control, but they and their followers are now in exile with the Persians; in their place a democracy on the Athenian model, firmly based on a democratic Boule selected by lot, is to be set up under Athenian supervision. The issue has clearly been medism. Athens' response is to carry out a political purge and give power to the common people; but an Athenian officer is to remain in Erythrai with an Athenian garrison.¹⁹ In Miletos the nature of the trouble was probably the same, but the Athenian response was different. We do not know who held power while the city was in revolt, but when Athens reasserted her control the oligarchy were allowed to govern. The first settlement, however, does not seem to have been completely satisfactory, for new measures had to be taken in 450/49. Considerable fragments survive of a decree from this year, which provides for the sending to Miletos of a board of five political residents, who are to cooperate with the local magistrates. The decree also refers to a garrison, *φρουροί*, and a badly preserved clause may define the military obligations to Athens of Miletos.²⁰

We should not be surprised that medism became a serious political issue in Ionia during these years. Artaxerxes, who had succeeded Xerxes in 465, had, by his success in Egypt, reversed the situation created by the league victory at the Eurymedon; the western satraps could hope to encourage divisions in the Greek cities and they would be anxious to win what credit they could with the king. We do not know whether any other cities of Ionia attempted, with Erythrai and Miletos, to break away from the league, but regular payments are preserved for Ephesos and Kolophon, where disaffection might have been suspected. No payments from Myous, Kumai, Phokaia, and Teos survive on the fragments of the first two lists, but this need not be significant, since approximately a half of each list is lost. In the satrapy governed from Daskylion we have even less evidence, but a decree concerning Sigeion deserves more attention than it has received.

In the year of Antidotos' archonship, 451/0, a decree was passed in the Athenian assembly in honour of Sigeion. The decree was inscribed on a narrow stele with short lines and cannot have been very long. In the opening clauses the Sigeians are praised for their services to Athens. What followed is lost, but the last six lines are preserved. The stele is to be set up on the acropolis, as the Sigeians request, 'in order that there may be a record and that they be not harmed by anyone soever on the mainland.' This curious language cannot surely refer to the danger of a Persian attack, for a Mede would be called a Mede and the Persians would not be impressed by a stele on the Athenian acropolis. The more likely inference is that other Greeks of the neighborhood had been hostile to Sigeion. Not far away was the fief granted to Gongylos the Eretrian by Xerxes, which could have encouraged disaffection when Persian hopes were rising.²¹

From the evidence that we have briefly reviewed, it is clear that in the years following the Egyptian disaster, loyalty to the league was weakened in Karia, Ionia, and near Sigeion, though the extent of the disaffection cannot be determined. More important but more controversial is the reaction of the islands. One of the most striking features of the quota lists of the first period, from 454 to 450, is the large number of island communities for which no payment is recorded in any of the surviving fragments. Statistically it is extremely unlikely that a state which has left no trace in the fragments of four lists, from each of which approximately a half is preserved, was paying regularly. Chalkis, Eretria, Hestiaia, Kythnos, Siphnos, Styra, Tenos, Paros, Naxos, do not appear; Keos, Seriphos, and Andros are recorded for the first time in 450. The inference is generally accepted that a substantial number of islands

either did not pay at all or at least did not pay regularly. West was the first to make use of this evidence; he suggested that these states were still contributing ships until the end of the period. Nesselhauf preferred to see in the absence of islanders from the quota lists evidence of disaffection. The latest and most authoritative review of the problem returns to West's views, but there is still scope for disagreement.²²

The issues cannot be resolved from the literary sources, because the references to the conversion of ship contributions to money payments are either vague or unreliable. Thucydides refers to the change in his reflections on the suppression of Naxos (not later than 467). Naxos, the first state in the league to be coerced by Athens when it attempted to secede, set the pattern for future revolts and their suppression. One of the main reasons for the failure of these revolts was that most of the ship contributors had chosen to convert their obligations into money and so were powerless when their crisis came.²³ This passage would be equally well suited if the conversions occurred before, after, or both before and after the Naxian revolt. Plutarch is not more easy to interpret. He attributes the policy to Kimon and contrasts it with the harshness of other Athenian generals who imposed penalties when allies failed to supply ships.²⁴ West argued that this pointed to Kimon's final period of power in Athens after his return from ostracism, on the eve of his final expedition to Cyprus; the policy of penalties had been pursued by the radicals in the fifties, while Kimon was absent from Athens. It would be dangerous to draw such sharp conclusions from Plutarch. Even if the passage goes back to a fifth century source and is not the product of fourth century or Hellenistic rhetoric, a date in the sixties would suit equally well. Kimon's position, supreme immediately after the Eurymedon, was shaken during the Thasian revolt, and the election of Ephialtes and Perikles to the generals' board before the radical reforms of 462/1 testifies to the growth of the opposition.²⁵

If we have to take refuge in the dangerous argument from probability, the thesis that these islands contributed ships down to the end of the fifties is not convincing. None of them had large fleets at Artemision or Salamis. Chalkis had had to borrow ships from Athens, Seriphos and Siphnos had supplied one pentekonter each, Kythnos two triremes and two pentekonters, Styra two triremes.²⁶ It is unlikely that Athens, when the centre of operations had shifted to the east side of the Aegean, would have chosen to recruit such small contingents to the league. Nor does it seem likely that states which had been satisfied to send ships through the Egyptian campaign and the first Peloponnesian war would have wished to change their commitment when the league's most successful

commander returned from ostracism. Thucydides gives, as the main reason for the change from ships to money, the growing dislike of the allies for service away from home. This cause should have operated long before 450. It is reasonable, therefore, to examine once again the arguments for inferring disaffection from the absence of islanders from the quota lists of the first period.

Not all the island absentees are regarded as ship contributors by the authors of the *Athenian Tribute Lists*. Naxos is not likely to have kept her fleet in commission when she lost her independence, but her name does not appear on any of the fragments. It is surely significant that Naxos is among the states to which Kleruchs were sent at some time near the middle of the century.²⁷ Among the motives ascribed by Plutarch to the policy of sending out Kleruchs was the strengthening of security; they intended 'by settling Athenians in allied territory to inspire fear and to prevent revolt'.²⁸ It is reasonable to infer from the evidence that Kleruchs were settled at Naxos because the island had been disaffected in the late fifties. This clue may be followed more widely. Andros is included in Plutarch's list of Kleruchs. The island pays 12 talents in 450, 6 talents in 449 and subsequently; there is no good reason to question the settlement of Kleruchs on Andros in the summer of 450.²⁹ It is at least possible that Kleruchs were sent to Euboia and Naxos in the same summer. Naxos appears first in the quota list of 448/7, paying $6\frac{2}{3}$ talents, which remains her assessment down to the Peloponnesian war. Unless an example can be found of a Kleruchy which was not accompanied by a reduction in tribute we should conclude that Kleruchs were sent to Naxos before the spring of 447. It is a reasonable guess, but perhaps no more, that the 500 Kleruchs were settled on Naxos by the same expedition that brought 250 settlers to Andros.³⁰

The Naxian Kleruchy is linked by Diodoros and Pausanias with the settling of Kleruchs in Euboia. Tolmides was in charge of the operations, but no further details are recorded.³¹ It has been suggested that the settlements in Euboia should be regarded as part of Tolmides' strategy against Boiotia, 'and that they were intended partly to prevent communication through Chalkis between disaffected elements on the island and exiles in Boiotia'.³² This hypothesis should be rejected for two reasons. If the Naxian assessment was, as we should expect, reduced when Kleruchs were settled, the Kleruchy must be dated before the payment for 448/7, which must surely precede the battle of Koronea. It would also be inconsistent with the literary tradition which suggests that Tolmides acted impetuously and underestimated the seriousness of

the situation in Boiotia.³³ There may be a little support in the quota lists for grouping the Naxian and Euboian Kleruchies with Andros in 450. In 450 Karystos pays 7½ talents; in 449 and later, only 5 talents. Since there was a new assessment in the late summer of 450 this reduction need not be specially significant. It could be explained by economic hardship or successful diplomacy; but Karystos had been forced into the league in the late seventies and had less reason than most of the Aegean states to feel grateful to Athens. It is tempting to believe that Kleruchs were sent to Karystos in 450.³⁴

If Kleruchs were sent to Naxos and Euboia as well as to Andros in the summer of 450, it would be legitimate to infer that in the preceding years there was widespread trouble in the islands. Two passages in Plutarch add a little respectability to the view. In his biography Plutarch says that Kimon, after his return from ostracism, led the Athenians to Cyprus 'in order that they should not cause trouble in Greece, and by sending large fleets round the islands and round the Peloponnese draw upon Athens charges of stirring up war among Greeks and provoking protests from her allies.'³⁵ A quotation from an unnamed comedy says that the Athenian demos, drunk with the heady wine of Ephialtes' reforms, 'no longer dared to be submissive, but bit Euboia and leapt on the islands'.³⁶ This would be a very intelligible description of the Kleruchy policy we have suggested.

If the absence of islanders from the fragments of the first period is taken as evidence that they were still contributing ships, it is logical to infer that other states which do not appear were in the same position. The authors of the *Athenian Tribute Lists* therefore include in this category Poteidaia, Akanthos, and Iasos.³⁷ It is even less likely that these states were chosen by Athens to supply ships, for none of them is known to have ever had an effective fleet. Here too, disaffection is a more likely explanation of their absence. Poteidaia was a colony of Korinth which retained a close association with her mother city down to the outbreak of the second Peloponnesian war. Athens' acceptance of Megara's appeal for alliance against Korinth had been the cause, Thucydides tells us, of Korinth's bitter hatred for Athens;³⁸ a loyal colony will not have remained unaffected. Akanthos similarly may well have shared the feelings of her mother city, Andros. Iasos was near enough to be infected by Miletos.

If this analysis of the evidence is on the right lines, the Egyptian disaster was followed by acute tension within the league. Athens wisely abandoned her offensive against the Peloponnese and concentrated her resources in maintaining or regaining control of her allies, and building

up her strength against Persia. It seems the loss of Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean was temporarily accepted, but already in 453 an expedition was sent to Karia, to remind the Karians that Athens had no intention of abandoning her active leadership of the league. It was not until the next year, 452, that the more important Erythrai and Miletos were recovered, and the trouble in the islands was dealt with last. The means used by Athens to maintain her control over the league can be inferred from what we know of Athenian methods at Erythrai and Miletos. They are not likely to have been the only towns which received Athenian garrisons and political residents. But while the immediate need was to preserve the league, the main objective was the reversal of the decision reached in Egypt. There could be no serious division on this point at Athens, for even those who questioned the indefinite continuation of hostilities with Persia must have realized that no satisfactory peace could be made from weakness. If a major offensive was to be mounted against Persia it was not enough to have broken off hostilities against Sparta and her allies; some guarantee was required that the Peloponnesians would not take advantage of the absence of Athens' main striking force. It is probable that to ease negotiations with Sparta Kimon was recalled from ostracism by decree.

The tradition that Kimon was specially recalled is found in Theopompos, Plutarch, and Nepos, and is linked with the battle of Tanagra; but it is an essential part of the story in all three sources that Kimon, on his return to Athens, ended the war with Sparta. We may believe that he was recalled precisely for that purpose, shortly before his ostracism expired in the spring of 451.³⁹ Sparta could believe that a truce negotiated by Kimon might lead to a stable peace and a revival of the mutual tolerance that had existed between Athens and Sparta before the reforms of Ephialtes and the ostracism of Kimon changed the temper of Athenian politics, and the objectives of her foreign policy. Kimon succeeded in bringing back from Sparta a five years' truce and was soon in command of a major league force sailing for Cyprus. The Athenian purpose at this stage was presumably to strike hard at Persia and regain control of Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean, but two unexpected turns of fortune radically changed her course. Kimon, after a successful opening to his campaign, died at the siege of Kition; and the Persians negotiated for peace. This at least is the version of Diodoros, who is generally considered to be following Ephoros. Persian approaches are followed by an Athenian embassy to Sousa, which results in the Peace of Kallias.⁴⁰

Few problems in the fifth century have been more continuously de-

bated than the Peace of Kallias, and the vigorous attack recently launched by Stockton seems to reflect a strong revival of scepticism.⁴¹ This is not the place to deploy the argument in detail; it must suffice to outline briefly the reasons for believing that peace was made and that it was known in the Aegean to have been made. As Wade-Gery demonstrated in his review of the problem, the starting point of the enquiry should be the peace which Andokides alleges that his uncle, Epilykos, negotiated with the great king.⁴² Andokides is a notoriously unreliable witness, but in this case he is strongly supported by what survives from an Athenian decree of the period. This decree honours a certain Herakleides and mentions the great king and a peace. A restoration of the missing first letter would make Neokleides the president of the assembly meeting which passed the decree, and an amendment was moved by Thucydides. Neokleides was a member of the Boule in 424/3; a Thucydides was a hellenotamias in 424/3. A Herakleides of Klazomenai was nicknamed 'Basileus' and was given Athenian citizenship; the restoration of 'the Klazomenaian' after Herakleides precisely fills the line, whose length is known. Here are too many coincidences. We should feel convinced that a peace was negotiated with King Dareio in 424/3 and that Herakleides of Klazomenai helped in the negotiations.⁴³ It is much easier to see in the peace of 424/3 a renewal of a peace with Artaxerxes than a completely new peace. The main attack against the peace in antiquity seems to have been made by Theopompos, and we only know one of his arguments. He dismissed the stele on which the terms were inscribed, because Ionic and not Attic letters were used.⁴⁴ This attack shows at least that the terms of the peace were publicly displayed, and Theopompos' attack would have been very unconvincing if the stele had only been recently erected; the peace was not an invention of Demosthenes' day when invention may have been in fashion.⁴⁵ The record must go back at least a generation before Theopompos' attack; it is very difficult to believe that Athens would have countenanced a public forgery so early. The discreditable Peace of Antalkidas may have revived memories of an earlier peace with Persia, but it did not lead to the invention and public display of the Peace of Kallias. In the eighties Athens was showing considerable outward respect to the great king;⁴⁶ Sparta had become the main enemy. But the most compelling ground for accepting the Peace of Kallias is the pattern of events in the early forties.

Before proceeding to these years it is necessary once again to take our chronological bearings. When did Kimon die, and when was peace with Persia made? The dates most commonly accepted for Kimon's campaign in Cyprus are 450 or 449, but the latter can be ruled out if we

accept the reliability of the Strassburg papyrus. This extract from a commentary on Demosthenes' speech against Androton tells us that the decision to use the accumulated tribute reserve on Athenian buildings was taken in the archonship of Euthydemos. Since Euthydemos' year, 431/0, does not fit the context, we may follow those who believe that the writer, or his source, like Diodoros, has confused Euthydemos with Euthynos, archon for 450/49.⁴⁷ If the building policy decision was taken before the change of archons in 449, Kimon's Cyprian campaign cannot be later than 450, for Thucydides son of Melesias had taken Kimon's place in politics when the issue was debated.⁴⁸ Even if Kimon died towards the end of the summer of 450 events have to be crowded uncomfortably together; for between peace with Persia and the decision about tribute we have to fit Perikles' decree inviting the states of Greece to send representatives to a congress in Athens. The subjects to be discussed were the rebuilding of the temples destroyed by the Persians, the performance of the sacrifices vowed at the time of the Persian invasion, and the policing of the seas.⁴⁹ The rebuilding of the temples was no longer a problem when Athens had decided to use the tribute reserve; the problem of security on the high seas would be a more natural topic in a period of peace than when Athens was still at war. The possibility of dating Kimon's Cyprian campaign in 451 should at least be seriously considered.

One of the reasons that has kept scholars from considering such an early date for Kimon's death is the evidence of Diodoros, who attributes two archon years to the Cyprian expedition, 450/49 and 449/8.⁵⁰ But, as we have seen, the dating of this expedition in 449 is not compatible with the evidence of the Strassburg papyrus. Unless it can be plausibly shown that the Cyprian campaign is the kind of event for which Diodoros is likely to give a reliable date, his evidence need not seriously concern us. Many of his dates are notoriously untrustworthy; it is safer indeed to assume that his dates for military campaigns are wrong, unless they can be shown from other sources to be right.⁵¹ Thucydides, however, cannot be lightly dismissed; no date should be accepted if it contradicts his evidence. In Thucydides' text there are two clues to the date of the expedition to Cyprus. It follows the five years' truce with Sparta, and this truce is separated from the expedition of Perikles against Sikyon and Oiniadai by three years. There are two reasons why the truce should be dated before midsummer 451. Kimon is said to have negotiated with Sparta as soon as he returned to Athens.⁵² If we are right in believing that he was recalled before his period of ostracism expired in the spring of 451, the negotiations should have been completed before the summer

of that year. At the other end we should not believe that Sparta broke the truce unless there is clear evidence that she did, for in such matters Sparta was sensitive.⁵³ Sparta invaded Attica in 446 and, though the precise month cannot be established, the invasion seems to have been earlier than midsummer, which also puts the truce in the first half of 451.⁵⁴ If the truce were made in or before May, there is no good reason why Kimon should not have sailed for Cyprus in June, for Athens, as we think, had been building up her strength since 454 for a renewal of war with Persia. The redating of Kimon's expedition offers a more intelligible pattern of events in these years. The policy of establishing Kleruchies in allied territories is set by Plutarch within the political struggle between Thucydides son of Melesias and Perikles.⁵⁵ According to Plutarch, Kimon should have been dead when Andros was settled in 450. The policy is more easily explained if Athens has decided on peace with Persia and at the same time realizes that she may have to face increasing resentment in the empire. A better context is also provided for Perikles' law requiring Athenian parentage on both sides as a qualification for citizenship. Jacoby thought that this law of 451/0 might have been a thinly disguised threat against Kimon, whose mother was Thracian, but such a clumsy attack on Kimon, when he was once again leading league forces, is unlike Perikles, nor would the people have tolerated it.⁵⁶ The law restricting citizenship makes better sense when Kimon is dead, peace assured, and the policy of the *εμπισθος πόλις* is to be shortly developed.

If Kimon died in the second half of 451 the Athenian embassy should have returned from Susa in 450, and by the end of the year the Aegean world should have known that Athens had made peace with Persia. This created a completely new situation. The league had been formed for action against Persia; the Peace of Kallias removed the purpose for which tribute had been designed. Disaffection had spread among the allies after the Egyptian disaster; it could be expected now to revive on a more serious scale. At this critical point Athens made no attempt to compromise. She made it abundantly clear that she had no intention of dissolving the league or abandoning her claim to tribute. By these decisions what had still nominally been an alliance before the Peace of Kallias became, in name as well as in fact, an empire. And instead of moderating her aims to disarm the opposition, she quickened the pace of imperialism. The driving force behind Athenian policy in these years was the mind and tongue of Perikles. He had served his political apprenticeship with Ephialtes in the late sixties, and had made his mark as a general in the fifties. He was now mature, confident, and ambitious,

but he had to fight hard to realize his aims. His policies were bitterly opposed, both at home and in the empire, and it was not until the ostracism of his main political rival, Thucydides son of Melesias, in 443, that he could feel politically secure.

One of the first steps taken after the making of peace with Persia was the settlement of Athenian Kleruchs in the islands, which had been the most disaffected area in the late fifties. It was probably at approximately the same time that Perikles carried his decree inviting the Greek states to send representatives to a congress at Athens, to discuss the rebuilding of temples and the policing of the sea. Sparta was hostile from the start, and the congress did not meet.⁵⁷ This cannot have surprised Perikles, but it gave him a justification for using the empire's resources to do what the rest of Greece was not prepared to do. Athens would use the accumulated tribute to rebuild her temples, and would use her fleet, financed by the annual tribute, to keep the Aegean free from pirates. The use of the tribute reserve to build the Parthenon and other temples was keenly contested, and Plutarch preserves a colorful summary of the debate.⁵⁸ His account of the speeches on either side is suspiciously rhetorical, and we may believe that it took shape in the fourth century, or later, but there is probably genuine fifth century material at the heart of the argument. It is likely enough that Thucydides and his followers concentrated first on the moral principle involved; though some at least may have been more concerned with the political implications of an ἔμμισθος πόλις. Their case might have convinced the allies; the main mass of Athenians had too much to gain from an ambitious building policy to worry about questions of morality. The decision seems to have been taken in the first half of 449, and when the Parthenon was begun in 447/6 the main grants received by the commissioners each year came from the treasurers of Athena.⁵⁹ We can infer that the tribute reserve had been transferred to the safe keeping of Athena.

Defeated on this issue, the opposition continued the attack on Perikles' policies, but our meagre sources do not tell us what arguments they used and what successes, if any, they gained. Developments in the empire are better attested, though not all the evidence is easy to interpret; the quota lists in particular raise puzzling problems. The first list of the period, that of 450/49, follows close on the making of peace with Persia; it reflects, we think, the hesitations that followed the news. In the first four columns several states are credited with incomplete payments; in the last column some at least of these states are listed again with the balance due. We may accept the suggestion that this column was filled by states completing an incomplete payment or paying

late in the year.⁶⁰ Only two other lists are preserved from this second assessment period, and their numbers do not survive. The first is at the bottom of the front face of the stele, the second on the right side. The second follows closely the order of the first, is complementary to it, and must surely belong to the next year. No fragments survive from the top of the back face. The next list of which the number survives is the list of the tenth year, 445/4, but the list immediately above it on the back face is from the same assessment period, and is almost certainly the list of 446/5.⁶¹ It follows from the evidence either that there is one list missing from the series or that there was a very short list at the top of the back face, providing room for less than 70 cities from an expected total of over 160. This list would be the list of 447/6 and in that year Megara and Euboea revolted. But such a large reduction in numbers from 447 to 446 is not credible, and had this space been occupied by a quota list some fragment would surely have survived and been identified. We should agree with the authors of the *Athenian Tribute Lists* that the space at the top of the back face was unoccupied and that the year in which no *aparchai* were recorded was 449/8.⁶²

The simplest explanation of the omission of a quota list for 449/8 is that no tribute was collected; and if no tribute was collected none was demanded. Athens could have remitted tribute for 449/8 pending the result of the congress, or in order to celebrate the peace. It is, however, also possible that no *aparchai* were listed, because the whole tribute of the year was given to a special purpose. Whatever the explanation, the missing list considerably strengthens the case for a formal peace with Persia. Further reactions to the peace can be seen in the lists of 447 and 446. The first is a short list, of not more than 150 cities. Several of the payments are incomplete, nine cities are listed in a different hand at the end of the last column, under a special heading, of which only one letter survives. The only acceptable restoration that has been suggested implies that these payments were received late, after the Dionysia.⁶³ The second list, for 447/6, is the longest of the series. It includes arrears from 448/7, payments for the current year, and also complementary payments for the year's incomplete payments. In his first review of these lists Wade-Gery regarded the incomplete payments as evidence of disaffection created by the peace with Persia; the long list of 446 he attributed to a special effort made by Athens to collect the full tribute from reluctant allies.⁶⁴ This interpretation has been abandoned in the *Athenian Tribute Lists*, as a result of a more detailed analysis. It is now inferred that the irregularities in these lists should be interpreted in

terms of bookkeeping rather than politics.⁶⁵ The reasons for the change of mind must be examined.

One of the most interesting results of the new analysis is the identification of a south-eastern group of cities, of which Miletos is the most important member. They are included in the final column of the list of 449; they are missing from the list of 447; they were probably listed twice in 446, making payments for 447 as well as for 446. ‘We have evidently a group of cities, from the neighbourhood of Ephesos and Miletos, which habitually made their payments late in the year.... They may perhaps be distinguished from their appendix-fellows in that their late payment was very likely due to distance.’⁶⁶ That these cities habitually paid late in this period is virtually certain, but some other explanation than distance is needed; Phaselis and the cities of Rhodes had much further to come, but seem to have paid at the normal time. And if the heading above the last nine names in the list of 447 is rightly restored to cover payments made after the Dionysia, we should infer that Miletos and her neighbors in the group had not brought their tribute when the hellenotamiae of 448/7 closed their books. On the other hand this is an area where there had been trouble in the late fifties, and where there was to be more acute trouble later. We have seen that when Athens regained control of Miletos she allowed oligarchs to rule, but that within a short time she had to intervene again. Some time after this intervention in 450/49 the oligarchs carried out a purge of the demos in defiance of Athens; but by the time of the Samian revolt Miletos was almost certainly under democratic government. It is probably significant that there are no surviving traces of Milesian tribute payments between 445 and 442: within this period we should put the excesses of the oligarchs, revolt from Athens, and the imposition by Athens of democracy. Irregularities in payment in the preceding years may be interpreted as the growth of anti-Athenian feeling.⁶⁷

More important for the general mood within the empire is the significance of part payments. Here too *ATL* reinterprets the evidence, and rejects Wade-Gery’s earlier view that this was a sign of disaffection. It is now held that the arrears from 447 listed in 446 were not in fact paid in 447/6 but in 448/7. They represent not late but advance payments, collected by Athenian commanders to finance their operations; they were levied before the tribute was sent to Athens in 447 but they could not be formally recorded in Athens until the commanders returned, after the hellenotamiae of 448/7 had closed their books; they were included in the list of 446 because it was the hellenotamiae of 447/6 to whom they were reported. This interpretation raises more difficulties

than it solves. It is surely improbable that Athenian commanders would need to maintain their crews by collecting here and there small advances of tribute, nor should we expect them to have left Athens before the tribute was received at the time of the Dionysia. Most of the states concerned are in the Hellespontine district, but Kos on this interpretation is strangely isolated. If the part payments by Kos represented prepayments levied for an Athenian fleet, surely there would be other instances in the Ionian and Karian districts. Moreover, two entries explicitly record payments made outside Athens. Abdera is credited with a payment of 14 talents in 447 from an assessment of 15 talents; in 446 Abdera pays 1 talent 'to Eion.' This is presumably the balance of the 447 tribute and it is taken to the Athenian colony of Eion, which may have been a base for operations in the Thraceward area.⁶⁸ Similarly two payments are made 'to Tenedos,' presumably for operations in or based on Tenedos.⁶⁹ If these exceptions to the general rule are noted, we should expect other payments which did not come to Athens to be similarly noted, as they were in later lists.⁷⁰

We may therefore prefer to return to Wade-Gery's earlier judgment and infer from the absences and partial payments of 447 that Athens' new imperialism was resented, particularly in the Hellespont. Further evidence of trouble in 447 may be seen in a casualty list that is mistakenly associated with the Samian revolt. This stele records Athenian losses in the course of a campaigning season, and the names are listed by tribes and under place headings. There were 23 casualties 'in the Chersonese,' 12 'at Byzantium,' and 18 'in the other engagements.' This list was for a long time dated towards the end of the century because only then was it thought that there was serious fighting in these areas, but the letter forms look much earlier, and one of the dead, Karystonikos, must have got his name when Karystos was forced into the league in the late seventies. A context before the second Peloponnesian war was needed, and the period of the Samian revolt was chosen because Thucydides records that Byzantium joined Samos in revolt.⁷¹ The fatal objection to this setting is that Samos is not mentioned, and was too important to be included in 'the other engagements'; we cannot believe that the casualties at Samos in either of the years of the revolt were as small as this view would demand. The main emphasis is on the Chersonese, and the epigram inscribed below the list of names commemorates those who died by the Hellespont. This is at once explained if the main military operation of the year was the settlement of Athenian Kleruchs by Perikles in the Chersonese, which from the evidence of the quota lists can be dated with considerable probability in 447.⁷² The

fighting at Byzantium may have been against Thracians, who were the main enemy in the Chersonese, but it is not impossible that the enemy were Byzantines. Byzantium was a colony of Megara, and Megara had come to regret the Athenian alliance of 461; in the next year she was to massacre her Athenian garrison. We have no firm evidence for identifying 'the other engagements,' but the phrase suggests fighting at several points. One perhaps was in Chalkidike, where the colony of Brea was soon to be established; further speculation is wasted effort. The casualties, however, were very light. We should imagine a series of small task forces.

While many states can be seen from the quota lists to have been irregular in their payment of tribute during this period, the names of others are entirely missing from the fragments.⁷³ Since these lists are comparatively well preserved, the inference that these states were either not paying, or at least not paying every year, is legitimate. They include Kolophon, Argilos, Poteidaia. Regular payments were made by Kolophon before 449 and after 446.⁷⁴ That the city was disaffected in the intervening years seems to be confirmed by an Athenian decree which records Athenian intervention and a political settlement. The style of the inscription and the form of the letters suit this period; the decree has been tentatively dated in 447/6.⁷⁵ Argilos was an Andrian colony and may have been a centre of trouble, for it was probably in her territory, and at her expense, that the colony of Brea was established.⁷⁶ There may, as has been seen, be a hint of the military operations that preceded the establishment of the colony in a payment made by Abdera to Eion, recorded in the quota list of 446.⁷⁷ Poteidaia is missing also from the fragments of the first period, and now as then the authors of the *Athenian Tribute Lists* infer that Poteidaia was still contributing ships.⁷⁸ This would make her the last survivor of the ship-contributors, apart from the three great islands; it is more probable that Poteidaia was still infected by her mother city, Korinth. Aigina may also be suspected. In 449 a part payment is recorded of 26 talents, 1200 drachmas instead of her normal 30 talents, and we do not know whether she also paid the balance; but her name does not survive in the lists of 447 and 446. She may have been hoping to enlist Sparta's help in the changed situation created by the Peace of Kallias.

Faced with opposition at home and in the Aegean, Perikles seems to have followed an unyielding course. Even in official decrees the language of the league is replaced by the language of empire. The lost Erythrai decree of the late fifties still refers to 'the alliance'; in decrees which, from their letter forms, seem to be not much later, 'the alliance' has

become 'the cities which the Athenians control.' One of these decrees refers to a collective penalty of five talents to be paid by a state for the killing of an Athenian in its territory, and special protection for an Athenian proxenos. Such measures presuppose strong anti-Athenian feeling and attacks on individual Athenians and friends of Athens. It may be mere coincidence that no evidence which must be dated earlier than the forties survives, but the reaction of the Aegean world to the Peace of Kallias would be a very appropriate context.⁷⁹

Further evidence of Athens' assertion of her imperial position at this time may perhaps be seen in the decree which imposed Athenian coinage, weights, and measures on the allies. This decree provides for the closing of independent mints, the changing of local coins for Athenian at Athens, and the inclusion in the Athenian Bouleutic oath of a clause binding members of the Boule to punish offences against the terms of the decree. The main characteristic of the style of this decree is its uncompromising harshness. There is no suggestion that the measure is in the interest of the allies, and there is clear recognition that it may be unpopular. A copy of the decree is to be put up in each city, and 'if they do not wish to do this themselves, [the Athenians shall do it for them].' There also seems to be a reflection of opposition to the decree at home in the insistence that the maintenance of the policy shall be protected by a clause of the bouleutic oath, and in the manner in which penalties are threatened against any attempt to reverse the policy: 'and if anyone proposes or puts a vote to the assembly that non-Athenian coinage may be used or lent, he shall be indicted at once before the eleven.' Finally it should be noted that action under the decree is to be initiated by Athenian officials in the cities, and only when there are no such officials by the local magistrates. When this decree was passed Athenian garrison commanders or political residents must have been widespread in the empire.⁸⁰

In style, and particularly in its threats of penalties, the coinage decree suggests the same imperialistic mood as the extravagant assessment of 425; and it was parodied in Aristophanes' *Birds*, produced in 414. These were two good reasons for dating the decree towards the close of the Archidamian war, or during the Peace of Nikias. It was not until a new fragment was found in Kos in 1933 that a considerably earlier date was advocated.⁸¹ The fragments on which the text had hitherto been based were found at scattered points in the Aegean, and seem to have been locally inscribed. This would account for the wide variety in the scripts and the difficulty of dating them; but the Kos fragment was inscribed in Attic letters on Pentelic marble and had presumably been cut at

Athens. Since a considerable number of Athenian public inscriptions of the fifth century are dated, it is legitimate to use letter forms as a dating criterion for the Kos fragment, and the use of the three-barred sigma in particular seemed significant to the first editor. This form was used consistently in Attic public inscriptions until the fifties, when the four-barred sigma begins to intrude. For some ten years both forms are current, but, so far as our present evidence goes, there is no clear instance of the earlier form known in public documents inscribed at Athens after 445. If there were very few securely dated inscriptions in the ten years following 445, the argument would have no force, but in addition to the annual quota lists we have the accounts for the Parthenon, the Athena Parthenos, and the Propylaia, the expenses of the Samian revolt, and the decree which followed the Samian surrender. The survival of the three-barred sigma into the twenties would be a striking anomaly which should only be considered if other arguments are compelling.⁸²

Further support for a date in the early forties may be found in the quota lists. If the inscription was cut at Athens and transported to Kos, the natural explanation is that the Koans ignored the instruction to set up a copy of the decree themselves. There are further hints of Koan disaffection. The assessment of Kos in 450 seems to have been 5 talents, but throughout this second period her payments were consistently irregular. In 449 she paid in two instalments, of 3 talents 3360 drachmai and of 1 talent 2640 drachmai; in 447 only one payment is preserved, again of 3 talents, 3360 drachmai; in 446 this unusual figure reappears and there are two further Koan entries, only one of which, 2160 drachmai, is preserved.⁸³ No payments from Kos are preserved in any of the fragments of the following three lists, and this may be significant; for if we discount cities that do not appear on any prewar lists after 446 only eight other states in the Ionian-Karian district are missing, and of these only Miletos is financially significant. Miletos is suspected of revolt in this period; this may also be the reason why Kos is not found.⁸⁴ The tribute record of Tenedos provides interesting points of comparison.⁸⁵ The island's assessment in 454 was 4½ talents. In 449 two payments are preserved, of 2 talents 5280 drachmai and 1 talent 3720 drachmai. In 447 an irregular payment is only partly preserved. In 446 the payment of 2 talents 5280 drachmai recurs and there are three further payments, one of 3240 drachmai and two of 2160 drachmai. But whereas Tenedos, after paying 4½ talents regularly from 445 to 443, has to pay only 2 talents 5280 drachmai in and after the assessment of 443, Kos returns to her old assessment of 5 talents. It looks as if both

Tenedos and Kos were trying to stake their claim in the second period for a lower assessment, and that Tenedos eventually made her point.

There was also found in Kos in the same district as the fragment of the coinage decree a stone marking a reservation of 'Athena, queen of Athens'; this stone, similar to others found in Samos, may be a mark of Athenian confiscation.⁸⁶ It is, however, also necessary to explain the appearance of Koan coins after the middle of the century. The early issues of Kos were on the Aiginetan standard, but at some time which cannot be precisely determined near the middle of the fifth century, a series of tetradrachms were struck on the Attic standard; and so far as we know they were not accompanied by smaller denominations. If these coins were, as is very probable, issued after the coinage decree, they will not represent defiance since they use the Attic standard. The obverse type may suggest the explanation. While the crab which seems to have been the heraldic type of Kos is retained for the reverse the obverse has a naked diskobolos, with tripod behind him. This clearly refers to a festival.⁸⁷ Athens may have allowed Kos to issue these festival coins as a concession after putting down trouble in the island.⁸⁸

The most decisive argument, however, may eventually be the coins themselves. Robinson, after a full review of the evidence, was satisfied with a date near the middle of the century.⁸⁹ But until many more fifth century hoards are found it must be admitted that the coins cannot alone resolve the chronological problem. Where style is the only dating criterion the margin of error should not be underestimated. It remains to show that the spirit of the decree is not inconsistent with the Athenian mood of the early forties.

If our reconstruction of the reactions to the Peace of Kallias and, in particular, our interpretation of the quota lists of the second assessment period are not seriously misconceived, the imperialism of the coinage decree need not surprise us. Athens, in this view, was determined to force the pace rather than show any sign of weakness. We may be surprised that Athenian officials were so widespread in the allied cities so early, but the means of control that were used at Erythrai and Miletos might have been used elsewhere at any time after the revolt of Thasos. The Athenian officials in the cities are also referred to as a widespread class in another decree whose history has been not dissimilar to that of the coinage decree. Until 1940 it was confidently placed in the first half of the Archidamian war; when a new fragment was found, epigraphic and historical arguments were used to date it in the forties, and probably in 447.⁹⁰ This decree, moved by a Kleinias, is concerned with the tightening up of tribute collection: 'the Boule and the (Athenian)

officials in the cities and the *episkopoi* shall ensure that the tribute be collected in the course of each year and brought to Athens.' Instructions are then given to the cities to record on separately sealed tablets the amount of tribute which they are sending, and these tablets are to be handed over in the Boule by the couriers with the seal unbroken when they hand over the tribute. The natural inference is that previously when Athens has complained of incomplete payments, the blame has been laid by some cities on their couriers. A more important decision of imperial policy is also referred to in this decree. After the procedure has been laid down for dealing with offences, by Athenians or allies, connected with the tribute, a clause is added applying the same procedure 'if anyone commits an offence connected with the bringing of the cow or panoply.'⁹¹ Shortly before the Kleinias decree the Athenians had imposed on all the allies the obligation of sending a cow and a panoply to the Great Panathenaia.

The decree of Kleinias was formerly dated in the early twenties, because it was associated with another decree about tribute. This second decree, moved by Kleonymos, required the cities of the empire to appoint tribute collectors who would be responsible for ensuring that the full tribute was collected. The decree of Kleonymos was dated to the second prytany of 426/5; it was regarded as a sequel, at no long interval, to the decree providing for the control of the couriers. The first decree was intended to ensure the safe arrival of all the tribute that was dispatched; the second took stronger measures to ensure that all the tribute was collected.⁹² The new fragment disclosed for the first time the name of the proposer, Kleinias, and the new editors, influenced by the redating of the coinage decree, thought that they had found a better context in 447. If Kleinias, not a common name, was to be identified with Alkibiades' father, the decree must precede the battle of Koronea at which he died, not later than the early summer of 446. In 447 there was a particularly tempting context between the short quota list of 447, with its many partial payments, and the very successful collection of 446. The decree of Kleinias could have been in part the explanation of the success. Reconsideration of the lettering and style of the inscription was now thought to be consistent with the earlier date.⁹³ The epigraphic argument, though less strong than in the case of the coinage decree, is not to be dismissed. Though there is no letter form as significant as the three-barred sigma, the disposition of the letters over the space is unlike the style of the twenties but can be paralleled in the forties. There is no difficulty in assuming a long interval between these two attempts to tighten up tribute collection, and the association of the decree of

Kleinias with the reluctance of the allies to pay their full tribute in the years following the Peace of Kallias is not extravagant.

In the study of Athenian imperialism, however, the regulation requiring all the allies to bring standard offerings to the Athenian festival of the Great Panathenaia is considerably more important than the attempt to improve the collection of tribute. Until the second fragment of the decree of Kleinias was found, the earliest evidence for this regulation was from 425. Thoudippos, who was responsible for the decree ordering a new and higher assessment in that year, later added a second decree, which was inscribed on the same stele, requiring that 'all the cities assessed in the year of the Boule of which Pleistias was first secretary in the archonship of Stratokles should bring a cow and a panoply to the Great Panathenaia, and should escort them in the procession [like colonists].'⁹⁴ We can now believe that this very concise decree was applying to cities that were included in the new assessment of 425 for the first time, or after a long interval, a rule that had been applied for some twenty years to the regular payers of tribute. No such regulation had been made at the time of the settlement at Erythrai, for the obligations of Erythrai to the Great Panathenaia are set out in great detail, though the text is not recoverable.⁹⁵ Erythrai was generally recognized as a colony of Athens, and her participation in the greatest of Athens' religious festivals would accord with recognized custom. It was a bold demand to require Ionians from Thrace and Chalkidike and Dorians to act as if Athens was their mother city; but it matches the imperialism of the coinage decree.

The history of the years between the Egyptian disaster and the Thirty Years Peace is the crisis of Athenian imperialism. Athens stood the shock of the Egyptian disaster, and in meeting the disaffection that followed she strengthened her control over the allies. She was thus able to weather the more serious storm when her leaders decided to make peace with Persia. The policies that were developed in the next few years show that Pericles had clear aims and was prepared to achieve them by bold means. The transition from league to empire was made explicit and emphasized by such decrees as the coinage and the Panathenaic decrees. The resentment among the allied cities was met with firmness, and by 446 Athens' position seemed stronger than ever. But then in quick succession Megara massacred her Athenian garrison, Euboia revolted, and a Peloponnesian army crossed the Attic border. Megara had to be abandoned, but Perikles secured the withdrawal of the Peloponnesian army and Euboia was regained. In the peace negotiations that followed, Sparta could salve her conscience by insisting on the

autonomy of Aegina, though she could not rescue her from tribute;⁹⁶ she could not challenge Athens' right to empire.

The Perikles of these years is not the Perikles we meet in Thucydides. He is nearly twenty years younger, less cautious, more ambitious, with clear-cut ideas of empire to realize and a social and economic policy to fulfil. The organized opposition, led by the son of Melesias, sharpens the tone of debate and is reflected in the firm and threatening style of important decrees. It is interesting to reflect that many of the finest achievements of Athenian civilization were produced against such a stormy background.

APPENDIX

In a substantial and provocative article published in *Historia* X (1961) 148–188, H. B. Mattingly has advocated a radical revision of many of the dates on which my reconstruction of the early forties hinges. It would be inappropriate here to examine in detail all his closely reasoned arguments, but sufficient must be said to explain why I am not persuaded to change my main views. By comparing Mattingly's dates for some of the most important documents with those accepted above, it will be seen at once that the issues are fundamental. If Mattingly is right in his main contentions, the account of the period outlined above becomes romantic nonsense. Coherence is not necessarily truth. The individual arguments for changing individual dates must be met.

	<i>Meiggs</i>	<i>Mattingly</i>
Athenian regulations for Miletos	450/49	426/5
The Congress Decree	450/49	After 438
The decision to use tribute on Athenian buildings	449	After 438
The Coinage Decree	450–446	425/4 or 424/3
Athenian regulations for Kolophon	447/6	427
The Panathenaic Decree	447	425/4
The Kleinias Decree	447	425/4

Regulations for Miletos, ATL II D 11 (pp. 174–181). The letter forms, including the early sigma with three bars, have been compared with the Kos fragment of the Coinage Decree. The accepted date 450/49 is taken from the archon's name Euthynos. Diodoros calls the archon of the year Euthydemos, but he gives this name also to the archon of 426/5, known from an inscription to be Euthynos. Mattingly advocates 426/5 for the Miletos decree on the following grounds: (1) Euthynos is attested for 426/5 but not for 450/49. That Diodoros made a mistake once does not necessarily mean that he will make the same mistake a second time.

(2) There are two obscure allusions associating Kleon with Miletos in Aristophanes' *Knights*, which would be topical if Athens had intervened the previous year. (3) Lines 10–16 of D 11 probably contain provisions for the supply of Milesian troops to Athens. Precisely in the summer of 425 Thucydides records Milesian hoplites serving in Greece under Athenian command, the first time in the war that he specifies any such contingent from the empire (IV 42.1). (4) The ἐπιμελητάι of D 11, line 42, were first elected in the second prytany of 426/5 (D 8, lines 38ff.). (5) Diodoros (XIII 104.4–5) describes an oligarchic coup at Miletos linked with the presence of Lysander at Ephesos in 405. This recalls the anonymous oligarch's statement that when the Athenians supported oligarchy at Miletos the experiment was unsuccessful; the oligarchs soon massacred the common people (*Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 3.11). The silence of Xenophon's *Hellenica* suggests that Diodoros may be mistaken in his context, and other mistakes in Diodoros make it possible to believe that some confusion has led him into a serious chronological error.

Thucydides does not mention any trouble in Miletos during the Archidamian War, but, though this would be surprising, we may agree with Mattingly that the argument from Thucydides' silence is not decisive, since he omits other events which we should expect him to record. More serious is the rough handling of Diodoros. His dates are often wrong, but his sequence of events is usually right, or at least intelligible. No adequate explanation of his mistake is given. On more general grounds it is unlikely that in 426/5 Athens would have supported oligarchs rather than democrats in Miletos; in the middle of the century such compromise is less difficult to understand. D 11 implies that oligarchs were in power when Athens intervened and would remain in power. This is surely inconceivable if the settlement followed the troubles described by Diodoros. The fact that Milesians are first known to have fought for Athens in 425 is not good evidence for believing that they had never before been required to fight if needed. The payment for service seems to be 4 obols a day (I. 13); this is probably too low for the Archidamian War when Athenian hoplites and sailors were paid a drachma a day (Thuc. III 17). The allusions in Aristophanes to Kleon's relations with Miletos must have a point, but the point need not be an Athenian settlement following an oligarchic coup. About ἐπιμελητάι we know too little and the text of D 11 is too uncertain to date the Miletos decree by reference to the decree of Kleonymos (D 8).

Other decrees with the early sigma (pp. 169–173). Mattingly also challenges the accepted dates of three other decrees which, like the Kos fragment of the Coinage Decree and the Miletos Decree, use the early sigma with three bars. He thinks that the first decree for Athena Nike (16, 1²24; Tod, *GHI* 40) fits better a date early in the twenties immediately before the building of the temple, rather than the generally accepted date c. 449, which leaves a gap of some twenty years between the decision

to build the temple and its beginning. It may be agreed that this redating satisfies common sense, but if the temple was intended to commemorate the fighting against Persia, as the sculpture of the frieze might suggest, a context following closely the end of hostilities against Persia is preferable. The choice will depend largely on the validity of the three-barred sigma criterion.

Mattingly interprets the Hermione Treaty, of which only a small fragment is preserved (*SEG* X 15) in the light of the Athenian expedition of 430 against Epidauros and her neighbors and the settlements made by Athens with Halieis and Troizen, both probably in 424/3. Mattingly suggests that Hermione made a similar settlement earlier to preserve her territory from invasion. But while it is true that such a settlement could have been made in the twenties, it remains equally true that a date in the fifties suits the pattern of the first Peloponnesian War no less well, though the first editor's date, 450, is too precise.

More important is the decree providing for the institution of Eleusinian *ἐπιστάται* (*SEG* X 24), currently, on account of its letter forms, dated c. 450. Mattingly regards one clause as decisive for dating the decree in the late thirties. The board of five *ἐπιστάται* is to be modelled on previous commissioners (lines 10ff.): *τούτο|[s] δὲ ἐπισ[τέ]ναι [τ]οῖς χρέμασι τοῖς τοῦ θ|[ε]οῦ καθάπερ οἱ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐμ πό[λ]ει ἔργο|ι|s ἐπεστ[ά]το[ν] τοι νεδοι καὶ τοι ἀ[γ]άλματι*. This clause, in Mattingly's view, refers unequivocally to the commissioners who supervised the Parthenon and the Athena Parthenos, and the tense of *ἐπεστάτων* shows that they have completed their work. If the current date is retained, the commissioners who are to serve as a model must operate in the fifties. The statue could be the Athena Promachos and the temple could be a temporary reconstruction of the old temple of Athena Polias, or perhaps her temple together with her cult statue could be meant; but it may be admitted that here again much depends on the validity of letter forms as a criterion.

The Kolophon Decree, D 15 (p. 175). Mattingly also questions the date 447/6 given to the decree laying down Athenian regulations for the Kolophonians. He recalls Thucydides' description of the defection of Kolophon in 430, the spread of trouble to Notion, the strong intervention at Notion by Paches in 427, and the settlement at Notion of loyal Kolophonians by *οἰκισταί* sent out from Athens (Thuc. III 34). The decree also refers to *οἰκισταί* and faction complicated by intrigue from another city is implied. 'It would be indeed strange if Athens twice dealt so similarly in one generation with the same people . . . ; it is reasonable economy of hypotheses to make the decree and Thucydides refer to the same events.' Such economies are dangerous. There is no difficulty in believing that where trouble has broken out once it will break out again, as the example of Miletos (above, p. 16) shows. Letter forms are not the only argument for the date suggested by ATL. Kolophon's name does not survive in any of the fragments of the second assessment period, but regular payments are

preserved before and after. It is a reasonable hypothesis that Kolophon was in revolt and that the decree marks the end of the revolt (*ATL* III 282–284). Kolophon's neighbours, Lebedos and Dios Hieron, are mentioned in the decree. If it referred to the events of 427, some reference to Notion should have been preserved, though in view of the many large gaps in the text this point cannot be pressed; nor can any certain inference be drawn from the reductions in the assessments of Kolophon and her neighbors in 446.

The Congress Decree (pp. 159–161). Mattingly emphasizes the mark of time in Plutarch's introduction. The decree was passed when the Spartans were beginning to feel resentment at the growth of Athenian power (Plut. *Per.* 17: ἀρχομένων δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἔχθεσθαι τῇ αὐξήσει τῶν Ἀθηναίων). This, Mattingly thinks, fits the early thirties after the Samian revolt better than the early forties. Mattingly recognizes the difficulty of reconciling this date with the current interpretation of the congress agenda. One of the problems to be discussed was the rebuilding of the temples burnt by the Persians. It is generally held that these included the Parthenon and that when the Parthenon was begun (447/6) the decision to use the tribute on Athenian buildings had already been taken. Mattingly's dating of the Congress Decree is untenable unless the beginning of the rebuilding of the burnt temples and the decision to use the tribute on Athenian buildings can be dated in the thirties.

The use of tribute on Athenian buildings (pp. 163–166). Since both date and content are disputed, it will be discreet to ignore the Strassburg papyrus (above, p. 12) and concentrate on Plutarch's *Pericles*. Plutarch describes the attack of the oligarchs on the Athenian decision to use the tribute transferred to Athens from Delos on thousand-talent temples, statues, and costly stones. The context is the political struggle between Thucydides, son of Melesias, and Perikles, before the ostracism of 443 (Plut. *Per.* 12). Mattingly holds that the Parthenon should be excluded from the temples burnt by the Persians because only a half-built temple stood on the site when the Persians sacked Athens. Until 437/6 the commissioners of the Parthenon and of the Athena Parthenos received only the *aparchai* from the tribute, whereas the commissioners for the Propylaea also received from the hellenotamiae money received from a campaigning general, which presumably was tribute. The clearest evidence, however, for the use of tribute on buildings Mattingly finds in a decree concerning Athens' water-supply generally dated in the thirties (*IG I²* 54, D 19). This has been understood to record that Perikles and his family offered to meet the expense, but the assembly, while insisting on economy, decided that the money should come from the tribute. (*ATL* III 328). This decree Mattingly believes to be the basis for Plutarch's story in *Perikles* 14. Attacked for the extravagance of his building policy in the assembly, Perikles asked the people whether they thought that the cost was high. When they said 'Very high,' he replied, 'Put the cost then

down to me and the monuments shall bear my name.' Mattingly thinks that Plutarch is confused: 'He misplaces the incident, imagining that it preceded Thucydides' ostracism, and fancies that Perikles was offering to pay for the temples! We do see, however, that the assembly was seriously concerned with the great expenses already incurred, and that Perikles' offer was a new attempt to disarm criticism. All this can be read between the mutilated lines of D 19.'

This surely is reading too much between the lines. Plutarch's story has a simpler explanation in the context in which he sets it. Perikles, under attack from Thucydides and his followers for spending so much money, is asking the assembly whether they wish to return to the age of aristocratic patronage, in which case Perikles' name would be associated with the Parthenon, as the name of Peisianax was associated with the Stoa Poikile, or whether public buildings should be initiated, controlled, and paid for by the people. Similarly Plutarch's building debate cannot be dissociated from Thucydides without a rigorous analysis of his sources, and Mattingly's objection that the Parthenon could not have been called a thousand-talent temple until the cost was known towards the end has little force. Some rough idea of the cost could have been given in the assembly when the decision to build was approved, but the opposition would not have needed a firm estimate to attack the extravagance of the proposal in colorful terms. The fact that the hellenotamiae hand over the *aparchai* each year does not mean that no other tribute was used. The rational assumption is that the main reserve had been handed over to the treasurers of Athena before the Parthenon was begun. How could the feverish building policy of the forties have been financed if no tribute except the *aparchai* was used?

The Coinage Decree (pp. 148–159, 181–188). In addition to the main coinage decree there survives a fragment of another decree concerned with coinage and the mines of Laureion, which Meritt originally dated c. 423/2, because he judged that it was cut by the same hand as the Perdikkas treaty, then dated to that year (*SEG X* 87). Meritt has since revised his date for the Perdikkas treaty to c. 436, but Mattingly prefers to keep the old date. He thinks that the two decrees about the coinage should be close together: 'the efficient running of the Laureion mines would be needed more than ever to keep Klearchos' arrangements in full vigour.' Mattingly also thinks that references to the contrast between good Athenian and bad foreign currency in the *Acharnians* and to Byzantium's iron currency in the *Clouds* and in Plato's *Peisander* reflect the enforcement of Athenian silver currency throughout the empire. Mattingly also emphasizes the point made by Tod (*JHS LXIX* (1949) 105) that the coinage decree reflects a fourfold division of the empire; heralds are to be sent to the islands, to Ionia, to the Hellespont, to Thrace. This fourfold division appears first explicitly in the quota list of 438/7; the coinage decree should therefore be later.

These arguments are not strong. Measures to improve the efficiency of the Laureion mines during the Peloponnesian War or in the thirties are in no way inconsistent with a date in the early forties for the Coinage Decree. The reflections in comedy are too few, and too indirect, to be cogent. The fourfold division of the empire is found also in the Congress Decree, and Mattingly's attempt to dislodge that decree from its natural setting between 449 and 447 does not convince. More important is the more general historical argument which will be briefly discussed below.

The Kleinias Decree, D 7 (pp. 150–159). This decree, which aims at the tightening up of tribute collection, is similar in tone to the Coinage Decree. It used to be closely associated with the Kleonimos Decree (D 8), which provides for the appointment of local collectors who are to be responsible for the collecting of tribute in the cities. D 8 is dated to the second prytany of 426; D 7, before a new fragment was found, was dated shortly before 426. Mattingly urges that the association of the two decrees should be maintained but that D 7 is the later of the two. It is doubtful whether the relation in time between the two decrees can be decisively established from their content, and Mattingly admits that his argument from a comparison of the procedures laid down may seem no less subjective than the orthodox view. He attaches much more weight to the reference in D 7 to the regulation requiring all the allies to bring cow and panoply to the Great Panathenaia. This requirement was, as was seen above (p. 23), laid down in a short decree moved by Thoudippos shortly after the reassessment decree of 425/4. 'Is it not altogether more natural,' Mattingly asks, 'to assume that Thoudippos had recently established it than that *his* measure merely reasserted a custom some thirty years old?' The decree of Kleinias should therefore follow the decree of Thoudippos, in 425/4.

This argument is not decisive. Thoudippos' Panathenaic decree is suspiciously short if it is the first formulation of such an advanced imperial regulation; its brevity is much more natural if it extends an existing institution over a slightly wider area. The addition to the assessment of 425 of cities that had never paid tribute before, or had not paid since the fifties, is an adequate explanation. But though the arguments for dating the Kleinias decree during the Archidamian War are by no means compelling, we can claim no more than that 447 provides a better context. We believe that the style of the inscription fits the forties much better than the twenties, but there is no three-barred sigma to take refuge in, and further study of the stone is needed.

In this controversy the main arguments need to be carried further. The first is epigraphic. Should we reject the dating criteria accepted by epigraphists, and especially the rule that no public inscription using the three-barred sigma should be dated after 445; and, if we do, should we accept the degree of elasticity which Mattingly's dates require? We may agree that Greek and Roman historians have often come to regret their

faithful acceptance of dating pronouncements by epigraphists, and that, particularly in Roman epigraphy, there is a strong reaction against the use of letter forms for dating purposes. But scepticism should not go too far. In periods of transition, such as the middle of the fifth century at Athens and the late Republic at Rome, when letter forms are changing, it is reasonable to collect the evidence and examine the statistics. Mattingly's challenge should encourage epigraphists to re-examine the evidence more closely. The second argument is historical. Mattingly's strongest objection, which others will share, to the early dating of the Coinage Decree and the Kleinias Decree is the form of imperialism that they display. In both it is implied that Athenian officials are widely spread through the cities of the empire; Mattingly sees in this a clear sign of lateness. 'Though isolated examples may belong to the Periklean period, the regular maintenance of numerous officials overseas is clearly characteristic of the Peloponnesian War' (p. 158). Mattingly also thinks that not until Kleon's ascendancy could Athens take such strong measures. 'Such measures as the unilateral universal edict seem foreign to his (Perikles') outlook and never so more than in the formative years after Kimon's death.'

This is not Plutarch's view of these formative years (*Perikles* 11–14). He, or perhaps we should say his source, sees it as a stormy period of political conflict in which Perikles bid high for the people's support. We believe that the stresses and strains are reflected in the tribute quota lists and in the decrees of the period. The decision to use the tribute reserve on Athenian buildings is firmly established in the early forties; it is not the policy of a cautious politician. It is true that most of our evidence for Athenian officials in the empire comes from the period of the Peloponnesian War, but that is due to the nature of our sources. For the war years we have the plays of Aristophanes and the detailed narrative of Thucydides. The literary sources for the history of the empire down to the middle of the century are negligible; our only hope of securing evidence is the chance discovery of inscriptions. But if we are right in believing that Athens moved a long way towards empire between the revolt of Naxos and the Peace of Kallias, the Athenian officials that we find in the Erythrai and Miletos decrees may be typical rather than exceptional. But more study and discussion of the epigraphic and numismatic evidence is needed before we can be satisfied that the Coinage Decree and the Kleinias Decree are firmly placed in their right context.

NOTES

The Carl Newell Jackson lectures on which this article is based were delivered at Harvard in April 1961, before the publication of H. B. Mattingly's article on the Coinage Decree in *Historia* X (1961) 148–188. This text would be considerably less carefree and less clear if it were adapted to meet all Mattingly's argu-

ments. I have therefore maintained the general form of the lectures and added an appendix on Mattingly's views.

1. Thuc. II 63.3: ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἥδη ἔχετε αὐτήν.
2. Thuc. I 97.2: βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη.
3. The most important studies of the period are by H. T. Wade-Gery in *Hesperia* XIV (1945) 212-229; B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists* vol. III. The earlier part of the period is discussed by Meiggs in *JHS* LXIII (1943) 21-34.

4. Diod. XI 70.3-4.
5. Thuc. I 100.2: διενεκθέντας περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρᾳ Θράκη ἐμπορίων καὶ τοῦ μετάλλου ἢ ἐνέμοντο.

6. Thuc. I 104-105.
7. Samians in Egypt, Peek, *Klio* XXXII (1939) 289; against Aigina, Thuc. I 105.2; at Tanagra, I 107.5, Tod, *GHI* 27.

8. What we particularly need to know is why Athens attacked Halieis, or perhaps rather whether Athens expected Korinth and Epidauros to fight for Halieis. No reconstruction of the opening of the war can be complete which ignores the battle of Oinoe, at which Argos with Athenian help fought Sparta (Paus. I 15.1 and X 10.4).

9. Thuc. I 104-110.
10. Plut. *Per.* 12.1.
11. Thuc. I 111.

12. The chronological relation of Thucydides' main digression on the Egyptian expedition to what preceedes and what follows is uncertain. ATL (III 168-180) assumes that the first event in the digression follows the last preceding event, the periplus of Tolmides, and that the first events which follow come after the Egyptian disaster. But the opening of the digression (I 109.1) marks a resumption: οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπέμενον.... τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐκράτουν τῆς Αἰγύπτου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ βασιλεὺς πέρπτε ἐς Λακεδαιμονία Μεγάβαζον.... It is not necessary to believe that the despatch of Megabazos was later than the periplus of Tolmides. Thucydides may have chosen to begin his digression at the point where the arrival of Persian reinforcements changed decisively the course of events. He then completes the story to its natural end before returning to operations on the Greek mainland. It is probable that if the Thessalian and Akarnanian expeditions had been in the year before the Egyptian disaster Thucydides would have been more explicit (cf. IV 129.1-2), but when he digresses from Kleon's campaign in Chalkidike to the embassy of Phaiak to Sicily in 422/1 the digression is not interrupted, though the chapter which follows deals with events earlier than the end of the digression (V 4-5).

13. Thuc. I 112.1. ὕστερον δὲ διαλιπόντων ἔτῶν τριῶν. Gomme, *Commentary on Thucydides*, I (Oxford 1945) 325, believes that three empty years are more likely to have followed the truce than to have preceded it and is tempted to follow Diodoros, who places it in 454/3. He underestimates the effect of the Egyptian disaster and overestimates the value of Diodoros. The text of Thucydides makes good sense.

14. ATL III 265.
15. *Ibid.* 266f.
16. *Ibid.* 7-9.
17. Meiggs (above, n.3) 26f.; but the local Milesian decree, Tod, *GHI* 35,

- should be withdrawn from this context, as Earp suggests in *Phoenix* VIII (1954) 146f.; *ATL* III, 253.
18. *ATL* III 253–257.
 19. *IG* I² 10 (Tod, *GHI* 29); text revised, *ATL* II D 10; Meiggs (above, n.3) 23–25; *ATL* III 254f.
 20. *ATL* II D 11. Military obligations, lines 10ff.
 21. *IG* I² 32, revised with new fragment by Meritt, *Hesp.* V (1936) 360 (= *SEG* X 13); Meiggs (above, n.3) 28; Gongylos' fief, *Xen. Hell.* III 1.6.
 22. West, *Am. Hist. Rev.* 1930, 267ff.; Nesselhauf, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Delisch-Attischen Symmachie* (*Klio*, Beiheft XXX, 1933) 11ff.; Meiggs (above, n.3) 30f.; *ATL* III 267f.
 23. Thuc. I 99.
 24. Plut. *Cim.* 11.2.
 25. Election of Ephialtes and Perikles, Plut. *Cim.* 13.4, quoting Kallisthenes.
 26. Herod. VIII 1.2; 46.
 27. Plut. *Per.* 11.5.
 28. *Ibid.* 11.6: φόβον δὲ καὶ φρουρὰν τοῦ μὴ νεωτερίζειν τι παρακατοικίζων τοῖς ουμάχοις.
 29. The Andrian Kleruchy of 450 is generally accepted, *ATL* III 287.
 30. Nesselhauf (above, n.22) 30–31 n.1, argued that no inference could be drawn from the tribute assessment for the date of the Naxian Kleruchy; but he offers no example of an assessment unaffected by a Kleruchy.
 31. Diod. XI 88.3; Paus. I 27.5.
 32. *ATL* III 294.
 33. Plut. *Per.* 18.2; Thucydides (I 113) is less explicit, but he implies that the Athenians did not expect a battle when they returned from Chaironeia. *ATL*'s dating has the further disadvantage of separating the Kleruchies of Naxos and Euboia which are combined in the sources.
 34. A Kleruchy at Karystos in 450 was suggested in R.E. s.v. Karystos, XX 2258 (v. Geisau).
 35. Plut. *Cim.* 18.1.
 36. Plut. *Per.* 7.8.
 37. *ATL* III 267f.
 38. Thuc. I 103.4.
 39. Theopompos *FGrH* 115 fr. 88: ὁ δὲ παραγενόμενος τῇ πόλει τὸν πόλεμον κατέλυσε; Plut. *Cim.* 17.8–18.1: εὐθὺς μὲν οὖν ὁ Κίμων κατελθὼν ἔλυσε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ διήλλαξε τὰς πόλεις (cf. *Per.* 10.4); Nepos, *Cim.* 3.2–3. The close association of Kimon's return and peace with Sparta is emphasized by Wade-Gery, *Hesp.* XIV (1945) 221 n.21, and accepted by Jacoby, *CQ* XLI (1947) 16. According to Plutarch the decree of recall was moved by Perikles.
 40. Diod. XII 3–4.
 41. Stockton, *Historia* VIII (1959) 61–79.
 42. Andokides 3.29; Wade-Gery, *HSCP* Suppl. vol. I (1940) 121–154 = *Essays in Greek History* (1958) 201–232. The case for the Peace of Kallias will be argued in detail in a forthcoming study of the Athenian empire.
 43. Wade-Gery, *Essays*, 207–211.
 44. *FGrH* 115. fr. 154.
 45. Habicht, *Hermes* LXXXIX (1961) 25f., while accepting the reality of a peace, argued that the terms recorded on the stele criticized by Theopompos were invented in the mid-fourth century.

46. The language of the Athenian alliance of 384 with Chios in particular is quite inconsistent with a public forgery to the discredit of Persia, Tod, *GHI* (II) 118. The Chians are praised by the Athenian assembly for their good will (ll. 14–16): *καὶ ἡκουον ἀγαθὰ ἐπαγ[γ]ελλόμε[νοι τῷ]|ι δῆμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων [καὶ ἀπάσῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ βασιλεῖ.*

47. Text revised and discussed, Wade-Gery and Meritt, *Hesp.* XXVI (1957) 163–197.

48. Plut. *Per.* 11–12.

49. Plut. *Per.* 17.

50. Diod. XII 3–4.

51. There is a dangerous tendency to accept Diodoros' dates when they are convenient and reject them when they are inconvenient. It is clear that much of his narrative is based on a source (almost certainly Ephoros) which was not annalistic, but arranged by subject, and which gave few if any archon years. So Diodoros can record under a single archon year Kimon's career from the capture of Eion to the victory of the Eurymedon and Themistokle's career from before his ostracism to his death. Similarly Diodoros ends the Egyptian expedition in 460/59 probably because his source told the full story of the revolt before turning to the first Peloponnesian War. We may be equally suspicious when whole years are occupied solely with events in western Greece or in Asia, and feel that sometimes he gives a date arbitrarily because he has used up all the years up to that point. But Diodoros has also used a chronological source or sources, from which he took at least regnal years, and probably foundation-dates; but it is very difficult to discern how many military and political events should be included in this category and how accurate such dates were. His date for the Cyprian campaign might have come from such a source, but how are we to know whether it is more accurate than his date for the Five Years' Truce (454/3), the reforms of Ephialtes (460/59), the revolt of Thasos (464/3), or the expedition of Pausanias to Cyprus (477/6)? See W. Kolbe, 'Diodoros' Wert für die Geschichte der Pentekontaetie,' *Hermes*, LXXII (1937) 241–267.

52. Note 39 above.

53. This is suggested by Sparta's anxiety to pin the guilt on Athens before she went to war in 431 (Thuc. I 126.1) and her relief when Athens became formally responsible for the continuation of war in 414 (Thuc. VII 18.3).

54. The sequence of events in Thucydides (I 114) is that Euboia revolted, Perikles took an army to the island; meanwhile Megara massacred the Athenian garrison and a Spartan invasion was threatened. Perikles brought his army back from Euboia, negotiated the Spartan withdrawal, and returned to crush Euboia. Tribute was paid by Eubolian cities in 446; the revolt will therefore have broken out openly not earlier than April. The most effective season for a Peloponnesian invasion would be May, but in 446 no summer month can be decisively ruled out.

55. Plut. *Per.* 11.5–6.

56. Jacoby (above, n.39) 17.

57. Plut. *Per.* 17; Wade-Gery (above, n.3) 222–225; *ATL* III 279f.

58. Plut. *Per.* 12.

59. *JG* I² 339–353; *SEG* X 246–256.

60. *ATL* III 32–36.

61. Lewis in *BSA* XLIX (1954) 25–29 makes a strong case for interpreting

what in the *ATL* text is part of a prescript as part of a city name and adding one or two lines to the list.

62. Wade-Gery (above, n.3) 212–215. Reference to different views, *ATL* III 278 n.16.

63. M[ετὰ Διονύσια].

64. Wade-Gery (above, n.3) 226–228.

65. *ATL* III 59f.

66. *Ibid.* 35f.

67. Meiggs (above, n.3) 26f. associated the revolt of Miletos with the absence of tribute payments in 448/7. Earp gave good reasons for preferring a later date in *Phoenix* VIII (1954), 142–147. His conclusions will be confirmed by new evidence in an article by J. P. Barron in *JHS* LXXIII.

68. List 8 col. I 105, ἐς[‘Ε]ιόνα ἡβδηρί, *ATL* III 60.

69. List 8 col. II 108–109, *ATL* III 59.

70. Special rubrics in lists 25, 26.

71. Tod, *GHI* 48, dates the list in 440/39. *Καρυστόνικος* col. I 27. The general Epiteles (I 4) is probably to be identified with the dedicator of *IG* I² 580, the letter forms of which seem appropriate to the mid-century. Description with facsimile, Raubitschek, *Dedications from the Athenian Acropolis*, no. 384 (p. 412).

72. Plut. *Per.* 19.1. For the date, *ATL* III 59.

73. *ATL* III 58f., where eight cities are listed.

74. *ATL* I 316 (Register).

75. *ATL* II D 15; III 58. But see Appendix, p. 26.

76. Plut. *Per.* 11.5 mentions settlers among the Bisaltai. The territory of the Bisaltai marched with that of Argilos, Herod. VII 115.1. See Nesselhauf (above, n.22) 131; Gomme (above, n.13) 277, n.2.

77. Above, p. 17.

78. *ATL* III 58; above, p. 9.

79. Meiggs, *CR* LXIII (1949) 9–12. Compare in the Erythrai decree (*ATL* II D 10) l. 31: φευχέτο ήπασαγ τὲν Ἀθεναίον χωνμαχί[δα] with the language of *IG* I² 28a (*SEG* X 23) ll. 7–10: ἔπει δέ τις ἀπο[κτένει] Ἀχελοῖον[α ἐτ]ῶν παίδων τιν[ὰ ἐν τὸν πόλεῶν ποι] ὁπό]σουν Ἀθεναῖοι[ι κρατῶσιν, τὲν πόλιν π]έντε τάλαντ[α ὄφελεν] Cf. *IG* I² 27 (*SEG* X 19). Neither of these two decrees can be precisely dated, but both have the early three-barred sigma and their other letters suggest a date near the middle of the century. It should be made clear that though a date after the Peace of Kallias may seem historically more probable there is no epigraphic objection to a date shortly before 450.

80. Text, with photographs, *ATL* II D. 14.

81. M. Segré, *Clara Rhodos* IX (1938) 151–178.

82. Tod in a valuable review of *ATL* II in *JHS* LXIX (1949) 105 urged a later date and suggested that old-fashioned masons might have come out of retirement to cope with the large number of copies of the coinage decree that might be needed. He also reminded us that fragments of the decree found earlier had been dated to Kleon's period or shortly afterwards on epigraphic grounds. The strength of this argument is difficult to assess since there is so little material for comparison outside Athens, but it is possible that the decree was revived and reinscribed later. The Siphnos fragment indeed is considerably less mature than the Aphytis fragment (*ATL* II, Plates VI, VII), but this need not necessarily imply a difference in date.

83. Kos payments, *ATL I* (Register) 326.
84. The other absentees are: Θερμαῖοι, Διοσερῆται, Γαργαρῆς in Ionia and, in Karia, Πηδασῆς, Τερμερῆς, Πλαδασῆς, Ἀρκέσσεια For Miletos, above, p. 16.
85. Tenedos payments, *ATL I* (Register) 420.
86. W. R. Paton and E. L. Hicks, *Inscriptions of Cos* (1891) p. 160 n.148: *hópos τεμένος Ἀθηνῶν μεδεόσης*; the date is very uncertain. A similar inscription on two stones from Samos, *SEG I*. 375 and 376. Similar inscriptions marking reservations of other Athenian cults in the cities of the empire are collected in G. F. Hill, *Sources for Greek History* (rev. ed., Oxford 1951) pp. 318–320.
87. Head, *Historia Numorum* (1911) 632; Robinson, *Hesperia Suppl.* VIII 337; Babelon, *Traité*, CXLVIII 9–13.
88. A very different explanation of the evidence from Kos is offered by G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook. In a brief but very interesting survey of the island (*BSA* LII, 1957, 119–127) they suggest that in the fifth century the capital of Kos was at Kefalos in the southwest, a Dorian settlement in a comparative backwater. The site which was to become the new city of Kos in the fourth century at the northeast end of the island near C. Skandarion represented the earlier pre-Dorian element. The two payments from Kos, they think, represent the two centres, Kos Astypalaia and Kos Meropis. The northeast centre may have had an Athenian station at the key point on a busy seaway commanding the straits. It was in this area that the boundary stone and the fragment of the coinage decree were found; they represent loyalty, as does the minting of eoins on the Attic standard. This view does not, I think, explain why the copy of the coinage decree should have been inscribed at Athens rather than locally; and if the two payments represented two centres they should as in other cases be differentiated, nor will this explain the third payment of 446 and the apparent absence of Kos from the lists of 445–443.
89. Robinson (above, n.87) 324–340. A possible confirmation of an early date for the coinage decree may come from Chios, briefly discussed by Boardman in *BSA* LIII–LIV (1958–59) 308 with n.23. Boardman draws attention to a unique Chian elektron stater which, by the shape of the amphora, can be dated near the middle of the century. He suggests that it was struck in the interval between two different series of Chian silver coins and may reflect Chios' reaction to the currency decree. The clause to be added to the Bouleutic oath does not suggest that Chios was exempt.
90. *IG* I² 66, revised with a new fragment by Meritt and Hill, *Hesp.* XIII (1944); *SEG* X 31; *ATL* II D 7. The epigraphic evidence is also reviewed by Raubitschek, *AJP* LXI (1940) 477–479.
91. Lines 41–43: [καὶ ἐ]άν τις περὶ τὸν ἀπα[γογέ]ν| ν τες βοὸς ἐ[τες πανηοπλία]ς ἀδικεῖ, τὰς γραφὰ[ς ἔνο]ι|ι κατ' αὐτὸν κ[αὶ τὸν ζεμίαν κ]ατὰ ταῦτα.
92. Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents* (1937) 3–60.
93. Meritt and Hill (above, n.90) 1. For a different view, see Appendix, p. 29.
94. *IG* I² 63, revised, *ATL* II A 9, 55–58; *ἱοπόσι*[ει πό]λεσι φόρος [ἐτάχ]θ[ε]πὶ τ[ο]ῦ [βολές ἡ]ει Πλειστ[ο]ν πρότος [έγρα]μμέτενε...|...βό[ν καὶ πανηοπ]λ[ίαν ἀπάγεν ἐ]σ Παναθ]έναια τὰ με[γάλα] ἡαπάσας· πεμπόντον| δ[ὲ ἐν] τὲι πομπὲι [καθάπερ ἄποι]κ[οι].

95. ATL II D 10, 2-8. It is clear that Fauvel found the stone extremely difficult to read in this section. Restoration is unprofitable.

96. In 432 Aigina complained: *λέγοντες οὐκ εἶναι αὐτονόμους κατὰ τὰς σπονδάς* (Thuc. I 67.2). See Gomme (above, n.13). The most likely interpretation is that there was a special clause, similar to a clause in the Peace of Nikias (Thuc. V 18.5), in the Thirty Years Peace which safeguarded Aigina from direct Athenian interference provided that she paid her tribute.

THE ATHENIAN ANAGRAPHEIS

By STERLING DOW

CONTENTS

Terms in English	38
The Codifiers of the Fifth Century	38
The Democratic Anagrapheis of the Fourth and Third Centuries	39
The Oligarchic Anagrapheis of 321/0–319/8 B.C.	40
The Anagrapheis of the 290's B.C.	40
Modern Study of the Inscriptions	41
Summary of Dates Assigned	41
Recent Changes of Names and Dates	43
CATALOGUE OF OFFICIALS AND PREAMBLES	44
321/0	44
320/19	45
319/8	47
294/3–292/1	51
Uniformities in the Texts	53

FROM as far back as the inscriptions take us, that is, from the first half of the fifth century, the Athenians called the secretary in charge of decrees by the term *γραμματεύς* and by no other term. From thousands of repetitions in public documents, *γραμματεύς* and its verb *γραμματεύω* had become so familiar that when an alteration was introduced into the constitution whereby, beginning in 321/0 B.C., the term for the official in charge of decrees was altered to *ἀναγραφεύς*, the mere change of term was doubtless felt to be, and was meant to be, significant. Otherwise decrees were much the same as before; all by itself, the prominent new title in the preamble proclaims the alteration of regime.

The present article deals with the inscriptions of the periods when Anagrapheis were in charge. There were two such periods, and they were brief. But in other periods, periods definitely democratic, the term Anagrapheus had been used for two other officials, and it will be convenient first to distinguish them, and thus to clear the ground. But first a section on terms in English.

Terms in English. The term "Registrar" as a translation goes back at least to 1898. As used by W. S. Ferguson, "Registrar" is doubtless a good general equivalent, but the word has connotations which may or may not be familiar to non-English-speakers, and may or may not have any relation to the duties (whatever exactly they were) of the Athenian official. It seems to me the Germans, by keeping the transliteration Anagrapheus, have done better. It is to be hoped that in English also "Anagrapheus" will prevail. LSJ gives "registrar" and also "recorder." In fifth century Athens, as we shall see, an Anagrapheus could do more than record, he might be a codifier (of laws). By Aristotle's day the verb *ἀναγράφω* itself was in common use to mean "inscribe," "write down," and the like (see an index to *AthPol*).

The Codifiers of the Fifth Century. The title of Nikomakhos and his colleagues in the recodification of Athenian law carried out in two periods, 411/0–404/3 and 403/2–400/399 B.C. (S. Dow, *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* 1953–1957. 3–36; *Historia* 1960. 270–293), appears to have been *ἀναγραφεῖς* or more fully *ἀναγραφεῖς τῶν νόμων*. Their long term and — even allowing for flagrant exaggeration by Lysias (30) — their great powers show that the title was meant to be modest and inoffensive rather than accurate. They did not merely "write down" the law, to some extent they decided what it should be.

Their successors, though less in power and scope, were given the accurate title *νομοθέται*.

In any case the later secretarial Anagrapheis have never been, and need never be, confused with the codifiers.

The Democratic Anagrapheis of the Fourth and Third Centuries. The later Anagrapheis, the democratic and the oligarchic, have easily been confused with each other in the past, and it has only become possible just now to distinguish them finally and decisively.

In the second half of the fourth century B.C., under the democratic constitution, there appear in Athenian inscriptions certain officials called *ἀναγραφεῖς*. Being officials, they were of course citizens. Tenure was for one year and there was only one holder at a time. The duties of this *ἀναγραφεύς*, whatever they were, were not such as to cause him to be mentioned regularly in decrees. No mention of any Anagrapheus is to be found in Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia* or anywhere else, save in the inscriptions. When Ferguson first studied the clerical officials (1898), and still, much later, when Dinsmoor published his first study of the Anagrapheis (1931), only two holders of the democratic office were known by name. Of these two, one Anagrapheus occurred as the third official in a list of eight officials honored along with the Bouleutai of 335/4 B.C., in *IG II²* 1700 line 215. This was Aristophanes son of Hieronymos of Teithras. The other was honored in a decree devoted to him alone, *IG II²* 415 II, dated, though on thin evidence, ca. 330 B.C. This was Kallikratides son of Kallikratides of Steiria. Some confusion with the Anagrapheis of the oligarchic period(s) naturally resulted, although Ferguson was positive that about the two men the evidence was sufficient to establish the existence of a regular democratic office continued throughout many democratic years (*Secretaries* [1898] 41).

This proposition can be tested by new data. In addition to the decree *IG II²* 415, there are now five lists, two of which are unpublished, which mentioned the (democratic) Anagrapheus. Subjoined to dated lists of Bouleutai or Prytaneis, all five are of democratic date. The five lists are as follows: *IG II²* 1700, *Prytaneis* No. 1, *Hesp* 1941. 42, and the two unpublished inscriptions, Agora I 249 (restored but indubitable) and Agora I 4720. A detailed study must await the publication of the two latter, which are long and complicated lists; but it is amply clear that in the second half of the fourth century, and in the first two decades at least of the third, except in the very few years of oligarchy, there existed in Athens a clerical official called the Anagrapheus. Ferguson's view is wholly confirmed, and the confusion is ended by which Anagrapheis

actually democratic were assigned to oligarchic years. There were democratic and there were oligarchic Anagrapheis, and this knowledge operates to remove any necessity for confusing the ones with the others.

The most troublesome aspect had been the decree *IG II² 415* for Kallikratides, which seemed inappropriate for a minor clerical official, but well suited to the oligarchic Anaprapheus, who appears from his prominence in some of the oligarchic decrees to have achieved as much power, or show of power, as any secretary in all of Athenian history. The democratic Anaprapheus, however, although in some lists his position is low, stands next to the top in one list. Hence the honors for Kallikratides need not be considered inappropriate; and hence there need be no doubt that he was a democratic Anaprapheus.

The Oligarchic Anaprapheis of 321/0–319/8 B.C. During the two undemocratic periods — one oligarchic, the other involving an unconstitutional two-year tenure of the Arkhonship by one man — the Anaprapheis were elevated to prominence. Their name, along with that of the Arkhon, was prominent in many of the decrees. The periods when the Anaprapheis were thus prominent were two periods apparently of three years each, 321/0–319/8 and 294/3–292/1 B.C.

In the first period, 321/0–319/8, the franchise was limited to 9,000 of the 21,000 citizens; several other changes are known; and the duty of superintending the records was given to the Anaprapheus. Under him were the successive Grammateis chosen from among the then Prytaneis, one for each tenth of the year. They too are named in several of the decrees, nearly always in a subordinate position. The relations of the Anaprapheis to the Grammateis and to the constitution as a whole are excellently described by W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, 19–26. Many details are known. The model was of course alleged to be Solonian, but it is doubtful whether Solon had any doctrine about secretaries. More likely the title *ἀναγραφεύς*, although lately used for an official usually not prominent, had connotations of dignity that clung to it from the last great lawgiving, viz. the codification by Nikomakhos; *ἀναγραφεύς* sounded more pretentious than *γραμματεύς*.

The Anaprapheis of the 290's B.C. Eventually more will perhaps be learned, but for the second period it is important to stress how little is now known. The former general Olympiodoros was made Arkhon for a second successive year. His first year, 294/3, like the other, was under Demetrios Poliorketes, under whom the constitution, at least formally, should have been democratic. Whether it was or not we have no epigraphical proof. In his second year, what we have is three decrees all

passed on one and the same day. They are published under an Anagraphaeus; no Grammateus is mentioned. One more decree, exactly similar in sequence of formulae, can be dated in the next year, 292/1. Not much more can be said (W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens* 136–138).

Modern Study of the Inscriptions surviving from these two periods may be dated from an article by A. Wilhelm: *JOA* 1908. 82–100, which has photographs of many of the inscriptions. After the publication of the texts in J. Kirchner's *IG* II i 1² (1913) and his fascicule of chronological tables *IG* II iv 1² (1918), there was no progress until W. B. Dinsmoor put the study on a firm basis by his discovery in 1928 (*IG* II² 649B) and his brilliant chapter of 1931 (*Archons of Athens* 16–28), which records the history down to that time. Dinsmoor was able to establish the existence of the second period, theretofore unsuspected; and he established three of the Anagraphaeis in years where they have ever since remained. In the thirty years since *Archons*, further advances have been made, owing to the new inscriptions from the Agora, published by B. D. Meritt and by M. Crosby, W. K. Pritchett, and E. Schweigert. In these recent publications, the interest of the editors has centered on the calendar.

The handbooks of constitutional law have nothing satisfactory. G. Busolt — H. Swoboda, *Gr. Staatskunde* (1926), which has otherwise little more than a few mentions (see F. Jandebeur's Index), is actually misleading. It says that the Anagraphaeis of 321/0–319/8, merely because they sometimes precede the Arkhon in preambles of decrees, were "eponymous" (p. 927). In the past the (democratic) *γραμματεύς* had sometimes caused his own name and title to stand first, in a heading above the rest. Moreover there is only one preamble, *IG* II² 390, odd and different (unlike any other in more than the present respect), which puts the Anagraphaeus first with *ἐπί* before it. Dating by the eponymous Arkhon was old and had never been altered in any period. It was not altered now. There is no reason to believe that any Athenian ever referred to "the year of the Anagraphaeus Eukadmos" rather than to "the year of the Arkhon Apollodoros."

Summary of Dates Assigned. Following Dinsmoor's tabulation (*Archons* 17), a summary of the various datings is given in the accompanying table. References to the older studies are obtainable from Dinsmoor's bibliographies in *Archons*.

Dinsmoor, whose work of 1931 was the turning-point, subsequently favored extending the period of Anagraphaeis downward from 293/2 in

C. Schäfer G. F. Ürger	J. Penndorf M. Brillant	W. S. Ferguson	A. Wilhelm J. Kirchner B. Leonards	W. B. Dinsmoor ¹⁹³⁴ (<i>Archivs</i> 17, 30)	W. K. Kolbe ¹⁹³³ (<i>Göt Nachr</i> 508)	W. B. Dinsmoor ¹⁹³⁹ (<i>List</i> 20)
335/4 ca. 330/29	Aristophanes* Kallikratides*					A agreeing with Ferguson, gives four instances, all ante-307/6, in place of the former two (<i>List</i> 34)
321/0 320/19	Kallikratides Arkhedikos	Kallikratides Arkhedikos	Thras[ylkes] Arkhedikos	Thras[ylkes] Arkhedikos	— of Oion Arkhedikos	(Arkhedikos)
319/8	Epikouros	{'Thrasylkes'} {Epikouros}	Epikouros	{Eukadmos Epikouros}	Eukadmos	(Eukadmos)
294/3 293/2 292/1 291/0 290/89				Thrasylkes] of ² Thria Epikouros	Epikouros	(Normal Secretary) Thrasylkes of Thria
					Epikouros	Epikouros
					— of Oion	XI
					— of Oion	X
					Thras[— of Philya (Normal Secretary)	IX
335/4						
W. K. Pritchett —B. D. Meritt 1940 (<i>Chronolog. xvi;</i> Meritt <i>Hesp</i> 1944-235)	W. K. Pritchett —O. Neugebauer 1947 (<i>Calendars</i> 61-64)	W. B. Dinsmoor ¹⁹⁵⁴ (<i>Hesp</i> 31-33)	W. B. Dinsmoor ¹⁹⁶¹ (<i>Archiv 231-232</i>)	B. D. Meritt ^{1961 bis} (<i>Hesp</i> 289-292)	B. D. Meritt ¹⁹⁶² (the present article)	S. Dow ¹⁹⁶²
321/0	— of Oion	— of Oion	(Normal Secretary)	Thrasylkes of Thria	Thrasylkes of Thria	
320/19 319/8	Arkhedikos Eukadmos	Arkhedikos Eukadmos	Arkhedikos Eukadmos	Arkhedikos Eukadmos	Arkhedikos Eukadmos	Arkhedikos Eukadmos
294/3	Thras[— of Phyle	Thras —	(Normal Secretary)	Thrasylkes of Phyle	Thrasylkes of Phyle	(Unknown)
293/2 292/1 291/0 290/89	Epikouros	Epikouros	Epikouros XI — of Oion X (Unknown) 9	Epikouros	Epikouros — of Oion	Epikouros Th? — of Oion
			Thras[— of Phyle VIII			

* On the evidence of these two, Ferguson held that in normal (democratic) years the Anagrapheus was one, and not the chief, of several clerical officials.

order to fit with schemes of tribal cycles. In this he has not been followed (e.g. B. D. Meritt, *Hesp* 1957. 53–54). I have made no special study of the cycles or of other external factors: thus I put *IG II² 385A* (Th?—of Oion) in 292/1 merely because it will not go so well in 294/3. Whether an Anagrapheus was in charge in 294/3, or a normal Secretary (Dinsmoor), I see no way of determining. It can only be a guess, like so many “assignments” of Arkhons to years — a guess based in this instance on (1) the absence of a Secretary datable to this year, (2) the fact, proved in 1931 by Dinsmoor, that Olympiodoros held the Arkhonship two years and had an Anagrapheus in the second, and, in some instances, (3) a scheme of cycles.

In considering the table, non-specialists may wish to note two aspects, however obvious: that each scholar could deal only with what was available, *but* that there has been much too much construction of schemes, and much too little actual examination of the inscriptions.

Recent Changes of Names and Dates. Of the preambles as a group, there have been hitherto three principal examinations (*supra* 41). All three were distinguished performances, especially Dinsmoor’s; but none was, or pretended to be, systematic, thorough, and final throughout, either for individual readings or for comparative study of formulae. There has been no listing of the inscriptions for thirty years, nor a systematic study of formulae at any time.

The total number of texts has been increased by several published only recently; there are now 19 in all. Moreover in 1961–62 several new changes have been made (S. Dow, article “Symproedroi,” *Hesp* forthcoming 1963 or 1964):

The alleged Anagrapheus from Phlya has been abolished. The total number of Anagrapheis now known for the periods 321/0–319/8 and 294/3ff. is five.

IG II² 336 III, formerly dated 320/19, has been removed from the period of the Anagrapheis and assigned to a normal year, 333/2.

IG II² 358 is thereby displaced from 333/2 and will require a new study (*infra* 56–60).

IG II² 378 has been moved from 294/3 to 321/0. For 294/3 no inscription is now known.

IG II² 385A has been moved to 292/1 and finally divorced from *IG II² 385B* (*infra*).

IG II² 546, most recently assigned to 321/0 b.c. (W. K. Pritchett — B. D. Meritt *Chronology* 4–6) has been moved to a normal earlier year.

CATALOGUE OF THE OFFICIALS AND PREAMBLES

Recent texts of those of the preambles which are significant for the calendar, with the Greek quoted, though only through the date, are conveniently set forth in B. D. Meritt, *Athenian Year*, pp. 112–125. The inscriptions for 319/8 B.C. were tabulated, also for study of the calendar, by W. K. Pritchett in *Hesperia* 1941. 269 (cf. W. K. Pritchett — O. Neugebauer, *Calendars* 63 and n. 56).

Like the foregoing, the present tabulation omits fragments, mainly from the ends of decrees, which evidently belong in the periods of Anagrapheis but cannot be precisely dated and add nothing relevant and substantial. Nor is there here any review of “purely historical” or of “calendaric” problems. The comments are mostly on textual details.

The text cited first in each instance is the one which ought to be considered as standard; other texts, or partial texts, or commentaries, of any relevant significance follow in parentheses. (A complete bibliography of each inscription, unless accompanied by extensive critical comments, would be a waste and an impediment.)

321/0 B.C., Arkhon Arkhippos

Anagrapheus: Θρασυκλῆς Ναυσικράτους Θριάσιος

Grammateis:

Prytany V Σωκράτ[ης Εὐμάχου Εὐπυρί?]δης

This is the only Grammateus with a patronymic in any of the Anagrapheis inscriptions.

Prytany ? Ἀριστ[.....¹⁷.....]

Inscriptions:

Prytany V *Hesp* 1961. 289–292 and pl. 59.

Lines 4–5. The Grammateus has hitherto been given unrestored, Σωκράτ[. |¹⁵]δης. Attention should be called to *PA* 5818, Eumakhos son of Sokrates of Eupyridai (Leontis), a donor prominent in the year of Diomedon (247/6 B.C.; *Hesp* 1942. 291.51–52; *IG* II² 791 d 9–10). A hypothetical (i.e. otherwise unattested) ancestor would exactly fit the present line, Σωκράτ[η|ς Εὐμάχου Εὐπυρί]δης. No other Sokrates is known to me with a demotic in -δης.

Line 9. The Rhetor would be expected, and the restoration can at least recognize him and give him a

demotic: ἔδοξεν τ[ῶι δήμω|ι.....¹³.....]ηλου
Πό[ριος or Πο[τάμιος εἶπεν. ἐπειδὴ, κτλ.

Prytany? *Hesp* article “Symproedroi” forthcoming 1963 or 1964 [hereinafter “*Hesp* forthcoming”] (*IG II²* 378 + *Hesp* 1935. 173–174 [photo]; *Hesp* 1938. 99 [photo]).

Summary for 321/0. From this first year, one of the two inscriptions is of exceptionally poor quality. The other stele was surmounted by a relief. The formulae differ: *Hesp* 1961. 289 has the Anagrapheus first, in the nominative, then the Arkhon and the rest of a normal preamble. We may call this:

Type I

ἀναγραφεὺς — — — — —, ἐπὶ — — ἄρχοντος
ἐπὶ τῆς — — — πρυτανείας ἥι — (—) —
ἔγραμμάτευν

The other, *Hesp* forthcoming, compressed, seems to make the Anagrapheus an intrusion into the preamble:

Type II

ἐπὶ — — ἄρχοντος, ἀναγραφέως — — — — —,
ἐπὶ τῆς — — — πρυτανείας

The Grammateus was not included in this instance.

320/19 B.C., Arkhon Neaikhmos

Anagrapheus: Ἀρχέδικος Ναυκρίτου Λαμπτρεύς

Grammateis:

Tribe in Prytany:

Prytany II	Θηραμένης Κηφισιεύς	Erekhtheis
V	Νικόδημος Ἀναφλύστιος	Antiochis
[VI]	[.]ψι[-----]	Akamantis
[VIII]	[..] νων Ὁηθ(εν)	[Oineis]
[X]	Στρατ[ωνίδης Παιανιεύς]	Pandionis

Inscriptions:

Prytany II *IG II²* 380+Addenda p. 660 (B. Leonardos *ArchEph* 1923. 43; *SIG³* 313).

In Kirchner's preliminary bibliography, for Kumanudis VI read Kumanudis Ἀθηναῖον VI.

Prytany V *IG II²* 381.
It has not been noted that what remains is actually two fragments, fastened together.

Prytany V

They have no point of contact, but undoubtedly they belong with each other.

IG II² 382 Addenda p. 660 (B. Leonards ArchDelt 1915. 216).

The text in the Addenda rectifies the spacing of *IG II² 382* but omits the "invocation," which should be read [ΘE] *O[I]*.

There is a shield in the pediment (cf. *IG II² 386; infra*).

This decree was passed on the same day as the preceding.

Prytany [VI]

Dinsmoor *Archons 23* (*IG II² 383*).

The stele was made very thin and cheap (0.065 m., back preserved), with a tall flat cone-like pediment.

Prytany [VIII]

Hesp 1944. 234–241; Pritchett-Neugebauer Calendars 62; Meritt Year 119–120.

A new restoration will be proposed by me *infra* 73–67.

Prytany [X]

IG II² 383b, Addenda p. 660; Hesp 1944. 236–241; Meritt Year 113–117.

The numeral for the prytany should be [$\delta\epsilon\kappa\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\varsigma$] (*infra* 60–67).

Prytany ?

IG II² 384.

The stele is small and thin, but it had a regular moulding and pediment. The letters too are small: height, 0.006 m.; chequer horizontally, 0.011 m.; vertically, same.

A new line 1, on the moulding: $\Theta[EOI]$.

In conformity with all the other decrees of this year, provide for the secretary:

[$\pi\rho\tau\alpha\nu\acute{\epsilon}\iota\alpha\varsigma \hat{\eta}\iota$ — — — $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\rho\alpha\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\nu\epsilon\nu$]

I am unable to overcome the difficulty of restoration:

line 1 with 27 letters, line 2 with 28.

Line 3 seems to read [$s\acute{\epsilon}$] $\pi\hat{\eta}\iota$ [$\tau\hat{\eta}\varsigma$, $\kappa\tau\lambda$].

Summary for 320/19. In the second year, the formulae are well stabilized. Of the seven preambles, six are Type I; the other (*infra* 67–75; *Ath Year 119*) is Type II, and it has now been shown to be exactly similar to *Hesp* forthcoming (*IG II² 378*) of the year before, being less compressed only in that the Grammateus is named. The Grammateus

was named, indeed, in all the decrees of this year (one restored). His inferior position is emphasized in each instance by omission of the patronymic. The Anagrapheus, in contrast, has the patronymic in all seven inscriptions. Altogether this is *his* year: in no other year is the Anagrapheus so regularly prominent.

319/8 B.C., Arkhon Apollodoros

Anagrapheus: *Eὐκαδμος Ἀνακαιεύς*

Patronymic never given.

Grammateis:

Prytany	IV	(Unknown)	Tribe in Prytany:
	VI	<i>A[.]ι[-- or ?A[.]ι[--</i>	Aigeis
	VIII	[Φιλ]οκτήμων <i>Κηφισ[ιεύς]</i>	Erekhtheis
	X	'Αφόβητο[s] <i>Κοθωκίδης</i>	[Oineis]

Inscriptions:

Prytany IV Meritt *Year 121–122* (lines 1–7); *Hesp* 1940. 345–348.

Meritt's text is correct: note a one-space vacat at the end of the first line (3) of the decree proper (which like several other first lines of Anagrapheus preambles contains only the Anagrapheus), and an extra iota at the end of line 6. Note also that the length of line increased after the preamble.

Prytany VI New text *infra* (A. Wilhelm *AbhAkBerlin* 1939 [pub. 1940] no. 22, pp. 22–23; Meritt *Year 122*; *IG II²* 386 and Addenda p. 660+EM 12564).

In the pediment, as in *IG II²* 382 of the previous year, a shield. They may well have been made by the same hand. (The mouldings however are not closely similar, and the lettering is by different hands).

Line 1. About the center of the stele, Dinsmoor (*Archons* 22) errs, in that ☉EOI, which is oddly crowded together and carved in small letters, is to the left of the center, thus: ☉EO|I

Line 2. Judging again by the preserved center, line 2 should be restored:

[Π]ΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΑΜΥΝΤ[— —^{ca.} 8 —? — —]

See the photograph, *JOAI* 1908. 84.

There are other forms in *'Αμυντ[-]*, mostly longer. A. Wilhelm (*JOAI* 1908. 85) conjectured that the Amynt[as] in question was the son of Alexandros, and the brother of Peukestas. This Amyntas is best treated in H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographische Grundlage* no. 56 (II p. 26). We now see however that there is insufficient room in line 1 for *[Αλεξάνδρον]*. Amyntas was a common name in Makedon (Berve nos. 56-65), but I am unable to find a plausible candidate.

The preserved center of the stele permits a line of 29 letters (*pace* Dinsmoor) as well as one of 30.

Line 4. The inscription is notable as having one delta, viz. the second preserved letter of line 4, definitely and unmistakably inscribed with the regular shape of alpha. (The delta in line 3 is normal.) This is the only positive instance I know: and it is evidently due, not to placing the horizontal bar a little too high, but rather to a definite, though erring, intention to carve an alpha.

Line 5. Previous editors had read no line 5, but Wilhelm rightly saw that traces remain: *vermutlich*, he said, of *Δωσι[θεος]*. Meritt copies this, dotting the delta and sigma, but indicating no further doubt. Thus a non-existent Athenian is launched in the modern tradition. Although he thought it *could* be a delta, Wilhelm read no lower stroke for the first letter, and in fact it would show if present; a correctly formed delta is impossible here, and the letter is lambda or just possibly alpha. The traces read by Wilhelm as possible parts of omega and sigma can be seen, and are spurious. The iota alone is positive. More may sometime be recovered: meantime read *Δ[.]ι[--]* or *Δ?[.]ι[--]* and do not restore.

Part of the upsilon, for instance, if it were
 $*\Lambda[\nu\sigma]\iota[--]$ ought to show.

IG II² 386 and 387 are the only two preambles which have the Secretary in the nominative. In *IG II²* 387 the Secretary is followed immediately by the Anagrapheus, also in the nominative. Provision should be made, as Wilhelm saw, for restoring him in *IG II²* 386.

IG II² 386 + EM 12564

319/8 B.C.

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1 | ◎EOI |
| 2 | <i>[Π]ΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΑAMYNT [—ca, 8(—?)—]</i> |
| 3 | <i>ἐ[π]ι ’Απολλοδώρου [ἀρχοντος ἐπὶ τῆς Α]</i> |
| 4 | <i>[ἰγ]εῖ<δ>ος ἔκτης π[ρυτανείας· γραμματ]</i> |
| 5 | <i>[εὺς] Α[..]ι[-----, ἀναγραφεὺς --]</i> |
| 6 | <i>[-----]</i> |

Stoikh. 29

Prytany VII *Hesp* 1938. 476–479 (Pritchett-Neugebauer *Calendars* 63; Meritt *Year* 122).

Remove the brackets in the *Hesp* text at the beginnings of lines 6 and 7.

Prytany VIII *IG II²* 388 (*Hesp* 1938. 479; Pritchett-Neugebauer *Calendars* 64; Meritt *Year* 122–125).

Prytany X *IG II²* 387 (*Hesp* 1938. 477–478; Meritt *Year* 123).

There is a slip in the last-cited text: in place of *NON-ΣΤΟΙΧ.* read *ΣΤΟΙΧ.* 21 for lines 1–2, for the rest 23. See Wilhelm's photograph, *JOAI* 1908. 88 — every preserved letter is in place, except that in line 10, HNA have been crowded into two stoikhoi, and in line 1 the spacing seems wide. Rather than assume that lines 1 and 2 observed the stoikhoi but left two stoikhoi empty in each line — this would be unexampled — it is better to assume that lines 1 and 2 were treated as a heading, which with slightly wider spacing would give 21 letters as much space as 23 have below. Headings somewhat similar to this are of course frequent. The shadowy traces mentioned by M. Crosby in *Hesp* 1938. 477–478 if real are puzzling: no erasure shows (but the whole

surface is worn and cloudy), and no letters are actually deeper than others below. The letter read by earlier editors as mu, to make ἐβδόμηνς, has the shape of alpha or lambda, and is troublesome.

Prytany X

Hesp 1941. 268–270.

Prytany ?

Meritt *Year* 123 (*IG II²* 390; Dinsmoor *Archons* 21–22; *Hesp* 1941. 269).

There seems to be no way of avoiding the assumption that line 4 was one letter short: not, surely, because a blank space was left for punctuation, as previous editors assumed, but in order to end the line with a syllable (lines 2 and 3 end with words), or more likely because of some error.

Summary for 319/8. In the third year again seven preambles are preserved. There are several changes from 320/19, principally the primacy of the Arkhon in five of them, which are Type II modified. The other two, with the Anagrapheus first, also have modifications. It is a year of variety, perhaps of confusion.

Type I: *Hesp* 1940. 345: normal. Grammateus not named.

IG II² 390: unique variations:

ἐπὶ ἀναγραφέως ————— [καὶ] ————— ἄρχοντος,
ἐπὶ τῆς ————— πρυτανείας. Grammateus not included.

Type II: *Hesp* 1941. 268: δέ is an innovation:

[ἐπὶ ————— ἄρχοντος, ἀναγραφέως δέ —————] —————,
ἐπὶ τῆς ————— πρυτανείας

Type IIa, a modification: *IG II²* 388:

ἐπὶ ————— ἄρχοντος [καὶ] ἀναγραφέως ————— —————,
ἐπὶ τῆς ————— πρυτανείας, εἰ —————
ἔγραμμάτευεν

Type IIb, another modification: *Hesp* 1938. 476:

ἐπὶ ————— ἄρχοντος, ἐπὶ τῆς ————— πρυτανείας,
[καὶ] ἀναγραφέως ————— —————. Grammateus not included.

Type IIc, still another modification: *IG II²* 386; 387:

ἐπὶ ————— ἄρχοντος, ἐπὶ τῆς ————— πρυτανείας,
γραμμάτευς ————— —————, ἀναγραφεὺς ————— —————

In four of these preambles the Grammateus is not included: *Hesp* 1940.

345; 1938. 476; *IG II²* 390; *Hesp* 1941. 268. In no instance is the patronymic of the Anagrapheus given. This, plus his occurrence twice in third place and only twice in first, would seem to show a decline in the office.

294/3 B.C., Arkhon Olympiodoros

(Anagrapheus [or Secretary ?] unknown and no inscription known, unless *IG II²* 385A, dated *infra* 292/1 B.C.)

293/2 B.C., Arkhon Olympiodoros *bis*

Anagrapheus: *Ἐπίκουρος Ἐπιτέλος Ραμνούσιος*

Grammateis: (none known)

Inscriptions:

- | | |
|-----------|--|
| Prytany X | Dinsmoor <i>Archons</i> 3–15 (7–8) and fig. 3 (<i>IG II²</i> 649). |
| Prytany X | Dinsmoor <i>Archons</i> 18–21 (<i>IG II²</i> 389; Dinsmoor <i>List</i> [1939] 30–32; <i>Hesp</i> 1938. 97–100 [lines 1–3]; <i>Hesp</i> forthcoming). |
| Prytany X | <i>Hesp</i> 1938. 97–100.
All three were passed on the same day. |

292/1 B.C., Arkhon Philippus

Anagrapheus: *Θ[.]^(20 or 21) ε]ξ Οἰον*

Grammateis: (none known)

Inscriptions:

- | | |
|-----------|---|
| Prytany ? | <i>IG II²</i> 385A (further references <i>infra</i>).
<i>IG II²</i> 385 is two non-joining fragments brought together, though with hesitation, by A. Wilhelm. Some years ago I sent to W. B. Dinsmoor reasons why they should be divorced; he accepted and published this opinion (<i>Archon List</i> 35), which is briefly re-echoed, without reference, in B. D. Meritt, <i>Hesp</i> 1961. 290. I publish <i>infra</i> 78–92 an edition of Frag. B, which is no longer relevant to the Anagrapheis. The remainder of the present note is devoted to Frag. A. |
|-----------|---|

Lines 2-3. Readings: The nu of $\alpha]$ *ναγραφέως* is legible. After the ΔΕ at the present end of line 2, a letter ought to show. The only possible trace is the top of a round letter displaced to the right from its stoikhos: ⊖, Ο, or Ω. In line 3, the top bar of Ε is quite clear, fortunately, because of the other letters also only the tops are preserved: but as a whole $\epsilon]\xi\Omega\circ\eta$ is indubitable. Beyond it no trace of other letters can be seen.

Restoration: First to be noticed is the fact that all previous texts have one letter too few in the lacuna which makes up most of line 3. The first omicron of $\Omega\circ\eta$ falls directly beneath the gamma of $\alpha]$ *ναγραφέως*. At the end of line 2 either two or three letters, I cannot determine which, are wholly missing.

Obviously these elements must be kept to a minimum for a restoration with Olympiodoros, the Arkhon of one of the only two years open:

[$\epsilon\pi\lambda\Omega\lambda\nu\mu\pi\iota\delta\omega\rho\iota\sigma\alpha\ddot{\rho}\chi\omega\eta\tau\sigma\alpha\ddot{\rho}$] $\alpha]$ *ναγραφέως* δὲ Θ[...] [- - - - - $\tau\omega\hat{v}$ ²⁴ - - - - - $\epsilon]\xi\Omega\circ\eta$ [- - -

The name and patronymic of the Anagrapheus would have to contain 24 (or 25) letters (plus $\tau\omega\hat{v}$) at least. This is not impossible, but names so long are unusual. (By an odd chance, the Anagrapheus praised in *IG II²* 415 of ca. 330 b.c., who was from Steiria, had 25). The minimum with Philippos is:

[$\epsilon\pi\lambda\Phi\iota\lambda\iota\pi\pi\sigma\alpha\ddot{\rho}\chi\omega\eta\tau\sigma\alpha\ddot{\rho}$] $\alpha]$ *ναγραφέως* δὲ Θ[...] [- - - - - $\tau\omega\hat{v}$ ²⁰ - - - - - $\epsilon]\xi\Omega\circ\eta$ [- - -

This restoration, which demands 20 (or 21) letters (plus $\tau\omega\hat{v}$) at least, is definitely preferable.

Line 1. The letters are cut in the fascia of the moulding. The final Y is spaced widely to the right (from the next letter, center-to-center, 0.045 m.), evidently so as to come near the end, and fill the space. The other letters

average 0.035 m. center-to-center; their height is 0.016 m. The name

[ΑΡΙΣΤΟ]ΝΙΚΟΥ

would fit easily into the space available with a line of 34 letters, i.e. restored with Φιλίππου. The longer restoration of lines 2ff. would involve a name of improbable length in line 1. The restoration and identity of the man in line 1 must remain an open question. A hypothesis *can* be invented, as I shall suggest in the article on Aristonikos, which would make the same man the subject of both decrees, 30+ years apart, but it is unlikely.

Summary of 294/3–292/1. For these three years there are decrees from only two days, but it may well be no accident that all four preambles are identical with respect to the officials:

Type II with δέ

ἐπὶ — ἄρχοντος, ἀναγραφέως δὲ — — —,
ἐπὶ τῆς — — πρυτανείας

The Grammateus is not included. The Anagrapheus is given his patronymic.

Uniformities in the Texts. Asyndeton is often admitted, as in preambles of democratic years. When, with some improvement, a connective is present, it is δέ or, three times but a restoration in all three, [καὶ]: *Hesp* 1938. 476; *IG II²* 388; 390, all of 319/8 B.C. This is probably correct (cf. Pritchett-Meritt *Chronology* 88): a triple sequence of ἐπὶ such as the following, was doubtless avoided:

*ἐπὶ — ἄρχοντος, ἐπὶ ἀναγραφέως — — —,
ἐπὶ τῆς — — πρυτανείας

Contrary to what used to be considered a plausible restoration in some of these preambles, the Arkhon is never in the nominative, *ἄρχων — but always, as normally, ἐπὶ — — ἄρχοντος.

The Anagrapheus is always present. His name, whether nominative or genitive, is always preceded, not followed, by his title. The verb is never used to indicate his office.

The Grammateus if included always follows immediately the phrase for the prytany — of which he was a member. The normal form $\hat{\eta}i$ — — — $\acute{e}\gamma\rho\alpha\mu\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\nu\epsilon(\nu)$ is changed twice in 319/8 to the shorter asyndetic $\gamma\rho\alpha\mu\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\nu s$ — — —.

THREE ATHENIAN DECREES
METHOD IN THE RESTORATION OF PREAMBLES
BY STERLING DOW

CONTENTS

Calendar Theory vs. Epigraphical Fact	56
<i>IG II² 358 of —— ?</i>	56
Previous Studies	57
Kirchner's Text	57
Dinsmoor's Text	57
Non-Textual Criteria	58
Textual Evidence	59
Restoration to Fit the Spaces	60
<i>IG II² 383b (ADDENDA, p. 66o) of 320/19 B.C.</i>	60
The Assumption of a One-Space Vacat	60
Blank Spaces Left as Punctuation	61
Three Alleged Irrational Irregularities	62
Some Actual Irrational Irregularities	63
Gaps in Inscriptions: Flaws in the Stone	64
A Principle to Guide in Restoring	65
<i>MERRITT ATHENIAN YEAR 119-120 of 320/19 B.C.</i>	67
Meritt's Restorations:	
First Restoration (rejected)	68
Second Restoration (rejected)	68
Third Restoration (rejected)	69
Fourth Restoration (preferred in 1944)	69
Fifth Restoration (latest preferred)	71
Restoration Proposed Herein	74

Calendar Theory vs. Epigraphical Fact. The systematic study of the Anagrapheis inscriptions has affected the dating of the three preambles considered in the present article. The three preambles have something in common: they are of course from the same period; they have been difficult to restore; and the current restorations have all involved assuming irregularities which were assumed, and which would only be assumed, under the influence of wider theories. The wider theories are mostly about the calendar. Currently very much on the defensive, these theories are being attacked by W. K. Pritchett and his associates. Such scholars are altering their practices in restoration. Where formerly they filled in gaps so as to suit the calendar, as then conceived, now they regard much of such activity as a game without effective rules. Restoration threatens to become impossible, because its bases are inadequate.

I do not deal herein with the calendar, but rather attempt to show that certain facts of Athenian epigraphical practice have been not merely neglected, they have been violated without, in most cases, a word of explanation or excuse. Epigraphists can do better than this. A time when calendaric theories are losing force ought to be propitious for advancing sound principles in their place.

In the present three instances, theories were allowed to determine restorations, with little or no regard for small and insignificant-looking facts. The first preamble is the least clear in this respect; it is still unsolved but it can be disengumbered of everything except the proper data. The second preamble is a straight problem of (calendar) theory *vs.* the contention that blank spaces should not be assumed promiscuously. The third preamble has the most interesting history. In what was intended as a model procedure, four restorations of the whole were discussed, the fourth being approved as correct. Then, when the stone was examined, a fifth whole restoration, differing from all the others, was offered as correct. These five efforts were dominated, however, by calendar theory, in disregard of the proper considerations; and so this fifth restoration can be proved to be wrong. In place of all these restorations, one can be made which, I think, needs only to be seen to be adopted.

IG II² 358 OF ——?

There is sound reason why *IG II² 336 III* should be removed from the period of Anagrapheis (it was dated 320/19 B.C.), and dated in a

normal year, 333/2 B.C.: S. Dow, *Hesp* forthcoming. The year 333/2, however, already contains another preamble, *IG II²* 358, assigned to it by W. B. Dinsmoor. The calendar equations of the two preambles are evidently incompatible with each other. In the present section *IG II²* 358 is examined to test former datings, including Dinsmoor's, and to try to establish bases for future attempts.

Previous Studies. U. Koehler (*IG II* 175) attempted no restoration of the Arkhon or Secretary. He read a double interpunct :: followed by a blank space, in line 7; these have been retained in all subsequent editions. After G. F. Unger and A. Wilhelm had restored the Arkhon and Secretary of 327/6 B.C., J. Kirchner copied them, and his text, *IG II²* 358, remained unaltered for some years. It is reproduced here:

Ol. 113, 2. Elaph. 327/6. Stoix. 35.	<p>[Ἐπὶ Ἡγίμονο]ς ἄρχο[ντος], [ἐπὶ τὰς]¹⁴.....] τὸς πρυτανείας, ἦ [Ἄγτοκλᾶς Φανίου Ἀχαρνε]ὺς ἐγραμμάτευεν. Ἐ- [λαφηβολιῶνος ἔνη καὶ νέαι ἐμβολίμωι, πέμ- 5 [πτηι καὶ εἰκοστῇ τὰς πρ]υτανείας· ἔκκλησ[ι]- [α· τῶν προέδρων ἐπεγήφιζ]ε[ν] Φανόμαχος Αἴω[ν]- [ος Κυδαθηναίευ· ἔδοξεν] τῷ δῆμῳ :: <i>vacat</i> ²¹.....νος Κυδαθηναίευ- [σ εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ καὶ νῦν καὶ] ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν 10 [χρόνῳ⁸.... καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Κυδρίων ²⁰..... το]ῦ δήμου τοῦ Αθην- [αίων¹⁴..... πράτ]οντες ἀγαθὸν. ¹⁶..... τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ύ- ²²..... καὶ βούλαρχησ- 15²³..... θον παρελθεῖν ²³..... τ]ετιμήκασιν ε-</p>
--	---

In 1931 W. B. Dinsmoor, *Archons* 357–358, attempted a new dating, because the calendar equation would no longer fit 327/6 B.C. He recognized 338/7 and 318/7 B.C. as the limits, the latter because καὶ συμπρόεδροι is not in the text. If written out, his text would have read:

IG II² 358

Dinsmoor's Version of (1931)

333/2 B.C.

<p>[ΕΠΙΝΙΚΟΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ] ΣΑΡΧΟ[ΝΤΟΣ]</p> <p>[ἐπὶ τῆς¹¹..... <ἀγδ>όντος> πρυτανείας ἦι Stoikh. 35</p> <p>[Ἄρχελοις Χαριόιου Πελληνεὺς ἐγραμμάτευεν. Ἐ-</p> <p>[λαφηβολιῶνος, and so on, as in <i>IG II²</i>]</p>

Although Dinsmoor was obliged to alter the numeral, from $\epsilon\nu\alpha] \tau\eta\varsigma$ actually preserved in part on the stone, and to crowd a Secretary of 23 letters into 22 spaces (as a parallel for this he cited *IG II²* 338 of 333/2 B.C.), he declared that *IG II²* 358 "undoubtedly" belonged in 333/2 B.C.

There it has remained: W. K. Pritchett-B. D. Meritt, *Chronology* 6; W. K. Pritchett-O. Neugebauer, *Calendars* 48; and B. D. Meritt, *Athenian Year* 84-85, where the text of lines 1-5 leaves line 2 untouched; for line 3 he suggests, as an alternative, *Xαιρίο* for *Xαιρίου*, noting [*ΙΙν]* $\lambda\alpha\gamma\circ\rho\circ$ in *IG II²* 331 of 335/4 B.C.

About the ideal requirement for the Arkhon's name (*infra*) Dinsmoor did not know; but an emendation of an epigraphical text, followed by a proposal (however defended) to restore 21 letters in 20 spaces — three irregularities, any one of which should give pause, all in three lines, is faulty method. Whatever is right, this is wrong. That such a version should ever have been accepted shows the difficulty of dating this preamble, but it also shows how loose are the standards that have been common in these studies. The year was not 333/2.

Although it is difficult to find a solution, at least an effort should be made to assemble the relevant data.

Non-Textual Criteria. In line 7, for instance, the alleged quadruple interpunct :: would be a sign of early date; thus in *IG II²* 800 two triple interpuncts, if read, should have warned that the proper date is perhaps 75 years before the date given, which is 'med.s. III a.' (*Hesp* forthcoming). But in *IG II²* 358 all four marks are accidental: they are of different sizes, they are not properly placed, and in any case interpuncts would not be used before a blank space. Hence this evidence, which ought to have been taken as indicating an early date, is simply non-existent. Except for the heading and the blank space at the end of line 7, the letters are arranged in a stoikhedon pattern without any irregularity whatever. The chequer-unit is square or nearly square: 10 lines plus 10 interlines occupy 0.114 m. vertically; 10 stoikhōi plus 10 interspaces occupy 0.112 m. horizontally. This should be recorded, but it is normal, i.e. valueless as a criterion, throughout the period ca. 350—ca. 300 (R. P. Austin *Stoichedon Style* 35). Quite striking is the seven-letter space left blank at the end of line 7, so as to mark the end of the preamble and to set off the Rhetor in the next line. This device was part of a considerable development of spacing in the third century, but it began well back in the fourth (*IG II²* 216-217, 240) and continued, though sporadically, throughout the rest of the century (*IG II²* 363, 372, 374, 403, 455, 504, 548, 610). This being so, it too is of no help for dating.

The lettering itself is very neat, regular, and altogether competent: the shapes are *volg. s. IV a*. As a whole the workmanship does not resemble closely the general run of Athenian inscriptions after 316/5 or 315/4 B.C., when Demetrios of Phaleron ruined the masons' craft in Athens by prohibiting elaborate grave monuments. But it would be hazardous to exclude *IG II²* 358 from a later date on account of the lettering alone.

The heading, line 1, is cut on the fascia of a moulding which has a total height of ca. 0.04 m., and the letters are of the same height (0.006 m.) as the rest. Here again chronological significance is as yet to seek.

Textual Evidence. It was unfortunate that the phrase *καὶ συμπρόεδροι* was relied upon for dating. Formerly its presence was regarded as a bar to a date earlier than 318/7 B.C., but in 1936 I was able to prove that it occurs in the 320's (*Hesp* forthcoming). Now the converse ought to be pointed out: the absence of *καὶ συμπρόεδροι* is uncommon, but must be recognized, after 319/8. Thus it is lacking in *IG II²* 456 and 464, of 307/6 B.C. (but not in *IG II²* 474 of 306/5: S. Dow, *AJA* 1933. 412–414).

The identity of the Rhetor, with a name of unusual length, [.....]²¹....] *vos Kυδαθηναιε[ν]*s, ought to be discoverable, but as yet has not been established. The name of the man honored, [.....]⁸....] son of *Kυδρίων*, also remains unknown.

We are thus reduced to considering the restoration of the Arkhon and Grammateus. For the body of the decree, the length of line, 35 letters, need not be doubted. It is fixed by the restorations of lines 6 and 9; lines 4, 5, and 7 are in accord. But no one appears to have reckoned the length of the Arkhon's name with any care: Unger and Wilhelm could restore 7 letters where Dinsmoor put 9½.

Line 1, inscribed on the fascia, was spaced out, not exactly but only by eye. The preserved letters average 0.017 m. on centers, and five of them occupy the space of eight stoikhoi below. It can be seen that the Arkhon's title ended near the right edge. It would certainly begin fairly close to the left edge; the fascia would project somewhat to the left beyond the inscribed surface of the stele below. Thus it appears clearly that the total number of missing letters is close to 13; subtract επι and the Arkhon should be restored as [— — — ^{ca. 10¹} — — —]Σ. In such calculations a margin of error of at least 10 per cent should be admitted, that is, for line 1 the calculation may be considered reliable within a margin of one full letter, or at most two either way. Thus ['*Hγιμουο*]s

(327/6), the old restoration, is excluded; but Dinsmoor's [*Νικοκράτους*] (333/2), with 9½ letters in the gap, might by itself be admissible. The problem is therefore to find a year with officials whose names fill the following gaps:

[ἐπὶ — — — — —^{ca. 10¹}]ς ἄρχο[ντος]
[ῆι |¹⁹ ε]ὺς ἐγραμμάτευεν

In the whole period 346/5–230/29 B.C. there is one and only one known Arkhon-and-Grammateus whose names fit the spaces exactly. The year is 307/6:

IG II² 358

Restoration to fit the spaces

307/6 B.C.

- 1 [ΕΙΠΙΑΝΑΞ ΙΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ] ΣΑΡΧΟ[ΝΤΟΣ]
- 2 [ἐπὶ τῆς¹² τῆς πρυτανείας ἦι]
- 3 [Ἀνοίας Νοθίππου Διομεε]ὺς ἐγραμμάτευεν 'Ε
- 4 [λαφηβολιῶνος ἔνηι καὶ ν]έαι ἐμβολίμωι, πέμ
- 5 [πτηι καὶ εἰκόστηι τῆς πρ]υτανείας ἐκκλησί
- 6 [οι τῶν προέδρων ἐπειθήφιζ]ε[ν] Φανόμαχος Αἴω[ν]
- 7 [οις Κυδαθηναιεύς ἔδοξεν] τῶι δήμωι^{υνυνυν}
- 8 [.²¹]οις Κυδαθηναιεύ
- 9 [ς εἶπεν ἐπειδὴ, κτλ.]

Stoikh. 35

The possibility of such a restoration should at least be pointed out, but there are grave doubts whether it can be correct. The calendar is apparently an obstacle. The absence of mention of the Symproedroi, and the lettering, are other real if not absolutely decisive difficulties.

IG II² 383b (ADDENDA, p. 660) OF 320/19 B.C.

The Assumption of a One-Space Vacat. The numbering should not mislead: this inscription is, and has always been treated as being, quite distinct from *IG II² 383*. By a slip on the part of clerk or mason, the month was altogether omitted. The number of the Prytany, in line 4, is broken away, and has to be restored entire: seven stoikhoi are available for the number. All this is undisputed and indisputable.

Three different ordinals will fit the seven-stoikhos space. To restore [πέμπτης] is however impossible, because the fifth Prytany is otherwise filled. To restore [έβδόμης] would make more trouble for the calendar than the tenth, so that [δέκατης] has usually been restored (Dinsmoor *Archons* 23–24).

A different restoration has recently been proposed, involving not seven letters but only six. In *Ath Year 113-117*, B. D. Meritt discusses the calendar of 320/19 at length, and in order to make the calendar as regular as possible, he restores a six-letter ordinal followed by a one-stoikhos blank space: [τρίτης^v]. At whatever cost, this gives a normal year. I propose to leave aside the problem of just how necessary or desirable it is to establish the year as "normal," and instead to attack the problem of the extent to which the assumption of a one-space gap can be justified.

So far as can be seen, the entire 10-line text is solid stoikhedon, unbroken by any blank space. A blank space would hardly be expected just here (see *infra*). Nor does Meritt argue that it would. He is candid about an explanation: no rational explanation, he says, can be given. "The occasional uninscribed space in an inscription may be quite inexplicable on any attempt at rationalization" (117). This may well seem an attractive doctrine. If blank spaces, or other "inexplicable" irregularities could be introduced into restorations whenever theory seemed to conflict with fact, the tasks of epigraphy would be easier. Moreover, it is certainly true that occasional uninscribed spaces do occur in inscriptions.

But there will be scholars who will hesitate to restore inexplicable blank spaces. To them such restorations will seem like a surrender, not a victory; like self-delusion, and the deluding of non-specialist readers, not the advancement of knowledge.

Blank Spaces Left as Punctuation. Before considering inexplicable and irrational blank spaces, it will be well to investigate whether a blank space, as in [τρίτης^v] or in any other restored part of this line, could be considered rational and regular. In inscriptions the one rational and regular use of single blank spaces is for punctuation. Tabulation of all instances in the Athenian decrees in *IG II 1 1 and 2²* (nos. 1-1087) will show that punctuation by a blank space between numeral and πρυτανεῖας is unexampled in any period. Even if the preserved fragment showed that, as in the third century B.C. blank spaces were being used freely (instead of indicating, as it does, that none was used), still no blank space would ever be expected just here. (*IG II² 462* is restored with curious gaps; the latest attempt, however, in W. K. Pritchett — B. D. Meritt, *Chronology 16*, has a gap in the next line but none here.)

It is fair to conclude — in complete agreement with Meritt on this point — that if a blank space occurred in this line it was not for punctuation, but rather it was in some sense irrational.

Three Alleged Irrational Irregularities. Meritt himself, in defense, gives three instances of blank spaces which he alleges to be irrational. Unhappily all three involve areas where the surface of the stone is destroyed, so that it is not even possible to establish with certainty whether or not the gaps are inexplicable. Nevertheless in the first instance, *Pyrtaneis* no. 71, line 1, a possible explanation is easy. At present the surface of the marble over much of Frag. A has flaked off. It has flaked off in the six spaces that follow *Oἰνεῖδος*. Just enough surface remains in the first two spaces to assure us that no letters were cut there. It is easy to suggest, and impossible to disprove or prove, that the surface was defective just here when the mason began his work.

Unfortunately the other two blank spaces considered by Meritt to be irrational are both restorations. It happens however that in each case something additional can be understood.

The first of them, *IG II²* 704, is dealt with in *Hesp* 1957. 56–57. There Meritt publishes a new text based in part on inspection of the stone by R. Hubbe. At the end of line 2, Hubbe ably detected, though by touch, not by a squeeze, a shallow erasure and traces of one erased letter. The mason had evidently inscribed $\pi\rho\nu\tau\alpha\nu\epsilon$ [*s*]. Correcting it, the mason left, clearly, $\pi\rho\nu\tau\alpha\nu$ [*iα[s]*]. The right edge of the stone is preserved, and there was certainly room for the whole word; it makes a (stoikhedon) line of 27 letters, which is the norm for this inscription. Formerly the line had been so restored, i.e. with the sigma in last place and 27 letters in the line. When however the Secretary's full name was discovered, it was evident that there was one letter too few to fill the next line (3). But Meritt nevertheless filled the next line, simply by carrying over the last letter, the sigma, of the previous line (2), thus leaving one blank space at the end of that line (2) as follows (I change the brackets from a box to the brackets of the Leyden system):

Line 2 [— — — — — π]ρυτανε[*iα[v]*]]

Stoikh. 26

3 [*s* ἡι Σημωνίδης Τιμηστὸν Σουνιε[*v*]]

Meritt considers that the blank space thus restored is both indubitable and irrational.

Hubbe's reason for inferring that the last space was left blank, and the sigma was carried over, is that the preserved final alpha is slightly to the left of the center of its stoikhos. He supposed that the erasure may have "damaged" the end of the line, so that the mason decided not to inscribe the sigma there. But Hubbe could not tell by touch whether the erasure covered more than the one stoikhos, that of the iota, the third stoikhos from the end.

The use of touch to detect difference in level on the surface of an inscription is by no means objectionable. But a good squeeze will show any such difference more sharply. In the present instance, a good squeeze shows clearly that the erasure did continue. The mason had inscribed the whole word, and all of it doubtless in line 2, before he erased. He then inscribed IAΣ in the erasure. The end of line 2 should be printed $\pi\rho\nu\tau\alpha\nu\epsilon\llbracket i\alpha[s]\rrbracket$.

It is line 3 which is one letter short, and the cause cannot be determined. That a blank space was left, and that it was completely irrational, could be urged with some slight plausibility if it were not for the erasure at the end of line 2. The natural suggestion is that the erasure extended into line 3; and that somehow the corrected version involved leaving one space blank.

In this instance, therefore, the blank space, so far from being inexplicable, has a context which makes a natural explanation easy. The explanation is vague, and cannot of course be proved to be correct, but that is because it partakes of the nature of all non-formulaic restorations.

The third alleged instance, *IG II² 768* line 4 (Meritt *Ath Year 59 n.37* on the calendar), is restored with a one-space gap which has been taken to be inexplicable: *Mv]ρρινούσι[os^v] ἐγ[ρ]αμμ[ά]τενεν*. A good squeeze shows, however, that here too there was a very shallow erasure, never noticed before. The letters of the demotic are cut deeper and are of slightly larger size than the rest. The letters ΟΥΣ are displaced to the right from their stoikhoi. Presumably a letter had been repeated by error, and the erasure of it left one stoikhos blank. In any case the preserved letters clearly reveal that there had been some disturbance. Here too, therefore, the blank space is by no means inexplicable.

Some Actual Irrational Irregularities. But the fact that Meritt's instances of "irrational" gaps, which he did not trouble to investigate, upon examination are found to prove almost nothing, still it must be admitted that relevant phenomena — irregularities of which the explanation is not obvious on regular assumptions — undeniably do occur. Whether they are sufficiently frequent as to constitute plausible restorations is another question. First, positive instances must be collected and examined.

IG II² 472, line 4: the letters IKA occupy two stoikhoi. Here there is no erasure nor any other physical disturbance. It is not that kappa is crowded into the same stoikhos as iota (correct Kirchner's note), but rather that the mason, erring, first inscribed iota at the left side of the

chequer instead of in the middle. So as not to leave an unsightly gap, he then cut kappa and alpha in the same and in the next chequer, thus compressing them into the space of 1½ letters. Passed on the same day, *IG II² 471* proves that the next line, 5, of *IG II² 472* also had an extra letter, possibly from the same cause; but it was in the part of the line that has to be restored. The rest of *IG II² 472* (including *IG II² 169*: see Addenda) is all regular.

IG II² 455, line 1, ends with a seven-space blank. In the first of the seven spaces, the surface is well preserved, smooth, and altogether available for letters. The rest of the area shares with other lines a shallow erosion. The seven-space blank, a solitary phenomenon, was clearly unintended. Presumably — what else can be imagined? — the mason was interrupted where line 1 now ends; on resuming work, he forgot that line 1 was not filled.

All gaps left by error are irrational (though not really inexplicable) in the sense that they are not intended. If a mason laid down one chisel with which he had just finished a letter, and picked up another chisel to begin the next letter, he might easily (one would think) skip a space accidentally; or any other interruption might have the same effect. In modern longhand writing on paper, the pen moves swiftly through shapes often connected, and the chances of unintended gaps are reduced. A typewriter, like a mason, makes one letter at a time, and occasionally leaves gaps. Any such gap left by a mason might appear to be "irrational" to us, i.e. its cause was wholly "natural," but we are not in a position to know the circumstances and so to explain it.

Only a few such gaps are known to me. However easy it may be for us to imagine a gap being left by accident, actually it seems not to have been a natural and easy thing to happen. Thus for some reason the mason never inscribed a rho in *IG II² 226–38*: ΤΙΜΩΝΙΑΣ. In one instance, however, negligence was a habit: the long and almost perfectly preserved earlier inscription of the Salaminioi contains scores of unfinished letters, many gaps left especially for round letters, and occasional omissions without any gaps left for them: *Hesp* 1938. 1–9.

Gaps in Inscriptions: Flaws in the Stone. There are only two causes, I think, for gaps in inscriptions left intentionally by masons: gaps left because of flaws in the stone, and gaps left for their effect on the reader, i.e. for punctuation and kindred purposes.

Occasionally there are to be found in marble intrusions of harder stone, or soft areas caused by veins, or other flaws which make letters

difficult to carve. In such cases the mason might simply leave a gap. The most conspicuous example of *vitium lapidis* is on the fine sculptured monument of the Hippheus Dexileos, *IG II²* 6217, often reproduced, e.g. in J. Kirchner — G. Klaffenbach, *Imagines Inscriptionum Atticarum*² no. 43, p. 16 and pl. 21. The flaw causes a gap (none of them recorded in these editions) in each of the four lines. The widths of the gaps vary.

A systematic search, and an attempt at a definite list, of gaps caused by flaws would hardly pay. Without claiming any kind of completeness, my notes offer the following; I have inspected the stone only in the last instance:

<i>IG II²</i> 226.10	<i>E^vAN</i>
.19	<i>ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΕ^vA</i>
654.37	<i>ΠΑΤΡΑ^vOY</i> (a name, evidently complete)
978.6	<i>TPIAKOΣ^vTEI</i>
1961. 55	Inscription, lost, known from one copy. <i>Vitium</i> is thought to have displaced all the rest of Col. II from line 55 down.
2460.9, 11	Flaws interrupt both lines.
Prytaneis 64.8	<i>ὑγιείαι</i> <i>vvvvvv</i> καὶ σωτηρίαι

There is another group in which the mason left a one-space gap between words where no gap would ordinarily be left for punctuation. (This is exactly what Meritt was willing to restore in the present inscription.) Examples:

<i>IG II²</i> 338. 25	<i>στήλας</i> <i>v</i> <i>λιθίνας</i>
343. 8	<i>αὐτὸν</i> <i>v</i> <i>χρυσῶι</i>
. 721. 3	<i>το[ν]^vs</i> <i>v</i> <i>εἰς</i> <i>έα[ντόν]</i>

Some or all of the instances may be due to flaws in the stone.

Two facts may impress the reader. One is the brevity of such gaps: longer ones may well exist, but the flaws listed above are all of one space only, except for one gap which is of two spaces. The other impressive fact is the rarity of such flaws. The foregoing lists, for instance, include all the instances encountered in one search through *IG II i 1²* with its 831 inscriptions. I suggest that the two facts, brevity and rarity, are related to each other: themselves subject to condemnation, ordinarily the state officials would refuse to accept from a mason a stele with a flaw. Actually a few defective inscribed stelai escaped condemnation, the flaws in these instances being very small.

A Principle to Guide in Restoring. Proceeding with the investigation of Meritt's theory of an "irrational" or unintended gap, meaning a gap

which would be included in any one of the foregoing classes, we have now to try to decide what conclusions are warranted about the restoration.

In the first place, there can be no denying that what actually happened in one Athenian inscription *could* (in some sense) happen in another. Restoration of a blank simply cannot be debarred on the ground that it calls for an impossibility. In strict logic, any restorer of any inscription can if he chooses restore *any* kind of irregularity for which a similar instance can be discovered: it being understood that "can" means "without impeachment on the ground that the irregularity is impossible."

The flood-gates might seem, therefore, to be open, and the principle would almost be, in vulgar language, Anything goes. No one, of course, believes this or acts as if he believed it. No one restores irregularities unless he feels compelled, by what he considers sufficient reason, to do so. But since, especially in regard to the calendar, there is no universal agreement at present on what constitutes compulsion, skeptics will be slow to concede that restoration of an epigraphical irregularity is warranted in order to create calendaric regularity.

But there is no need to worry over abstractions. The clue is in the notion of probability, about which Classical scholars are not always well-informed. To propose a restoration which admits a *possibility* is not enough. What is at stake is *probability*: and this is an utterly different matter. Suppose that an irregularity of the kind we are considering occurs on an average once in every fifty Athenian inscriptions. (Actually the data at hand suggest that this is much too low a figure, and that relevant irregularities are far fewer.) Then the chances are exactly 49 to 1 that in any given inscription no such irregularity occurred.

But this statement, though not incorrect, is crude, because the present theory calls for an irregularity in a given *line* of the given inscription. Suppose that fifty Athenian inscriptions contain on an average ten lines apiece. (Again the figure is far too low, but let it serve.) In that case the chances against an irregularity in a given *line* of a given inscription are exactly 499 to 1.

There is no need to refine the argument further, and to consider the chances against an irregularity in a given *space* of a given line of a given inscription. The principle is clear. To fix attention on the exception, and to act accordingly, is to neglect the vital consideration. The vital consideration is probability. Scholars are not free to neglect that.

In short all depends, not on whether an alleged irregularity *ever* occurs, but on how often it occurs. If a given class of irregularity is

really common (actually nearly all, as we have seen, are rare), then the proposed theory has exactly as much probability as a (high) count of irregularities indicates. Only if the count shows that the probability in favor of a restoration is 251 to 249, or greater, can that restoration be made with any confidence at all.

The ideally correct, though impracticable, procedure would be to indicate probabilities for each proposed irregularity. If a statement had to be printed, "Chances against this restoration, 499 to 1," then such restorations would no longer be published (except perhaps as suggestions, in commentaries), and epigraphical publications would be that much more trustworthy.

There is a particular comment yet to be made. In the upset conditions of the oligarchie years 321/0-319/8, followed by Demetrios' ten years when many good masons left Athens, and continuing when democracy was re-instated in 307/6 when a plethora of decrees began to be inscribed, an unusual number of errors were made. No one can restore inscriptions of this period without assuming an error of some sort now and then. Inspection of the 19 inscriptions of the Anagrapheis series will illustrate this. The present inscription is one of these, and the chances that it contained errors are greater than in most periods. Let that be freely granted. Nevertheless promiscuous suppositions of error are not warranted. One must discriminate: a clerical error, not due perhaps to the mason at all, but to the copy given him, is quite different from a space left blank unintentionally in the inscribing. The chances against the latter are still so overwhelming that, even if arguments from the calendar were strong, the assumption of a blank space would be faulty method.

Actually, so far as I can see, the arguments based on the calendar have no strength at all. Here too probability is the guide. It is a proved fact that the politicians not seldom, perhaps in some periods regularly, tampered with the Athenian calendar. The compulsion, if any, may well be exactly the opposite from what Meritt argues. The compulsion may be to make the calendar irregular. In any case the epigraphical facts must be granted primacy. Just as here the restoration must fill the space, [$\delta\epsilon\kappa\alpha\tau\eta\varsigma$], so in all similar instances to call an assumed blank space "a lesser evil" is to defy enormous adverse probability.

MERITT ATHENIAN YEAR 119-120
of 320/19 B.C.

The inscription is Agora I 5626, first published by B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia* 1944. 234-241. He prefaced this first edition by stating that

"The inscription offers a good example of the practical steps that must be taken to restore the complete preamble with the help of available evidence, and for this reason the various considerations that come into play are outlined here with more than usual detail" (*Hesp* 1944. 235 n. 62). It is instructive to follow the steps that were taken.

First, the facts. The inscription is two fragments joined. The right edge is preserved, but the surface near it is damaged. The moulding was trimmed off for re-use. Subsequently the stele was broken up, as the sharp breaks show, by a point. Of the text, parts of the first 23 lines remain, but the lines after the preamble give no help because no one of them has been fully restored. The Rhetor was the famous Demades, and his motion honored [.]*κόστρατος* [---]*λωνος Φιλ* [---], who has not been identified, nor can his services be made out. Practically, the inscription is no more than a preamble. On all of this there need be no question. All of it is in an area of agreement.

For the restoration, Meritt first considers beginning with [*ἄρχων Νέαιχμος*] and a restoration of the rest with a consequent line of 35 letters:

Agora I 5626, First Restoration
Hesp 1944. 236 (there rejected)

[*ἄρχων Νέαιχμος ἐπ'*] ἀναγραφέω[*s 'Αρχεδίκου*] Stoikh. 35
 [τοῦ Ναυκρίτου Λαμπ]τρέως ἐπὶ τῆ[*s Οἰνεῖδος*]
 [ἔκτης πρυτανέας ἦι ..]νων 'Οηθ ἐγραμ[μάτευε]
 5 [Γαμηλιώνος ἐνάτηι ἵσ]ταμένου τετ[άρτηι κα]
 [ὶ εἰκοστήι τῆς πρυτανέ]ας ἐκκλησί[α· τῶν προ]
 [έδρων ἐπεψήφιζεν . . .]οφων Στει[ρ· ἔδοξεν τ]
 [ῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῷ δήμῳ] Δημάδης Δη[μέου Παι]
 [ανιεὺς εἶπεν ἐπειδὴ Νι]κόστρατο[*s -- κτλ.*]

Four resulting irregularities are carefully listed (239), of which [*ἄρχων Νέαιχμος*] is now known to be unexampled before the (only) three in the 280's-270's. Meritt rightly rejected this solution.

The alternative beginning is with *ἐπί* and Meritt added another *ἐπί* shortened to *ἐπ'* before the Anagrapheus:

Agora I 5626, Second Restoration
Hesp 1944. 240 (there rejected)

[*ἐπὶ Νεαίχμου ἄρχοντος ἐπ'*] ἀναγραφέω[*s 'Αρχε*] Stoikh. 35
 [δίκου τοῦ Ναυκρίτου Λαμπ]τρέως ἐπὶ τῆ[*s Οἰν*]
 [εῖδος ἔκτης πρυτανέας ἦι ..]νων 'Οηθ ἐγραμ[μ]
 5 [άτευε Γαμηλιώνος ἐνάτηι ἵσ]ταμένου τετ[άρτη]
 [τηι καὶ εἰκοστήι τῆς πρυτανέ]ας ἐκκλησί[α· τ]

[*ῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφιζεν*]οφων Στει[ρ· ἔδ]
 [οξεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δῆμῳ] Δημάδης Δη[μέ]
 [*ον Παιανιεὺς εἶπεν ἐπειδὴ Νι]*κόστρατο[s —κτλ. —]

Some of the former irregularities survive here. There is also evidence (*supra* 53) that this would be the only instance of a triple repetition of *ἐπί*, itself stylistically objectionable.

Meritt noted that the apparent position of the right margin seemed to require more letters. He therefore added one letter-space per line by assuming syllabification and consequent blank spaces, but he cited no comparable instances of either:

Agora I 5626, Third Restoration
Hesp 1944. 240 bis (there rejected)

[*ἐπὶ Νεαίχμου ἄρχοντος ἐπ’]* ἀναγραφέω[s 'Αρχευ] Stoikh. 36
 [δίκου τοῦ Ναυκρίτου Λαμπ]τρέως ἐπὶ τῇ[s Οὐνη]
 [*ίδος ἔκτης πρυτανείας ήι . . . νων* Οῆθ ἐγραμ[μά]
 5 [*τενε· Γαμηλιώνος δεκάτη ίσταμένου τετ[άρ ν]*
 [*τῇ καὶ εἰκοστῇ τῆς πρυτανέ]ας· ἔκκλησί[α νν]*
 [*τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφιζεν*]οφων Στει[ρ· ἔδο]
 [*ξεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δῆμῳ ν] Δημάδης Δη[μέ ν]*
 [*ον Παιανιεὺς εἶπεν ἐπειδὴ Νι]*κόστρατο[s —κτλ. —]

There are various irregularities, but at this point the uninscribed right margin again came up for consideration. The right margin could be determined only from the photograph (this was in 1944); the preference however was clearly for more letters at the right, so that the then final choice involved a line lengthened by yet one more letter.

Agora I 5626, Fourth Restoration
Hesp 1944. 234 (the 1944 preference)

[*Νικόστρατος ——] λωνος Φιλ [ιππεύς?]
 [*ἐπὶ Νεαίχμου ἄρχοντος*] ἀναγραφέω[s δὲ 'Αρχεδί] Stoikh. 37
 [κου τοῦ Ναυκρίτου Λαμπ]τρέως ἐπὶ τῇ[s Οὐνεῦδος]
 [*ἔκτης πρυτανείας ήι νων* Οῆθ ἐγραμ[μάτευ]
 5 [*εν· Γαμηλιώνος δεκάτη ίσταμένου τετ[άρτῃ ν]*
 [*καὶ εἰκοστῇ τῆς πρυτανε]ας· ἔκκλησί[α κυρίω]*
 [*τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφιζεν Ι]οφῶν Στει[ρ καὶ συμ]*
 [*πρόεδροις ἔδοξεν τῷ δῆμῳ] Δημάδης Δη[μέον νν]*
 [*Παιανιεὺς εἶπεν ἐπειδὴ Νι]*κόστρατο[s]
 10 [*—————]τε τῶν ἐς Σ[. . . ? . . .]*
 [*—————] 'Αθηναίων μη[. . . .⁵]*
 [*—————]τοὺς ἐπιβουλ[. . . .]*
 [*—————] 'Αθηναῖ[. . . .⁶]**

- 15 [--- γυναι]ξὶ καὶ παι[δί νν]
 [οις---] Ε. ὁ μέλλων Α[....]
 [--- κα]ταληφθῆναι [....]
 [--- ων καὶ διΑ[....⁶....]
 [---]ν αὐτὸν Ἀθ[ηναῖ ν]
 [ον---?] ἐπίσταται ὁ δῆμος ὁ [Ἀθηναῖ ν]
 20 [ναιών---]ο πλέον τ[....⁵....]
 [---]ι μετ[....⁵....]
 [---]τα[....⁶....]
 [---]ι[....⁶....]

Meritt noted that the preferred forms *ἐγραμμάτευεν* and *πρυτανείας* (no discussion had been provided of the frequency of the shorter forms) are now present. *Oἰνεῖδος* is an admitted violation of stoikhedon, and [*καὶ συμ|πρόεδροι*], though allowable before 318/7 (*Hesp* forthcoming) is uncommon in that period.

Also not discussed is the double blank space at the end of line 8, in the midst of the Rhetor's name. The survey of gaps in Athenian decrees shows that even a single blank space just here would be unexampled in this period or any other. Any arrangement to end a line with a patronymic is almost unheard of in stoikhedon decrees before the third century. Double blank spaces for punctuation are also unknown until the third century, and are rare even then: two new instances, which occur, oddly, in the purported decree of Themistokles from Troizen, are discussed in *AJA* 1962.365–367.

A last feature of the Fourth Restoration is that the lines all end with syllables; three end with words. There is no discussion, but obviously syllabification is meant to be an advantage, definitely confirmatory. But again study of the Athenian decrees in *IG²* shows beyond a doubt that, so far from being confirmatory, syllabification at any time before the third century B.C. is uncommon, and hence suspicious; even after ca. 300 B.C. it is comparatively rare in stoikhedon decrees. This matter also is investigated in *AJA* 1962.364–365.

The Fourth, final, preferred restoration of 1944, to which the discussion in *Hesp* 1944.234–241 led, is therefore as dubious as the preceding three.

In 1958 Meritt examined the stone in Athens, to ascertain how many letters should be restored at the right. He reported that the position of the (preserved) right side permitted eight letters after the omega of *ἀναγραφέω[s]* in line 2. He then tacitly abandoned the assumption of syllabification, in favor of a line lengthened once again, now to 38 stoikhoi; but with the last stoikhos used only once.

Agora I 5626, Fifth Restoration

Athenian Year (1961) 119–120 (latest preferred)

- [..κόστρατος--] λωνος Φιλ[ιππεύς ?] Stoikh. 38
 [Ἐπὶ Νεαίχμου ἄρχοντος, ἐπ'] ἀναγραφέω[ς δὲ 'Αρχε^v]
 [δίκου τοῦ Ναυκρίτου Λαμπ]τρέως ἐπὶ τῆ[ς Οἰνεῖν]
 [δος ὁγδόης πρυτανείας ἥι . . .]νων 'Οῆθ ἔγραμ[μάτ^v]
 5 [ευεν Μουνιχιῶνος ὁγδόηι ἵσ] ταμένου, τετ[άρτη]
 [καὶ τριακοστῇ τῆς πρυτανεύ]ας· ἐκκλησί[α κυρ^v]
 [ία· τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφιζεν Ι]οφῶν Στευ[ρ καὶ σ^v]
 [υμπρόεδροι· ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ] Δημάδης Δη[μέουν]
 [Παιανιεὺς εἶπεν νῦν ἐπειδὴ ..]κόστρατο[ς ..⁵...]
 10 [-----]τε τῶν ἐσ Σ[...⁶...]
 [-----] 'Αθηναίων μη[....]
 [-----] τοὺς ἐπιβουλ[....]
 [-----] 'Αθηνα[...⁵...]
 [-----] γνωσι]ξὶ καὶ παι[σν]
 15 [-----]Ε. ὁ μέλλων Α[...]
 [-----]κα]ταληφθῆναι [...]
 [-----]ων καὶ διλ[..⁵...]

By 1961 the inscription had been known for 23 years (it was discovered in 1938), and had received protracted study, involving an unusual printed discussion of what evidently seemed to be all of the principal alternatives for restoration. There is no unfairness therefore in submitting the latest text to thorough examination.

In the first place, the (undiscussed) assumption of a stoikhos laid outas if for use but used only once (for τετ[άρτη] in line 5), is an assumption which I think could not be upheld by any evidence whatever. It does not accord with natural or actual practice. When a stoikhos was laid out for use, it was used. Beyond the vertical guide-line delimiting the last stoikhos was a margin. Since stelai tapered, margins usually grew wider downwards with each successive line. The margin, that is, did not usually resemble a stoikhos: but it could be invaded to the extent of a letter or more likely a half-letter (iota) if the mason so chose. (These matters are treated, for the first time, in *AjA* 1962. 361–364.)

In the present instance, it is surely correct to assume that the final iota of line 5 invaded a *margin*, i.e. an area to the right of the last vertical guide-line, otherwise not used, and intended never to be used; in other words, to call the length of line 37 letters, admitting line 5 as an exception with 38. There would be a similar margin at the left, of course not, and properly not, indicated in texts:

Line 2 [ν ἐπὶ Νεαίχμου, κτλ.

3 [^v δίκου τοῦ Ναυκρίτου, κτλ.
and so on.

But this does not alter the problem of restoration.

The ἐπ' for ἐπὶ is of course not impossible; I have not counted instances, but note that they are comparatively few. There is no need to repeat what has been said on the sequence ἐπὶ — — — ἐπὶ — — — ἐπὶ — — —; and on [*καὶ συμπρόεδροι*]; and on the double blank space restored in line 9. Here it should be noted that all of these features are not optional but are inescapable with a 38- (or 37-) letter line. The combination of so many unusual elements all involved in one restoration ought, I think, to inspire lively distrust, leading to outright rejection.

Conceding that the exact position of the right side could not be determined in 1944 (it should of course have been noted, with measurements, on the squeezes made in 1938), we have to observe that that did not prevent the printing of four successive texts, of which an unwary reader might have been led to adopt the Fourth. The Fifth Restoration clearly supersedes the rest with respect to the right side, but it is not free of the multiple dubious (though small-looking) assumptions which have been made so lightly at every stage. In spite of the efforts and ink expended, and admitting that the problem is not easy, the only possible judgment is that a credible text of Agora I 5626 has yet to be produced. Worst of all, with five different texts before him, nearly any reader will be discouraged enough to ask, Can *any* text be credible? The answer is of course No, if so many variables can so easily be brought into play, the whole business is a deuces-wild game, and the game is a game played with bluffing.

Before surrendering to this scholarship-is-what-you-can-get-away-with conception, it might be well to make one more attempt, but under different rules. The main rule will now be, Every feature must have authority sufficient to make it credible.

Greek decrees were usually inscribed with side margins at the top, i.e. at the first line of regular text, of less than one stoikhos. It is notable however that in this very year, *IG II²* 380 has a margin at line 2 of 0.014 m., the full width of a stoikhos being only slightly larger, 0.016 m. The margin increases a little down the stele. The margin could be invaded by a half-letter, but the stone would *not* be inscribed right up to the edge. Hence in Agora I 5626 the proper length of restoration at the right calls for seven letters, not eight, after the omega of ἀναγραφέω[ς] in line 2. Restoration of the full designation of the Anagrapheus

(lines 2–3) gives a line of 37 letters when δέ is included. The Fourth Restoration (*supra*) shows the result; and the irregularities are still there.

But the problem may not be hopeless. Correct method would direct that a search be made first for lines where the restoration can be positive. *Not* line 2: [ἀρχων Νέαιχμος] would now be without a parallel until 50 years later, but after ἀρχοντος there could be ἐπί, ἐπ', or nothing. *Not* the gap at lines 2–3, where a δέ might or might not be present. *Not* lines 3–4 with a numeral and a personal name. *Not* lines 4–5 with nu-movable and month and day, *nor* 5–6, where there was another calendar numeral (henceforth only a very few, very plain calendar words can ever be allowed to determine the length of a line). *Not* lines 6–7, where κυρία is uncertain and a personal name is present. *Not* lines 7–8, with mention of the Symproedroi comparatively infrequent; instead, the Boule might better be included in the ἔδοξεν-clause. *But* in lines 8–9 the name of the man honored is -]κόστρατο[s, which in 1944 Meritt restored as *Ni*]κόστρατο[s. In 1961, he abandons it for ..]κόστρατο[s, but without stating what alternative(s) he has come upon in the interval. F. Bechtel, *Hist. gr. Pers.* under -στρατος gives no name in -κο- except *Nikόστρατος*. In Pape we find *Λικόστρατος* which, it is notable, Bechtel evidently overlooked, or thought the references mistaken; and B. Hansen, *Rückläufiges Wörterbuch*, adds *Oίκόστρατος*, which also is in Pape but not in Bechtel. But these names are both very rare. Quite apart, however, from the fact that no supplement could be more natural than *Ni*]κόστρατο[s, there is agreement that only two letters are missing; for present purposes this suffices. Before the names, ἐπειδή; and, in this period with no (one-space) gap for punctuation, εἰπεν immediately precedes. As to the Rhetor, the restoration has been the name of the famous Δημάδης Δη[μέου Παιανιεύς]. Except for relatives, no other Demades De- is known; whereas the famous Demades, *PA* 3263, is known to have proposed more decrees than any Athenian of any period, except the demagogue whose akme was in 307/6 B.C. and the following years, viz. Stratokles son of Euthydemos of Diomeia. An article by A. N. Oikonomides, *ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 1956. 105–129, usefully collects all the decrees and related documents by Demades. The restoration of his name can be regarded as virtually certain.

Let the (intolerable) double-vacat be omitted so that the text is restored solid at this point. If this is correct — the name of the man honored is the sole uncertainty — lines 8–9 give a length of 35 letters. Alone, this finding would have to be considered merely probable. But let (the infrequent) [*καὶ συμπρόεδροι*] in lines 7–8 give way to the usual clause, [*ἔδοξεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δῆμῳ*]: the result is again a line of

35 letters. On this basis, which I submit is the *only* sound basis, a restoration of the earlier lines may be attempted:

Agora I 5626

Sixth Restoration (for the present article)

320/19 B.C.

- | | | |
|----|---|------------|
| 1 | [<i>NIKOΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ</i> — ^{ca. 4½} —] <i>ΛΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛ[ΙΠΠΕΥΣ?]</i> | |
| | <i>[ἐπὶ Νεαίχμου ἄρχοντος]</i> <i>ἀναγραφέω[s 'Αρχεδί]</i> | Stoikh. 35 |
| | <i>[κου τοῦ Ναυκρίτου Λαμπτ]τρέως ἐπὶ τῆ[s Οἰνεῖδ]</i> | 36 |
| | <i>[ος ἔκτης πρυτανείας ἦι ..]νων 'Οηθ(εν) ἐγραμ[μάτ]</i> | |
| 5 | <i>[ενεν' Γαμηλιώνος ἔκτηι ἵσ]ταμένου τετ[άρτηι]</i> | 36 |
| | <i>[καὶ εἰκόστηι τῆς πρυτανεί]ας ἐκκλησί[α· τῶν]</i> | |
| | <i>[προέδρων ἐπεψήφιζεν]οφων Στει[ρ(ιεὺς)· ἔδοξ]</i> | |
| | <i>[εν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ] Δημάδης Δη[μέου]</i> | |
| | <i>[Παιανιεὺς εἶπεν ἐπειδὴ Νι]κόστρατο[s ..]</i> | |
| 10 | <i>[.....²².....]τε τῶν ἐς Σ[...⁵..]</i> | |

[Remains of lines 11–23 not copied here. An uncertain number of lines missing below line 23.]

Line 1, never mentioned in the discussions, is printed in previous texts with the sigma over the first alpha of line 2; and with wide spacing. Thus the patronymic is made to appear correctly, and to be of about 10 letters, but the ethnikon does not fill the line. The actual correct position of the sigma, however, is five spaces farther to the right (a poor wartime photograph, sadly reduced, *Hesp* 1944. 234). The preserved 7½ letters are spread over 9½ stoikhoi; on this basis Meritt's original restoration fills the line. Nikostratos and his ethnikon remain unknown.

In the remainder of the text, there are two demonstrable weaknesses, and they are almost exactly alike: lines 3 and 5 protrude an extra half-space into the (right) margin. In line 5 the extra half-space is occupied by an iota, added to complete *τετ[άρτηι]*. In line 3 it is assumed that the last iota was inscribed not in the center but in the left half of its chequer, and that the delta was then inscribed half in this stoikhos and half in the margin. Figures on the frequency of this modification of stoikhedon have never been compiled, but an exact parallel for the leftward displacement of iota, with other letters also displaced, has been examined *supra* 63–64. Moreover we now have an instance of no fewer than nine lines ended in this fashion, all in one inscription, viz. the purported decree of Themistokles from Troizen. They have been studied and tabulated (S. Dow *AJA* 1962. 365). Therefore although the restorations of these lines involve irregularities which by themselves are highly improbable, some modifications of the stoikhedon scheme is a necessary assumption, and these are the most natural and likely type of modification.

There is no other flaw. In line 2, the asyndeton is precisely the same as in *IG II²* 378: [ἐπὶ Ἀρχίππου ἀρχοντος] ἀναγραφέως Θρασ|[υκλέους, κτλ. In the main, syllabification is disregarded, as should be expected at this period. The forms ἐγραμ[μάτ|ενεν and [πρυτανεῖ]ας are correct. In line 6 κυρία is unnecessary. For the calendar equation we have to compare:

IG II² 381, 382 Prytany V 36 = Posideon II 14
 Agora I 5626 Prytany [VI 2]4 = Gamelion 6

Assuming that Prytany V had 38 days, there is a discrepancy of three or four days. Rather than assume that Posideon II was prolonged by extra days, some scholars may prefer to allow the possibility that the numeral in line 5 was [ἐνάτηι ἵσ]ταμένου. Two iotas in one space were regular with at least one mason in the fifth century. But on this, exact figures are needed, and even then there will be nothing like certainty. I mention here the possibility of regularizing the calendar merely to emphasize once again that the calendar, so far from being, as hitherto, the controlling factor in the restoration of the present preamble, is actually the element of greatest uncertainty.

ADDENDUM. Since the foregoing was written, I have measured to the right edge on the marble itself at six different levels. Meritt's calculation, applied to line 2, from the marble, and my former estimate, from the photograph (hence less reliable) are confirmed. The texts *supra* pp. 71 and 74 agree completely with the measurements, and with each other, on the space available at the right. (The right margin, left blank except in certain lines, was slightly wider than the norm, but not as wide as in some instances. It invited an extra letter; and doubtless lower down, as the stele broadened, occasionally there were more.)

THE ATHENIAN HONORS FOR ARISTONIKOS OF KARYSTOS, "ALEXANDER'S ΣΦΑΙΡΙΣΤΗΣ"

BY STERLING DOW

CONTENTS

THE INSCRIPTION

<i>IG II² 385A and 385B</i>	78
Text of <i>IG II² 385B</i>	79
Restoration of the Name	81
An Aristonikos in Athenaios	81

ATHENIAN HONORS FOR INDIVIDUALS

The Honors for Aristonikos	81
<i>Σίτησις ἐν Πρυτανείῳ</i>	82
The Highest Athenian Honors	83
Decrees Awarding Statues but Not Sítēsis	84
Recipients of Decrees Awarding Sítēsis	85
Statues for Foreigners Awarded Sítēsis	86

ARISTONIKOS OF KARYSTOS

The Aristonikos in Athenaios and in <i>IG II² 385B</i>	86
The Dating of <i>IG II² 385B</i>	87
The Reasons for Honors to Aristonikos	88
Aristonikos and the Statue	91
Aristonikos and Ball Games	91

NOTE. For learned and generous help I am indebted to H. Bloch, G. L. Huxley, and P. Stadter.

YET another inscription, *IG II² 385B*, is affected by study of the Anagraphais. *IG II² 385B* survives to the extent of eighteen lines, and they come, not from the preamble, which is altogether missing, but from the body of the decree. Hence in this inscription there is no calendar aspect; nor is there any special "epigraphical" feature. The interest of the decree is rather in the very high honors it awards; and in the recipient, one Aristonikos.

THE INSCRIPTION

IG II² 385A and 385B. The two fragments, A and B, were published most recently by J. Kirchner, *IG II² 385*. They were presumed to have been one on the ground that they honored the same man. The first step is to investigate this proposed union of the two pieces.

IG II² 385A is the upper right corner of a stele. It preserves the profile of the moulding, some of the pediment with the gable akroterion, and the start of the central akroterion. Photograph: *JIAI* 1908. 98. Restoration and date: *supra*.

IG II² 385B itself actually consists of two fragments, but the join is extensive and tight, so that they may be considered as one. Photograph: *JIAI* 1908. 99.

IG II² 385A was first united with B by A. Wilhelm, whose combinations were not always fortunate (cf. Pritchett-Neugebauer, *Calendars* 48 on *IG II² 339*); but he felt misgivings. 385A honors $[-\text{ca. } 4-5 - \circ] \nu \kappa \circ s$, 385B honors *A[ριστ]όνικος*. There is no other bond between the two fragments; on the contrary, the restoration of A involved formulae never seen elsewhere. W. B. Dinsmoor, *Archons of Athens* (1931), pp. 24-25 (with references to earlier studies), saw that 385A should be restored with a (stoikhedon) line definitely shorter than the (stoikhedon) line of 385B. He did not, however, explicitly divorce the two fragments, but gave the (united) document a fourth-century date, 321/0, such as it seemed the man honored must evidently have. In suggesting that perhaps the two fragments ought to be divorced, Dinsmoor states that he was encouraged by a positive opinion I had sent him; but he did not publish any argument. Re-echoing this view, though without a reference, B. D. Meritt *Hesp* 1961. 290, also gave as his reason the different (restored) lengths of line. 385A, he declared, belonged probably

in 292/1, whereas 385B ought to retain its fourth-century date. This may be correct, but Meritt would doubtless admit that the disparity of lengths of line falls short of proof. Instances of two decrees inscribed on one stele but with different lengths of line are known. There is need, therefore, of a fuller study.

The lettering is similar, though not necessarily by the same hand. But the horizontal measurements of the letters are different:

	<i>IG II² 385A</i>	<i>385B</i>
Height of tallest letters	lines 2-3	
10 letters plus 10 horizontal inter-	0.008 m.	0.007-0.008 m.
spaces	0.120 m.	0.134 m.
2 letters plus 1 vertical interline	0.022 m.	0.021 m.

Variations within one inscription, such as those of the horizontal inter-spaces, are known but are very rare.

Examination of the marbles shows that the thicknesses, as recorded in *IG II²*, are misleading. 385A has its original thickness, 0.085 m., which is suitable for a comparatively narrow (ca. 34-letter) stele. B, now 0.095 m. thick, has a rough back, on which no tool-marks show. The stele represented by B was therefore a different stele. It was originally thicker, and had a longer line. The back was broken away after the whole was used as a doorsill. The pivot-hole for the door can be seen in Wilhelm's photograph, and below it the cutting for the door-jamb. They are near the present bottom: the door extended up the length of the stele, proving that the stele was of at least moderate height, and that our fragment comes from fairly well down in it, as the text indicates.

These facts suffice to prove conclusively that *IG II² 385A* and 385B are from different stelai. The remainder of the present study will be devoted to 385B.

Text of IG II² 385B. The text which follows was made from a good squeeze; it includes ten letters not read before. Dots indicate letters which could not be positively identified independently of the context. The surface is well worn; I have dotted many letters (Kirchner has no dots).

IG II² 385B
Uncertain number of lines missing

[...]ι τὸν Ἀθηναῖον.....²¹.....τῆι βου] Stoikh. 41
 λῆ[ι] κ[αι] τ]ῶι δῆμω[ι -----]
 γέο [-----]
 [...]π[.....²¹.....προσάγειν]

- 5 'Α[ριστ]όνικον [πρός τὸν δῆμον καὶ χρηματίζειν περὶ]
 αὐτὸν, γνώμη[ν δὲ ἔνυμβάλλεσθαι τῆς βουλῆς εἰς τὸν δῆμον ὅτι δο[κ]εῖ [τῇ βουλῇ, ἐπαινέσαι 'Αριστόνικον 'Α]
 ριστορή[δ]ου [Καρύστιον καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυσῷ στε]
 φάνω αἴροντος: [δραχμῶν καὶ ἀνειπεῖν Διονυσίων τῶν με]
 10 γάλ[ων] τοῖς [τραγωιδῶν ἄγωσιν? εἶναι δὲ 'Αριστόνικο]
 ν 'Α[θηναῖ]ον [αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκγόνους καὶ εἶναι αὐτῶι γρά]
 ψι[σθαι φ]υλ[ῆς καὶ δήμου καὶ φρατρίας ἡς ἢν βούλητα]
 ι π[λὴν ὧν οἱ] γόμ[οι ἀπαγορεύοντι. δοῦναι δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ]
 [οῦ?] Α[.] τὴν ψῆφον τῶι δήμῳ τού]
 15 [εις πρυτά]γεις τοὺς μετὰ τὴν πρυτανεύοντ]
 [ας. εἶναι]ι δὲ αὐτῶι καὶ σίτησιν ἐμ πρυτανείωι καὶ ἐκ]
 [γ]ό[νων]ν ἀει τῷ[ι πρεσβυτάτῳ καὶ προεδρίαν ἐν τοῖς ἡ]
 γῶσι[ν πᾶσσι]ν [οἷς ἡ πόλις τίθησιν, κτλ.]

42

Uncertain number of lines missing.

Most of the new readings confirm the old restorations, which I have taken directly from Kirchner. The following details require comment; other aspects are discussed *infra*:

Lines 1-2. New readings add the Boule.

Line 4. The three letters formerly read are spurious.

Line 9. The two interpuncts and the numeral together occupy one stoikhos only.

Line 10. A tau, formerly read in the tenth stoikhos, is spurious.

Lines 9-11. The former restoration, [εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν] | ν 'Α[θηναῖ]ον
 [αὐτὸν καὶ, κτλ.] is so awkward that we may surely replace the first pronoun with the name. For the name in the clause of citizenship, just before 'Αθηναῖον (but with the patronymic given), cf. *IG II²* 558. 17-18: εἶναι 'Οξύθεμιν 'Ι|[ππο]στράτου 'Αθηναῖον αὐτὸν καὶ ἐ|[κγ]όνους, κτλ. The *τοῖς* of *IG II²* 385B after [Διονυσίων τῶν με] | γάλ[ων] is unique, but in this position *IG II²* 657. 62 has τραγωιδῶν τῶι ἄγωνι; the phrase *τοῖς* [τραγωιδῶν ἄγωσιν], which is unexampled, at least fits the space in *IG II²* 385B. *IG II²* 456. 4 has τῶι γυμνικῶι ἄγωνι.

Line 14. Formerly read as omega, the one preserved letter was read to fit a regular formula; but actually it is lambda. What the variant phraseology was, here as in line 10, remains to be found.

Kirchner's text appears to indicate that the inscription ended with line 18, and the cutting for the door (*supra*), which is near the present lower edge, may also indicate that not many lines — perhaps no more than ten — are missing. But of course the stele *may* have been much longer, and the lower part *may* have been broken away before it was used as a door-sill. Thus there may have been clauses with additional

honors (viz. a statue), and provisions for setting up the stele; there was surely an uninscribed space at the bottom, normally ca. 0.20 m., and a further ca. 0.10 m. of stone for insertion into the base.

Restoration of the Name in the Inscription. The nomen is preserved in *IG II² 385B* as *A[...]όνικον*; the space would accommodate *'A[μειν]-όνικον*, but the name is very uncommon, and *'A[ριστ]όνικον* would be restored even if the presence of the Aristo- element in the father's name did not give strong assurance that the son's should be restored with it. The patronymic *[']A[ριστομή[δ]ον* is as good as complete in the inscription; but the man is unknown from any other source, and the name gives no more help.

The ethnikon is lacking in the inscription, but beyond a reasonable doubt it was of nine letters.

An Aristonikos in Athenaios. Early in the *Deipnosophistai*, Athenaios writes at some length about ball-games (1.14D–1.15C). Presently he mentions a ball-player: *ὅτι Ἀριστόνικον τὸν Καρύστιον, τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου σφαιριστὴν, Ἀθηναῖοι πολίτην ἐποιήσαντο διὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ ὄνδριάντα ἀνέστησαν* (1.19A). It was a proof, Athenaios continues, of the later Greek sense of values: they admired banausic skills more than those of the intellect. He gives further instances; but we need not follow him in this. The Hellenistic Athenians also set up statues of philosophers.

At the moment it is relevant to note that Athenaios supplies an ethnikon for his Aristonikos. Ethnika in nine letters are of course very numerous, but it is notable that *[Καρύστιον]* exactly fits the space in the inscription. It would only be by a curious and improbable coincidence that in one generation the Athenians would bestow honors (as will be seen presently, very nearly their highest honors) on two men each named *'Αριστόνικος [.....⁹.....]*.

ATHENIAN HONORS FOR INDIVIDUALS

The Honors for Aristonikos. Athenaios says that the Athenians erected a statue of Aristonikos. The decree mentions a series of honors; but, in its present curtailed condition, no statues. It is interesting that no one has realized the curtailment; nor has attempted to assess the importance of the omission of the statue from what we have; nor in general has studied the honors conferred in the preserved lines of *IG II² 385B*.

The decree *IG II² 385B* doubtless began by a recitation, perhaps in fairly abstract and formal language, of the benefactions of Aristonikos: this was lines 1–4 *et ante*. The next provision, lines 4–7, is for a measure to be drafted and presented to the Ekklesia specifying honors. Then

comes the list of honors, lines 7–18. So far as it now extends, the list is preserved complete, as follows, the restorations being positive except in lines 10 and 14:

- | | | |
|-----|--------|---|
| I | Line 7 | Praise (no quality specified). |
| II | 8–9 | Crown, valued at 1000 dr. |
| III | 9–10 | Announcement. |
| IV | 10–13 | Citizenship, for himself and his descendants; it is open to him to be inscribed in whatever tribe, deme, and phratry he wishes, except what ones the laws forbid. |
| V | 13–16 | Prompt action about him in the Ekklesia. |
| VI | 16–17 | <i>σίτησις</i> in Prytaneion (discussed <i>infra</i>) for life; and thereafter for the eldest of his male descendants. |
| VII | 17–18 | <i>προεδρία</i> (i.e. a seat in or near the front row) at all the <i>άγωνες</i> (i.e. musical [plays] and athletic) which the state presents. |

After Item VII the inscription is broken away.

Of all these honors, Items I–V are not uncommon. In this period, crowns awarded in decrees were normally valued, like Aristonikos', at 1000 dr., and were publicly announced. Grants of citizenship, by no means rare, were normally worded as in Item IV, and prompt action was normally provided for (V).

Σίτησις ἐν Πρυτανείῳ. The unusual honor, higher than any of the others, and rarely awarded, was Item VI, *σίτησις ἐν Πρυτανείῳ*. It happens that we know somewhat more than formerly about the Prytaneion and the state banquets.

With a long history behind it, the Prytaneion was the Town Hall. As yet undiscovered, it was evidently part way up the North Slope of the Akropolis. The Prytaneion was altogether separate and distinct from the Prytanikon, which was built later; has been excavated and published; and was down in the Agora. Under the democracy, as doubtless theretofore, certain dignitaries were given free meals for life in Prytaneion: Perikles himself seems to have been the Rhetor of the decree that settled who they should be. I give here the group as it appears in the text of *IG I² 77* by M. Ostwald *AJP* 1961. 25–26; two are restorations and doubtful, but for present purposes that does not greatly matter.

[The (Eleusinian) Hierophantes.]

The eldest descendant of Harmodios and of Aristogeiton.

[One of the Manteis] of Apollon.

The (Athenian) victors at the Olympia, Pythia, Isthmia, and Nemea; both gymnastic and hippic.

Possibly in Perikles' decree, certainly by Aristotle's time, the Athlo-thetai of the Panathenaia were included for most of the month, Hekatombaion, in which it was held (*Aristotle AthPol* 62.2).

To be made one of this company was to receive Athens' most practical and most ornamental honor. When this fact could be adequately grasped, it was possible to realize the full meaning of Sokrates' irony in Plato's *Apology*, where he states to the court that he is worthy of *στῆραις ἐν Πρυτανείᾳ* (S. Dow *CW* 1943/4. 130–132). For Sokrates nothing could be more appropriate: the high honor, the freedom from expense, the chance to converse daily for the rest of his life with some of the city's best (though perhaps not most philosophical) people.

As scores of decrees tell us, the custom was to invite ambassadors of foreign states to dinner in Prytaneion the day after their business had been dealt with by the Ekklesia. Similarly with certain other persons honored by the State: they too were invited *εἰς αὐπιον* to dine in Prytaneion. But it was only for once.

The decree which stands first in the new era of liberation after the Athenians had got rid of the Macedonian garrison in 229/8 B.C., viz. *IG II² 832*, specifies certain extraordinary services to Athens for which, it is implied, the Athenians granted Sitesis. *No other award is even mentioned*. The services are services in war and in peace. They are put down as being cited from a law. There is no way of knowing exactly when (before 229/8 B.C.) the law was passed; but whenever it was passed, we need not doubt that it simply recognized as an accepted fact the primacy of Sitesis in public esteem. That primacy surely dated back to Perikles and beyond.

The Highest Athenian Honors. To complete the account of Athenian honors in the period *med. s. IV a.* and in the Hellenistic period, it must be added that statues could also be voted. They are always specified to be of bronze, the superior material; and presumably all were life-size figures, shown as standing if not on horseback. Whether or not systematic grades of award were recognized, in fact statues were awarded as follows (in ascending order):

One statue, normally in the Agora.

One statue, on the Akropolis.

Two statues, one in the Agora, one in the Theater, or in Peiraieus, or on the Akropolis.

A statue with a figure on horseback.

Among honors which were rare, the naming of a building for a man is

known to us in nearly all the instances, probably, that occurred. The person so honored was usually the one who gave the money.

Beyond all these mundane honors was deification, accompanied by the building of cult places (but not temples) with altars, the writing of hymns, the creation of tribes, the creation (or re-naming) of demes. We have no decree on any of these subjects, and in any case deification has no bearing on Aristonikos. The Athenians deified six persons, all rulers: Alexander, Antigonos I Monophthalmos and his son Demetrios I Poliorketes, Ptolemy IV, Attalos I, and Hadrian.

Decrees Awarding Statues but Not Sitesis. If we turn to actual decrees, we find that the Athenians passed hundreds of decrees honoring individuals; but of these only a few award the high honors, viz. Sitesis, Proedria, statue(s).

In three known instances, plus a likely fourth, bronze statues were voted without the award of Sitesis:

IG II² 555: Asklepiades of Byzantion, in 307/6–304/3 B.C.

The statue is to be erected in Byzantion. Three Athenians are to go to Byzantion to arrange about the announcement and the statue.

Asklepiades is not made a citizen. Although he is granted Proedria, it seems clear that Asklepiades is not thought of as intending to live in Athens. The decree, with the statue, are evidently, in part at least, gestures of friendship to his city.

IG II² 653: King Spartokos of the Bosphorus, in ca. 285/4 B.C.

The statue is to stand in the Agora near those of his ancestors, who had been made citizens. Proedria is not mentioned. There is no sign that he had come in person to Athens, or intended to; rather, three men are to go to him.

IG II² 654: King Audoleon of the Paiones, in the same year, ca. 285/4 B.C.

The statue is to be on horseback and is to stand in the Agora. King Audoleon is made a citizen; but there is no mention of Proedria. There is no indication that he intended to reside in Athens; it is permitted to him to be duly enrolled as a citizen, but that is a mere honor.

Hesp 1960, 12: One Θέρων apparently; unidentified; dated s. III/II a.

I have made no special study of the inscription. It is much damaged, but there is no hint that Proedria was included.

In all of these instances there is of course no proof that Sitesis, if it had been granted, would not have been enjoyed by the recipient during an occasional month's visit (say) to Athens. But one may doubt whether the Athenians would have granted the privilege on such a basis. In any

case the four decrees prove that a statue did not always and necessarily entail other high honors.

IG II² 648 is the last 16 lines of a decree which awarded honors. Since δοκιμασία is provided for (line 2), the recipient is foreign-born and we should restore, in the missing upper portion, an award of citizenship. Since he is awarded a statue ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ[ι], he is probably a poet. The statue is the last honor mentioned. There is no way of knowing whether Sitesis was also awarded; and so this decree cannot be included in the present discussion.

Recipients of Decrees Awarding Sitesis. Twelve decrees are now known which award to named individuals, *honoris causa*, σίτησις ἐν (five times; εἰ μέν four) *Πρυτανεῖων* (the phrase is never varied except that *Hesp* 1936. 422. 34 intrudes the word ἔαντρῳ into the phrase).

These decrees have never been studied as a group. The eldest male descendant is always included except in *IG II²* 1223. The recipients fall into two classes:

- A. Earlier than 294/3 B.C. Six decrees, three of them honoring foreigners, two unknown, and the present decree for Aristonikos. List *infra*.
- B. Later than 294/3 B.C. Six decrees, all of them honoring native-born Athenians (demotics of five preserved, the other a leading statesman).

DECREES AWARDING SITESIS
AND STATUES TO NATIVE-BORN CITIZENS

IG II² 649 (Dinsmoor *Archons* 1931. 7–8) of 293/2 B.C.

IG II² 657 of ca. 283/2.

IG II² 672 of ca. 279/8.

IG II² 682 of ca. 274/3.

Hesp 1936. 419 of 196/5 (Kephisodoros: demotic unknown).

IG II² 1223 of post 167 B.C.

The appearance is that the Athenians altered their practice. In the generation when they voted extravagant honors to Antigonos and Demetrios, they also admitted foreigners into the Prytaneion club: foreigners and their descendants. It is true that in each case, undoubtedly, the foreigners were made citizens — they are all their descendants. But social clubs, or clubs with a social aspect, are delicate: one or two members who prove to be unsuitable can be disruptive. Some political aspect, as nearly always in Greece, may have entered in. And

so a change was made. Theretofore (unless the accidents of the preservation of inscriptions mislead us — but we have hundreds of honorary decrees) citizens not holding the positions defined by Perikles and by subsequent legislation, such as the laws recodified by Nikomakhos, had not been admitted. To admit such citizens at any time was perhaps hazardous, because citizens generally might seek the prize; but at least the Athenians selected *could* be well known, and actually, unless the surviving inscriptions mislead us, the awards were few.

Statues for Foreigners Awarded Sitesis. (B) All six of the *citizens* awarded Sitesis were given statues, and the statues were specified in the decrees before the award of Sitesis. (A) The decrees for five of the *foreigners* who were awarded Sitesis preserve also the clauses for the award of statues. The sixth decree is *IG II² 385B*, which alone is broken away, and does not preserve a clause awarding a statue.

DECREES AWARDING CITIZENSHIP, SITESIS, AND
STATUES TO FOREIGNERS

Inscription:	Date B.C.	Recipient	Order of Mention of Statue
<i>IG II²</i>			
385B	?	Aristonikos Karystios	at end ?
450	314/3	Asandros Makedon	at end
513	post 318/7	— —	before Sitesis
467	306/5	Timosthenes (Karystios ?)	[?]
510	post 306/5	— —	before Sitesis
646	295/4	Herodoros	at end

The fourth entry requires comment. Although nothing in the present study depends on it, and I have made no thorough study, I assume that the Sitesis referred to in *IG II² 832* was awarded in *IG II² 467*. This cannot be proved. *IG II² 467* breaks off just at the point where citizenship is being awarded. Sitesis and statue, if any, would of course have come later.

ARISTONIKOS OF KARYSTOS

The Aristonikos in Athenaios and in IG II² 385B. A measure of uncertainty remains, but the probability is definite that the decree for Aristonikos, like all the other ten Sitesis decrees about which we can judge, specified a statue. If so, the statue would be the statue known, though probably only through intermediaries, to Athenaios; the statue may not have survived the Sullan devastation, but it is unlikely that the report of the existence of the statue was a pure invention.

On this basis, Athenaios is corroborated, and *IG II² 385B* is the very

decree for the Aristonikos of Karystos known to Athenaios as having been made a citizen — just as the decree says he was — and as having been voted a statue. The evidence thus far fits together without any contradictory aspect. Moreover we have learned, what was not appreciated before, that Aristonikos also received the unusual honor of Sitesis. This last was surely unknown to Athenaios, because he would have found it singularly apposite for the *Deipnosophistai*.

The Dating of IG II² 385B. Some new non-verbal criteria are available for dating an inscription like the present (S. Dow, *AJA* 1962, 353–368). For instance, the chequer: 10 letters plus 10 inter-letters horizontally average 0.0133 m.; vertically, 5 lines plus 5 interlines average 0.0132 m. The chequer was thus (intended to be) square, a fact which favors, though not decisively, a date before 300 b.c. (R. P. Austin *Stoichedon* 35–36). So far as can be told, no blank space whatever was left (for punctuation) in the extant lines; this is another criterion which opposes a date after 300. There is also the lettering, but until the lettering of the period ca. 340–ca. 280 b.c. has been carefully studied, it is difficult to speak about the date of the lettering of *IG II² 385B*. The shapes are all regular, except that omega is small. The cutting is light, not monumental; I doubt whether it is earlier than 330 or later than 300 b.c. The hand is not the same, but the style is closely similar to that of *IG II² 467* of 306/5.

The other criteria are verbal. Some of the phraseology (lines 10 and 14) was evidently unusual, and all of the formulae need up-to-date chronological study. Thus a statement of value for the crown (line 9) is usually dated post-318/7 and ante-303/2, and that is generally correct; but there are now (later) exceptions, e.g. *IG II² 649*. Clauses prescribing announcements of honors at festivals appear, so far as I have studied them, to begin only in 318/7 b.c. Of some interest also is the phrase qualifying the choice of Phratry: π[λὴν ὅν οἱ] γόμ[οι ἀπαγορεύουσι] (line 13). This phrase occurs in only five decrees. Largely restored in some instances, it is nevertheless fairly certain, because no known alternative need be considered. The only other long phrases used after ἦν ἄν βούληται (or βούλωνται) are two variants, both still more rare, ὅν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσι (solely in *IG II² 225* and 405), and ὅν οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσι (solely in *IG II² 448*).

DECREES QUALIFYING CHOICE OF PHRATRIA
with πλὴν ὅν οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσι

334/3 b.c. *IG II² 336a* line 4. This line is a great rarity in Greek inscriptions, being an emendation of the text of 336a 20,

itself oddly worded. Evidently the qualification was a new thing at this time. Presumably one or more Phratriai were becoming too full of foreigners, and a restrictive law had been passed.

?

IG II² 385 (the present decree). The new readings strengthen the restoration [line 13], which may be regarded as indubitable.

*Paullo
ante 321*

Hesp 1944. 231, lines 12–13. Date and restoration both certain.

Fin. s. IV

Hesp 1961. 210, no. 5 [lines 2–3]. Meritt's dating of this small fragment is based, evidently, on lettering and formulae; I have made no elaborate examination, but the stoikhedon order makes the restoration probable.

Med. s. III

IG II² 804 [lines 9–10]. The one preserved letter is a perfectly clear reading, and I assume that it guarantees the restoration. Isolated in time though the present phrase is, nevertheless the dating is correct: it is assured by the use of blank spaces, especially of double ones; and assured also, equally, by the style of lettering. It is a new dating.

Apart from this last minor exception, a variety of criteria agree, and no criterion disagrees: a date for *IG II² 385B* earlier than 300 B.C., or perhaps than 303/2, can be assumed to be correct. For an early limit, the formulae would seem to favor a date not much if any earlier than ca. 318/7 B.C. Evidently the decree is later than the death of Alexander in 323 B.C., but of course Aristonikos may have been alive and active in the lifetime of Alexander. By itself, however, that does not tell us why he was honored.

The Reasons for the Honors to Aristonikos. It could well be that although Aristonikos was, or had once been, skilled in some form of ball-playing, and that he was also connected with Alexander, still the unusual honors may conceivably have been voted by the Athenians merely to curry favor with some Successor; or the honors may have been awarded for reasons having nothing to do with either Macedonians or ball-playing, but rather for other deeds which endeared Aristonikos to Athens; or, a third alternative, that the honors were in fact, as Athenaios believed, voted because the Athenians wished to honor a *σφαιριστής*.

A fourth alternative, though it deserves mention, need not be seriously considered: Karystos was probably not important enough to Athens in these years so that high honors to a Karystian were likely to produce valuable results. When honors did come to be voted to a Karystian, they were not very high honors. And yet, in the record as it is preserved to us,

no Karystian of the Hellenistic period looms larger than *Πρύτανις Ἀστυλεῖδου Καρύστιος*, the philosopher who served Athens as ambassador, and who was honored in 226/5 B.C. The contrast between the honors for Prytanis and the honors for Aristonikos is interesting. The decree for Prytanis, which survives complete (*Hesp* 1935. 525), awards only praise, a gold crown, public announcements, and an invitation to (one) dinner in Prytaneion.

Even if a positive choice between the (first) three major alternatives cannot be established, still some firm statements can be made. In the first place, it seems that during his lifetime the Athenians were not often in a mood to curry favor in this manner with Alexander himself. Favors could be curried with the Macedonians, if the Athenians desired to, by honors to persons more important than ball-players, e.g. to their generals. On the other hand, the Asandros Makedon of *IG II²* 450 was doubtless a friend of Kassandros and of Demetrios of Phaleron: the honors to Asandros are intelligible on this basis, and Aristonikos may have played a similar role. The inscriptions make it clear that from 307/6 B.C. on, the Macedonian Kings were flattered by constant Athenian references. But again, it would have seemed more rational to honor their (the Kings') own friends, not Alexander's. In short a small but real presumption exists that Aristonikos was not honored for political or other such reasons; but rather because he was, or had been, a ball-player.

Conceivably Sitesis was awarded — and was awarded all the more often and carelessly — because few if any of the foreign recipients lived or was likely to live in Athens, and thus to be able to exercise the privilege. There can be no doubt that citizenship was thus treated: it was awarded to a great many men who never intended, and surely were not expected, to live in Athens. There was a failure to exercise care, and dubious choices were made. Some new citizens became active enemies of Athens. On all this, see A. Billheimer *Naturalization* 88–101. (But in some cases, e.g. that of King Kotys of Thrake, Athenian citizenship was a mere gift, voted in the hope, however desperate, of gaining favors in return. Such a gift could not be counted on to sway the policy of a powerful monarch against what presently appeared to him to be his true interests. Athens was in a humiliating position, and she acted so.) Billheimer rightly points out that the formulae of the decrees contain no sign that tells whether or not the recipient is expected even to enroll. All alike — foreign monarch as well as resident metic — are explicitly given their choice of Phyle, Deme, and Phratria, usually with a restriction which excludes some of the Phratriai (unnamed) from the field of

choice. The very fact of the exclusion from certain Phratriai suggests strongly that too many new citizens had thronged into certain ones, i.e. had in fact enrolled in some numbers as citizens.

Nevertheless it would seem, on the foregoing evidence as a whole, that there could be no certainty as to whether any given foreign-born recipient of the award of Sitesis was expected actually to exercise the privilege. Like citizenship, in some instances at least Sitesis may have been a mere phrase.

On the other hand, there is a real distinction to be made. Citizenship was distributed freely, Sitesis rarely. For active, residential citizenship there was no fixed numerical limit; the Athenians could take in virtually all the new citizens they wanted. But for Sitesis presumably the number of diners who could be accommodated was limited. Unless it too was a mere phrase, their eldest living descendant also had to be taken into account. Following Billheimer's method of studying who the recipients were, we may note that none was a monarch or otherwise obviously unlikely to reside in Athens. An award of Sitesis to King Kotys would perhaps have seemed ridiculous. There is one further consideration: the record as we have it shows that in just about 294/3 foreigners ceased to receive the award, and citizens were the sole recipients for several decades. There may well have been other causes for this change, but certainly if Sitesis had not meant *something* — most likely an excess in the numbers of foreign-born diners in Prytaneion — then the change might not have been made.

There is further evidence in a decree long known, but never studied in the present connection. *IG II² 832* of 229/8, already mentioned, provides for all who, having performed certain actions, have been honored with Sitesis, a series of benefits: generally (lines 17-18) to look out for them and their descendants; to provide (lines 18-20) a dowry for daughters; to restore (lines 20-21) worthily their own financial position. The date of the decree is two or three generations later than Aristonikos, but the law it is quoting is already in effect in 229/8, and may well have been long in effect long before 229/8. The State benefactions mentioned would surely not be bestowed upon some family which resided abroad. On the contrary, these are benefactions for people who are relatively near and dear. Sitesis in this law surely implies residence in Attika.

It is therefore a reasonable conjecture that Aristonikos' career with Alexander was over, whether because Alexander had died or for some other reason, and that the honors of *IG II² 385B* were awarded to him when he was well settled and well known in Athens, perhaps as long as

twenty years after his arrival. Meantime he *may* have served Athens in any one of several ways other than by being a resident famous athlete.

Aristonikos and the Statue. Among the hundreds of surviving Athenian honorary decrees, no other, so far as I know, honors a non-Athenian-born athlete. In *IG II²* 832 honors for athletes are not specifically mentioned at all among the reasons for the award of Sitesis. Nevertheless Perikles, or whoever proposed *IG I²* 77, had admitted to Sitesis all future Athenian winners in the four great international games. For them no special decrees were needed. Awards for athletes who were *not* victors in the games would be expected to be rare, and for us, as has been said, there is none at all, except *IG II²* 385B.

But there is a concrete reason for believing that Athenaios was right and that Aristonikos was in fact honored for being a ball-player. The statue of him, which we have found independent reason to believe in, would have had an inscription, and that inscription, as well as *IG II²* 385B, may have stated that Aristonikos was honored as a ball-player. Since Athens was crowded with statues, many of them post-Sullan and doubtless not remarkable, the fact that Aristonikos' statue was remembered is probably due not to some epigraphist making notes about inscriptions, but far more probably to the fact that the statue showed Aristonikos as a ball-playing athlete. It may well have been conspicuous as the only such statue of a ball-player in Athens.

Aristonikos and Ball Games. Taking it as a whole, the case in favor of believing that Aristonikos was in fact honored with some of Athens' highest honors because he was a ball-player is a strong enough case to warrant a look at its implications.

No one has done so; Aristonikos has been neglected. There is of course an article in *PA*, 2033a (Vol. II p. 448; correct Wilhelm's 2038a in *JOAI* 1908. 97), but it adds nothing. In *PWK* there is no article. A. Billheimer's generally useful *Naturalization in Athenian Law and Practice* (diss. Princeton 1917, pub. 1922) 85 merely suggests that Aristonikos had performed at some Athenian festival, e.g. the Panathenaia (routine mentions: 55; n. 211 on 63; 113). This speculation is weak: a single performance, or even a series of performances, would hardly deserve extraordinary honors; if Billheimer had appreciated the full extent of the honors (he never mentions Sitesis) I think he would not have printed this particular speculation. H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* I. 129, knows only Athenaios, not the inscription.

It is not surprising, therefore, that E. Norman Gardiner, in the book

which contains the best modern account of the little that is known of Greek ball games, *Athletics of the Ancient World* (1930) 230–238, has nothing to say of Aristonikos, or for that matter of Alexander. Yet these were the highest-placed known ball-players of the Ancient world. The tradition, preserved for us by Plutarch *Alex* 39 and by Athenaios on Aristonikos, i. 19c, was that Alexander had at his headquarters a group of ball-players. In what little is said, they are not represented as being officers in the army, nor was it a "kitchen cabinet" of prominent officials. Instead they appear to have been more-or-less professional ball-players. We are told the names of two. Besides Aristonikos, who was evidently considered by the Athenians to be a worthy person, there is said to have been one Σεραπίων, of whose high-mindedness a story is told by Plutarch. Unhappily the name itself, though perhaps not utterly impossible, would hardly be expected until the deity was "created" (Berve I 701; the name in Athens, S. Dow *HTR* 1937. 221–223). Along with the name, the story is suspect, but the ball-playing at Alexander's headquarters (or court) may still be considered a fact.

To Plutarch's source, the game was a throwing game, in which the player who had the ball had a free choice of whom he should throw it to; but no more can be said, and not enough is known about Greek ball games to encourage speculation. Honors to one man alone suggest, though they do not by any means prove, that the game he excelled in was not a team game; and this agrees with the simple facts given in Plutarch's story.

The Spartans were inveterate and enthusiastic ball-players: Gardiner and I. C. Ringwood (Arnold) *Agonistic Features of Local Greek Festivals* (diss. Columbia, pub. Poughkeepsie, N.Y. 1927) 76–77 are good introductions. The evidence is mostly later than Alexander, but doubtless it began far earlier. Ball games were popular also in Athens. The honors for Aristonikos may well be the strongest evidence we have of enthusiasm for the sport in Athens or anywhere else, at any period, in the Greek world.

RES OLIM DISSOCIABILES: PRINCIPATUS AC LIBERTAS

LIBERTY UNDER THE EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE

By MASON HAMMOND

LIBERTY¹ may be freedom for or freedom from, as Chaim Wirszubski remarks in the introduction to his study *Liberty as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate*, upon which the following remarks are largely a comment.² Wirszubski holds that civil liberty at Rome was conceived as freedom from, that is, from the mastery of another. This concept of liberty derived from the legal, namely the condition which distinguished the free man from the slave subject to the complete ownership of another and deprived of all civil and personal rights.³ Momigliano, in a review, justly criticized Wirszubski for neglecting other connotations of liberty, such as the political, dating from the early struggles of the plebs against the patricians, and the philosophic relation between liberty and the whole concept of man, *humanitas*.⁴ For the present discussion, however, the concept of liberty as freedom from arbitrary rule seems to have been the dominant one during the early empire.⁵

Liberty, therefore, did not mean license to do as one wants; it was constrained within a legal, social, or political framework. It did not connote, in modern terms, democratic egalitarianism, as it might have done in Greece, but rather an existence ordered under law rather than under the arbitrary will of a master.⁶ It might in the later republic be diversely interpreted by the senatorial ruling class, the *optimates*, as freedom to enjoy the privileges and opportunities to which they thought that their rank and position, their *dignitas*, entitled them. Or it might be used by their senatorial opponents, eager to promote their own careers, as a watchword under which to appeal to the sovereign people against the dominance of the optimate clique.⁷ In general, however, by the end of the republic, and particularly in Cicero's writings, liberty had become identified with citizenship in a republic under legal and constitutional government.⁸

During the years from 49 to 29 B.C., the republican constitution, and hence liberty, were overshadowed by the dictatorship of Caesar and by

the collegiate dictatorship of the Second Triumvirate. The experience of these years confirmed the Roman upper and intellectual class in the view, expressed during these years by Cicero, that the recovery of liberty was concomitant with the restoration of the orderly government of the Senate and Roman People in accordance with law and tradition. While Cicero never attained in popular imagination the status of martyr to freedom which Cato achieved by his suicide after the defeat of the republican forces at Thapsus in 46 B.C.,⁹ he had been the literary and philosophic spokesman for the opposition to tyranny from his consulship in 63 B.C. until his death in 43 B.C., and his influence must have remained strong in the identification of liberty with the republican constitution.¹⁰

In the following discussion, the influence of this identification upon the Augustan principate and the gradual change of emphasis which took place from 30 B.C. until the accession of Nerva in 96 will be illustrated by a consideration of six specific phrases:

- (1) *Libertatis P(opuli) R(omani) uindex*, "Champion of the liberty of the Roman People," as applied to Augustus on coins issued somewhere in Asia Minor in 28 B.C.
- (2) The watchword *libertas* given by the senate to Cassius Chaerea after the murder of Gaius Caligula in 41.
- (3) The legend *libertas Augusta* which first appeared on the coinage of Claudius.
- (4) The legend *libertas P(opuli) R(omani) restituta* which figured initially and only briefly on coins of Galba after his revolt against Nero in 68.
- (5) The description of Vespasian as *adsertor libertatis public(ae)* on senatorial coinage of 71.
- (6) The familiar sentence from Tacitus' *Agricola* partly used as a title for this discussion: *Nerua Caesar res olim dissociabiles miscuerit, principatum ac libertatem*, "Nerva Caesar united things formerly incompatible, principate and liberty."

An issue of silver tetradrachms issued in Asia Minor in 28/27 B.C. bears on the obverse a head of Augustus surrounded by the legend *Imp. Caesar diui f. cos. VI libertatis P.R. uindex* and on the reverse a female figure with appropriate attributes labeled *Pax* and surrounded by a laurel wreath.¹¹ Mattingly included this issue among coins of the mint of Ephesus, presumably as issued by the assembly of the cities of the Roman province of Asia, the *Koinon Asiae*. Sutherland and Grant attribute it rather to Bithynia.¹² Although Augustan propaganda placed

great emphasis on the restoration of peace, this obverse legend represents the only mention of liberty on Augustan coinage. Sutherland and Grant therefore conclude that it commemorated the restoration of senatorial government in provinces freed from the arbitrary rule of the Triumvirs, and Grenade connects both obverse and reverse with the importance of the restoration of liberty (with reference to "free" cities), peace, and good government to the war-torn eastern provinces.¹³ He compares Cicero, *Phil.* II 113:

et nomen pacis dulce est et ipsa res salutaris, sed inter pacem et seruitutem plurimum interest. Pax est tranquilla libertas, seruitus postremum malorum omnium, non modo bello sed morte etiam repellendum.

The term *uindex* meant in Roman law one who took the place of an accused person as his bail and champion in trial, and hence generally a protector or defender; the meaning "punisher" or "avenger" is only derivative.¹⁴

The obverse legend is commonly compared with Augustus' own statement at the opening of the record of his achievements which he left to be set up before his mausoleum. At the opening of his *Res Gestae* he states:¹⁵

exercitum priuato consilio et priuata impensa comparaui, per quem rem publicam a dominatione factionis oppressam in libertatem uindicaui.

Here the statement is that "I championed into liberty the state oppressed by the arbitrary rule of a faction" whereas in the legend of the coins it is liberty herself whom he championed, presumably also against arbitrary rule. Hence it is unlikely that the legend of 28 B.C. harked back to the events of 43 B.C. The general trend has been to refer it to the victory of Actium in the fall of 31 B.C., but Grenade makes a strong case for referring it to the end of the Civil Wars, which he believes Augustus to have proclaimed by edict in 28 B.C., and hence for connecting the championing of liberty with the restoration of the republican constitution.¹⁶ According to Grenade, the Augustan "settlement" comprised three steps: the triumph over the foreign enemy Cleopatra after the Battle of Actium; the proclamation of the end of the Civil Wars, reaching back to 49 B.C.; and the "restoration of the Republic" in 28-27 B.C., of which Augustus says toward the end of the *Res Gestae*:¹⁷

In consulatu sexto et septimo, postquam bella ciuilia extinxeram, per consensum uniuersorum potitus rerum omnium, rem publicam ex mea potestate in senatus populi Romani arbitrium transtuli. Quo pro merito meo senatus consulto Augustus appellatus sum etc.

It is immaterial to this discussion whether Augustus was sincere in this statement or whether, as Suetonius, Tacitus, and Dio were to maintain a century and more later, he hypocritically veiled behind the facade of the Restored Republic the foundation of a monarchy which in their time had become overt.¹⁸ At least the description of Augustus on this coin as "champion of the liberty of the Roman People" is closely connected with the peace which he established for a world which had suffered long from war, and also, as Grenade makes clear, with an ostensible return to a republican government under law and tradition such as Cicero had advocated.¹⁹

Augustus realized, however, that the experience of the late republic proved that liberty and peace needed some better guarantee than simply the restoration of the sovereignty of the Senate and Roman People. He therefore built himself into the framework of the Republic as an agent to whom the Senate and Roman People assigned certain specific powers and functions, notably the control of the sinews of power, the armed forces and, to a considerable extent, the finances. His personality, achievement, and position further created for him a respect, endowing him with what the Romans called *auctoritas*, which gave him undisputed influence even in areas for which he had no specific commission. In a familiar passage in the *Res Gestae* separated from that just quoted only by the list of honors voted in January, 27 B.C., he continues:²⁰

Post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestatis autem nihilo amplius habui quam ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt.

He thus became only the first among equals, *princeps inter pares*, vis à vis other magistrates or senatorial governors, and indeed vis à vis the source of his powers, the Senate and Roman People.²¹

The intrusion of the "prince" into the Restored Republic inevitably imposed limitations on its liberty. Moreover, whether or not the popular assemblies continued to function for long under the principate, they were in fact ineffective under Augustus, since initiative in legislation and elections emanated from him or from the senate and even the magistrates, particularly the tribunes, lost whatever independent initiative they had asserted under the late republic. Thus liberty soon lost the connection with the Roman People expressed on the tetradrachm of Augustus, and assumed primarily the connotation which it had sometimes had under the late republic, the freedom of the senate from domination by the prince.²² Suetonius, *Tib.* 29, preserves a statement

by Tiberius which illustrates the developing concept of how the prince should behave:²³

Dixi et nunc et saepe alias, patres conscripti, bonum et salutarem principem, quem uos tanta et tam libera potestate instruxistis, senatu seruire debere et uniuersis ciuibus saepe et plerumque etiam singulis. Neque id dixisse me paenitet; et bonos et aequos et fauentes uos habui dominos et adhuc habeo.

The sense of duty which led Tiberius to compare his relation to the state to that of a slave (*seruire*) to a master (*dominos*) is attested by other statements attributed to him. Dio, LVII 8.2, quotes his remark that he was master (*despotes=dominus*) of his slaves, commander (*autokrator=imperator*) of his soldiers, and prince (*prokritos=princeps*) of the remaining people. And Velleius Paterculus, II 124.2, says that he wanted to be *potius aequalem ciuem quam eminentem . . . principem*. Tacitus, *Ann.* IV 37-38, puts in his mouth in 25 a refusal of divine honors which contains the following parallel statement in § 38.1:

Ego me, patres conscripti, mortalem esse et hominum officia fungi, satisque habere si locum principem impleam, et uos testor et meminisse posteros uolo; qui satis superque memoriae meae tribuent, ut maioribus meis dignum, rerum uestrarum prouidum, constantem in periculis, offenditionum pro utilitate publica non pauidum credant.

Such expressions carry on the Augustan ideal of the principate in which, as Grenade (among others) notes, there was a strong element of the Stoic view that the ruler is responsible for the well-being of the state.²⁴ They may also, despite Tacitus' view, indicate that Tiberius regarded his position with real humility and a strongly Roman sense of duty.

Unfortunately, both the subservience of the senate and, as Wirszubski says, Tiberius' own admission that the principate was endowed with *tanta et tam libera potestate* were fraught with ill omen for the future of liberty conceived of as freedom from arbitrary rule but still under a prince.²⁵ Tiberius' personality, his eventual withdrawal from Rome to Capri, and his misplaced confidence in his praetorian praefect Sejanus created so wide a breach between him and public opinion that his death in 37 was hailed with general rejoicing and his image as a "tyrant" was imposed upon later historical tradition by the senatorial writers of the time.²⁶

Tiberius' successor Gaius, commonly known by the nickname "Caligula," either was mentally unbalanced on his accession or became so soon thereafter. His outrageously arbitrary and autocratic conduct led within four years to the formation of a conspiracy against him among

leading senators and high officers of the praetorian guard. A praetorian tribune, Cassius Chaerea, played the chief role in his assassination early in 41.²⁷ The Jewish historian Josephus gives the most detailed account of the assassination and its sequel, probably following contemporary accounts and perhaps one by a participant, the senator and historian Cluvius Rufus.²⁸ He states that when Cassius asked the consuls for a watchword to give to the troops on sentry duty, they, surprised at this recognition in the hundredth year since the Republic (*ten demokratian*) was first dissolved, gave him the word "Liberty," *eleutherian edosan*. Clearly, at this second of the moments under discussion, liberty still connoted the recognition of the consuls as chief magistrates of a Republic freed from the domination of a prince become tyrant.

But Cassius and the consuls were appealing to ideals already anachronistic. When the praetorian guard supported Gaius' uncle Claudius, the senate had no recourse but to confer upon him the powers which had gathered around the principate. Claudius may well have desired initially to restore the Augustan balance between prince and senate. Some bronze coins issued during his opening years bear on the reverse a female type indicated by the legend as *libertas Augusta* and Mattingly comments that this is meant to show that liberty could flourish under the principate, that is, that constitutional republican government would replace Caligula's mad despotism.²⁹ Thus for the ideal briefly revived in 41 that liberty meant the restoration of the Republic without a prince was substituted a development of the Augustan concept of liberty under the "Restored Republic" but with a prince built into it. In the Claudian legend, liberty is actually fostered by the "Augustus" of the moment and the identification of liberty and principate becomes overt.³⁰

But Claudius failed to maintain the Augustan balance between prince and senate, not because he was monarchical, like Gaius, but because of his weakness of character and his consequent dependence upon his immediate entourage of freedmen and women.³¹ His niece and fourth wife, Agrippina the Younger, took forceful charge of him after their marriage in 49 and poisoned him in 54 to secure the succession to Nero, her son by a previous marriage. The young prince was torn three ways, between his domineering mother, his own artistic temperament, and his well-intentioned advisers, the praetorian praefect Burrus and the philosopher Seneca the Younger. Tacitus reports a speech, which he states to have been written by Seneca, given by Nero to the senate soon after his accession. In this speech Nero promises to return to the

Augustan ideal by avoiding that concentration of power within the palace which had characterized the reign of Claudius. Tacitus' version concludes, in *Ann.* XIII 4.2:³²

Discretam domum et rem publicam. Teneret antiqua munia senatus; consulum tribunalibus Italia et publicae prouinciae adsisterent; illi patrum aditum p[ro]aeberent. Se mandatis exercitibus consulturum.

Nero failed to live up to these high promises. In due course he rid himself of his adoptive brother Britannicus, of his wife (and adoptive sister) Octavia, and of his mother Agrippina. When death carried off Burrus, Seneca first retired and then was forced to suicide. In 65, a conspiracy among high senatorial and military circles no longer sought, as had that against Gaius, to eliminate the principate, but to substitute for Nero a certain Lucius Calpurnius Piso; it failed for want of nerve on the part of its members. But Nero's extravagant conduct had alienated public opinion in the provinces and armies, where the old traditions of Roman dignity and republicanism lived on. An initial revolt in Gaul, led by a Romanized native with the significant name of Vindex, was suppressed by the commanding general of the legions on the Upper Rhine, Verginius Rufus. The troops of Verginius offered to support him against Nero but he refused. However, the governor of the imperial province in Spain, Galba, though he had only one legion under his command, allowed himself in April of 68 to be hailed as a victorious general, thereby accepting a salutation reserved since Augustus for the prince. Suetonius, *Galba* 10.1, continues: *consalutatus imperator, legatum se Senatus ac Populi Romani professus est.*³³ Galba's early coinage, issued in Spain and Gaul, shows *imperator* after his name, that is, presumably, as a revival of the republican salutation of a general and not as establishing any claim to the principate. It also omits the *cognomen Augusti*, that is, he did not continue a "reigning family."³⁴ Thus his claim to be "legate of the Senate and Roman People" probably represented a program of restoring the Republic without a prince.

This propaganda is confirmed by the fact that his initial coinage in Spain and Gaul does not bear his image and superscription on the obverse, as had the bulk of the coinage since Augustus, but rather types and legends recalling the republican coinage.³⁵ On some issues, apparently minted in Gaul, appear such legends as *salus generis humani*, *salus et libertas*, or *pax et libertas*, the last of which recalls the legends of the Augustan tetradrachms.³⁶ On a few, the obverse type is a bust of Liberty personified, with a legend to name her, and on the reverse a *pileus*, the cap worn by a freed slave and hence a familiar symbol of

liberty, flanked by two daggers and the legend continued from the obverse: *P(opuli) R(omani) restituta*.³⁷ The type of the pileus flanked by daggers had last been used on the reverse of a *denarius* coined for Brutus in Greece in 44/43 B.C. with the legend *Eid. Mar.*, referring to the assassination of Caesar.³⁸ While this constitutes the most overt propaganda on Galba's coinage of hope of "the restored liberty of the Roman People," that is, of a return to a Republic without a prince, other Spanish *denarii* bear on the obverse the type of liberty and the legend *libertas P.R.* or *libertati* and *S.P.Q.R.* on the reverse.³⁹ This mention of "The Senate and Roman People" presumably reflects Galba's claim to be only their representative, not coining in virtue of his own *imperium*, since the coinage of gold and silver had regularly been a prerogative of the prince and only bronze had been issued in virtue of a *S(enatus) C(onsultum)*.⁴⁰

The type of liberty and the legend *libertas P.R.* appear on the reverse of some *denarii* issued in Rome with Galba's bust and name on the obverse, and liberty continued to figure prominently on his coinage throughout his brief reign.⁴¹ Kraay, indeed, holds that the type of liberty may derive from a statue erected in Rome, since an inscription reported by various scholars of the sixteenth century read on the front:⁴²

imaginum domus Aug. cultorib. signum libertatis restitutae Ser. Galbae imperatoris Aug. curatores anni secundi (5 names) s. p. d. d.

and on the left side:

dedic. idib. Octobr. C. Bellico Natale, P. Cornelio Scipione Asiatico cos., that is, on October 15, 68. That the statue should have been of "the restored liberty of Galba," rather than of "the liberty restored by Galba," and the fact that it was dedicated by the officers of a guild of "worshipers of the images of the Augustan house" indicate that it was impossible in Rome and in the palace to separate the concept of liberty from that of the principate. In fact Galba's image and imperial titles soon appeared on the obverse of his coins and, while liberty continues to be a major theme on the reverse, it becomes *libertas publica* or, as under Claudius, *libertas Augusta*.⁴³ Although some scholars regard "public liberty" as a variant of "liberty of the Roman People," it seems more likely that it did not refer to the freedom of the Roman People from arbitrary rule but rather to the freedom of all inhabitants of the empire under government and law, a freedom not inconsistent with the existence of a prince.⁴⁴ Wirszubski, indeed, identifies *libertas publica*

with good order, security, and confidence, in a word with *securitas*.⁴⁵ He cites Pliny, *Pan.* 44.5:

Salua est omnibus uita et dignitas uitae, nec iam consideratus ac sapiens qui aetatem in tenebris agit —

a conclusion which recalls Tacitus' condemnation in *Agr.* 2.3, 3.2, of the "silence" imposed by Domitian. Wirszubski might have gone on to quote Pliny's next sentence:

Eadem quippe sub principe uirtutibus praemia quae in libertate, nec bene factis tantum ex conscientia merces.

In saying this, Pliny, despite his identification of liberty and the principate, echoes the earlier contrast between the principate and liberty = the Republic. In short, by the time of Galba, "public liberty" was parallel to the "Augustan liberty" first publicized by Claudius as a virtue of the prince responsible for maintaining it. Indeed, Vitellius had placed on his coins *libertas Augusti* to emphasize the fact that liberty now pertained to the Augustus, as did other virtues similarly modified by the genitive rather than by an adjective.⁴⁶

Thus Galba's initial presentation of himself as legate of the Senate and Roman People, who would restore the liberty of the Roman People from the arbitrary rule of the tyrant Nero, may properly be regarded as the last occasion on which the restoration of the Republic without a prince was seriously advocated. Galba realized on his arrival in Rome that he must accept the responsibility and powers of the principate.⁴⁷ Though he continued to emphasize liberty, he returned to the concept implicit in Augustan propaganda and made explicit by Claudius that public liberty, the security of the inhabitants of the empire from arbitrary rule, was a responsibility and virtue of the prince.

Vespasian, winner of the struggle for the principate during the year "of the four emperors," made even clearer the position which Galba had had to accept, namely that the principate could not be abolished, by presenting it overtly as hereditary in order to strengthen it against the uncertainties to which the problem of succession had since the death of Augustus exposed it. It is, indeed, with the accession of Vespasian that it seems correct to begin to speak of the position of an emperor instead of the powers of the principate.⁴⁸ Some of his apparently early coins repeat the themes of Galba: *libertas publica* without or with *S.C.*, *libertas restituta S.C.*, *libertas Augusti S.C.*⁴⁹ At the same time, Vespasian claimed to return to the tradition of Augustus, and *sestertii* of 71 bear on the reverse a legend recalling the tetradraehms of 28 B.C., namely:

*S.P.Q.R. assertori libertatis public(ae).*⁵⁰ Whatever the reason for substituting the word “defender,” *assertor*, for the Augustan “champion,” *uindex*, the meaning is much the same, since the term “asserter of liberty” was applied in Roman law to one who asserted and defended the claim of an alleged slave to freedom.⁵¹ Donatus, indeed, commenting on a passage in Terence, says: *assertores dicuntur uindices alienae libertatis.*⁵² Mommsen argued that the phrase politically applied not to one who replaced a bad ruler by a good but to one who entirely overthrew monarchy.⁵³ He notes that Pliny the Elder, *NH* XX 160, called Vindex *assertorem illum a Nerone libertatis*; that Martial, VII 63.10, speaks of the year 68 as that *asserto qui sacer orbe fuit*; that Tacitus, *Hist.* II 61, says that a certain Mariccus, a Boian who started an uprising in the same year, claimed to be *assertor Galliarum et deus*; that Suetonius, *Galba* 9.2, says that Vindex, before his defeat, had written to urge *Galba ut humano genere assertorem ducemque se accomodaret*; and that Pliny the Younger, *Ep.* VI 10.4, cites Verginius Rufus’ epitaph for himself:

Hic situs est Rufus, pulso qui Vindice quondam
imperium adseruit non sibi, sed patriae.

These examples suggest that the phrase *assertor libertatis publicae* reflects the current antityrannical parlance of the time and that, as Mommsen concludes, anyone who wanted to consolidate the principate anew after Nero’s fall must officially present himself as “protector of the public liberty.”⁵⁴ In the legend on Vespasian’s *sestertius*, therefore, the concept of liberty is again, as Wirszubski says, set in opposition to that of slavery and Vespasian meant that as Augustus had “vindicated” the liberty of the Roman People from the arbitrary rule of the Triumvirs, so he had “asserted” public liberty, that is, the liberty of all inhabitants of the empire, from the arbitrary rule of Nero. Thus “liberty” was no longer simply that of Roman citizens under the Republic but the secure enjoyment of legal rights and protection by everybody under the constitutional prince, who was in a fair way to become a monarch.

Domitian, Vespasian’s second son and second successor, proved false these hopes of liberty as publicized by his father. He presented himself as an absolute and divine monarch, *dominus et deus*.⁵⁵ Tension between him and both the senate and his own entourage led to his assassination in 96 by a conspiracy not of senators but of his praetorian praefects and palace freedmen, who feared that if they did not get rid of their master, he would eliminate them.⁵⁶ The conspirators, warned by events on the deaths of Gaius and Nero, had a candidate ready. Tacitus, hailing the

accession of the elderly senator Nerva as the end of fifteen years of silence imposed by Domitian's unwillingness to hear anything except flattery, asserted of him and his colleague and successor Trajan, in *Agr.* 3.1:⁵⁷

Nunc demum reddit animus; et quamquam primo statim beatissimi saeculi ortu Nerua Caesar res olim dissociabiles miscuerit, principatum ac libertatem augeatque cotidie felicitatem temporum Nerua Traianus, nec spem modo ac uotum securitas publica, sed ipsius uoti fiduciam ac robur assumpserit etc.

The coinage of Nerva echoes that of Galba in advertising *libertas publica*, either with or without the qualifying *S.C.*, as the watchword of the reaction against Domitianic tyranny.⁵⁸ The German monk who visited Rome in the eighth or ninth century and with unusual precocity made a collection of inscriptions preserved in a codex at the Swiss monastery of Einsiedeln reports that one on the Capitoline Hill read (as restored):⁵⁹

libertati ab Imp. Nerua Caesare Aug. anno ab urbe condita DCCCXXXIIX xiiii k. Oct. restitutae S.P.Q.R.

That is, the Senate and Roman People dedicated something, whether statue or temple, to the liberty which Nerva had restored on October 18, 96, the day of the assassination of Domitian. In doing so, they recognized that liberty could no longer even ostensibly be presented as the restoration of the Republic. Pliny, in the *Panegyric* which he delivered in the senate in 100 to thank Trajan for allowing him to hold a suffect consulship, confirms Tacitus by stating that under Trajan *eodem foro utuntur principatus et libertas*.⁶⁰

Tacitus' statement that Nerva (first) reconciled things long incompatible, principate and liberty, is, of course, rhetorical exaggeration. During the century and a quarter which had elapsed from the foundation of the principate to the accession of Nerva, the concept of liberty as the restoration of the Republic survived, perhaps chiefly among the old "republican" families. It had been revived briefly in the watchword "liberty" given by the consuls on the assassination of Gaius and in the legend *libertas P.R. restituta* on coins issued by Galba while he posed as legate of the Senate and Roman People. But the tetradrachms of Augustus, presenting him as *libertatis P.R. uindex*, already implied that liberty and the principate were not irreconcilable and that liberty was closely joined to peace. Claudius gave open expression to the concept that *libertas Augusta* was a responsibility, and even a "virtue," of the prince, and in Galba's later coinage, this liberty is no longer that only of

the Roman People but *publica*, applicable throughout the empire, and equated with *securitas*. Thus Vespasian could be described as an *adserior libertatis publicae* against the absolute rule of Nero, Otho, and Vitellius, even though he openly insisted on the dynastic character of the principate.

This discussion has dealt with only one aspect of the concept of liberty under the Julio-Claudians and Flavians. Following closely the exposition by Wirszubski, it lies open to the criticism of narrowness made by Momigliano.⁶¹ Nothing has been said of the influence on the change in the concept which must have resulted from the fact that from the beginning, Roman rule had been accepted both in Italy and in the east as compatible with the existence of "free cities."⁶² More significantly, no mention has been made of the important part played by Stoic doctrine in the reconciliation of liberty and the principate.⁶³ The reconciliation may, indeed, be attributed not simply to the general recognition that the restoration of the Republic controlled, as envisaged by Cicero, by an enlightened senate was no longer a realistic program; it also reflects the emergence of a new senatorial class. The old republican families, whether genuinely devoted to the Ciceronian ideal or seeking to recover their own privileged position under the guise of liberty, were replaced during the first century of the empire by families promoted either through imperial favor or in the imperial service and therefore ready to accept the principate in terms of the Stoic views that the best should rule under the guidance of reason as expressed in law and that acceptance of such rule by the body politic constituted true liberty.⁶⁴ Liberty does indeed continue to appear on the coinage, but its significance becomes closely connected with the emperor, and particularly with his liberality.⁶⁵ In short, under the Antonines, the concept of liberty as standing over against slavery, the concept from which this discussion began, gave way to that of liberty as freedom from arbitrary rule, under the security afforded by law and by a prince responsible for its equitable application.⁶⁶

In the later Empire, political liberty ceased to be an important concept and equal justice for all became the too often violated ideal of good government.⁶⁷ But the Christian church took over the idea that the only true freedom was in complete submission to an all-powerful but also all-wise and just God.⁶⁸ This remained perhaps the dominant concept of liberty during the Middle Ages and finds expression in a well-known statement of the English jurist Bracton in the thirteenth century: *rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub deo et lege*.⁶⁹ However, the reaction which took place in early modern Europe against absolutism meant a

revival of the older, republican connotation of liberty. In the mid-seventeenth century, Algernon Sidney wrote in an album at the University of Copenhagen verses which, though apparently of his own composition, might well have been used by Lucan to describe the action of those who assassinated Caesar and whose emblems were revived by Galba:⁷⁰

manus haec inimica tyrannis
ense petit placidam sub libertate quietem.

NOTES

1. This discussion was presented as part of a panel on "Problems relating to Freedom in the pre-Modern World" at the meeting of the American Historical Association in 1961. In it, dates B.C. will be so indicated but A.D. will be omitted with dates in the Christian era.

2. Chaim Wirszubski, *Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome etc.* (Cambridge Classical Studies; Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge Univ. Press 1950); reviewed by Arnaldo Momigliano in *Journal of Roman Studies* XLI (1951) 146–153. An Italian translation by Giosuè Musca, *Libertas: il concetto politico di Libertà a Roma etc.* (Biblioteca di cultura moderna 518; Bari, Laterza 1957) includes a translation of Momigliano's review but not the original bibliography. This study will be referred to as W with the pages of both the English and the Italian texts. Other works referred to by abbreviations will be:

BM: Harold Mattingly, *Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum* (London, For the Trustees):

- I: *Augustus to Vitellius* (1923),
- II: *Vespasian to Domitian* (1930),
- III: *Nerva to Hadrian* (1936).

CAH: *The Cambridge Ancient History* (Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge Univ. Press):

- X: *The Augustan Empire, 44 B.C.–A.D. 70* (1934),
- XI: *The Imperial Peace, A.D. 70–192* (1936).

Sutherland: C. H. V. Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy 31 B.C.–A.D. 68* (London, Methuen 1951).

Grant: Michael Grant, *Roman Imperial Money* (London, Nelson 1954).

Grenade: Pierre Grenade, *Essai sur les Origines du Principat etc.* (Bibliothèque des Ecoles franç. d'Athènes et de Rome 197; Paris, de Boccard 1961).

Other books cited more than once are referred to by author and short title in citations following the first. It may be noted that a panel discussion on "Classical Concepts of Liberty" was held at the meeting of the American Philological Association in 1960, see *Transactions and Proceedings of the APA* XCI (1960), *Proc.* xlii; the papers have apparently not been published. The recent book by Herbert J. Muller, *Freedom in the Ancient World* (New York, Harper 1961), has nothing relevant to the present discussion; his discussion of the later republic, pp. 254–260, is chiefly a criticism of Cicero as an insincere and impractical

"republican" and that of the early empire, pp. 260-270, mentions Augustus as "champion of liberty" on p. 261 but does not raise the issue of freedom until the discussion of a quotation from Aristides under the Antonines (p. 263), who praised the Romans as rulers over free men, thus echoing the concept of *principatus ac libertas* as used by Tacitus; see below, n.62.

3. W 1-3=7-11 contrasts liberty and slavery.

4. *JRS* XLI (1951) 146=W(Ital.) 259-261 gives Momigliano's enlargement of the concept of liberty. He cites Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press 1939) 59, 155, for the vague and "propagandist" connotations of *libertas* in the late republic; compare also W 103-106=157-161.

5. Hugh M. Last, in *CAH* XI 436, contrasts the Roman concept of *libertas*=freedom from arbitrary rule with the Greek concept of *eleutheria*=unfettered freedom. He notes that *libertas* "did not imply a community's untrammelled control of its international relations, with the right to declare peace and war at will," that it was not inconsistent with *principatus*, "which was one of its constitutional counterparts," and that the value of free institutions was not seriously impaired by the *Pax Augusta* and the imperial absorption of communities into a larger whole.

6. W 30=51 points out that liberty at Rome was not egalitarian.

7. W 40=65 contrasts the optimate and demagogic ("popular") use of liberty as a slogan.

8. W 95=145 identifies liberty with the senatorial republic.

9. Cato's reputation is best expressed in Lucan's famous epigram, *Phars. I* 128: *uictrix causa deis placuit, sed uicta Catoni.*

10. For Cicero's political theory, see, briefly, Mason Hammond, *City-State and World State etc.* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press 1951) 126-140.

11. For the "cistophoric" tetradrachms of 28/27 B.C., see *BM* I 112 nos. 691-693 and p. 17 no. 4, and W 97=148 n.3, 105-106=159-161.

12. For discussion of the tetradrachms, see Sutherland 31 with pl. I (frontispiece) no. 16; Grant 22-24, with fig. 4 on p. 20.

13. For the significance of liberty and peace to the East, see Sutherland 31, Grant 23, Grenade 64-65.

14. For the meaning of *uindex*, see Adolph Berger, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law* (*Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, new series 43.2; Philadelphia 1953) 766 s.v.

15. Aug. *RG* 1.1; for parallel passages see Jean Gagé, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* (*Publications de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Univ. de Strasbourg, textes d'étude* 5; Paris, Les Belles Lettres [ed. 2] 1950) notes on pp. 73-74. W 102=156 cites particularly a closely similar passage from Cic. *Phil.* IV 2; compare Grenade 69-70. For the connection between the coin legend and the *RG*, see also Salvatore Riccobono, *Acta Diui Augusti* I (Rome, Regia Academia Italica 1945) 82 no. 1 and pl. I no. 1; Jessie D. Newby, *A Numismatic Commentary on the Res Gestae of Augustus* (*Iowa Studies in Classical Philology* I; 1938) 2 no. 2.

16. The traditional connection of the coin legend with Actium is given in W 105=159. For Grenade's view, see pp. 63-66, concluding: "La monnaie de 28... nous introduit au centre de l'idéologie du Principat. Elle nous révèle le lien congénital que noue entre la Paix et la Liberté cette notion de la prétendue 'Restoration de la République' et la justification la plus haute pour les esprits de l'institution du Principat." Mattingly, *BM* I cxxv, refers the legend "to (Augustus') renunciation of power in B.C. 28 and 27."

17. *RG* 34.1; for parallel passages see Gagé's ed. 143–145 nn.; Velleius Paterculus II 89 is particularly close to the *RG*. The "restoration of the Republic" was gratefully recognized by the senate's vote of the *cognomen Augutus* and other honors on Jan. 16, 27 B.C.; see Gagé 164 under the day, and in general Grenade 144–165. On p. 151, Grenade eritieizes the view that the "republican ideology" of *uindex libertatis* was used by Augustus to justify him in acting on his own initiative, without any regular delegation of powers. This view Grenade attributes to André Magdelain, *Auctoritas Principis* (Société des Etudes Latines, *Coll. des Et. Lat.*, série scientifique XXII, Paris, Les Belles Lettres 1947) 39–47. Though Magdelain's book is the strongest argument for the view that after 23 B.C. Augustus depended on his undefined *auctoritas* and not on the proconsular *imperium*, in these pages he simply argues for the close connection between the phrase *uindex libertatis* and the program of the *res publica restituta*.

18. For the claim that Augustus was insincere in his restoration of the Republic, see Tacitus' general estimate of Augustus in *Ann.* I 1–10, especially I 1.1; also Dio's discussion of the nature of the principate in LIII 17–18, and his conclusion in LIII 19.1 that "in this way the constitution was changed at that time for the better and in the interest of greater security; for it was in every way impossible for the people to be saved if functioning as a democracy." For other references to Dio, see W 107–108 nn.3, 1 = 163 nn. 1, 3.

19. For argument in support of the view that Cicero's theory of the conservative republic with a "built-in" *princeps* or *principes* directly influenced Augustus, see Hammond, *City-State* 141–165, with a brief bibliography of earlier discussions in 203 n.16. More recently, Ettore Lepore has discussed the problem fully in his *Il Princeps Ciceroniano e gli ideali politici della tarda Repubblica* (Naples, Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici 1954).

20. *RG* 34.3; for the discovery of fragments of a Latin text of the *RG* at Antioch in Pisidia in 1927, which showed this *auctoritate*, not Mommsen's restoration of *dignitate* from the Greek, see Gagé's ed. 147 n. For a brief bibliography of the emphasis placed by modern scholarship on *auctoritas*, see Mason Hammond, *The Antonine Monarchy (Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome XIX)*; Rome 1959) 42 n.1, to which add Grenade 336–363.

21. For the origin and meaning of *princeps*, see Mason Hammond, *The Augustan Principate* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1933) 111–112 with nn. on pp. 267–268.

22. W 136–138 = 203–207 shows how liberty came to connote the affirmation of the rights of the senate.

23. In Suet. *Tib.* 29, Bergk yielded to the temptation to emend *semper* into the text before *seruire*, where it might readily have been omitted. See W 130 = 196–197.

24. Grenade 449; on p. 421 he dates the statement given by Suetonius to the first weeks of Tiberius' principate in 14.

25. W 112 = 169 on *tanta et tam libera potestate*.

26. J. C. Tarver, *Tiberius the Tyrant* (New York, Dutton; Westminster, Constable 1902), developed the thesis that the traditional rhetorical pattern of the "tyrant" influenced the historical characterization of Tiberius. Modern scholarship has analyzed the exaggeration and false emphases in the surviving ancient accounts, has redeemed the sincerity of Tiberius as an administrator loyal to the policies laid down by Augustus, and has discounted, or wholly denied,

the picture given of him as a monster of vice in his retirement at Capri; see the summary with bibliography in *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (1949) 906–907 s.v.

27. For Cassius Chaerea, see the account in Pauly, Wissowa, usw., *Real-Encyclopädie usw.* III (half-vol. 6, 1899) 1682–1683 under *Cassius* no. 37. He joined the conspiracy because Gaius had often insulted him; he and other principals in the plot were soon executed by Claudius.

28. For the assassination of Gaius and the accession of Claudius, see Joseph. *Ant. Iud.* XIX chs. 1–4 (secs. 1–274); the passage on the watchword is in secs. 186–187. See also J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *The Emperor Gaius Caligula* (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1934) 101–106; on pp. 223–224, 227–228, he accepts the earlier views that Josephus preserves the account of Cluvius Rufus. Louis H. Feldman “The Sources of Josephus’ *Antiquities*, Book 19” in *Latomus* XXI (1962) 320–333, argues that it cannot be taken as proved that Cluvius Rufus was Josephus’ source.

29. For *asses* of Claudius with the type of liberty and the legend *libertas Augusta*, see *BM* I clvii and 185 nos. 145, 146 (dated on p. 181 in 41) and pl. 35 no. 3 (both sides); 192 nos. 202–205 (dated, p. 190, 42 onward) and pl. 36 no. 6. Grant, p. 128 and p. 284 n. 134, cites *BM* I 185 (not, as he says, p. 184) no. 148, of the same character as nos. 145, 146, but with a countermark. He does not discuss its significance, though he refers to the legend on p. 162 (see pl. XII no. 1) and on p. 227 as an “anniversary” type; see also his discussion of the type on pp. 262–263. Mattingly lists no. 148 and the similar no. 147 as “imitations.”

30. For the significance of *libertas Augusta* on the *asses* of Claudius, see Sutherland 133 with pl. XIV no. 3. Although Tiberius tried to reserve the *cognomen Augusti* to Augustus, it was used of him and regularly assumed by his successors; see Mason Hammond, “Imperial Elements in the Formula of the Roman Emperors etc.” in *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* XXV (1957) 22.

31. Modern scholarship has shown that though Claudius’ physical and mental weaknesses prevented him from asserting himself in major policy matters, he was a conscientious, if pedantic, administrator in details; see the brief account of his reign and his personality with bibliography in the *Oxford Class. Dict.* 196–197.

32. For Nero’s speech in Tac. *Ann.* XIII 4, see Grenade 281–282, 419; Hammond, *Aug. Princ.* 41, 62–63, 129, 178.

33. For the revolt and proclamation of Galba, see Suet. *Galba* 9.2–11; Plut. *Galba* 4.2–5.3; *CAH* X 811.

34. For the omission of *Aug.* on Galba’s early coinage, see *BM* I lxviii, ccx, 337–351; for the placing of *Imp.*, see p. cciii and Hammond, “Imperial Elements” 24, citing for his republicanism, Mason Hammond, “The Transmission of the Imperial Powers etc.” in *Mem. Am. Acad. Rome* XXIV (1956) 67–68. The use of *Imperator* as a praenomen had been dropped by Tiberius but formally revived by Nero; see Hammond, “Imperial Elements” 22–23, especially n. 10.

35. For Galba’s early coinage in Spain and Gaul, see *BM* I and Colin M. Kraay, “The *Aes* Coinage of Galba” in *Numismatic Notes and Monographs* 133 (New York, American Numismatic Society 1956), who refines the assignment of Galba’s bronze coinage to mints and issues and, on the basis of this analysis, gives on pp. 8–11 a chronology of Galba’s few months of reign.

36. For coins of Galba with *salus generis humani*, see *BM* I lxxiv and *CAH* vol. of plates IV 206 no. n; in *BM* I cxciv, cxcvi, Mattingly attributes these to Gaul and connects them with the appeal of Vindex to Galba, cited below; later, as he says on p. ccv, the same legend appears on Galba's imperial issues at Rome, see Index VI 450 s.v. In his *Roman Coins etc.* (London, Methuen [ed. 2] 1960) 108, Harold Mattingly says that this legend originally was a slogan of Vindex. For *salus* (or *pax*) *et libertas*, see *BM* I cxcvi.

37. For Galba's early *denarii* issued in Spain with the reverse type of the *pileus* and daggers, see *BM* I cxci, 290 nos. 7, 8, and pl. 49 nos. 20, 21. On p. ccv, Mattingly remarks that Galba chose for the occasion of his proclamation a day, April 2, 68, on which he was sitting in judgment for the manumission of slaves; see Suet. *Galba* 10.1, Plut. *Galba* 5.1.

38. The *denarius* of Brutus in 44/43 B.C. shows on the obverse his bust with the legend *Brut. Imp.* and the name of the moneyer, *L. Plaet. Cest.*, and on the reverse the *pileus* between daggers and *Eid. Mar.*; see Edward A. Sydenham, *The Coinage of the Roman Republic* (London, Spink & Son 1952) 203 no. 1301 and pl. 30 no. 1301, and compare *BM* I cxci n.3, cxciii.

39. For Galba's Spanish *denarii* with *libertas restituta* (or *libertati*) and *S.P.Q.R.*, see *BM* I cxii, 292 nos. 12, 13, and pl. 49 nos. 26, 27.

40. For the division of coinage between *princeps* and senate, see Mattingly, *Roman Coins* (ed. 2) 102–108.

41. For the theme of liberty in general on Galba's coinage, see *BM* I Index IV 415–416. For Roman *denarii* with reverses showing *libertas P.R.*, see *BM* I 312 no. 24 and pl. 52 no. 10.

42. Kraay, "Aes Coinage of Galba" 41–42, discusses the theme of liberty on these coins and suggests that the type derived from a statue whose inscription was reported in the 16th century and is given in *CIL* VI 471=Dessau, *ILS* 238.

43. For the legends *libertas publica* or *libertas Augusta* on Galba's coinage, see *BM* I ccv, ccix, Index VI 441–442. *Libertas publica* occurs in Spain, p. ccix, as well as on senatorial bronze in Rome, but *libertas Augusta* S.C. apparently only in Rome on senatorial bronze, pp. ccv, ccxv; see also Kraay, "Aes Coinage of Galba" 14, 16, 17, 29, 34, 37, 56–57, and Index on p. 125, who seeks to assign these legends to specific mints.

44. Mattingly, *BM* I ccix (compare Grant 168), identifies *libertas publica* with *libertas P.R.*

45. W 158–159=237–238 equates *libertas publica* with *securitas*, and is cited with approval by Grant 262 in his discussion of the type of liberty on the coinage of the early Empire.

46. For *libertas Augusti* as a virtue of the prince on Vitellius' coinage, see *BM* I ccxxvi, referring back to the discussion of *libertas Augusta* under Claudius in p. clvii n.2. Compare Grant 166–168 for virtues modified by the gen. *Augusti*.

47. For Galba's assumption of the powers of the principate, see Hammond, "Transmission of the Powers" 67–68.

48. The gradual change from the Augustan principate to the Antonine Monarchy is the subject of Hammond's *Ant. Mon.*; for Vespasian's emphasis on heredity, see p. 17 n.22 with further refs.; also Leon Homo, *Vespasian etc.* (Paris, Michel 1949) 191–193.

49. An undated *denarius* of Vespasian issued at Tarraco, *BM* II 71 n.360 and pl. 11 no. 12, shows *libertas publica*, and a number of bronze coins of 71 show

libertas restituta S.C., *libertas publica* S.C., or *libertas Augusti* S.C.; see pp. xlvii–xlviii, Index V 473. One *denarius* of Lyons, undated, shows simply *libertas restituta*; see pp. lix–lx, 80 no.* and pl. 12 no. 13. Mattingly regards this last as a clear echo of Galba's theme. Judging from the entries in *BM* II Index 446 s.v., the type of *libertas* appears on Vespasian's early coinage and then, under the Flavians, only on an *as* of Galba "restored" by Titus; see p. 292 no. † restored from *BM* I 333 no. 142ff. The Flavians restored much of the coinage of Galba; see *BM* I ccxii ff. and compare Jean Gagé, "Vespasien et la mémoire de Galba" in *Revue des études anciennes* LIV (1952) 290–315. However, Kraay, "Aes Coinage of Galba" 47–51, reduces the extent of restoration of Galba's coinage by Vespasian, particularly by denying that one of the mints, which he denominates *Officina G* (which does not, however, show *libertas*; see p. 37), was posthumous to Galba. On p. 57 he notes that Galba's type of *libertas* was one of two restored by Titus and the only one restored by Trajan.

50. For Vespasian's emphasis on a return to Augustan policies, see Homo, *Vesp.* 193–195. The *sestertii* of 71 showing *adsertori libertatis public.* are *BM* II 123 no. § (Rome), 189 no. 781 (Tarraco, reading *publicæ* in full) and pl. 35 no. 4, 195 no. † (uncertain Gallic mint), 198 no. 805 (Lyons) and pl. 38 no. 4. Grant 185 fig. 60 illustrates a *sestertius* with a reverse similar to *BM* II 189 no. 781 and pl. 35 no. 4, but with a different obverse.

51. Grant 187 argues that Vespasian changed from the Augustan *uindex* to avoid any unfortunate reminder of the Gallic leader Vindex. For the legal *adsertor libertatis*, see Berger, *Enc. Dict. of Roman Law* 351 under *adsercio*.

52. Donatus ed. Wessner II (Teubner 1905) 43 line 21, comment on Ter. *Adelph.* II 1.40 (verse 194); cited by Mommsen (next n.) 348 n.2.

53. Theodor Mommsen, "*Adsertor libertatis*" in *Gesammelte Schriften* IV (*Historische Schriften* I; Berlin, Weidmann 1906) 347–352, from *Hermes* XVI (1881) 147–152. In an earlier article, p. 336= *Hermes* XIII (1878) 93 n.1, Mommsen had made the assertion that *adsertor libertatis* and similar phrases did not connote merely the substitution of a good for a bad ruler but rather an overthrow of monarchy; his view had been criticized by H. Schiller, to whom this article was a reply.

54. Mommsen, "*Adsertor libertatis*" 352=152; he here qualifies the absolute statement that *adsertor libertatis* meant the overthrow of monarchy. Given the general attitude of Vespasian, even if the phrase had previously connoted this, it could not have done so for him unless it was entirely false propaganda; more probably, as indicated in the text, "liberty" was identified with freedom from arbitrary rule under the protection of a constitutional prince.

55. For Domitian as *dominus et deus*, see Hammond, *Ant. Mon.* 235 n.75.

56. For the assassination of Domitian, see *CAH* XI 32–33; Hammond, "Transmission of the Imperial Powers" 86 n.132.

57. Tac. *Agr.* 2–3 praises the accession of Nerva; in the quotation from § 3.1, the *quamquam* clause is followed by a statement that human talents found it difficult to revive from the fifteen years of oppression and silence. It is uncertain whether the *Agricola* is to be dated after the association of Trajan with Nerva in Oct. 97, or the death of Nerva in Jan. 98; see recently Ronald Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1958) I 19, in his ch. III which considers Tacitus' attitude toward Agricola's ability to survive under Domitian. For the unusual meaning of *dissociabilis* in the quotation, see J. G. C. Anderson, ed. 2 of

Furneaux's ed. of the *Agr.* (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1922) 43 n. *ad loc.* For the concept of *libertas* in Tacitus, see W 160-167=239-249.

58. For *libertas* on the coinage of Nerva, see *BM* III xxviii and Indices III 586 (types; final entries s.v.) and V 622-623 (legends).

59. The inscription reported in the Einsiedeln codex is *CIL* VI 472=Dessau *ILS* 274; Dessau cites in n.2 both Tac. *Agr.* 3 and Pliny *Ep.* IX 13.4: *primis quidem diebus redditae libertatis*. Mattingly, citing the inscription in *BM* III xxxviii n.7, speaks of a temple; it does not appear to be mentioned by S. B. Platner and T. Ashby, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press 1929) 317 under *libertas* or by Giuseppe Lugli, *Roma Antica etc.* (Rome, Bardi 1946) in the Index.

60. Pliny *Pan.* 36.4, cited as a parallel to Tac. *Agr.* 3.1 by Mattingly in *BM* III lxxvii n.4, actually applies to the willingness of Trajan to have financial cases involving his procurators tried in the ordinary courts.

61. For Momigliano's criticism of W, see *JRS* XLI (1951) 146=W (Ital.) 258-261.

62. *Civitates liberae* in the later republic and early empire were technically free from direct interference in their internal affairs by the Roman governor; such cities might also enjoy freedom from taxation, in which case they were called *civitates liberae et immunes*; see F. F. Abbott and A. C. Johnson, *Municipal Administration in the Roman Empire* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press 1926) 40-46. In the mid-second century, the Greek orator Aelius Aristides published a speech "To Rome" which portrays the Roman rule as a "hegemony" over an "oikoumene" of free individuals and cities, enjoying security under a common citizenship and equality of treatment; see James H. Oliver, *The Ruling Power etc.* (*Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, new series 43.4; Philadelphia 1953). See also, for the religious aspects of the concept of freedom and its connection with democracy and the rule of law, his *Demokratia, the Gods, and the Free World* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press 1960), especially, for Rome, pp. 152-169.

63. For the Stoic concept of liberty, see W 138-158=207-237 with Momigliano's supplement in *JRS* XLI (1951) 149-153=W (Ital.) 272-285.

64. For the change in the composition of the senatorial class under the early Empire, see Hammond *Ant. Mon.* 249-256; for the cooperation (or consensus) between men of good will and the best man as ruler, see pp. 10, 23-24 nn.44-50 483; also Ernest Barker, "The Conception of Empire" in *The Legacy of Rome* (ed. Cyril Bailey; Oxford, Clarendon Press 1923) 65-72.

65. In *BM* III lxxvii-lxxviii, Mattingly states that *libertas* appears on Trajan's coinage from about 106 and suggests a connection with "restored" coins of 107; the indices of types and legends seem to show liberty only on such restorations of late Republican coins. Under Hadrian, both type and legends reappear, see pp. cxxx-cxxxii, cxxxv. However, only three *sesterii* of Hadrian, *BM* III 409 nos. 1160, 1161, 1162, and pl. 77 nos. 11, 12, dated on p. 406 between 119 and the end of Hadrian's reign in 138, show on the reverse the legend *libertas restituta*; in the text only the first two have also *S.C.* but the photograph of the third (pl. 77 no. 12) shows it in the same position as on no. 11, either side of the type. The type is one probably commemorating Hadrian's enlargement of Trajan's provision for the support of orphans, the so-called *alimenta*; see p. clxiv and compare Mason Hammond, "A Statue of Trajan represented on the 'Anaglypha Traiani'" in *Mem. Am. Acad. in Rome* XXI (1953)

170–172. Whatever the connection of liberty and the alimentary system, Mattingly concludes on p. cxxxv that “*Libertas* promises regard for Roman susceptibilities and freedom of action for the citizen within the necessary needs of the Empire.” It would carry the discussion beyond the limit set to pursue liberty through *BM* IV and V, i.e. through Elagabalus, and for the third century to Diocletian through vols. IV and V of Mattingly and Sydenham’s *Roman Imperial Coinage* (London, Spink & Son 1927–1949), but a note of Mattingly’s from *BM* V cxxxviii n.3 may be excerpted: “*Libertas* can denote many things — the payment of the largess . . . the extension of citizenship over the Empire . . . the encouragement of families by the alimenta . . . the protection of constitutional government against a usurper . . . later, even religious liberty.”

66. Barker, “The Conception of Empire” 71, cites from the Roman law books the contrasting statements that the emperor is “a living law on earth” and “free from all laws,” as against “it is a saying worthy of the ruler’s majesty that a prince should profess himself bound by the laws.” The first phrase apparently occurs only in a Greek “novel” of Justinian, CV 2.4, where it is stated that God has submitted the laws to the emperor’s fortune (*tyche*), “sending it as an animate law (*nomon empsychon*) for men.” This reflects the Hellenistic doctrine that the king is a “living law,” for which see W 133–136=200–203 and Erwin R. Goodenough, “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship” in *Yale Classical Studies* I (1928) 55–102, particularly, for the legal doctrine, p. 100 n.144. The second is a partial quotation from a constitution of Severus Alexander of 232, *Cod. Iust.* VI 23.3: *licet enim lex imperii sollemnibus iuris imperatorem soluerit, nihil tamen tam proprium imperii est, ut legibus uiuere.* In *Inst. Iust.* II 17.8 similar words are attributed to Septimius and Caracalla: *diui quoque Seuerus et Antoninus saepissime rescripserunt “licet enim” inquit “legibus soluti sumus, at tamen legibus uiuimus.”* The third phrase is from a constitution of Theodosius II and Valentinian III in 429, *Cod. Iust.* I 14.4: *digna uox maiestate regnantis legibus alligatum se principem profiteri: adeo de auctoritate iuris nostra pendet auctoritas; et re uera maius imperio est submittere legibus principatum.* For the development of the doctrine that the prince was freed from the laws, see Hammond, *Aug. Princ.* 113–116 with nn. on pp. 269–270 and *Ant. Mon.* 38–40 with nn. on pp. 56–57.

67. The late Greek historian Priscus visited the court of Attila in 449 and found there a Greek who had preferred a life of freedom among the Huns to the harsh and arbitrary justice of the late empire. Priscus argued with him that the ideal of equity and civilization of the Empire was preferable to the license of barbarianism; see the passage translated by C. D. Gordon, *The Age of Attila* (Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan Press 1960) 85–89 from frag. 8 and the comment on the hollowness of Priscus’ argument in E. A. Thomson, *Attila and the Huns* (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1948) 184–187.

68. The topic of Christian liberty is both vast and outside the limits of this discussion; the article “Freiheit” by I. Fetscher, in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Tübingen, Mohr/Siebeck) II (1958) 1101–1110 is more recent and, in its section on freedom in church history, more politically orientated (see the bibliography in col. 1108) than the article on “Liberty” by F. M. Pope in Hastings’ *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* VII (1915) 907–911.

69. Bracton, folio 5 verso, meant by his famous statement that the king should not be subject to arbitrary pressures from the men about him, but should rule

under law, both divine and human. The phrase *non sub homine sed sub deo et lege* is inscribed across the front of the Harvard Law School.

70. For Sidney's verse and a half, see Chester Noyes Greenough, "Algernon Sidney and the Motto of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts" in *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings* LI (Jan./Feb. 1918) 259-282, reprinted in *Collected Studies* (selected and arranged by F. W. C. Hersey; Cambridge, Mass., Merrymount Press 1940) 68-88. He apparently inscribed them in 1659 or 1660 and they figured thereafter in editions of his works, from one of which the second (the full) verse was adopted as a motto by the Massachusetts Council in the summer of 1775. This verse affords a perhaps unconscious echo of Lucretius' appeal to Venus to seek from Mars peace for Rome, *de Rerum Natura* I 40: *petens placidam Romanis, incluta, pacem.*

ADDENDUM. After the foregoing article was in proof, attention was called to the full discussion on the relation between *princeps* and *libertas* by Lothar Wickert in his article *Princeps (civitatis)* in Pauly's *Realencylopädie usw.* half-vol. 44 (1954) col. 1998 ff., of which chap. VIII B treats the topic in three sections. The first (2080-2090) shows, as does this article, that the official interpretation, particularly as attested on coins, was that the principate and liberty were compatible; a view attested even as late as Theodosius. The coins and inscriptions used above are included in cols. 2081-2085. The second section (2090-2096) argues that unofficial, literary opinion down to Cassius Dio generally regarded the principate and liberty as incompatible; even Tacitus (2092-2094), despite the phrase adduced above from *Agr.* 3.1, and Pliny the Younger, despite his *Panegyric*, generally take this position. The third section (2096-2098) analyzes the connotation of *libertas* under the empire, particularly its identification, as presented above, with *pax* and *securitas*.

THE STRUCTURE OF ARISTOTLE'S *ATHENAION POLITEIA*

By JOHN J. KEANEY

I. THE EXISTENCE OF A STRUCTURAL PATTERN IN THE *AthPol*¹

SINCE the discovery of the *Athenaion Politeia*, studies of Aristotle and the *Politeiae* have been concentrated, with but a few exceptions,² on the author of the *AthPol*, and they have been on him *sub genere historici*. This approach, however necessary and valid, has limitations. Its necessary one-sidedness has led to divergent opinions on the worth of Aristotle as an historian, and ultimately to the denial that Aristotle was the author of the *AthPol* by one scholar whose views on the subject carry weight.³

This and previous denials have been and could only have been made on the basis of a comparison of the *AthPol* with other works of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*: works, it must be remembered, which in a sense are not really comparable with the *Politeiae*, because the former are purely philosophical in content as well as intent.⁴ For instance, Hignett (29) finds that the supreme difficulty in believing that the *AthPol* was written by Aristotle is "the immeasurable superiority of the *Politics* to the *Athenaion Politeia* in breadth of treatment and soundness of judgment."

There is really a distinction here, unconscious though it may be, between Aristotle the philosopher and Aristotle—the historian. Now it may be correct to make this distinction, but only if it is made in connection with both works. Everyone would admit that Aristotle in the *Politics*, though primarily the philosopher, plays the part also of the historian in so far as he deals with historical fact, and makes philosophical judgments on the basis of historical research. This is especially evident in *Politics* IV–VI, which comprise its latest layer and which were based largely on the results of the research which went into the *AthPol* and the others in the series.⁵ Even in earlier parts of the *Politics*, however, there is some evidence of a semihistorical approach which Aristotle inherited from Plato. If arguments have recently been adduced to show that both

philosophers distorted to their own ends a truly historical and genetic approach developed in the fifth century,⁶ their framework remains avowedly historical, and both set themselves to deal with problems arising from this framework, even if it became for them teleological in its entirety. It will later be seen that this pervasion of Aristotle's thought by teleological principles affected his approach to writing of a more historical nature also.

If, then, there can be discerned in Aristotle's political philosophy an historical element, and if his intent in gathering the material of the *Politeiai* was conditioned by a philosophical end, is it not credible that there should in turn be a philosophical element in his historical writing? He had been working with the principles and methods of philosophy for some thirty years before he began his efforts at historical composition. It would be surprising, indeed, if he could effect an immediate and absolute divorce from his philosophical ways of thinking when he took up a mode of writing which might seem to call for such a change.

Wilamowitz, in a famous *obiter dictum*,⁷ affirmed that "Aristoteles war kein Historiker," and it is this sort of split between the modes of thought befitting a philosopher and befitting an historian which must have inspired his remark. In answer to this, it does not seem enough to say, with Jacoby (*Atthis*, 210), that Aristotle was a philosopher and had little intention of being an historian. Although Jacoby has rightly emphasized that Aristotle wrote a history, not of Athens, but of the development of the Athenian constitution, and that the *Politeiai* were only subsidiary and ancillary to the *Politics*, this is a far cry from explaining the apparent defects in the content and form of the work: the form especially of the first chapters seems quite peculiar, and these have been a continual source of controversy.

Even if we take into account this self-imposed limitation, viz., that of writing a constitutional history of Athens, we cannot easily approach a relatively complete understanding of the *AthPol* unless we see how this limitation functioned. It seems to me that we can do this only if we turn to the other side of the coin and look upon Aristotle as a philosopher, and as one carrying over a certain philosophical bias into his historical writing.

To anticipate for a moment, the particular bias of which I shall shortly be speaking is inspired by Aristotle's familiar teleological way of looking at things and processes. It is necessary to explain the phenomenon which will come under discussion as conforming to a philosophical preconception, rather than to believe that the concept first arose when Aristotle was in the midst of composing this particular treatise. In fact, to judge

only from the contents of the *AthPol*, the latter alternative is put out of court. Although we have no definite information about Aristotle's method of composition in this work, it has been assumed that he began with the systematic part — the description of the constitution of the fourth century — and worked backwards to the historical part.⁸ Since his purpose was the study of contemporary constitutions, it was more logical for him to follow this procedure. That such was his method is made fairly certain if we look at *AthPol* 8.1, where he says that Solon introduced the use of the lot in electing officials. The usual tradition was that Solon had made no change in the mode of election.⁹ Aristotle, in the *AthPol*, did not accept this tradition, because he found a law of Solon, still valid in the fourth century, which prescribed the use of the lot in electing treasurers (8.1; 47.1), and concluded from the existence of this law that Solon had introduced the lot. Since it was only on the basis of a knowledge of the fourth-century law that Aristotle could have rejected the usual tradition, he must first have gathered material of the contemporary constitution and used this material in discussing past history.

If we have grounds for believing that Aristotle worked in this manner, we can already see the beginnings of a certain way of looking at the history of the Athenian constitution. The form of government in Athens in Aristotle's time was a radical democracy. As will be seen, Aristotle accordingly conceived it his task not merely to give a factual description of the various historical developments in the Athenian constitution, in the manner of the Atticographers, but to go beyond their annalistic accounts and interpret the facts of Athenian constitutional history with reference to the contemporary democracy: to draw a kind of graph of the progression, with occasional regressions, of the Athenian constitution toward its culmination in the radical democracy of the late fifth and fourth centuries. Thus, he had to explain how this latter form of government came to be, and he overlaid this development with a teleological schematization.

In some of his other works, Aristotle makes use of a certain trick of style which, whatever the context in which it is used, carries with it the idea of the progression of a particular subject from a small and unimportant beginning to a quasi-determined end. This stylistic phenomenon has recently been commented upon with the following result (Else, 153):

The passages¹⁰ reveal clearly that we are in the presence of a pattern, a sequence which Aristotle believed was a standard one for all the arts: a very modest beginning (*ἀρχή*), small and unimportant to the eye but pregnant with possibilities ("big *δυνάμει*"); then a long, gradual (*κατὰ μικρόν*)

development (*προάγειν*) and expansion (*αὐξάνειν*) based on what went before; and finally the attainment of something sizeable (*τι μέγεθος*), a result that amounts to something.¹¹

Although it must be remarked that each of the passages which Else quotes does not contain all the elements of the pattern, the very fact that this pattern can be constructed, in its entirety, from scattered passages shows that in some sense it was present to Aristotle's mind in various of his writings, even when one or two of the elements of the complete pattern were lacking.

One of the best examples of the use of this pattern was passed over by Else and is to be found in the *AthPol*. Else listed six elements of which the full pattern is composed: ἀρχή — beginning; "big δυνάμει" — pregnant with possibilities; κατὰ μικρόν — gradual; προάγειν — development; αὐξάνειν — expansion; τι μέγεθος — a sizable result. In the *AthPol* we find:

- 41.2 ή ἐπὶ Σόλωνος, ἀφ' ἧς ἀρχὴ* δημοκρατίας εγένετο.
 23.1 τότε μὲν οὖν μέχρι τούτου προῆλθεν* ή πόλις, ὅμα τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ κατὰ μικρὸν* αὐξανομένη*.¹²
 25.1 ἔτη δὲ ἐπτακαλδεκα μάλιστα μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ διέμεινεν ή πολίτεια προεστώτων τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν, καίπερ ὑποφερομένη* κατὰ μικρόν*. αὐξανομένου* δὲ τοῦ πλήθους, γενόμενος κτλ.

When, according to the complete pattern, the beginning progresses into τι μέγεθος, something sizable, this only means that the final stage or result of the progression is the fully mature growth of the germ discernible in the beginning. In the *AthPol*, the final result of the historical growth of the Athenian constitution was the radical democracy of Aristotle's time. This point was reached in the last decade of the fifth century, when ἀπάντων αὐτὸς αὐτὸν πεποίηκεν ὁ ἔγιμος κύριον καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ψηφίσμασιν καὶ δικαστηρίοις ἐν οἷς ὁ δῆμος ἐστιν ὁ κρατῶν (41.2)¹³

It is enough for now only to observe that this pattern has been employed. Its use will become clearer when we turn to a consideration of the larger questions which this observation involves. Why did Aristotle use this pattern and, especially, why did he choose to use it for a particular phase of the development of the Athenian constitution? What effect did the use of the pattern have ultimately on the content and composition of the *AthPol*?

II. THE FORM OF THE PATTERN

This pattern is certainly stylistic, but the very fact that Aristotle could make use of it in different contexts and with widely diverse subjects¹⁴

suggests that the style only covers a deeper significance which the pattern possesses irrespective of the context in which it is used. Where the pattern occurs, it always points up the conception of progression, and of progression toward an end, a final point beyond which the process does not operate.

This conception, development toward a final point, must be connected in some way with Aristotle's teleological view of nature. It would seem that, both in the *AthPol* and in the *Poetics*, in which we also find a rather fully developed occurrence of the pattern, the form of Aristotle's thought and language is conditioned by this basic view, but not in the sense that the Athenian state had necessarily to develop into a radical democracy or that tragedy had necessarily to result in the form which it did ultimately take. He rather looked at tragedy in what he conceived to be its final form (*τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν*) and at *ἡ νῦν κατάστασις* of the Athenian state and set himself to describe how both developed into these, their final forms.¹⁵

One can find further analogies in his treatments of tragedy and of the Athenian constitution. In *Poetics*, 4, 1449a7ff., after outlining the first four elements in his pattern as they are relevant to tragedy, Aristotle continues: *καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσσα ἡ τραγῳδία ἐπει* *ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν*. The similarity of language between this sentence and the summarizing chapter of the *AthPol*, 41, in which he puts the long history of the development of the Athenian constitution in terms of its *μεταβολαί*, can hardly be accidental. Since *μεταβολή* for Aristotle means change from one point to another and, more often than not, the change is progressive,¹⁶ this similarity of language and of the whole schematic pattern rather shows that Aristotle was using a process of thought analogous to and deriving from his usual teleological way of thinking.

It need hardly be said that, as concerns the *AthPol*, there is no evidence of a real teleological process; nothing of a natural force working itself out toward a result determined by nature. As here used by Aristotle, the pattern is as much literary as mental. But the mental process which underlies the literary schematization, although influenced by Aristotle's teleological views, is, rather, retrospective and analytic in operation. It is closer to *φύσις* viewed as end or as full development (*Phys.*, II 1, 193a30) than to the view of it as the process of development (193b12).¹⁷

There is a passage in the *Politics* which has some bearing on the point which I am trying to bring out. In I, 1, 1252a24, where Aristotle discusses the proper method of approach to the study of the development

of the *polis*, he says: εἰ δή τις ἔξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φύομενα βλέψειεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ’ ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν. This appears to be a genetic approach, and it is, in Aristotelian terms. It is to begin at the beginning and trace the natural development of a subject to its end. However, Aristotle gives this approach a teleological cast since he already has in mind what he sets out to prove, viz., that the *polis* is prior in nature to both the household and the village. Thus the approach ceases to be genetic and historical and becomes retrospective and analytic. Aristotle begins with the end result and then searches for those elements in the process of development which contributed to making the final form what it is. Such an approach is necessarily selective in the details of the development which it includes, for the criterion of inclusion is the relevance of the details to the final result.

Once we have seen that this literary pattern is symptomatic of a philosophical preconception on the part of Aristotle, it will be easier to recognize how the contents and format of the *AthPol* result from this combined mental and literary process.

III. THE EFFECT OF THE PATTERN ON THE EARLY PARTS OF THE *AthPol*

Although it will be necessary to use several avenues of approach in order adequately to see the pattern in operation, it might be well to begin with another look at Aristotle's language. In 404/3 B.C., when, for Aristotle, the Athenian democracy ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν, so to speak, the *demos* has made itself κύριον ἀπάντων καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ψηφίσμασιν καὶ δικαστηρίοις ἐν οἷς ὁ δῆμος ἔστιν ὁ κρατῶν. In *AthPol* 9.1, Aristotle mentions the three aspects of Solon's reforms which in his eyes most contributed to the advancement of the *demos*: τρίτον δὲ ὡς καὶ μάλιστά φασιν ἰσχυκέναι τὸ πλῆθος, ἡ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἔφεσις. κύριος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος τῆς ψήφου, κύριος γίγνεται τῆς πολιτείας.¹⁸ He goes on to mention that this change was especially to the advantage of the *demos*, because the laws of Solon were not framed in a clear manner. The result was that there were many disputes about the interpretation of the laws and πάντα βραβεύειν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τὸ δικαστήριον. Aristotle is quick to exculpate Solon from the charge that he was a radical democrat, affirming that one must judge the lawgiver's intention from his constitution as a whole and not from the later results which one section of it brought about.

Even before he wrote the *AthPol*, Aristotle had inclined toward the view of Solon which he expressed more confidently later. For in *Pol.*, II, 12, 1274a1ff., he says that the growth of the Athenian democracy was

not in accordance with the intention of Solon, but came about rather by accident: ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος. When it is remembered that the pattern calls, in strictness, for a beginning "small, but pregnant with possibilities," it does not seem too fanciful to believe that Aristotle's view of Solon as only the accidental founder of Athenian democracy is connected in some way to the rest of the pattern. This is not to suggest that Aristotle formed this conception of Solon because it fitted neatly into a preconceived pattern. I mean rather to point out that, at some point in his thinking about the development of the Athenian constitution, he realized that a formal pattern, which he had found useful in other contexts, also applied here. The supposition which seems to me to be the most plausible one in this respect is that he compared the all-pervasive importance of the courts in the fourth century with their lowly origin. He specifically contrasts Solon's intentions with τὰ νῦν γιγνόμενα (9.2: cf. *Pol.*, II 12, 1274a11: τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν). The two terms of this contrast gave him the most important elements in the schematic pattern, the first and last, the beginning and end.

However that may be, it is noteworthy that in the same passage of the *Politics* just cited we find two elements of the same general pattern, development (*προίγαγεν*) and expansion (*αὔξων*), used with reference to the Athenian democracy. It is also noteworthy that these elements of the pattern do not coincide in the *Politics* and in the *AthPol.* In the former they have to do with the activities of the demagogues; in the latter they are used in connection with the Areopagos. Such a lack of coincidence, which will be discussed in more detail *infra*, seems to lead to two conclusions. Not only was this pattern quite pervasive in Aristotle's thought and style, but the first and last elements in it were the most important and most intimately connected, since the last element must be the final growth and result of the first.

Since, of the three aspects of Solon's reforms which were δημοτικά-τατα, Aristotle gave the position of logical importance to the third and last,¹⁹ which has been quoted *supra*, it is correct to see in the reform of the courts by Solon what Aristotle conceived to be not only the most salient characteristic of the developed democracy but also the germ of that element which was to be its *conditio sine qua non*. On the basis of these facts, we can already see the effect of the use of the pattern on the structure of the *AthPol.* I refer to the concluding chapters of the work, 63–69, which give a detailed description of the operation of the law courts. Both the position of these chapters at the end of the treatise, and the particularly detailed exposition, which is without parallel in the rest of the *AthPol.*, suggest that Aristotle expended more time and effort on

these chapters than he did on any other. The explanation of this detailed exposition must surely be found in the fact that it is only a necessary outgrowth of the logic of the pattern. It has been rightly said that "the literary form of this portion of the treatise is that of the excursus" (Bloch, 372), but Aristotle did not include this excursus only because "he was well aware of the importance which the courts had in the political life of Athens" (Bloch, 374). To him, the courts represented the fundamental element in, and the strength of, the Athenian democracy. Since Aristotle saw the whole development of the Athenian democracy in terms of the growth of the power of the popular law courts, as he looked at the whole of Athenian constitutional history in terms of the development of the democracy, it is not surprising that he devoted an important portion of his treatise to the description of these courts.

I have mentioned that Aristotle's method of approach to his study of the Athenian constitution, that of tying together the history of Athens with a democratic thread, not only determined how he interpreted the facts of that history, but also — what is only another aspect of the same process — determined what facts he selected and emphasized as relevant.²⁰ We have seen how he emphasized the importance of the law courts, and we must continue further along this same line and investigate how other areas of the treatise were also affected by the pattern. With this approach I shall argue that Aristotle did select only certain facts for discussion and that this principle of selection is consistent with the logic of the pattern. This will become clear if we consider two areas of the *AthPol*, the pre-Solonian period and the various discussions of the position of the Areopagos.

In essentials, the first question may be stated in the following terms. In chapter 41, Aristotle summarizes the changes which occurred in the development of the Athenian constitution from its beginnings. He gives no overt indication that this summary is not meant to be full and complete, but, in fact, it is not. While Aristotle is careful to include all changes which took place after Solon, he omits some of the changes which happened before. To use only details which we are certain Aristotle discussed in the early part of his treatise, we know that he failed to include in ch. 41 the quadripartite division of the kingdom of Attika by Pandion (F 2 Opp.=Herakl., *Epit.* 2) and the pre-Solonian oligarchic constitution described in ch. 3.²¹ For the whole of the pre-Solonian period, he thought it worth while to include in the summary only those constitutional changes which took place in the times of Ion and Theseus.

Although the schematic pattern starts only with Solon (41.2), we

cannot use it mechanically to say that Aristotle was entirely unconcerned with the period before Solon, because he does include changes from that period. We may say that the implications of the pattern demand that he include post-Solonian changes fully and completely, because they fall within its boundaries, but we must also try to ascertain why, in ch. 41, he put in those early changes which he did and omitted others. Recent scholars have generally approached this question from the viewpoint of the oligarchic constitution of ch. 3. Since this constitution is not mentioned in ch. 41, it is assumed that ch. 3 is a later insertion into the text.²² It is stated that ch. 2, with its description of the economic conditions before Solon, requires and looks forward to an account of Solon's economic reforms, which is given in chs. 5ff. If, however, it can be shown that ch. 3 is integral to its context, we are still left with the larger question, its omission in ch. 41. A closer look at ch. 2 may afford an insight into Aristotle's methodology.

We are fortunately in a good position to assess exactly the relevance of this chapter to the format of the early portion of the *AthPol*. Many years ago, in a fundamental article, F. E. Adcock called attention to the fact that close similarities existed between the *AthPol* and certain chapters of Plutarch's *Vita Solonis*. He also drew the basic conclusion that neither Plutarch nor his immediate source — most probably Hermippus, the pupil of Kallimakhos — had used the *AthPol* for this section of the biography, but that the similarities were due to a common source, Androtion the Attidographer.²³ Part of Adcock's analysis is useful for the present question.

Plut., Sol. 13 (p. 96, lines 11ff. Ziegler): τότε δὲ τῆς τῶν πενήτων* πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους* ἀνωμαλίας ὥσπερ ἀκμὴν λαβούσης, παντέπασιν ἐπισφαλῶς ή πόλις διέκειτο, καὶ μόνως ὃν ἐδόκει καταστῆναι καὶ παύσασθαι ταραττομένη τυραννίδος γενομένης. ἄπας μὲν γὰρ ὁ δῆμος ἦν ὑπόχρεως τῶν πλουσίων*. η γὰρ ἐγεώργουν ἔκεινοις ἔκτα τῶν γυνομένων τελοῦντες, ἑκτήμοροι* προσαγορευόμενοι καὶ θῆτες η χρέα λαμβάνοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν*, ἀγώγιμοι* τοῖς δανείζουσιν* ἡσαν, οἱ μὲν αὐτοῦ δουλεύοντες*, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἔνην πιπρασκόμενοι, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ παῦδας* ἴδιους ἡναγκάζοντο πωλεῖν — οὐδεὶς γὰρ νόμος ἐκώλυε — καὶ τὴν πόλιν φεύγειν διὰ τὴν χαλεπότητα* τῶν δανειστῶν.

AthPol, 2: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβη στασιάσαι τοὺς τε γυναρίμους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος πολὺν χρόνον. [ἡν γὰρ αὐτῶν η πολιτεία τοὺς τε ὄλλοις δλιγαρχικὴν πᾶσι] καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐδουλεύοντες* οἱ πένητες* τοῖς πλουσίοις* καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τα τέκνα καὶ αἱ γυναικες. καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο* πελάται καὶ ἑκτήμοροι*. κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ τὴν μίσθωσιν τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἄγρούς [(η δὲ πᾶσα γῆ δι' ὀλίγων ἦν),] καὶ εἰ μὴ τὰς μισθώσεις ἀποδιδοῖεν, ἀγώγιμοι* καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ

παῦδες* ἐγίγνοντο. καὶ οἱ δανεισμοὶ* πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν* ἤσαν [μέχρι Σόλωνος. οὗτος δὲ πρῶτος ἐγένετο τοῦ δήμου προστάτης.] [χαλε-
πώτατον* μὲν οὖν καὶ πικρότατον ἦν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν
τὸ δουλεύειν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδυσχέραινον. οὐδενὸς γὰρ
ώς εἰπεῖν ἐτύγχανον μετέχοντες.]

Besides the obvious similarity of language²⁴ — the asterisked words — there are almost exactly the same basic ideas expressed in both passages: the civic *stasis*, the economic reasons for the *stasis*, the economic burden and liability of the poor which extended to their children. While these similarities indicate a common source, what is more important here are the ideas which Plutarch and Aristotle do not share — the bracketed sentences and phrases. Most of the latter, it will be noticed, are of a political character.

The account in Plutarch is concerned exclusively with economic factors: the *stasis* is between the poor and the rich, *οἱ πένητες* and *οἱ πλούσιοι*. Aristotle also uses these words, but it is significant that he introduces his whole account as a struggle between *οἱ γνώριμοι* and *τὸ πλῆθος*, terms which have a political connotation. His terminology in this chapter, as well as the additions he made to the source common to him and to Plutarch, are most revealing. They show that Androton put the greater emphasis on the economic reforms of Solon and that Aristotle, although he was well aware of the importance of these reforms, was primarily interested in their political background. Moreover, the type of changes which he introduced reveal the answer to the first problem of ch. 3.

An outline of ch. 2 would run as follows:

- (1) *stasis*
- (2) political cause of *stasis*
- (3) economic cause of *stasis*
- (4) explanation of economic cause (Solon first *προστάτης τοῦ δημον*)
- (5) bitterness of *demos* for economic reasons
- (6) bitterness of *demos* for political reasons

In the structure of the chapter, economic factors are put within a political framework.²⁵ Further, while Aristotle, basing himself on Androton, explained the economic background, the political situation is merely stated in broad and vague terms — the government was oligarchic in all respects. Since Aristotle changed the account of Androton by adding political details, and since only the economic background was fully explained in ch. 2, he had logically and stylistically to justify his additions and changes by an equally full explanation

of the pre-Solonian oligarchic constitution. This he did, and could only do, in the following chapter, 3.

The description of the oligarchic constitution is, then, integral to the logical and formal structure of the *AthPol*. This conclusion is bolstered by two other stylistic details. Aristotle's own reference to Solon as the champion of the *demos* in 2.2 is balanced by the reference to Solon in 3.5: ἐπὶ δὲ Σόλωνος ἀπαντες εἰς τὸ θεσμοθετεῖον συνῆλθον (cf. note 31). Ch. 5, which some believe originally to have followed directly on ch. 2, begins: τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς τάξεως οὕσης ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ τῶν πολλῶν δουλευόντων τοῖς ὀλίγοις κτλ. This could hardly serve better as a transitional sentence, for τάξεως refers to the political subject matter of ch. 3 (3.1: ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀρχαίας πολιτείας), and τῶν πολλῶν δουλευόντων τοῖς ὀλίγοις to the economic conditions explained in ch. 2.

We can now turn to the larger question: why is the oligarchic constitution of ch. 3 omitted in the summary in ch. 41? The schematic pattern concerns only the growth of the democracy and begins with Solon. The direct conclusion from this is that the pre-Solonian period, being outside the boundaries of the pattern, was less important, according to Aristotle's view of the development of the Athenian constitution. This conclusion has both negative and positive effects. Negatively, Aristotle was justified, according to his own view, in omitting or de-emphasizing anything which occurred before Solon.

Positively, it meant that, if Aristotle were to adhere to the logic of the pattern, he would select for special attention — that is, put into his summary — only those details of the pre-Solonian period which threw some light on or were relevant to his main theme, the development of the democracy. It appears that this is exactly what he has done, for he is selective in the pre-Solonian constitutional changes which he includes, and also in the details which he inserts about each. Ion is included because, as Aristotle says, at that time the Athenians were first divided into four tribes, and tribe kings were established. These details, and only these, were mentioned because both institutions remained down to Aristotle's day and beyond: the tribe kings continued in existence²⁶ (57.4) and the tribe system remained the basis of Athenian citizenship (42.1), although the number of tribes was increased by Kleisthenes. There were other things that could have been said about this stage of constitutional development: it could have been said, for example, that Ion was the first polemarch, but that found its more proper position in the summary of the development of the archonship in ch. 3; or that the *πλῆθος* was divided into γεωργοί and δημιουργοί (F 5: Wade-Gery,

88–9) but this division did not last and was not relevant to the post-Solonian democracy.

The inclusion of Theseus in the summary is similarly due to Aristotle's use of the pattern. There are two certain sources of information about his treatment of Theseus in the *AthPol*: (a) 41.2: δεντέρα δὲ καὶ πρώτη μετὰ ταύτην ἔχονσά τι πολιτείας τάξις, μικρὸν παρεγκλίνονσα τῆς βασιλικῆς,²⁷ and (b) F 4=Plut., *Thes.* 25: ὅτι δὲ πρῶτος ἀπέκλινε πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν.²⁸ These pieces complement each other. Theseus effected some change in the monarchy and this change was, in some way, to the advantage of the *demos*. (b), further, shows the justification for the inclusion of Theseus in the summary, for it makes clear that Aristotle believed that the *demos*, which was later to become all powerful, first had some of its claims recognized by Theseus,²⁹ and that Theseus foreshadowed, in a small way, the democratic activities of Solon.

This was not the case with Pandion's quadripartite division of his kingdom (F 2). Although this must have involved some constitutional change, it had no importance for the later history of the constitution, nor was it at all relevant in that connection. Consequently Aristotle had no reason to include it in his summary.

When we come to consider what motives Aristotle may have had for failing to include the oligarchic constitution of ch. 3, we are faced with problems of a special nature, because this chapter describes not only the constitution which existed immediately before Solon, but also, in capsule form, the origin and development of the board of arkhons. To defer the second problem until later, two criteria have been established by which Aristotle excluded certain pre-Solonian constitutional changes from his summary chapter. Either the effects of these changes did not last into the period of the democracy or they did not make any substantial contribution to the growth of the democracy. The first of these will not serve here: the arkhons, the institution and function of which is described in ch. 3, remained the major officials at Athens.

Did, however, only the fact that the arkhons were the major officials mean that they were important for Aristotle's view of Athenian constitutional development? In other words, was it the existence of these officials that was important for Aristotle or was it rather the manner of their election and their position in the state? If we consider the *μεταβολαὶ πολιτειῶν* from Solon to the final establishment of the radical democracy with the brief account of each in ch. 41, we find that none of them is characterized merely according to the type of official which existed at each change. The *μεταβολαὶ* are differentiated according to

which person or group holds the sovereign power in the state, irrespective of what type of officials exist. Sometimes this is made clear by means of one or two words, e.g., ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας (Solon), δημοτικάτερα (Kleisthenes), τυραννίς (Peisistratos); sometimes it is more explicit, e.g., τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου ἐπιστατούσης.

Since there is not a word about the arkhons in any of the changes in ch. 41, it seems that Aristotle did not believe that they were particularly important for the history of the democracy, and that is also one of the reasons why we read little, in the course of his narrative, of the activities of this board in the period from Solon to the end of the fifth century. Aristotle showed more interest in who was allowed to hold office and which political group formed the policy of the state. To take one example, during the Peisistratid tyranny, there were the same number of arkhons as there had been before. As Thucydides (6.54.6) says, Peisistratos and his sons observed the existing laws, except that they took care that the major offices were always in their control. Similarly, it was probably as a private citizen that Kleisthenes carried through proposals which made the constitution more democratic (Wade-Gery, 136; Hignett, 127).

This interpretation of Aristotle's methodology in ch. 41 is consonant with a passage in the *Politics* (IV 1, 1289a15ff.) in which he defines a *πολιτεία* as the regulation of the offices of the state in regard to the mode of their distribution and to the question of what is the sovereign power in the state and what is the object of each political community:³⁰ πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἔστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἔστιν. Here it is clear that the type of office is least important: the concern is the way in which offices are used. Although the arkhonship which developed in the pre-Solonian period remained, neither the mode of appointment nor the qualifications for the offices (τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται), neither the supreme power (τὸ κύριον) nor the oligarchic spirit of this type of constitution (τὸ τέλος τῆς κοινωνίας), lasted beyond Solon. It did not help to explain the growth of the democracy nor contribute to it anything of lasting importance.

In another connection it has been stated (Von Fritz and Kapp, 9ff.) that *AthPol* 3 and 4 describe the same pre-Solonian constitution, the former showing its evolution, the latter its final, static form. Although chs. 3 and 4 have nothing to do with each other, this interpretation is true in one respect, for ch. 3 does give evolutionary and static aspects of the same constitution. The structure of the chapter shows this clearly. It is divided into two main sections which are unequal in length, five-

sixths being devoted to the arkhons and the remainder to the Areopagos. This disproportion seems not to be consistent with the relative importance of the two bodies, for it is the Areopagos which διώκει δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει. The lack of proportion is due to the fact that, while the information about the arkhons and the Areopagos, taken together, forms the static description of the constitution, the treatment of the arkhons, alone, constitutes its evolutionary aspect. The latter, furthermore, is not meant to be a full descriptive treatment of the arkhonship, but, like ch. 41, it is a summary.

There is evidence that the origins of the arkhonship were discussed in the early part of the *AthPol.* We know that Ion was mentioned (41.1; F 1), and it is fair to assume that the institution of the polemarchy, which occurred in the time of Ion, was also treated (cf. 3.2). Again, Aristotle says (3.3) that the Kodridai relinquished the kingship in return for the prerogatives of the arkhonship. Herakleides Lembos preserves a fragment (*Epit.* 3=F 7) in which Aristotle discussed certain ramifications of this change. Although the exact interpretation of the fragment is controversial (see Appendix), it at least shows that the details of the arkhonship were treated more fully in the early part and, for special reasons, more summarily in ch. 3.

It is possible to relate ch. 3, both in its evolutionary and in its static aspects, to the schematic pattern. This begins with Solon and ends with the final establishment of the democracy at the end of the fifth century. Formally, Aristotle puts this final establishment in a summary-list of those constitutional changes which were relevant to the growth of the democracy. It is the eleventh and final *μεταβολή*, and its position, in a summary, is deliberate.

After describing the events which led up to the establishment of the democracy, without, however, describing this democracy itself, Aristotle begins ch. 41: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον συνέθη γενέσθαι καιροῖς, τότε δὲ κύριος ὁ δῆμος γενόμενος τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐνεστήσατο τὴν νῦν οὖσαν πολιτείαν, ἐπὶ Πυθοδώρου κτλ. These words carry an echo of an earlier paragraph (6.1), in which Aristotle says that Solon, κύριος δὲ γενόμενος τῶν πραγμάτων, proceeded to put into effect his political and economic reforms. Similarly, we might have expected a description of ἡ νῦν οὖσα πολιτεία in ch. 41, but Aristotle preferred to make of this chapter a summary which also serves as a transition to his account of the contemporary democracy.

This procedure tallies with what we have so far seen of the formal structure of the *AthPol.* Aristotle started out to study the constitution of Athens as it was in the fourth century. To do this properly, he had to

trace how this constitution, a radical democracy, came into being. He saw that this evolution could be fitted into a pattern, which encompassed the origin and development of democracy from Solon to the end of the fifth century. To make the course of this development most easily intelligible to the reader, and further to refine it by excluding from the reader's immediate comprehension those pre-Solonian developments which seemed to him irrelevant to the growth of the democracy, he chose to summarize and epitomize this growth in the most logical place, directly before his full discussion of the last stage in the evolution.

At this point, we can distinguish two distinct and self-coherent sections of the *AthPol*: the first, within which the schematic pattern is most apparent, covers the evolution of the democracy from its germlike beginning with Solon to its final stabilization at the end of the fifth century and ends with a brief summary of this evolution; the second is an account of the democracy in its final form and concludes with a detailed description of the single most powerful element in the democracy, the popular law courts.

Since the deliberate break between these two parts has been fashioned by means of a summarizing chapter, it is stylistically fitting that the same device be used to signal the beginning of a new section of the treatise with the reforms of Solon, with which the democracy really starts. Aristotle used this device in ch. 3, and the two — perhaps three³¹ — explicit references to Solon in chs. 2 and 3 entitle us to call the beginning of the *AthPol* either an introduction to the reforms of Solon or an introduction to the rise of the democracy.

In its static aspect, too, Aristotle has so arranged ch. 3 as to have some relevance to his pattern. It will be remembered that, in his view, the main factor in the development of the democracy was the gradual acquisition by the *demos* of the judicial functions of the state: the democracy develops hand-in-hand with the ever-increasing powers gained by the popular law courts. In the light of this, it is not remarkable that Aristotle, in ch. 3, mentions one and only one function of the arkhons and that is specifically judicial.

He says (3.5): “then also, the arkhons passed the final judgments in lawsuits, and did not, as now, hold only the preliminary hearings” — κύριοι δ' ἦσαν καὶ τὰς δίκας αὐτοτελεῖς κρίνειν, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν προανακρίνειν. Since Aristotle distinguishes explicitly between this function of the arkhons as it was before Solon and in the period of the developed democracy, it seems that it was deliberate on his part to mention only this judicial function. It should not be thought that there is here any question about Aristotle's sources, that he found only this

statement about the functions of the arkhons in the material he used, whether documentary or secondary. On the contrary, this, like many of the other things which Aristotle has to say about the pre-Solonian period, is the result of an inference on his own part.

The process of thought by which he drew this inference is clear. He began with two facts: in his own day, the judicial powers of the arkhons were limited to holding preliminary hearings in lawsuits and introducing these suits to the proper popular courts for final judgment;³² over against this, he knew that the arkhons must have had fairly extensive powers when they were instituted. When the influence and powers of the *demos* became greater, it must have been at the expense of other elements in the state and, in the present case, at the expense of the arkhons. He could see the result of the diminution of the arkhons' powers in the functions which they had in the fourth century. These were the same in kind and, consequently, he argued that they were greater in the days when, generally speaking, the arkhons must have had greater powers than they possessed in his own time.

If he had so desired, he certainly could have used the same process of inference and argument from survivals to mention in ch. 3 functions of the pre-Solonian arkhons in other spheres of administration. That he restricted himself to their judicial powers must surely be the result of his conception of the Athenian democracy, that is, an identification of the essence of the *demos* with control of the *dikasteria*.

From another point of view, it seems unhistorical for Aristotle to make this kind of statement about the arkhons at this point in his narrative. Although the exact stages by which the arkhons lost their judicial authority are not clear, it was probably not until the reforms of Ephialtes or shortly thereafter that the process was nearly complete (Wade-Gery, 180–200; Hignett, 397). It is very doubtful that Aristotle was aware of the stages in this process. He did know that the power of the arkhons was not destroyed immediately by the reforms of Solon (cf. 13.2), but, in line with the rest of the literary tradition,³³ he emphasized the effect of Ephialtes' activities on the Areopagos rather than on the arkhons. He was correct in so far as the institution of popular courts by Solon was eventually to lead to the loss of the independent authority of the arkhons (Hignett, 98).

The most important reason which Aristotle has for making this statement here is, as we shall see, that he has begun another motif with his account of the arkhons in ch. 3. The *demos*, as it comes to power, can only do so by appropriating to itself functions originally performed by other elements in the state. The three bodies whose authority the *demos*

must overcome are respectively the college of arkhons, the Areopagos, and the Council of the Five Hundred.

IV. THE MIDDLE ELEMENTS OF THE PATTERN

The first of these, the board of nine arkhons, was disposed of, so to speak, in ch. 3. This is not so with the position of the Areopagos. When Aristotle mentioned the post-Solonian limitations upon the judicial authority of the arkhons, he strongly implied that there would be no necessity to treat them again. Enough had already been said about them to show that they posed no threat to the rise of the *demos*. In his discussion of the Areopagos in ch. 3, two of the three functions which he assigns to it are certainly judicial,³⁴ but he does not here imply any limitations upon its authority, for the Areopagos, unlike the arkhons, will once again rise to power and briefly retard the constant growth of the democracy. Even when he describes the position of the Areopagos immediately after Solon's reforms, he does not imply that its role in Athenian constitutional history is finished.

With Aristotle's treatment of the Areopagos, we come to the middle elements of the pattern and his application of them to the *AthPol*. He centers these elements, which apply to the gradual growth and expansion of the democracy, upon the period immediately after the end of the Persian Wars, when the Areopagos was alleged to be the leader of the Athenian state.³⁵

At first sight, this would appear to contradict the facts, and one would seem to be justified in saying that the period of growth would more logically be put in the time of the demagogues, Ephialtes, Perikles, and their successors. In fact, this is how Aristotle saw the development of the democracy in *Pol.* II 12, where, again, two elements of the same pattern, progression and expansion, were used.

A closer analysis of the apparent inconsistency may justify Aristotle's methodology. Although he used elements of the pattern in the *Politics*, he there omitted one that is found in the *AthPol*, the notion of *gradual* expansion. In the *Politics*, he was discussing the expansion of the democracy, without in any way qualifying this expansion. From that point of view, it is true to say that the democracy had its greatest growth in the period of the demagogues. When he came to use the fuller pattern in the *AthPol*, the incomplete use of it which he had made in the *Politics* no longer served his purposes. By the addition to the notion "expansion" of the qualification "gradual," the original idea is changed and we must expect it to have a different point of reference. This now

becomes the period of 113 years from Solon to Salamis rather than the 58 years from Ephialtes to the archonship of Eukleides.

It is clear that Aristotle deliberately centered³⁶ the middle elements of the pattern upon the political position of the Areopagos after the Persian Wars. Not only do we find the elements of growth and expansion by gradual stages applied to the democracy in a positive way, but Aristotle applies two of these elements, in a negative way, to the Areopagos. Its leadership, he says, lasted for seventeen years, although during that time its influence was steadily declining — *καίπερ ὑποφερομένη κατὰ μικρόν*. This curious inversion of the pattern is, so far as I know, unparalleled elsewhere in Aristotle's writings, but it well shows how functional the pattern was to him. In fact, we have in *AthPol* 23.1 and 25.1 the whole of Aristotle's conception of Athenian constitutional history in microcosm: the steady growth of the influence of the *demos* is matched by the steady decline of other elements in the state.

Aristotle's negative inversion of the pattern here may have been deliberate for another reason also. He may have found the idea it expressed convenient to mask the fact that he was actually in ignorance as to how the renascence of the Areopagos took place and exactly by what means this body declined. The basis of this ignorance is Aristotle's uncritical belief in the truth of the propaganda attached to the Areopagos in the fourth century, propaganda especially connected to the school of Isokrates³⁷ and fostered particularly by the latter's pupil, Androtion.

According to the conception of Athenian history publicized by such conservatives, the Areopagos had been the vital force in the ancestral constitution, the *πάτριος πολιτεία*, both before and after Solon, in matters educational, social, and political.³⁸ This conception fitted well with Aristotle's view, which itself was certainly shared by others, that Solon was a conservative reformer. If, as Aristotle believed, the democracy did not burst into full bloom with Solon, some other body must have had the sovereign power of the state at that time. He thought that this position was held by the Areopagos. For this to be so, it was necessary concomitantly to believe that the powers of the Areopagos were not essentially diminished by Solon. Aristotle seems to emphasize this when he writes: "Solon made it the task of the Areopagos to watch over the laws, just as in the preceding period³⁹ it had been the guardian of the political order; and the Areopagos still supervised the greater and more important part of public life" (8.4).

This view would seem to involve Aristotle in a contradiction. Any contribution Solon made to the growth of the democracy must necessarily have subtracted something from the power of the Areopagos. As

Jacoby notes (*FGrH* 3b2107 n.25), "it must be admitted that he did not take much trouble to set forth exactly the extent of the alterations which necessarily took place when the Council of the Five Hundred and the δικαστήρια were created. Probably he was not in a position to do so." However, it seems that Aristotle realized that he was on the verge of a contradiction. He did say that the Areopagos, after Solon, no longer had the power to elect the arkhons, and Jacoby again points out that "probably it is also on purpose that he extends the jurisdiction of the pre-Solonian Areopagos to πάντας τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας, that of the Solonian to the ἀμαρτάνοντας only: there were δικαστήρια now but he really did not know what their business was."

This was the great difficulty. Documentary material, which was a main basis for Aristotle's description of Solon's reforms, was lacking for the earlier period. Much of its history could plausibly be reconstructed from survivals and inferences, but, except for certain details, Aristotle seems to have been content generally to follow Atticographic sources, especially Androtion. Similarly, he subscribed to the view (of Androtion?)⁴⁰ that it was the Areopagos, and not the democratic figure Themistokles (Kleidemos, F 21 Jac), which was responsible for Athenian eminence in the Aegean world after the Persian Wars. Again, as with the early position of the Areopagos, Aristotle was not able to offer any incontrovertible facts in support of this view.

He has only one reference to the Areopagos between Solon and the Persian Wars (16.8): his statement that the Areopagos took over the hegemony οὐδενὶ δόγματι shows that he could find no positive arguments, either in primary or on secondary sources, to prove that the Areopagos had any greater power after the Persian Wars than it had before them. Finally, although the Areopagos was the leader of the Athenian state for seventeen years, its influence was declining steadily even during that period. Again, no evidence or arguments are offered to explain how this decline took place, although Aristotle did have evidence to show how the Areopagos was finally deprived of much of its authority in 462/1 B.C.

Instead of positive arguments or evidence, he presents us with his pattern but, this time, used in a negative way. According to Aristotle's scheme, no constitutional change happens suddenly. Solon's reforms are preceded by a long period of factional strife; it is only on his third attempt that Peisistratos firmly establishes the tyranny; Kleisthenes has to overcome Spartan intervention and political opposition at home, and so on. In line with this scheme, the *demos* is constantly becoming more powerful, and its rise, though interrupted for various periods of time, is

never completely halted. The negative use of the pattern shows that Aristotle believed that this gradual growth was going on while the Areopagos was sovereign. If Ephialtes was sufficiently powerful to carry through his reforms, conditions must have been conducive to the acceptance of his proposals. This could only have been so if the *demos* had been progressing in strength for these seventeen years and if this progression had been balanced by a gradual regression of the Areopagos.

We need not go beyond the words of Aristotle to support this argument. In combining negative and positive aspects of his pattern, he follows his statement about the gradual decline of the Areopagos — *καίπερ υποφερομένη κατὰ μικρόν* — with the application of an element of the positive pattern to the *demos* — *αὐξανομένου δὲ τοῦ πλήθους*. The close proximity of these two ideas, one following directly upon the other, provides convincing proof that the interpretation suggested above is correct. Ephialtes could not have carried through his reforms unless at once the Areopagos was less powerful than it was when it gained the sovereignty seventeen years earlier and the *demos* was more powerful than it had been. Before Ephialtes is mentioned at all, Aristotle makes it clear by his schematic pattern that these conditions were fulfilled.

Jaeger (*HSCP Suppl. Vol. I* [1940] 410) has said that "Aristotle, in his *Constitution of Athens*, represents the development of Athenian democracy as the history of the various attempts to break down the authority of the Areopagus during the fifth century. The philosopher derives the political degeneration of the Athenian state from the progressive elimination of the retarding influence of this august body." There is considerable truth in these statements, but they do not tell the whole story.

If the Areopagos had been the only element which retarded the growth of the democracy, it would logically follow that, once the power of this body were broken, there would be nothing to prevent the *demos* from taking full control of the state: the process leading to the final establishment of the mature democracy would have stopped here. This was not true historically, as Aristotle saw. Before the radical democracy was finally stabilized, progress to this culmination was interrupted twice, once by the government of the Four Hundred and once by the tyranny of the Thirty. These were the obvious obstacles in the way of the progression of the democracy. What is not equally obvious, but is peculiarly Aristotelian, is his conception that the Council of the Five Hundred, the *βουλή*, was historically important in impeding the steady development to radical democracy.

We have seen how Aristotle wrote off the arkhons and the Areopagos as threats to this evolution. When the authority of the latter body was revoked, its powers were not entirely transferred to the *demos*. As Aristotle says (25.2), Ephialtes deprived the Areopagos of those prerogatives which it had acquired and which had made it the guardian of the state, and gave some of them to the Council of the Five Hundred, some to the people and the law courts⁴¹ — τὰ μὲν τοῦς πεντακοσίους, τὰ δὲ τῷ δῆμῳ καὶ τοῦς δικαστηρίους ἀπέδωκεν. In other words, the contest for supremacy in the state, in Aristotle's view, was now between the *demos* and the *boule*. We expect him to show in what respects the powers of the *boule* were diminished, as he had done with the arkhons in a sentence (3.5) and with the Areopagos in a paragraph (25). However, he reserves discussion of this matter until the final section of the *AthPol.*

It was noticed above that Aristotle included in his summary chapter the final point reached in the development of the Athenian constitution, the radical democracy which was established at the end of the fifth century and lasted until his own time. He included this constitution without having previously discussed it in detail, and, for this reason, ch. 41 served to mark the transition to the systematic description of the fourth-century constitution. Without actually discussing it, Aristotle did — as is his method with the other constitutional changes mentioned in ch. 41 — summarize its general character, here in two sentences. In the first, he says that the *demos* has made itself master of everything through decrees of the assembly and decisions of the law courts, in which it holds the power — ἀπάντων γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν πεποίηκεν ὁ δῆμος κύριον καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται υἱηφίσμασιν καὶ δικαστηρίους, ἐν οἷς ὁ δῆμος ἔστιν ὁ κρατῶν. We have seen how Aristotle's emphasis on the law courts here fits into his view of the development of the Athenian democracy in that the law courts were the most important single element in that democracy.

He adds another statement in proof of what he has just said, continuing, “even the matters which the Council used to decide have passed into the hands of the *demos*” — καὶ γὰρ αἱ τῆς βουλῆς κρίσεις εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἐληλύθασιν. Here again, Aristotle is being selective in what he says. He does not mention that the *demos* has taken over powers of the Areopagos, nor powers of the arkhons. He has finished with those bodies in so far as they influence the development of the democracy. His concern now is the *boule*, and the reference to it in ch. 41 ties in with the statement he made in ch. 25 that the *boule* was given some of the functions of the Areopagos. As he reserves treatment of the final form of the democracy to the systematic part of his treatise, although he had

mentioned it before, so he reserves his treatment of the powers of the *boule* to the same section.

We have seen in the case of the arkhons in ch. 3 that one of the features of Aristotle's methodology was to distinguish earlier and later functions of the same body of officials. He used a similar method in the systematic part of the *AthPol*, in which he generally expresses this distinction by means of the words *πρότερον* and *νῦν*. Of the fifteen⁴² passages of this nature in that section, four have to do with the diminished powers of the *boule*. Aristotle says that the *boule* formerly had had the power to impose fines, imprisonment, and death, and goes on to describe how the *demos* took away this power (45.1); formerly the *boule* had the final authority in rejecting, upon examination, any of the arkhons or councilmen chosen to serve for the following year, but now any rejection may be reviewed by a popular law court (45.3); formerly the *boule* decided about the models and the *peplos*, but now the decision is in the hands of a law court (49.3); in the fourth passage (55.2), Aristotle repeats what he said in 45.3.

When compared with other occurrences of *πρότερον—νῦν* these items become the more significant, because they are unique in several respects. Apart from one instance (56.3, with reference to the arkhon), there is no mention of a diminution of the authority either of the arkhons or of the Areopagos in the systematic part of the treatise. There is only one anecdote in this section,⁴³ and that is used to prove a diminution of the powers of the *boule*.⁴⁴ Only in the case of the *boule* does Aristotle emphasize a loss of power by repeating the substance of one of his remarks. Finally — and most significant — his account of the *boule* as a whole (apart from the duties of the *prytaneis*, 43.2–44.4) begins not with matters over which the *boule* is *κυρία* but with those in which it is *ἄκυρος* (45.1–3: this portion is summed up in 45.4: *τούτων μὲν οὖν ἄκυρός ἐστιν η̄ βουλῆ̄*): in each instance, it is the popular law court which is *κύριον*. For these reasons, therefore, the references of this nature to the *boule* are seen to be part of the same logical and stylistic structure which is traceable in the rest of the *AthPol*.

V. SUMMARY

Aristotle's *AthPol* is divided into three⁴⁵ major sections, which deal respectively with the pre-Solonian period, the period from Solon to the final establishment of the radical democracy at the end of the fifth century, and, finally, the systematic description of this democracy as it existed in the fourth century. These sections are not independent of

each other, but are interconnected logically and stylistically. The idea which is the basis of this connection is Aristotle's conception of the development of the Athenian democracy.

He had to deal with a series of constitutional changes, each of which, while it necessarily had some connection with that constitution which preceded it and that which followed it, might nevertheless seem to be unrelated to others in the series and to the constitution of the fourth century. Aristotle, however, perceived that there was one way in which this series, with its manifold varieties of constitutions, could largely be unified and tied together. This was to look at the whole series against the background of the democracy of the fourth century and to attempt to ascertain what relation the series and its components had to the final constitutional change in the series. In effect, this meant that his task was to explain how the radical democracy came into being. He chose to do this by emphasizing the beginning and growth of democratic elements in the state. To express this growth accurately, he employed a stylistic pattern which he had found useful in others of his writings, and which, wherever he used it, carried with it the notions of beginning, development, and maturity.

The stylistic pattern expresses Aristotle's process of thought and it cannot be separated from the thought. Thus, as Aristotle with his conception of the history of the Athenian constitution was especially concerned with the portion of that history which had to do with the beginning and growth of the democracy, so his pattern bounds the same area, beginning with Solon as the founder of the democracy, and tracing the growth and development of the democracy to its culmination.

Aristotle's conception of Athenian history has certain ramifications, which themselves are subordinated to the logical demands of the pattern. Since the pattern traced the growth of the democracy, it had to begin with Solon. The immediate result of this was that the pre-Solonian period became less relevant to Aristotle's main conception and less important in his eyes. Against this fact, he still had to write a history of the whole constitutional development and not merely of those parts of it which were important for the fourth-century democracy. Accordingly, in the beginning of the treatise, now largely lost to us, he seems to have described all the constitutional changes which occurred before Solon. When he came to summarize this development, he subordinated the pre-Solonian part of it to his main conception by including in his summary only those early elements which threw some light on or made some contribution to the democratic phase of the development.

Another ramification of Aristotle's main conception was that, for the

power of the *demos* to grow, this growth must have been at the expense of other elements in the state. In one instance, when he is referring to the position of the Areopagos after the Persian Wars, Aristotle makes this explicit by an elsewhere unparalleled negative use of the pattern.

When he discusses the arkhons and the *boule* in this connection, another facet of his main conception comes into play. As he interpreted the constitutional development in Athens with reference to the growth of the democracy, so he saw in the popular law courts the most important element of the earliest and latest phases of that growth. Aristotle is deliberately vague about the powers and functions of the Areopagos, simply because he did not have the information to back up the views which he expressed about it, views which were part and parcel of the conservative interpretation of past Athenian history. His very vagueness suggests that these powers were not entirely judicial, and this is borne out by his statement that, when the influence of the Areopagos was finally lost, the prerogatives it had enjoyed were transferred not only to the law courts but also to the *boule* and the assembly. The situation was not the same with the *boule* and the arkhons. He wished to emphasize only the judicial authority of those bodies, and he easily accomplished this by summarily distinguishing between the judicial powers which they once had and the limitations later put on their authority by the *demos*.

The schematic pattern, which is the core of the stylistic structure of the *AthPol*, must be referred generally to the development of the democracy and not more particularly to the rise of the popular law courts. Although Aristotle conceived the most important element of the developed democracy to be the power of the law courts — to the extent that he devoted a detailed and specially positioned section of the treatise to a description of their operation — and believed that the institution of this element was the first impetus to the growth of the democracy, he did not carry through this conception. He characterizes the radical democracy as the arbitrary rule of the *demos* by means of decrees of the assembly.

Here Aristotle introduces another element, decrees of the assembly. Although we are perhaps prepared for this by his statement that some of the powers of the Areopagos were given to the *demos*, by which he means the assembly, from another point of view it is difficult to escape the conclusion that there is a slight shift of emphasis as Aristotle develops his main conception. He seems not to have attached any special importance to the assembly in his description of the early stages of the constitutional development. He could not entirely have overlooked it,

for he must have thought that it was by means of the assembly that Kleisthenes and Ephialtes, for example, carried through their reforms. The fact remains, however, that Aristotle put such an emphasis on the importance of the courts that it was almost by an afterthought that the assembly was granted a place in his conception of the development of the democracy.

APPENDIX

The fragment preserved by Herakleides (F 7) reads as follows: (1) ἀπὸ δὲ Κοδριδῶν οὐκέτι βασιλεῖς ἥροῦντο, (2) διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τρυφᾶν καὶ μαλακοὺς γεγονέναι. (3) Ἰππομένης δὲ εἰς τῶν Κοδριδῶν βουλόμενος ἀπώσασθαι τὴν διαβολήν, λαβὼν ἐπὶ τῇ θυγατρὶ Λειμώνῃ μοιχόν, ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἀνεῖλεν ὑποξέύξας [[μετὰ τῆς θυγατρὸς]] τῷ ἄρματι, τὴν δὲ ἵππω συνέκλεισεν ἔως ἀπώλετο.

As is usual in these matters, the latest and fullest discussion is given by Jacoby (commentary to Hellanikos, F 23). He also offers a clear exposition of the constitutional background against which the fragment must be interpreted. The point in question is that "in the fourth century there existed two conceptions of the Athenian supreme office: a simple conception regarding the archon as the immediate successor of the *βασιλεύς*, and a more complicated conception which finds within the period of the kings a development from *βασιλεία* to *ἄρχη διὰ βίου*" (*FGrH* 3b1.47). Jacoby also says, probably rightly, that "the intermediate stage of the *ἄρχοντες δεκαετεῖς* who according to their nature are more *ἄρχοντες* than *βασιλεῖς*, can be connected with either conception."

It is certain, according to the view expressed in ch. 3, that Aristotle believed, at least in that chapter, that the Kodridai relinquished the kingship and gained in turn the prerogatives of the arkhonship — ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου τῆς βασιλείας παραχωρησάντων τῶν Κοδριδῶν ἀντὶ τῶν δοθεισῶν τῷ ἄρχοντι δωρεῶν — whether this happened at the time of Medon or of Akastos. Since he also accepted the arkhonship for life and the arkhonship for ten years, it is evident that the view given in ch. 3 is the more complicated conception of the development of the arkhonship.

On the basis of the fragment quoted above, Jacoby argues that Aristotle adopted the simple conception in the early part of the *AthPol*. It is useful to observe the process of this argument. "Aristotle followed this version sc. the simple conception . . . in the lost opening of the narrative part of the 'Αθ.π., if the story of the last Kodrid Hippomenes is to supply the reason for the fact that ἀπὸ τῶν Κοδριδῶν οὐκέτι βασιλεῖς ἥροῦντο" (*FGrH* 3b1.45: my italics). He continues: "unfortunately all we have is an excerpt made by Herakleides in which the point seems to be lacking" — the fragment is quoted — "that looks as if the Kodrids had at some time lost royalty by

τρυφή and *μαλακία*, and Hippomenes tried to regain it: but then the end of the story is missing" (3b2.54 n.29). These statements really provide two explanations, not one, and I will argue that the second of these is correct.

According to the first interpretation, the body of the fragment — (3), as I have divided the text — must be so connected to (1) as to show a relation of cause and effect. Hippomenes was the last Kodrid king, and he was deposed because of his cruel deed. This interpretation, and any interpretation which makes (1) the result of (3), takes no account of (2). In the text (1) and (2) are combined. While it is perfectly possible that (3), Hippomenes' action, would result in (1), the loss of the kingship for his family, it is impossible to see how (3) would be the cause of (2), for there is nothing of *τρυφή* or *μαλακία* in Hippomenes' action. In this interpretation, also, there is no point of reference for *τὴν διαβολήν*.

More plausible is the second interpretation hinted at by Jacoby, according to which the fragment would be understood in the following way. (1) and (2) refer to an event different from that described in (3). The Kodridai will have lost the kingship and gained the archonship. The cause of this was their reputation for soft and luxurious living (2) — it is to be noted that Aristotle ascribes the institution of the polemarchy to the fact that some of the preceding kings were *τὰ πολέμια μαλακούς* (3.2). In this way, (1) and (2) are self-consistent. (2) is the cause of which (1) is the effect. Both refer to the loss of the kingship. An outgrowth of this event is what Herakleides/Aristotle describes in (3). Hippomenes, wishing to prove unfounded this slur upon his ancestors — *βουλόμενος ἀπώσασθαι τὴν διαβολήν* — performed the action he did. Two separate historical events are conflated in the fragment.

To make the fragment more comprehensible, it may be permissible to attempt to place the fragment in the early constitutional development. Aristotle's conception is that the monarchy which originally existed in Athens (F 1) declined. The first step in this decline was the institution of the polemarchy (3.2); the next step took place under Theseus, whose constitution was *μικρὸν παρεγκλίνουσα τῆς βασιλικῆς* and who first *ἀπέκλινε πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον* (F 4); yet a third stage was the transference of the royal powers to the newly created archon (3.2). The archon now became the chief official of the Athenian state, but his power was not as great as that of the king had been, else the change would not have been made. Further diminutions of the power of the archon came when the tenure of the office was limited to ten years and then to one. Hippomenes, who as a Kodrid still held the archonship — probably as *ἄρχων δεκαετής* — perhaps tried to regain the kingship⁴⁶ by an action which he thought would prove invalid the original reason for its loss in his family.

If this interpretation be accepted, further comment may be in place. According to Jacoby, *FGrH* 3b2.54 n.29, the story of Hippomenes either (and originally) was an aition for the place-name *παρ’ ἵππον καὶ κόρην*, or it explains why the Kodridai lost their position as kings or archons for life.

The story certainly, and both explanations of it probably, existed before Aristotle wrote. We cannot know whether he mentioned the first explanation, but we expect — as Jacoby says — a political application of the story. If, because Aristotle adhered to the complicated conception of the development of the archonship, he was unable to accept the usual political application, viz., that Hippomenes' action led to the deposition of the Kodridai, it is possible that he inverted the usual tradition and made the political factor the cause of Hippomenes' action, and not its effect.

This would explain why only in Herakleides/Aristotle is a political motive for Hippomenes' action suggested and also why we are not informed what happened to Hippomenes. Aristotle may have believed that Hippomenes was ὅρχων δεκαετής and that "as in our lists, he [reigned] for his full ten years notwithstanding the scandal" (Jacoby, 3b2.60 n.58).

NOTES

1. Works to which most frequent reference is made are cited as follows: Adcock = F. E. Adcock, "The Source of the Solonian Chapters of the Athenaiion Politeia," *Klio* 12 (1912) 1–16; H. Bloch, "Studies in Historical Literature of the Fourth Century B.C.," *HSCP Suppl.* 1 (1940) = *Athenian Studies presented to William Scott Ferguson*, 303–376; Else = G. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument* (Cambridge, Harvard 1957); Von Fritz and Kapp = K. von Fritz and E. Kapp, *Aristotle's Constitution of Athens* (New York 1950); Hignett = C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford 1952); Jacoby, *Atthis* = F. Jacoby, *Atthis, The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens* (Oxford 1949); Jaeger = W. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle, Fundamentals of the History of his Development*,² Eng. trans. by R. Robinson (Oxford 1948); Oppermann = H. Oppermann, *Aristoteles ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ* (Leipzig, Teubner 1928); Sandys = J. E. Sandys, *Aristotle's Constitution of Athens*² (London 1912); and Wade-Gery = H. T. Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford, Blackwell 1958). I make two assumptions on controversial matters, reserving further discussion to another time: (a) that ch. 4, the "Constitution of Drakon," together with the references thereto in the text, 3.1, 7.3, and 41.2, is an interpolation not made by Aristotle; (b) that *Pol.* II, 12 was written before the *AthPol*, and *Pol.* IV–VI were written after it.

2. One notable exception is F. Jacoby: see especially *Atthis*, 210ff. and *FGrH* 3b2, 359ff. See also Bloch, 355–356 and the articles of Usener and Dümmler cited by him, 356 n.2. A philosophical approach is used by L. C. Stecchini, *ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ, The Constitution of the Athenians* (Glencoe, Illinois 1950) 37–45, but his interpretations are frequently arbitrary. K. von Fritz, "Aristotle's Contribution to the Practice and Theory of Historiography," *University of California Publications in Philosophy* 28 (1958) 113–138, holds that Aristotle used the concept of biological evolution, and especially the notions of progress and development, with reference to the field of cultural phenomena. He argues that Aristotle never applied this conception to the political field, but I hope to show that a basically similar conception is used in the *AthPol*.

3. See Hignett, 28–29, and, for similar earlier views, Sandys, li ff. F. G.

Kenyon noted the early skepticism of English scholars in *CR* 5 (1891) 332. Hignett's theory was favorably received by Else, 119 n.95, mentioned without comment by H. Berve, *Gnomon* 22 (1955) 225–232; not discussed by M. McGregor, *Phoenix* 8 (1954) 112–114, and J. R. T. Pollard, *GaR* 22 (1953) 140; and denied without valid arguments by A. Aymard, *AntCl* 22 (1953) 502–503 and R. Weil, *REG* 68 (1955) 341–342. All the aforementioned, save Else, reviewed Hignett's book. C. J. DeVogel, *Greek Philosophy* 2 (Leiden 1953) 10, feels that the *AthPol* was probably written by one of Aristotle's pupils.

4. I say "in intent" because it is certain that the *Politeiae* have some connection with Aristotle's philosophical (political) theory. See the explicit statement in *NicEth*. X 9, 1181b17ff., with the comments of Jaeger, 265, and Bloch, 362.

5. Cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen* 1 (Berlin 1893) 356, and Jaeger, 265.

6. Cf. E. A. Havelock *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics* (New Haven 1957) chs. 2, 3, and 12.

7. Cf. Wilamowitz (above, n.5) 373 and *Greek Historical Writing* (Oxford 1908) 18.

8. Cf. K. von Fritz, *CP* 49 (1954) 88.

9. Cf. *Pol.* II 12, 1274a1–2, Isokrates, *Areop.* 22, Adcock, 6–7, and B. Keil, *Die Solonische Verfassung in Aristoteles Verfassungsgeschichte Athens* (Berlin 1892) 90.

10. The passages, which are quoted fully by Else, are *AthPol* 3.3, *Pol.* II 12, 1274a9, *De Caelo*, I 5, 271b12, *Met.* A, 2, 982b12, and *SophRef.* 34, 183b22ff.

11. *προάγειν* is, of course, interchangeable with *προελθεῖν*, depending upon the grammatical structure of the passage involved.

12. *αὐξανομένη* L, *αὐξανομένη* H. Richards, *CR* 5 (1891) 180.

13. For this characterization of radical democracy, see *Pol.* IV 4, 1292a35f.: *τοιαύτη κατάστασις ἐν ᾧ ψηφίσματι πάντα διοικεῖται*; and for the importance of popular law courts in this type of constitution, 1292a29f.

14. The pattern is used in connection with the arts of tragedy and rhetoric, of a civil office, and of the origin of philosophy, to use some of the examples cited by Else. Furthermore, its use seems not to have been confined to any one period of Aristotle's career. *SophRef.* is dated to an early period by F. Nuyens, *L'Evolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote* (Louvain 1948) 115ff. and by P. Moraux, *Les Listes anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain 1951) 316. The *De Caelo* is similarly dated by Moraux, 320, and Nuyens, 121ff. *Met.* A belongs to Aristotle's Assos period according to Jaeger, 189ff.; cf. W. Theiler, "Der Entstehung der Metaphysik des Aristoteles," *MusHelv* 15 (1958) 85–105. I will defer to another time a discussion of the pattern in itself and of the slight differences in Aristotle's use of it: in the *AthPol* it is mainly, though not entirely, a tool of analysis, elsewhere it is more descriptive. Similarities to this pattern are to be found in Plato, *Laws* III, although specific elements of it undoubtedly find their origin in pre-Socratic theories on the history of civilization: e.g., on *κατὰ μικρόν*, see Havelock (above, n.6) 83. G. Kaibel, *Stil und Text der ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ des Aristoteles* (Berlin 1893) 48, supposes a medical metaphor in *αὐξανομένη* and *ὑποφερομένη*.

15. Cf. Jacoby, *Aththis*, 212: "that philosopher, in accordance with the general nature of his thinking, recognized that the description of the existing form of a State does not teach us anything unless it is shown at the same time how the

form of the State concerned arrived at its φύσις, as one might say," and Wilamowitz (above, n.5) 187: "die ἐσχάτη δημοκρατία erfüllte immer mehr ihre φύσις in der sprache der Politik zu reden."

16. Cf. *Physics* V 1, 224b8: μᾶλλον γὰρ εἰς δὴ ἐξ οὐ κινεῖται ὀνομάζεται ἡ μεταβολή.

17. Cf. G. Barraclough, "The Basis of Politics: Aristotle and the Scientists," *Journal of Philosophical Studies* 4 (1929) 490–496.

18. This view seems also to have been shared by those who, according to *Pol.* II 12, 1274a5ff., blamed Solon for instituting popular law courts. By this action, they thought, Solon in effect robbed the magistrates and Areopagos of power. For the importance of the law courts in this connection, cf. Plutarch, *Solon* 18.2, Jacoby, *Atthis*, 387 n.61, and E. Ruschenbusch, "ΔΙΚΑΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΚΥΠΙΟΝ," *Historia* 6 (1957) 257–274.

19. This is true in spite of the fact that he says that τὸ μὴ δανείζειν ἐπὶ σώμασιν was πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον. This act removed the obstacles to the growth of democracy, but the institution of popular law courts gave the positive impetus to that growth.

20. Eloch, 355ff., has shown that a principle of selectivity was operative in the systematic part of the *AthPol*, in that Aristotle seems deliberately to have avoided including certain matters which Theophrastos was to discuss in his *Nomoi*.

21. There were undoubtedly other changes which he failed to include: see Jacoby, *Atthis*, 387 n.62.

22. Cf. Von Fritz and Kapp, 9ff. and Jacoby, *Atthis*, 387 n.62, with *FGrH* 3b1.50.

23. Adcock was not the first to argue that Plutarch did not here use Aristotle: cf. Wilamowitz 1.299ff., Sandys, xxxiii and Keil (above, n.9) 172. It was Adcock's merit to put this conclusion on a firm basis and to go beyond it to Androtion. For a similar analysis of Plutarch and Aristotle, which was written independently of Adcock, see A. Ledl, *Studien zur alten Athenischen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Heidelberg 1914) 14–16.

24. N. G. L. Hammond has recently argued (*JHS* 81 [1961] 91ff.) that *AthPol* 2 and Plutarch, *Solon* 13.3–5 provide different interpretations of the economic conditions before Solon. I think that this does not necessarily tell against the argument for a source common to both (which Hammond himself has assumed, *JHS* 60 [1940] 76). If Hammond is right, the discrepancies between Aristotle and Plutarch may have one of several explanations: e.g., while Plutarch reproduced Androtion more fully, Aristotle abbreviated that portion of Androtion's account which had to do with economic matters — a circumstance in itself not surprising, for Aristotle was more interested in the political background — and this abbreviation led to a lack of precision; or Aristotle, influenced by economic practices of the fourth century (so Hammond argues from the use of the phrase κατὰ ταῦτην τὴν μίσθωσιν [2.2]), tacitly corrected his source to bring the information there provided into line with these practices (for tacit corrections of Androtion, compare 6.1 with Androtion F 34, and 22.1–3 with F 6).

25. For this type of chiastic structure, in which the outer members (here, the political conditions) are the more important because of their position and lead directly into a more full exposition, see the strikingly similar arrangement in Herodotus, 1, 6.1–2 and 26–28, with the remarks of H. Immerwahr, *TAPA* 87 (1956) 254–255.

26. A further reason for the inclusion of the tribe kings may be that their

creation implied a diminution of the power of the king. There is some emphasis on the kingship in the first part of the summary. Theseus' constitution was μικρὸν παρεγκλίνονος τῆς βασιλικῆς: the series begins with a μετάστασις τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, and 'Αθηναῖοι τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔχρωντο βασιλείᾳ (Her., Ep. 1).

27. I use the text of Oppermann, which is based, through Wilamowitz (above, n.5) 186 n.1, on *Pol.* II 10, 1272b9–10. What is important for present purposes, the meaning of πολιτείας τόξεις, remains the same in all readings which are palaeographically possible; for which, see Sandys' *apparatus*. The addition of τι seems better to tally with μικρὸν παρεγκλίνονος.

28. ὄχλος, if it be Aristotle's word, probably implies that "Theseus took the first steps on the road leading to radical democracy" (Jacoby, *Atthis*, 247 n.49), but it is at least doubtful that it is his word: cf. F. R. Wüst, *Historia* 6 (1953) 181 and N. G. L. Hammond, *JHS* 81 (1961) 78 n.9. It does not occur elsewhere in the *AthPol.*

29. What is not clear is in what ways Aristotle conceived Theseus to have accomplished this. Recent attempts at reconstruction (the most notable being that of Wade-Gery, 88ff., who argued that much of Plutarch, *Theseus* 25 is derived from Aristotle: for criticism of this view, see Jacoby, *Atthis*, 247 n.49; cf. also Wüst [above, n.28] 178ff.) fail for lack of evidence when it comes to specifics. There was a tradition in Athens that Theseus was the founder of the democracy (E. Ruschenbusch, *Historia* 7 [1958] 408ff.), but it is important to remark that Aristotle did not adhere to this view, although he felt its influence. For him the ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας is with Solon: the constitution of Theseus was (or resembled: τι) a πολιτεία. The distinction is deliberate, and represents a compromise between his own view and others current (Jacoby, *FGrH* 3b1.311). Analytical statements about πολιτεία in the *Politics* (e.g., that it is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, although the term is usually applied to those mixtures which incline toward democracy [IV 8, 1293b33ff.], or that it exists where τὸ πλῆθος governs with a view to τὸ κοινὸν ουμέρον [III 7, 1279a37ff.]) are not sufficiently precise to help here, and, besides, Aristotle occasionally confuses πολιτεία and δημοκρατία (the constitution of Oreos is termed πολιτεία καὶ δημοκρατία V 3, 1303a18ff.; the same constitution in Syracuse is called in one place πολιτεία [V, 4, 1304a27ff.], in another, δημοκρατία [V 12, 1316a32f.]). There is, however, one passage which seems to be relevant. In *Pol.* IV 13, 1297b16ff. Aristotle points out that, in historical times, the governments which immediately succeeded kingships were made up of soldiers, and continues: αὐξανομένων δὲ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ισχυσάντων μᾶλλον πλείους μετεῖχον τῆς πολιτείας. διόπερ ὃς νῦν καλοῦμεν πολιτείας οἱ πρότερον ἐκάλουν δημοκρατίας· ἵσαν δὲ αἱ ἀρχαῖαι πολιτεῖαι εὐλόγως ὀλιγαρχικαὶ καὶ βασιλικαὶ, δι' ὀλιγανθρωπίαν γὰρ οὐκ εἶχον πολὺ τὸ μέσον, ὥστ' ὀλίγοι ὄντες τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν μᾶλλον ὑπέμενον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι. I think that there is implicit here, albeit in more general terms, the same criticism of the tradition of a democratic Theseus as is found in the *AthPol.* Further, if it may be so applied, the passage might suggest that, for Aristotle, the "democratic" contribution of Theseus was to be found in the fact that he slightly broadened the base of governing power, a base which was continually to be widened as the Athenian constitution developed.

30. This definition is basically a Platonic one: cf. *Laws* 6, 751a4ff. and G. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City* (Princeton 1960) 197.

31. If *AthPol* 4 is, as I believe, an interpolation, τῆς πρὸ Δράκοντος (3.1) must originally have been τῆς πρὸ Σόλωνος.

32. For the juridical functions of the archon in the fourth century, see *AthPol* 56.6: cf. also 57.2–4 (king), 58.2–3 (polemarch) and 59.2–5 (thesmophoros).

33. See G. Hill, *Sources in Greek History*, rev. ed. R. Meiggs and A. Andrewes (Oxford 1951) Index, 350.

34. Von Fritz and Kapp, 71, translate: "the Council of the Areopagus had the task of watching over the laws; in fact, it controlled the greater and most important part of the life of the community as the only and final authority in regard to the punishment of public offenders and the imposition of fines." If we try to press Aristotle's words for an exact meaning, "to watch over the laws" must imply "to make sure the laws are obeyed by having the power to exact some punishment, if they are not observed." It differs slightly from the more specific final clause, which rather emphasizes the absoluteness of its judicial authority.

35. On the historicity of this allegation, see Hignett, 6–7.

36. The symmetry of this structure appears to be deliberate. The middle elements of the pattern are centered around the Areopagos; the Areopagos is the second of the three bodies — archons, Areopagos, *boule* — which oppose the *demos*; in ch. 41, the constitutional stage represented by the leadership of the Areopagos stands in the middle of the series, with five μεταβολαί preceding and five following. Aristotle also uses another stylistic device here. Apart from technical usage (4.2; 43.5; 52.2; 53.1,7; 56.3; 63.4; 64.1; 67.2), μέχρι occurs only three times, and each time it is used to signal the treatment of an important topic: μέχρι Σόλωνος (2.2), before the discussion of Solon; μέχρι τούτον (23.1), before the discussion of the Areopagos; and μέχρι τῆς νῦν (41.2), before the discussion of the contemporary constitution.

37. Cf. Isokrates, *Areopagiticus*, and Ephorus, 70 F 139 Jac., who claims that Ζάλευκος συνέταξεν [sc. τὴν νομογραφίαν] ἐκ τε τῶν Κρητικῶν νόμων καὶ Λακωνικῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτικῶν.

38. The relevant passages are quoted by Jacoby, *FGrH* 3b2.109ff.

39. ὡσπερ καὶ πρότερον refers to 3.6, not, as some have thought, to ch. 4.

40. See Jacoby's comments on Androtion, F 4.

41. The translation of Von Fritz and Kapp, 95, is misleading: Ephialtes "gave some of them to the Council of Five Hundred, some to the (Assembly of the) people, and some to the law courts." This does not bring out the force of the τὰ μέν—τὰ δέ construction, by which Aristotle contrasts the βουλή and the δῆμος—δικαιοστήρια.

42. The fifteen passages do not have similar purposes, nor are they of equal weight. Four deal with the transfer of powers from the *boule* to the *demos*. Three refer to institutions which had been described in the narrative (cf. 53.1 with 26.3; 55.1 with 3.2; and 61.1 with 22.1). Four mark areas of political practice in which more democratic principles have come to be operative (a change from one judge to all the judges voting at the examination of the archon [55.4]; the tribes elect the comic khoregoi, who formerly had been appointed by the archon [56.3]; a change from election to sortition in the appointment of the γραμματεὺς κατὰ πρωτανεῖαν [54.3]; the same change for the ἐπιμεληταὶ τῆς πομπῆς [56.4] — this change originated after 350 B.C.). These, like the changes in the authority of the *boule*, are intended to justify and to illustrate Aristotle's statement (41.2) that the democracy of the fifth century has continued to exist ἀεὶ προσεπιλαμβάνοντα τῷ πλήθει τὴν ἔξουσίαν. The remaining passages refer to changes which took place between ca. 335 and Aristotle's death. They are intended to

bring the text up to date and — as I hope to show elsewhere — are probably to be treated as insertions made after the completion of a first draft of the *AthPol.* The increase in the number of *σιτοφύλακες* (51.3) must be the result of the grain famine of ca. 330–326 (cf. B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia* 13 [1944] 243ff.); the change in the manner of inscribing ephebe-lists will have occurred after 335/4 (53.4); the change in the name of one of the sacred triremes to *'Αμμωνίς* must be dated in the 330's (61.7: cf. C. J. Classen, "The Libyan God Ammon in Greece before 331 B.C.," *Historia* 8 [1959] 349–355); and we are informed in the text (54.7) that the Hephaistia was added to the list of penteteric festivals in 329/8.

43. In the narrative, anecdotes are used as an important historical source: cf., e.g., 6.2–3 (Solon) and 16.6 (Peisistratos).

44. While there seems no reason, in general, to doubt the accuracy of Aristotle's statements in his description of the contemporary constitution, Hignett, 241, rightly remarks that "the reference . . . to the wide powers of jurisdiction formerly vested in the boule is not above suspicion."

45. The usual view of the division of the treatise is expressed in extreme form by V. Ehrenberg, *The Greek State* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1960) 243, who says that the *AthPol.* "is divided into two parts, unconnected but set side by side, a history of the constitution and a systematic survey of the various elements in the state at the time of Aristotle."

46. I do not know what, if any, connection there is, but Diogenes Laertius 1.54 tells a story of Peisistratos which is reminiscent of that of Hippomenes. Peisistratos says that, in aiming at a tyranny, he is not doing what οὐ προσήκονται, γένους δύντι τῶν Κοδριδῶν. ἀνέλαβον γὰρ ἐγώ ἀ δύμοσαντες Ἀθηναῖοι παρέξειν Κόδρω τε καὶ τῷ ἐκείνου γένει ἀφείλοντο.

PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE

SOME EARLY INTERACTIONS

BY JAMES LONGRIGG

A STUDY of philosophy and medicine in ancient Greece reveals important cases of interaction between them. I propose to consider these interactions under three headings: (1) The beneficial influence of philosophy upon medicine; (2) The pernicious influence of philosophy upon medicine; (3) (to which I shall give most weight) the fruitful influence of medicine upon philosophy.

I. THE BENEFICIAL INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY UPON MEDICINE

Some records of early medicine in Babylon, Assyria, and Egypt have survived. Although our evidence is in an incomplete and fragmentary state, it is still possible to gain some overall impressions from it. We find no indication that anything of the real nature of disease was discovered by the ancient physician. Diseases were regarded as being marks of the displeasure of the gods or were held to be caused by the intrusion of a demon. The prime purpose of the physician was to appease the god or drive out the demon which had "possessed" the sick man's body. In order to do so he employed prayers, supplications, sacrifices, spells, and incantations. The Egyptian medical papyri which have survived consist, for the most part, of prescriptions of drugs, and are interspersed with magical spells which were believed to impart efficacy to the prescriptions which follow. Many of the remedies prescribed contain noxious or offensive ingredients. The intention was, presumably, to make them as unpalatable as possible to the possessing spirit and so give it no inducement to linger in the patient's body. Coprotherapy is much in evidence. A good example of this practice is to be found in the *Hearst Papyrus* (85):

O ghost, male or female, thou hidden, thou concealed one, who dwelleth in this my flesh,
in these my limbs. Lo, I brought thee
excrements to devour! Beware, hidden one,
be on your guard, concealed one, escape!

In ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia the views of the physician on the causes of disease and the operation of remedies were so linked with the belief in supernatural forces that a rational understanding of the organs and functions of the body or of the operation of the remedies applied to it was impossible.

There is, however, one medical treatise, dating from early antiquity, which makes us hesitate in dismissing Egyptian medicine, at least, as completely dominated by magic. This is the famous *Edwin Smith Surgical Papyrus*, named after its modern purchaser, which was copied in the seventeenth century B.C. from a work written during the third millennium B.C. This treatise is organized in a systematic manner and seems to be free from the magical elements which pervade other Egyptian medical papyri such as the *Ebers Papyrus* and the *Hearst Papyrus*. Breasted, the best modern editor and translator of the papyrus, has claimed that the work is in the true sense scientific.¹ This claim has by no means been universally accepted, and it is still a subject of controversy whether the treatise can be so described. It has been argued, contra Breasted, that there are magical elements in the text of the treatise.² It is maintained that when we find the following formula: "It is a malady which I will contend with" or "wrestle with," these words clearly imply belief in magic, and that the author was still a magician at heart. This conclusion, however, does not necessarily follow. The author here could be merely expressing himself figuratively or, more probably, adopting a familiar and traditional mode of expression. The surgeon would be dealing with observable physical causes, and it is hardly likely that he would regard their effect as due to possession by a demon with whom he would have to "wrestle." Moreover, in the papyrus we have two cases which deal with a similar complaint: Case 21 is that of a split in the temple; Case 18 is that of a wound in the temple. The surgeon "contends" with the former, yet merely "treats" the latter. Are we then to believe that the surgeon would consider the one to be of a mysterious magical origin, the other the result of an observable physical cause?

It is my opinion that this controversy cannot be definitely settled upon the available evidence. I am, for my part, disinclined to accept Breasted's claim, and believe that it derives its plausibility from the fact that, unlike the physician, the surgeon had to deal with afflictions which were the result of observable physical causes³ and had little or no connection with the malignant demons of disease. A wound caused by a weapon, fall, or tool would be well understood and treated by rational means, whereas the causes of fever, for example, would be quite

mysterious and their effect would be regarded as due to the patient's being possessed by some demon or other. Since belief in magic is prevalent throughout the rest of the Egyptian medical papyri and pervades our earliest surviving medical literature generally, we see no good reason to doubt that this particular surgeon was a true child of his times and also believed in the powers of the supernatural. Although it must be acknowledged that the systematic organization of the treatise approximates to a scientific presentation of empirical data, it seems most unlikely that scientific medicine had its origin in Egypt.

Magic and superstition are found in Greek medicine also. They are, however, rare in the Hippocratic *Corpus*, and the majority of the works contained in the *Corpus* are completely free from both mythological conjecture and magical intervention. In them we find a striking contrast in outlook with previous medical literature. The emancipation of medicine from superstition and its subsequent development as a science was the outcome of precisely the same attitude of mind which the Ionian philosophers were the first to apply to the world about them. Their attempt to explain the world in terms of its visible constituents brought about the transition from mythological conjecture to rational explanation.⁴ As Jaeger well points out⁵, the clearest evidence of this relationship is the fact that the medical literature of the fifth and fourth centuries is in Ionic. Although the inhabitants of Cos spoke Doric, Hippocrates and his school wrote in Ionic.

Here there can be seen the first and most advantageous influence of philosophy upon medicine. In two treatises in the *Corpus*, *Airs Waters Places* and *The Sacred Disease*, this rational attitude is especially marked. In these works it is emphasized that all diseases arise through natural causes. Both of them lay particular stress upon the moistening of the brain as a cause of disease.⁶ The former work attempts to expound the effects of climatic and topographical considerations upon health. In the latter treatise the uniformity of nature is stressed in the sense that no disease can be any more "divine" than any other. It is argued that all diseases arise through natural causes and that men think some are of divine origin only because of their inexperience and their wonder at the peculiar symptoms which characterize them. We quote the following passages from this work to illustrate the rational outlook derived by medicine from philosophy.

But this disease [epilepsy] is in my opinion no more divine than any other; it has the same nature as other diseases, and the [same] cause that gives rise to individual diseases. It is also curable, no less than other diseases, unless by long lapse of time it be so ingrained as to be more

powerful than the remedies that are applied. Its origin, like that of other diseases, lies in heredity . . . Another strong proof that this disease is no more divine than any other is that it affects the naturally phlegmatic, but does not attack the bilious. Yet, if it were more divine than others, this disease ought to have attacked all equally, without making any difference between bilious and phlegmatic.

(Ch. 5)

This disease styled sacred comes from the same causes as others, from the things that come to and go from the body, from cold, sun, and from the changing restlessness of wind. These things are divine. So that there is no need to put the disease in a special class and to consider it more divine than the others; they are all divine and all human. Each has a nature and power of its own; none is hopeless or incapable of treatment.

(Ch. 21)⁷

It should, however, be pointed out that the influence of Ionian natural philosophy brought about no sharp cleavage in the history of medical thought. As we said, magic and superstition are found also in Greek medicine. The practice of "incubation" in the temples affords a good illustration of this. Aelian preserves for us the following account of the historian, Hippys of Rhegium (*H.A.* IX. 33):

A woman had a worm and the cleverest of the physicians despaired of curing her. So she went to Epidaurus and begged the god to free her from the parasite. The god was not there, but the attendants made her lie down where the god was in the habit of healing the suppliants and she lay quiet as she was enjoined. But the servants of the god began to treat her and removed her head from her neck. Then one of them inserted his hand and drew out the worm, a great brute of a beast. But they were no longer able to fit the head in place and restore it to its usual fitting. Then the god arrived and was angry with them for undertaking a task beyond their wisdom and he himself with the irresistible power of a god restored the head to the body and raised up the suppliant.

We also find Aristophanes in the *Plutus* (665ff.) burlesquing these temple rites and giving a farcical account of the proceedings in the temple of Asclepius.

II. THE PERNICIOUS INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY UPON MEDICINE

In spite of this first, beneficial influence of philosophy upon medicine, its later influence was far from advantageous, and the subordination of the latter study to philosophy greatly hampered its development. In the middle of the fifth century B.C. the philosophers sought to extend their views about the world at large to man himself and as a corollary to this

began to base their medical theory upon their philosophical postulates. (The idea that man and the outside world are made of similar materials and behave according to similar rules, already to some extent implicit in Anaximenes' thought, can be clearly discerned in Heraclitus, who believes that man's very life is bound up with his surroundings. But it was not until the middle of the fifth century, curiously enough as a result of an increased interest in medicine, that the implications of this idea were fully drawn out.)

Empedocles affords the best illustration of the manner in which the attempt was made to base medicine upon a philosophical postulate. That he had medical interests is undoubtedly. His fame as a doctor, which is suggested by his own words,⁸ is confirmed by references to him in later medical works. Again from his own words we see that he by no means lacked confidence in his own abilities.⁹ Wellmann speaks of him as the "founder" of the Sicilian school of medicine.¹⁰ Burnet goes even further and claims that Galen actually made Empedocles the founder of the Italian school of medicine.¹¹ But neither Galen nor any other ancient authority states this. The passage of Galen which Burnet cites (*de methodo medendi I 1 X5K*) does not, as he believes, offer any support to his claim. He has overpressed the evidence here. Empedocles' theories exercised a considerable and harmful influence upon later medical doctrine, particularly in Sicily and southern Italy. But whether he actually founded a school such as that on the island of Cos cannot be definitely ascertained. Wellmann's attempts to find other members of the school are not plausible. However that may be, our evidence clearly reveals how Empedocles extended his views from the world at large to man himself. We find that the same four components which form the world also give rise by their mixture to man's flesh, blood, bones, and so on.¹² In this way medical theory came to be based upon a philosophical hypothesis.

Another philosopher whose theories exercised a strong adverse influence upon medicine is Diogenes of Apollonia. Theophrastus has preserved for us a short account of his theory of health.¹³ Brief though our information is, it is nevertheless apparent that he, too, based his theory upon his philosophical postulate. According to Diogenes, who may actually have been a doctor himself and may even have written a medical treatise,¹⁴ health was the result when a large amount of air in a normal condition mingled with the blood and lightened it, penetrating throughout the whole of the body. Whenever the condition of the air was not normal and failed to mix with the blood, the latter coagulated, became weaker and denser, and sickness ensued.

The attempt to apply philosophical postulates to medicine in such a manner is vigorously attacked by the author of the Hippocratic treatise *Ancient Medicine*. In this remarkable little work we find for the first time some recognition of the distinction between science and philosophy. The author is clearly conscious of the opposition between the dogmatic method of the natural philosopher and the more empirical method of the physician. This is especially apparent in the first two chapters of the work, where he carefully points out that

[medicine] has no need of a “new-fangled” postulate, as do insoluble mysteries, which necessarily require the use of a postulate, if an attempt be made to discuss them, for instance the mysteries of heaven and of the regions below. If anyone were to express his opinion about the condition of these, it would not be plain either to the speaker himself or to the audience whether the statements were true or not. For there is no test the application of which would bring certain knowledge. But medicine has long had everything to hand, with a principle and method already discovered, by which many excellent discoveries have been made over a long period; while what remains will be discovered, if the inquirer be competent and familiar with discoveries already made, conducting his researches with these as his starting point. But whoever spurns and rejects all these, attempting to conduct research after a different method and fashion, and then declares that he has made some discovery, deceives and is deceived. He attempts the impossible.¹⁵

Again, in chapter 12, we find him declaring proudly that medicine has been able to rise by reasoning from deep ignorance to approximate exactness and therefore its discoveries should be admired as being the result of excellent and correct research, not of chance.

In *Ancient Medicine* Empedocles is made to represent the objectionable influence of the “philosophical” approach to medicine. The work begins with a polemic against those who seek to introduce their philosophical postulates into medicine, and an example of such a postulate is given, viz. that there are four powers active in the human body, the hot, the cold, the moist, and the dry. That Empedocles should be directly named and this particular example of a postulate chosen seems to offer some support to the view that he arrived at his four element theory by identifying these four opposites each with the appropriate cosmic mass.¹⁶ Thus it may well have been Empedocles’ immediate influence which fixed these two pairs of opposites as the canonical *δυνάμεις* in Sicilian medicine. A successor to Empedocles’ medical views and another western Greek, Philistion of Locri, clearly did associate these specific *δυνάμεις* with the four elements.¹⁷

Notwithstanding the vigorous polemic delivered by the author of *Ancient Medicine* against the attempt to found medical theory upon the basis of a philosophical postulate, there are several works to be found in the Hippocratic *Corpus* which clearly show the adverse influence of philosophy upon medicine. Since the philosophical influences upon certain works in the *Corpus* are already well known, we shall content ourselves with a brief mention of them.

The influence of Empedocles may be traced in the treatise *The Nature of Man*,¹⁸ where the number of humours is limited to four, viz. blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. This view is the counterpart of the four element theory, and it seems to have been the influence of the latter which led to the restriction of the number of the humours to four. Moreover, like the four elements themselves, these four humours are each characterized by the quality hot, cold, moist, or dry.

Diogenes' influence is marked in two of the Hippocratic works, *Breaths* and *The Sacred Disease*. The former work is more of a sophistic essay than a serious medical treatise. As Jones suggests,¹⁹ the work may have been presented by its sophist author to the library of the medical school at Cos. It apparently became known as a Hippocratic work at quite an early date, for it is referred to in Meno's *Iatrica* (Chapters 5 and 6) and is in the list of Erotian. The author has no genuine interest in medicine and is even more guilty of making dogmatic assertions and failing to verify or reject them by experiment than the philosophers themselves. Like Diogenes, he believes that air, which is of fundamental importance in the world generally, is instrumental in causing diseases. In addition to this major influence, there are one or two minor reminiscences of Diogenes in the medical work. In Chapter 3 its author puts forward the theory that the sea has air in it which is breathed by fish and other aquatic creatures. This theory is apparently derived from the philosopher (cf. Aristotle *de Respiratione* 2, 471a3 DK64A31). At the very end of the same chapter we find the poetic description of air as the $\gamma\eta\varsigma \delta\chi\eta\mu\alpha$. This expression is also found in Euripides' *Troades* 884. If the author of *Breaths* is not simply imitating Euripides, they could both be copying some famous utterance of Diogenes. We know that the latter's thought was well known in Athens at this period, for his views are parodied by Aristophanes in the *Clouds* (225ff.).

The Sacred Disease is a work written expressly to explain on rational grounds the nature and causes of epilepsy and at the same time to combat the superstitious beliefs held about this disease. The author is strongly influenced by philosophy and attempts to apply a philosophical hypothesis to medicine in a manner which would have brought down

upon his head the wrath of the writer of *Ancient Medicine*. Like many other medical writers of this period the author of *The Sacred Disease* is an eclectic, and the psychological theory contained in his work reflects in some aspects the influence of Alcmaeon as well as that of Diogenes. The latter, however, is undeniably eclectic himself and the influence of the former on the medical work may have been at second hand. Alcmaeon's physiological researches had led him to the belief that the brain was the essential organ of intelligence and perception.²⁰ Diogenes had revived the monistic theory of Anaximenes and assumed air as his first principle. He conceived of it as psychical in nature, so that for him it was not only the primary substance but the principle of intelligence as well. (The immediate influence of Anaxagoras may be found here.) Upon the basis of these two theories, that the brain is the seat of the intelligence and that air is the source and principle of intelligence in the organism, is elaborated a comprehensive explanation of disease. Epilepsy, the most important of these for the medical author's present purpose, is caused by the stoppage of air in the veins by a flow of phlegm from the brain.

Diogenes' influence may also have made itself felt in the account of the venous system outlined in Chapter 3 of *The Sacred Disease*. Aristotle preserves Diogenes' own account (*Hist. Anim.* III 2.511b30 DK64B6) and there are close similarities between them. Later in the work (Chapter 16 Littré) the doctrine is advanced that moisture is harmful to thought. This theory, too, seems to have been derived from Diogenes, who appears himself to be indebted to Heraclitus for it.²¹ Theophrastus in *de Sensibus* 44 (DK64A19) tells us that Diogenes believed that moisture (*ἰκμάς*) hampered the intellect. This word appears to have been a technical term used by Diogenes himself. The word is rare in Attic and occurs a further three times in the tradition relating to Diogenes; viz. in Alexander (*Quaest. Nat.* II 23 DK64A33), the Scholium on Apollonius Rhodius IV, 269 (DK64A18) and in Aristophanes' parody of Diogenes' theories at *Clouds* 225 (DK64C1).

The influence of Heraclitus is also marked in the *Corpus*. In the treatise *Nutriment*, a later Heraclitean, skilfully copying his master's aphoristic style, applies the theory of perpetual change to the assimilation of food by a living organism. *Regimen* I is also written in the Heraclitean style, and reminiscences of Anaxagoras and possibly Empedocles and Archelaus can be found in the work.²² The influence of Pythagorean numerology may be traced in the work *Sevens* (see especially Chapter 5) and *Fishes* (Chapters 12–15), and perhaps in the im-

portance assigned to "critical days" generally, since Celsus actually refers to them as "Pythagorici numeri."²³

III. THE FRUITFUL INFLUENCE OF MEDICINE UPON PHILOSOPHY

The impulse to turn from the macrocosm to the microcosm was considerably quickened by the influence of medicine. Although one result, as we have seen, was that the development of medicine itself was gravely hampered, there was a more fruitful influence in the reverse direction, and it can be seen how medical interests coloured philosophical thinking. The influence of medicine upon philosophy in this way is especially marked in the middle of the fifth century B.C., and, as Burnet rightly points out, "it is impossible to understand the history of philosophy from this point onwards without keeping the history of medicine constantly in view."²⁴

It is unfortunate that no Greek medical literature prior to the Hippocratic *Corpus* has survived. Alcmaeon is the only pre-Hippocratic Greek medical writer whose views have survived in any form.²⁵ That they survived at all may, as Heidel suggests,²⁶ have been sheer accident. Alcmaeon's interests seem to have been primarily medical and physiological, but like so many of the Greeks of his time, his interests were wide.²⁷ Some of the problems he considers either had engaged or were to engage the interest of the natural philosophers. Aristotle, therefore, took note of his opinions and he was later dutifully included by Theophrastus in his *Physical Opinions*. It is curious that there is no mention of him at all in Meno's *Iatrica*. It may have been Theophrastus' inclusion of him among the physicists which led to his exclusion from the medical history.

Alcmaeon is a figure of importance in the study of interrelations between medicine and philosophy. His influence upon later philosophical thought was, we believe, considerable. It is unfortunate that our evidence is so deficient that we cannot even date him with any degree of certainty.²⁸ Again owing to our lack of pre-Hippocratic medical literature in Greek, it is impossible to say whether or not he was the actual originator of the medical theories he expresses. Our evidence, however, strongly suggests that he was an original and independent thinker. Whether or not Alcmaeon actually originated these theories is of subsidiary importance to us here. What is important is that it seems to have been Alcmaeon's influence which stimulated the interest of later philosophers in them.

Alcmaeon's main interests, as we have said, seem to have been

primarily medical and physiological. Aëtius has preserved for us some information about his medical theory.²⁹ According to this account, Alcmaeon regarded health as due to the equilibrium (*ἰσονομία*) of the "powers" composing the body, while the supremacy (*μοναρχία*) of any one of them caused disease.³⁰ This medical theory exercised a wide influence. In Empedocles' thought it is fruitfully combined with his philosophical hypothesis. Man's flesh and blood are made up of the four world-components on the pattern of *ἰσομοιρία*, and where this gives way to inequalities, deviations from perfect health and wisdom occur.³¹

The influence of this medical theory, combined with the Empedoclean thesis identifying the four elements with the components of the body, can be traced, through Philistion,³² to Plato.³³ Its influence on the latter was particularly strong; for, as Taylor well points out,³⁴ his ethical theory of pleasure and pain, most fully expounded in *Republic* IX and in the *Philebus*, but equally implied in the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Timaeus*, represents an attempt to apply this medical formula in psychology.³⁵

Alcmaeon's physiological interests, and in particular his researches into the nature of the sense-organs, seem to have had an even more important effect upon philosophical thought. His preoccupation with these matters stimulated the interest of later philosophers in them, and after him psycho-physiological enquiries became almost a standard topic of investigation.³⁶ These interests had important repercussions upon their philosophy.

Most of our information concerning Alcmaeon's physiological researches comes from Theophrastus,³⁷ who appears to have had access only to limited information. Chalcidius, however, has preserved for us some additional information,³⁸ which he may have obtained from Posidonius, who can be shown to have drawn freely on Academic and other sources of learning.

In the course of his dissections Alcmaeon appears to have discovered that certain passages or "pores" led from various sense-organs to the brain. From this discovery he inferred that all the senses are somehow connected with the brain and that therefore the brain must be the seat of the intelligence. He observes that, if the brain moves or shifts its position, perception is impaired since the pores through which the sensations pass are blocked.

Empedocles, too, employs pores in his theory of perception. His theory is that perception arises when effluences from the object perceived fit into the requisite pores of the sense organ.³⁹ Pores also play an important part in his explanation of the process of respiration. We learn

from Aristotle⁴⁰ that he described them as "bloodless tubes of flesh extended over the surface of the body." Burnet⁴¹ and Taylor,⁴² followed by Vlastos,⁴³ claim that Empedocles adopted his theory of pores from Alcmaeon. This view seems plausible, but is by no means self-evident as these scholars appear to think. The term *πόρος*, being a word of general application, unfortunately offers no support to their claim. Moreover, it could be argued that Alcmaeon was referring to the more obvious passages in the head such as the nostrils and eustachian tubes and that his further discovery of the "passages" leading from behind the eyes (presumably the optic nerves) had led him to the too swift generalization that all the sense-organs were connected to the brain by such passages. Support for this argument could, perhaps, be derived from Theophrastus, who tells us that in the case of touch where there are no discernible passages Alcmaeon was silent.⁴⁴ However, in the preceding chapter Theophrastus informs us that he attempted to give an account of taste. Here, too, there are no obvious passages. We also learn from the *de Sensibus* that Alcmaeon held that all the senses were connected to the brain.⁴⁵ If, as seems likely, his discovery of the passages reaching from behind the eyes to the brain had led him to the general theory that all the sense-organs were connected to the brain in such a fashion, his treatment of taste, where there are no passages apparent to the eye, suggests that his "pores" could vary in size and that in this instance, at least, they resembled those of Empedocles.

The latter did not confine his use of pores to explaining purely physiological phenomena. They also play an important role in his physics generally. In order to circumvent the impasse caused by the Eleatic arguments, Empedocles postulated four "roots" or elements, each of which bears a close resemblance to the Parmenidean One in that it is uncreated and cannot be destroyed. All things come into being and pass away through the mixture and interchange of these four elements. According to Aristotle he held that mixture was only possible between things whose pores were of the same size and shape.⁴⁶

In view of the fact that Alcmaeon employs a pore-theory to explain perception and Empedocles makes elaborate use of pores for the same purpose, it is likely that the latter extended the theory from the sphere of sense-perception and physiology to the world at large, rather than vice versa. Consequently, although Empedocles is censured by the author of *Ancient Medicine* for seeking to apply his philosophical hypothesis to medicine, his medical and physiological interests were not without their influence upon his physics and thereby played an important role in his attempt to free philosophy from the sterile bonds of

Parmenides' logic. We may also point out that one of his moving causes, Love, which plays so important a role in his physics, is the selfsame impulse towards union that is found in human bodies. He looks upon it from a physiological viewpoint, declaring that no mortal has yet noticed that the same Love, which men recognize in their own bodies, performs an identical function in the world at large.⁴⁷

Those physiological interests which began, after the time of Alcmaeon, increasingly to engage the attention of the philosophers are even more apparent in Anaxagoras' thought, and medicine had a much more comprehensive effect upon his physics than it had upon Empedocles'. Anaxagoras appears to have been particularly interested in nutrition. A paraphrase by the scholiast on Gregorius Nazianzanus preserves for us the problem with which Anaxagoras considered himself to be faced.⁴⁸ "How," he asks, "could hair come to be from what is not hair and flesh from what is not flesh?"

The answer which he felt he had to find was one which would satisfy the canons of Parmenidean logic. Presumably he did not think Empedocles' prior attempts to meet the Eleatic arguments successful.⁴⁹ Perhaps his objection was that, according to the latter, in any division of a compound body a stage would be eventually reached where, instead of the original body, the four constituent elements would exist separately, e.g. if bone were divided far enough, one would arrive at its constituent elements in their different proportions. In this way Empedocles' theory leaves itself open to confutation by the Eleatic *elenchus*. For it can be seen that at some stage bone comes into being which did not exist before and we have generation of bone from what strictly is not bone. Anaxagoras would require a solution which did not render him liable to be confuted in such a manner.

His answer to this problem is preserved for us by Aëtius.⁵⁰ His solution was to claim that everything pre-existed in our nourishment: it seemed to him quite impossible that anything should come into being from the non-existent or be dissolved into it. At any rate we take in nourishment that is simple and homogeneous, such as bread or water, and by this are nourished hair, veins, arteries, flesh, sinews, bones and all other parts of the body. Which being so, we must agree that everything that exists is in the nourishment we take in, and that everything derives its growth from things that exist. There must be in that nourishment some parts that are productive of blood, some of sinews, some of bones, and so on . . .

In Simplicius further evidence is found that Anaxagoras was concerned with the problem of nutrition and growth.⁵¹ It seems likely that he

arrived at his general theory as a result of his preoccupation with these very problems. This view that Anaxagoras' physiological interests influenced his physics seems to be strengthened by his use of *σπέρμα* as a new technical term.⁵² And Simplicius tells us (*Physics* 460,28) that Anaxagoras "passed from the mixture in the individual to the mixture of all things." Here, then, a fruitful influence of medicine upon philosophy may be traced, since it seems to have been his physiological interests which suggested to Anaxagoras a way to circumvent the Parmenidean impasse.

If we are correct in our analysis of the thought of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, it will be seen that there is a dramatic reversal in outlook between them. Empedocles largely applies his theories about the world at large to man; since the whole world is composed of four elements, these elements are also the basic constituents of man himself. Anaxagoras, on the other hand, applies to the macrocosm theories evolved through the study of the microcosm.* Both are clearly influenced by their medical interests. Why, then, should there be this reversal in the trend of thought? Is it possible to give a specific reason for it? We think that it is possible and suggest that Anaxagoras' philosophical outlook has been influenced not only by medicine in general but also by one medical treatise in particular.

Between the extant fragments of Anaxagoras and the treatise *Ancient Medicine* there exist some striking similarities both in thought and wording.⁵³ In the medical work is put forward a theory of indefinitely numerous *δυνάμεις* (see esp. Chapters 14 and 15), which, though harmless when mixed or compounded with another, when they are separated off and stand alone become apparent and hurt a man:

Ταῦτα μὲν μεμιγμένα καὶ κεκρημένα ἀλλήλοισιν οὔτε φανερά ἔστιν οὔτε λυπέει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὅταν δέ τι τούτων ἀποκριθῇ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ γένηται, τότε καὶ φανερόν ἔστι καὶ λυπέει τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

The similarities between this passage and Anaxagoras seem particularly close.⁵⁴ The assertion that when things are mixed together they are not apparent (*φανερά*), but when one of them is separated off (*ἀποκριθῆ*) and stands alone (*αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ γένηται*) it then becomes apparent, is paralleled in Anaxagoras, who stated that when things were all mixed together, nothing was plain, but when they had been separated off, each thing became that which preponderated in it. In Chapter 14 of *Ancient Medicine* it seems to be implied that a *δύναμις* is capable of a separate and absolute existence. This, however, is emphatically denied in the

* Cf. W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford 1947) p. 157.

following chapter, where the author pours scorn on the idea that there could be an absolute hot or cold or moist or dry. It is also stressed that there are, for example, many kinds of hot things possessing many opposite powers. Accordingly, it appears that when the author of *Ancient Medicine* speaks of something separating off and being $\alpha\dot{\eta}\tau\dot{o}\ \dot{\epsilon}\phi'$ $\dot{\epsilon}\omega\eta\tau\dot{o}\nu$, he really means that a particular $\delta\dot{u}\eta\mu\dot{i}s$ then becomes predominant over the others, though it can have no separate existence of its own. This is precisely the theory put forward by Anaxagoras (Fragments B8 and B12), who believes that, although things are separated off, nothing is completely separated from anything else (except *Nous*).

Vlastos asserts that in the treatise it is considered that the multiplicity of powers which are in man are also in other things, not only in nutrient, but in leather, wood, and many other things ($\kappa\dot{\alpha}\dot{l}\ \dot{\epsilon}\nu\ \sigma\kappa\dot{u}\tau\dot{e}\iota\ \kappa\dot{\alpha}\dot{l}\ \dot{\epsilon}\nu\ \xi\dot{u}\lambda\dot{\omega}\ \kappa\dot{\alpha}\dot{l}\ \ddot{\alpha}\dot{l}\dot{\lambda}\dot{o}\iota\dot{s}\ \pi\dot{o}\lambda\dot{l}\dot{o}\dot{\iota}\dot{s}$), and this is the view of Anaxagoras. It is true that we are told that there are in man "the salt, bitter, sweet, acid, astringent, insipid and a vast number of other things possessing powers of all sorts in number and in strength," but it is uncertain that this view was extended from man to things like leather and wood. This passage which Vlastos quotes from Chapter 15 clearly does not support his claim. The medical author is here concerned to point out that there is no such thing as an absolute hot or cold or moist or dry; but that each hot thing, for example, also possesses other qualities such as the insipid or astringent, which bring about diverse effects. He points out that the hot and astringent, when applied, has the opposite effect to the hot and insipid, although both medicaments possess the same quality of heat. He seeks to illustrate further his argument by pointing out that these diverse effects are also produced upon less sensitive media than the human body. As Festugière remarks,⁵⁵ it is a characteristic trait of the author of *Ancient Medicine* to try to explain what happens in man by a reference to external phenomena.

Other and perhaps more cogent parallels are drawn by Vlastos. He points out that while the $\ddot{\alpha}\dot{k}\rho\eta\tau\dot{o}\nu$ is spoken of as $i\dot{\sigma}\chi\rho\dot{\nu}\nu$ in the medical work, Anaxagoras declares that Mind $i\dot{\sigma}\chi\dot{\nu}\epsilon\ \mu\dot{e}\gamma\dot{\iota}\dot{s}\tau\dot{o}\nu$ because it is absolutely unmixed (Fragment B12). He also points out that Anaxagoras' only known medical doctrine is that $\chi\dot{o}\lambda\dot{\eta}\iota$ is the cause of acute disease,⁵⁶ while in the medical work what is apparently a similar disease is caused by the efflux of $\xi\dot{a}\nu\theta\dot{\eta}\ \chi\dot{o}\lambda\dot{\eta}\iota$.⁵⁷ Vlastos argues in addition that Anaxagoras' doctrine that all sensation is accompanied by pain would be easily understood if he, too, held a doctrine of $\kappa\dot{r}\dot{\alpha}\dot{\sigma}\dot{\iota}\dot{s}$ whose disturbance pains the man and assumed that the sensation of any quality involved the concurrent predominance of that quality in the organism. Theophrastus'

objection to the belief that all sensation is accompanied by pain, however, seems to tell against such a claim:

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ αἱ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ τὸ τῶν χρόνου πλῆθος οὐδὲν σημεῖον ὡς μετὰ λύπης ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐν συμμετρίᾳ τινὶ καὶ κράσει πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἡ ἀισθησις.⁵⁸

Were Vlastos correct, we would expect to find *μόνον* rather than *μᾶλλον* here.

On the basis of the foregoing arguments, Vlastos claims that the medical author may have read one of Anaxagoras' physiological treatises or, failing this, have been influenced by someone who had taken over parts of Anaxagoras' doctrine. He considers it "chronologically most unlikely" that the author of the medical work could have influenced Anaxagoras, for "an Ionian treatise which combats Empedoclean influence on medicine could hardly have preceded the formulation of Anaxagoras' theory."

Vlastos' claim that there is some interaction here between philosophy and medicine is convincing, but his dismissal of the possibility of the latter's influencing the former is too hasty. We believe that it can be shown that there is no good reason why *Ancient Medicine* could not have been written at a time early enough to have influenced Anaxagoras and, secondly, granted the influence between them, that it is more likely that the medical work influenced the philosopher than vice versa.

The difficulties in assigning precise dates to certain events in the fifth century B.C. are enormous. In the first place the exact dates of Empedocles are uncertain. Apollodorus fixes his *floruit* in Ol. 84 (444–441), the date of the foundation of Thurii. His methods are well known, and it is most likely that he arrived at this answer simply by assuming that Empedocles was forty years old when Thurii was founded. This date he apparently selected as that of Empedocles' *floruit* solely on account of the statement made by the biographer Glaucus of Rhegium that Empedocles visited the city shortly after its foundation (cf. D.L. VIII 51 DK₃₁A₁). From Aristotle⁵⁹ and Theophrastus⁶⁰ we learn that Empedocles was a younger contemporary of Anaxagoras. Rather more is known about the latter, but even so the tradition presents conflicting accounts and it is difficult to assign a definite chronology to the various events in his life. However, the dates 500/499–428/7 which have been assigned to his lifetime⁶¹ may well be approximately correct. Empedocles' *floruit* in that case may be considered to have been somewhere around the middle of the fifth century B.C. It is impossible to determine how old he was when he wrote his work *On Nature*.

The difficulty of assigning dates to works in the Hippocratic *Corpus* is notorious. All that can be said with any confidence is that *Ancient Medicine* was definitely and Anaxagoras' work most probably written after Empedocles' poem, *On Nature*. It seems most unlikely that Anaxagoras' work was written any later than 440 B.C., for Socrates remarks in the *Phaedo* (97B ff.) that he had read his work as a young man and was disappointed in him. It is possible that Empedocles could have written his work as early as c. 460 B.C. and Anaxagoras his as late as c. 440 B.C. But could *Ancient Medicine* have been written in the interval and influenced Anaxagoras?

Jones thinks not and claims that the date of the composition of the treatise falls between 430 and 400 B.C.⁶² His claim rests on the argument that the author of *Ancient Medicine* lived after Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Protagoras. As we saw, the similarities between the medical work and the fragments of Anaxagoras, pointed out more recently at greater length by Vlastos, had previously been noticed by Jones, who is likewise of the opinion that it was the philosopher who influenced the medical work. His claim that the treatise was written after Protagoras' work is based upon an allusion to the *πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρωπος* of Protagoras which he believes he has found in Chapter 9 of the medical treatise:

μέτρον δὲ οὐτε ἀριθμὸν οῦτε σταθμὸν ἄλλον, πρὸς δὲ ἀναφέρων εἰσηγήσασθαι τὸ ἀκριβές, οὐκ ἀν εὑροις ἄλλ' ἢ τοῦ σώματος τὴν αἰσθησιν.

Jones also sees in the words *θηριώδεος διαιτης* in Chapter 3 a reminiscence of Democritus. His reference is to the sketch of the rise of human culture preserved in the history of Diodorus Siculus,⁶³ which Reinhardt originally suggested should be attributed to Democritus. This view, however, has been contested by other scholars on the ground that the sketch contains no clear reference to atomism. Although this objection does not preclude the possibility of Democritus' being its source, since much of his biological thought, for example, is not explicitly based on his hypothesis, the sketch may be pre-atomic or perhaps more probably have been written by some eclectic who drew from earlier thinkers ideas which served his own purpose. Jones' argument that the medical work is post-Democritus is not a strong one. The Atomist could just as well have been influenced by the medical author, and, in any case, the idea that men initially lived a primitive animal-like life was certainly in the air before the middle of the fifth century B.C.⁶⁴

Wanner also believes that the treatise is later than Protagoras, and claims to have found certain sophistic elements in it.⁶⁵ He argues in addition that the author has adopted from Protagoras elements akin to

those which Plato attributes to the sophist in the dialogue of his name⁶⁶ and made use of them for his presentation of the old theory of medicine. Finally, like Jones, he believes that the Protagorean theory of relativity is in evidence.

The first two arguments of Wanner are not convincing. In the first place the treatise contains no trace of the artificialities which are usually associated with sophistic rhetoric, although here and there we find a few touches which are very mildly rhetorical. Little significance can be attached to these, for, as Finley has shown,⁶⁷ there is evidence of some degree of rhetoric in Greek literature at least as early as 442 B.C. Secondly, there is absolutely no reason to assume that the medical author could not have put forward on his own account the parallel between the doctor of his own day who prescribes a diet for the sick and the man who originally replaced a savage, brutish mode of life by a more suitable form of nourishment without having been influenced by the sophist. Wanner's last argument is the most important of the three and will be given closer attention.

First, however, it may be noticed that Taylor,⁶⁸ followed by Festugière,⁶⁹ maintains precisely the opposite thesis. He argues that Protagoras' "relativity formula" could not have made enough headway for our writer to have taken it into account; for if it had been widely accepted, it would have gravely affected his contention that medicine, while relying on *αἰσθησις*, is nevertheless a surely established *τέχνη*. He also claims that the treatise contains "no trace of the scepticism about science, which was so characteristic of the time of the Archidamian war." Two other considerations help Taylor to fix the date of the work. On the one hand, since it treats Empedocles' four element theory as the latest and favourite cosmological speculation, it cannot be much earlier than the middle of the fifth century; on the other (Taylor argues), since the cosmologists are spoken of simply as *σοφισταί*, it may be assumed that the name had not yet been specially appropriated to describe those itinerant educators of men.

The author of *Ancient Medicine* uses the term "new-fangled" (*καιωῆς*)⁷⁰ to describe the procedure of those who sought to base medical theory upon a hypothesis such as the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry. The use of this term seems to imply that the treatise was written not long after the influence of Empedocles' thought had made itself felt. We can also agree with Taylor that the term *σοφιστής* does not bear here the technical sense of "Professor of Wisdom, who informs for money," but is used rather in the old sense of "sage" or "expert."⁷¹ But, as Festugière points out,⁷² no conclusion can be drawn from this concerning the

date of *Ancient Medicine*, because the word continued to be employed in the sense simply of "sage" for a long time after the advent of the sophists.⁷³

As we saw, the argument was advanced that the medical treatise was written after the *'Αλήθεια* because of an alleged allusion to the Protagorean formula in Chapter 9. But the meaning of this passage seems to be not that there are no objective standards at all but rather that they are inapplicable in the case of medicine. As Festugière well says,⁷⁴ what these words seek merely to show

c'est qu'il n'y a pas, en médecine, de critère d'une sûreté absolue comme lorsqu'il s'agit de nombrer, de mesurer des grandeurs ou des poids, il n'y a pas d'autre critère que l'*αἰσθησίς* corporelle. Mais le corps se comporte généralement de la même manière en telle et telle circonstance, on peut donc observer, voire expérimenter, et c'est cette méthode d'observation que notre auteur préconise.

In Chapter 20 the writer argues that cheese does not harm all men alike, for some can eat their fill of it and are thereby strengthened, whereas others come off badly. But here, too, there is absolutely no need to assume that he is under the influence of Protagoras, for there is nothing here which could not quite naturally have occurred to someone who practised medicine.

The argument of Taylor and Festugière, on the other hand, that the medical work was written before the "relativity formula" had made sufficient headway for the writer to have taken account of it, as otherwise it would have affected his claim that medicine was an established *τέχνη*, is very doubtful. The tradition that he drew up the laws for Thurii⁷⁵ suggests that he believed in the possibility of a *πολιτικὴ τέχνη* at least, and a belief in sheer subjectivism would hardly recommend him for the post.

In the *Theaetetus* (161e) the question is asked how, if man is the measure of his own knowledge, as he himself says, Protagoras could set himself up to be wiser than others. Protagoras answers:

For I do indeed assert that the truth is as I have written: each of us is a measure of what is and what is not; but there is all the difference in the world between one man and another just in the very fact that what is and appears to one is different from what is and appears to another . . . By a wise man I mean precisely a man who can change any one of us, when what is bad appears and is to him, and make what is good appear and be to him.

(166d-167c)⁷⁶

In view of the fact that it is particularly emphasized that this is the answer Protagoras himself would have made had he been alive, and that

it is accepted as such by Theodorus, an old admirer of Protagoras, it may be inferred that it is put forward as an honest attempt to explain what the latter meant and how his theory was not incompatible with his claim to be a practical teacher.⁷⁷ Taylor's argument, then, cannot stand, as there is nothing in Protagoras' thought which would have affected the author of *Ancient Medicine*'s claim that medicine was an established *τέχνη*. Taylor's other argument that scepticism about the sciences is characteristic of the time of the Archidamian War is equally unconvincing. It is true that at this period social and ethical problems increasingly engaged the attention and interest of thinkers, but this is not to say that there was a general scepticism about science.

Although Taylor's arguments in support of his claim that *Ancient Medicine* was written before Protagoras' views became widespread are unacceptable, his general viewpoint may, in fact, be correct. For it is not impossible that the medical work could have influenced the sophist. In Chapter 9 the medical author points out (perhaps, as Festugière suggests, in reaction to Empedocles) that in medicine there are no exact standards, reference to which would give exact knowledge; there is only the *αἰσθησις* of the body which is the *μέτρον* in this case. Protagoras could have extended this view and claimed that there are, in fact, no absolute standards at all and that the *αἰσθησις τοῦ σώματος* (or *ἄνθρωπος*) is the *μέτρον* in every case.⁷⁸ If this were so, he would be expected to be inimical to the idea that there could be such standards as number and weight. It may, then, be significant that we learn from Aristotle,⁷⁹ whose information comes perhaps from Protagoras' own treatise *Περὶ τῶν μαθημάτων*, that he attacked the geometers and in particular their assertion that the tangent touched the circle only at a point. Moreover, the definition of a "wise man" given in the *Theaetetus* is at least consistent with Protagoras' having been influenced here by medicine, for the doctor is cited as an example of such wisdom. It is also interesting to note that Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, where he is conjecturing as to the origin of the formula, puts forward the possibility of a medical origin.⁸⁰

By the foregoing arguments we hope to have shown, at least, that the possibility of *Ancient Medicine*'s having influenced Anaxagoras should not be too hastily dismissed. Now let us turn to our second claim that, granted the influence between them, it would be natural to assume that the medical work influenced the philosopher rather than vice versa.

Before doing so, it may be advisable to anticipate an objection. "How is it possible," one might ask, "that a work in the Hippocratic *Corpus* could have been written early enough to have influenced Anaxagoras?"

Our answer is simple. It must not be assumed that, because the collection of medical treatises is termed the "Hippocratic *Corpus*," "Hippocratic" medicine itself sprang into being fully grown. Hippocrates himself must have had teachers, and there are works in the *Corpus* which are considered by some scholars as pre-Hippocratic.⁸¹ The similarities between *Ancient Medicine* and those writings in the *Corpus* which are generally assigned by scholars to Hippocrates himself, e.g. *Prognostic*, *Epidemics I* and *III*, and especially *Regimen in Acute Diseases*,⁸² could easily be explained if the former were the honoured work of an older colleague.

Both Littré⁸³ and Steckerl,⁸⁴ however, believe that *Ancient Medicine* was written by Hippocrates himself. They base their argument on the supposed resemblance between *Phaedrus* 270 C-D and part of Chapter 20. Granting their claim, if the traditional date of Hippocrates' birth be accepted (c. 460 B.C.),⁸⁵ then the treatise could not have been written at the time we claim. This passage in the *Phaedrus*, however, is extremely controversial, and another interpretation⁸⁶ implies that it is necessary for the physician to know cosmology — a view which is emphatically rejected in *Ancient Medicine*. (Galen,⁸⁷ it may be added, believes that Plato is here referring to *Nature of Man*.)

Two considerations seem to us to weigh very heavily against the possibility of the author of *Ancient Medicine*'s being influenced by Anaxagoras. In the first place, it would be thoroughly disingenuous of him to stress repeatedly throughout the treatise that medicine is an established art with its own methods of research and based upon long practical experience, if he had, in fact, derived his theory from Anaxagoras. It might be countered that while the overrestrictive hypothesis of Empedocles is vigorously attacked by the medical writer, the much less economical theory of Anaxagoras, with its indefinitely numerous "powers," would have appealed more to his outlook; for we see that, while in the first chapter of the treatise its author is bitterly opposed to the idea that it is possible to "narrow down the primary cause of men's diseases and death by postulating one thing or two as the same cause for all," he stresses in the fourteenth chapter that the constituents of men are "salt, bitter, sweet, acid, astringent, insipid, and countless other things, possessing powers of all kinds in number and in strength." But this objection is clearly invalid. In addition to his hostility towards the philosophical postulate generally, we have his express statement that "medicine has long had everything to hand, with a principle and method already discovered, by which many excellent discoveries have been made over a long period; while what remains will be discovered, if the

inquirer be competent and familiar with discoveries already made, conducting his researches with these as his starting point. But whosoever spurns and rejects all these, attempting to conduct research after a different method and fashion, and then declares that he has made some discovery, deceives and is deceived." Moreover, if the author of *Ancient Medicine* had been indebted to Anaxagoras for his theory, in view of his emphatic denial of the possibility of knowledge about $\tau\alpha\ \mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\omega\rho\alpha$,⁸⁸ some disavowal of Anaxagoras' attempt to extend his theory to cover this sphere, too, would have been expected.

The theory outlined in the medical work is basically that propounded by Alcmaeon, who holds that when the various powers are mixed and blended there is *ἰσονομία*, but when one of them has been "separated off" and "stands alone" it then gains *μοναρχία* over the others and causes a man pain. An origin as early as this, or even earlier, is consistent with the author's claim that medicine is an established art based upon long practical experience.

Finally, as we noted above, there is the reversal in outlook between Empedocles and Anaxagoras. The former largely argues from macrocosm and applies his theories about the world at large to man himself, whereas the latter, influenced by such physiological problems as growth and nutrition, argues from microcosm to macrocosm, almost as if he were giving heed to the assertion in Chapter XX of *Ancient Medicine* that clear knowledge about natural science can be acquired only from medicine:

νομίζω δὲ περὶ φύσιος γνῶναι τι σαφὲς οὐδαμόθεν ἀλλοθεν εἶναι η̄ ἐξ ἴητρικῆς . . .

We hope to have shown by the above arguments how philosophy is here indebted to contemporary medical theory. But even if these arguments are not accepted, it is still apparent that Anaxagoras' physiological interests, aroused by the widening influence of medicine, exercised an enormous influence upon his physics; for it was these interests which suggested to him a way round the Eleatic elenchus.

APPENDIX A

Our sole testimony to Alcmaeon's date is Aristotle at *Metaphysics* A5 986a29 (DK24A3). The text as it stands is obviously corrupt. Ross, in his edition of the *Metaphysics*, regards the words $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\epsilon}\tau\acute{o}\ \tau\acute{h}\nu\ \acute{\eta}\lambda\acute{\kappa}\acute{\iota}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ and $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{l}\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\rho\acute{o}\nu\acute{t}\iota\ \Pi\acute{\nu}\theta\acute{\alpha}\gamma\acute{\o}\rho\acute{\alpha}$, which are omitted by one MS and ignored by Alexander, as later additions. He believes, however, that the statement is

likely enough to be true and appeals to the evidence of Iamblichus *V.P.* 104, where Alcmaeon is included among the contemporaries of Pythagoras "young in his old age." But as this same list also contains the names of Philolaus, Archytas, and Leucippus it is of no value as evidence. Ross argues that the suspiciousness of these words is further increased by the fact that Aristotle only once mentions Pythagoras elsewhere and nowhere claims any knowledge of his date. This argument is doubtful. Aristotle wrote a work on the Pythagoreans, now unfortunately lost, in which he did mention Pythagoras (cf. *Frag.* 5). Moreover, this is the obvious context where Aristotle would assign a date to Alcmaeon; only here (984a11) does he "date" Anaxagoras and Empedocles. Even if Ross's facts were correct, his reasoning is unsound. It is a curious argument to claim that Aristotle only once mentions Pythagoras elsewhere and nowhere claims any knowledge of his date and on the basis of this one other context reject the passage where he is named and apparently "dated." Heidel claims ("The Pythagoreans and Greek Mathematics," *A.J.P.* 61, 1940, p. 5) that we have here a marginal note carelessly embodied in the text, perhaps derived from Porphyry (*sic*; Iamblichus, he should have said). It is also possible that this statement rests on no more firm a basis than that someone (perhaps Sotion?) had fitted him into a line of succession. Even if this dating does represent the opinion of an interpolator and not that of Aristotle himself, as Raven points out (*The Presocratic Philosophers* [Cambridge 1957] p. 232 n.1), there is no reason why it should not be approximately correct. If these words bracketed by Ross (in agreement with Zeller and Jaeger) are in fact a gloss, a curious repetition in the text must then be explained. Diels reads:

καὶ γὰρ ἐγένετο τὴν ἡλικίαν Ἀλκμαιῶν (νέος) ἐπὶ γέροντι Πυθαγόρᾳ ἀπεφήνατο δὲ παραπλησίως τούτοις.

This reading does get round the latter difficulty.

Until quite recently it was the generally accepted opinion that Alcmaeon was a Pythagorean, although Wachtler (*De Alcmaeone Crotoniata*, diss. Leipzig 1896, p. 104) stoutly declared "assecla non fuit." Later writers have been more guarded, with the exception of Zafiropulo (*Empédocle d'Agrigente* [Paris 1953] p. 60) and Sambursky (*The Physical World of the Greeks* [London 1956] p. 53), both of whom refer to him unreservedly as a Pythagorean. This claim is based upon the following evidence: Alcmaeon lived at Croton, where Pythagoras first established his Order; Diogenes Laërtius tells us that he "heard Pythagoras" (*καὶ οὗτος Πυθαγόρου διήκουσε*, VIII 83 DK24A1). Finally there is this assertion of Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* that Alcmaeon may have derived his theory of opposites from the Pythagoreans.

Diogenes' remark that Alcmaeon "heard Pythagoras" may mean no more than that someone fitted him into a line of succession. Burnet's assumption (*Early Greek Philosophy* p. 194) that he dedicated his treatise

to the Pythagoreans, though accepted by Ross (note on *Metaphysics* A5 986a27ff.) and even Heidel (*A.J.P.* 61, 1940, p. 4), has been shown by Vlastos to be misguided. He points out that we have no parallels for dedications at this period, and a discourse which takes the form of a personal address, like that of Empedocles to Pausanias, does not necessarily imply agreement with the views held by the person to whom it is addressed ("Isonomia," *A.J.P.* 74, 1953, p. 344 n.25). Finally we turn to the passage in the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle declares that Alcmaeon either derived the theory of opposites from the Pythagoreans or they from him. Far from being evidence that Alcmaeon was a Pythagorean, this passage surely implies that Aristotle did not regard him as such. The notion that the world displays a perpetual contrast between opposites is a common one. Alcmaeon could have considered this idea confirmed by medical practice without being influenced by Pythagorean philosophy. Furthermore, as Vlastos points out (*ibid.*, p. 345), two pairs of opposites which, on any view, are characteristic of Pythagoreanism, viz. the Peras-Apeiron and Odd-Even, are conspicuously absent from those of Alcmaeon and, moreover, are alien to all that is known of Alcmaeon's thought. The only point of contact, in fact, between the two groups is that of "the good and the bad," which is too commonplace to be significant. Why Aristotle should consider that such a natural point of view must have been borrowed by either from the other — especially as he himself has just emphasized the importance of the role of certain contrarieties in Ionian thought — is a mystery. It would, we may note, be much less of a mystery if the relative dating of Alcmaeon and Pythagoras in this passage of the *Metaphysics* were that of Aristotle himself.

APPENDIX B

Empedocles' use of pores to get round one aspect of the Eleatic *elenchus* seems, at first sight, to be quite an ingenious solution. Yet, on closer examination, it proves to be not quite such a happy solution, for there are seen to be fundamental inconsistencies in it. It is, in the first place, a curious assertion that only those things can mix whose pores are symmetrical (*de Gen. et Corr.* A8 324b26, DK31A87). It would be easy to understand if, for example, one body had pores and the other was fluid. But it is not thought that sponges are good at absorbing sponges. It has been suggested that what Empedocles really meant was that one of the constituents was porous and the other fissile into particles, which could then fuse with the pores. This explanation, however, is unsatisfactory, for if, as Empedocles says, "it is with earth that we see earth, water with water etc." (Fragment 109), why should one lump of earth, for example, have different qualities, i.e. porous, from another, i.e. fissile into parts?

Aristotle asks (*de Gen. et Corr.* A8 326b6) whether the pores are empty or full. They can hardly be empty in view of Empedocles' emphatic denial

of the void (Fragments 13 and 14). But if they are full Aristotle considers that they are then superfluous. Perhaps Aristotle is a little unfair here and Philoponus preserves for us Empedocles' own answer (178, 2 DK31A87):

ἴσμεν δὲ διὰ οἱ τοὺς πόρους ὑποτιθέμενοι οὐ κενοὺς ὑπετίθεντο τούτους, ἀλλὰ πεπληρωμένους λεπτομερεστέρους τυνὸς σώματος οἰον ἀέρος.

and 154, 5:

διαφέρουσι δὲ τοῦ κενοῦ οἱ πόροι, διότι οἱ τοὺς πόρους εἰσάγοντες κενὸν εἶναι οὐκ ἔλεγον.

For it is unlikely that Empedocles would have made his pores full of "what is not."

As a theory, then, it seems upon superficial examination plausible enough. Upon closer examination, however, serious inconsistencies appear. In Fragment 109 it is claimed that perception is of "like by like" and that with air we perceive air. But this is surely ridiculous; for air apparently has within it pores filled with air into which air fits. Similarly in his physics air would be able to mix with air because the pores of each part of air (already filled with air) are symmetrical. Aristotle (*de Gen. et Corr.* A8 324b26) claims that Empedocles held the theory that it is possible to see through air, water, and diaphanous things generally because they have numerous pores arranged in rows all over them, invisible owing to their smallness. The more pores a body has the more transparent it is. If Aristotle is correct and Empedocles did put forward this theory to explain the transparency of some bodies, the same inconsistencies again appear. If Empedocles claims that we can see through air because it has numerous invisible pores, then these pores must be either full or empty. If they are empty, Empedocles has fallen into the very error he is attempting to avoid; if they are full, they are filled with air. Thus we have the ridiculous explanation that air is transparent because it has numerous pores all filled with air!

NOTES

The author offers this article as a small token of his gratitude to members of the Department of the Classics at Harvard for their kindness to him and his wife during the year that he was privileged to spend among them as the Jackson Research Fellow. He would like also to express his indebtedness to the late Professor Jaeger for the kindness and encouragement with which he read an earlier draft and to Mr. G. E. L. Owen for his keen criticisms of these arguments.

1. J. H. Breasted, *The Edwin Smith Surgical Papyrus* (Chicago 1930) vol. I p. 14.

2. Cf. Warren R. Dawson, "Egypt's Place in Medical History" in *Science, Medicine and History, Essays in Honour of Charles Singer* (Oxford 1953) vol. I p. 58.

3. It has been suggested from the nature of the wounds described in the papyrus that its author was a surgeon in the army.

4. It may be pointed out here that in the Greek view of the origin of medicine (by contrast with astronomy and mathematics) no debt to Egypt or Mesopotamia is acknowledged (cf. *Ancient Medicine* Chapter 3 and *Republic* 405f.).

5. *Paideia* (Eng. trans.) vol. 3 Book 4 p. 4.

6. Cf. *Airs Waters Places* III and *The Sacred Disease* VIII.

7. W. H. S. Jones' translation, Loeb *Hippocrates* vol. II.

8. Cf. Fragment 112.

9. Cf. Fragment 111. M. Wellmann, *Fragmentsammlung der griechischen Ärzte* vol. I *Die Fragmente der Sikelischen Ärzte* (Berlin 1901) p. 29 n.1, claims that when the author of *The Sacred Disease* speaks slightly of "magicians and purifiers and charlatans and quacks" (Chap. 2 Littré) he is speaking of Empedocles. There certainly seem to be affinities between the above fragment and chapter 4 of this work. This view is strengthened when we find the author stressing that it is with the brain that our "pleasures, joys, laughter and jests as well as our sorrows, pains, griefs and tears arise," and later attacking the view that we think with the heart and that it feels pleasure and pain. Compare Chapters 14 and 17 (Littré) with Empedocles' Fragments 102-109, especially 105 and 107.

10. Wellman (above, n.9) pp. 68ff.

11. J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (London 1930) p. 200.

12. Cf. Fragments 84, 96 and 98; Aëtius V, 22, 1 (DK₃₁A78); Theophrastus *de Sens.* 7 (accepting καὶ ὑδωρ with Diels after Karsten) and 10-11 (DK₃₁A86).

13. Theophr. *de Sens.* 43 DK₆₄A19.

14. Galen, in *Epid.* VI, *comm.* II (XVII A 1006, 8 Kühn DK₆₄B9), tells us that while almost all the doctors agreed that the male was not only formed before the female but was also the first to move, Rufus said that Diogenes alone disagreed with this. (Rufus' assertion is inconsistent with Censorinus' statement at *de die nat.* 9, 2 DK₆₄A26.) This passage is by no means conclusive in itself that Diogenes was a doctor. We have, however, further hints as to his medical interests. Again from Galen (*On Medical Experience* XXII 3, translated from the Arabic by R. Walzer [Oxford 1944]), we learn that "Diogenes, writing more briefly and compendiously than you (sc. Asclepiades), has collected the diseases and their causes and remedies in one treatise." This Diogenes may be the Apolloniate. From Theophrastus (*de Sens.* 43) and from another medical writer ([Galen] *de humor.* XIX 495 K DK₆₄A29a) we learn that the latter held views about the possibility of diagnosis by the tongue and the colour of the patient.

15. W. H. S. Jones' translation (with slight modification) in *Philosophy and Medicine in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore 1946) p. 65f.

16. It may be noted here that the suggestion has been made that there is evidence of the four element theory before Empedocles. O. Gigon (*Untersuchungen zu Heraklit* [Leipzig 1935] p. 99) writes: "Man kann kaum Frg. 126 für Heraklit beanspruchen und zugleich die Vier-Elementenlehre ihm absprechen" and uses this fragment as evidence for accepting air as Heraclitean in Frg. 76. K. Reinhardt (*Parmenides* [Bonn 1916] p. 223) even goes so far as to hold that since no one can have known of the four elements as early as the traditional date of Heraclitus, this date must be wrong and the latter was actually younger than Parmenides. G. S. Kirk, however, rightly points out (*Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* [Cambridge 1954] pp. 342-44) that the mention of air in Frg. 76 is almost

certainly due to Stoic influence and that Frgs. 31 and 36 show sufficiently clearly that Heraclitus held that there were three, not four, world masses.

17. Cf. *Anon. Lond. XX*, 25: "Philistion thinks that we are composed of four 'forms,' that is, of four elements — fire, air, water, earth. Each of these too has its own power (*δύναμις*): of fire, the power is the hot, of air it is the cold, of water the moist, and of earth the dry."

18. Chapters 4 and 5.

19. Jones (above, n.7) vol. II p. 225.

20. Theophrastus, we may note, in the *de Sensibus* 39ff., informs us that Diogenes held that the sense-organs were connected with the brain. This belief the latter may have derived from Alcmaeon.

21. Cf. *de Sens.* 25ff. DK24A5 and Aēt. IV, 17, 1 DK24A8. Cf. Clem. *Strom.* VI, 16 (DK22B36); Stob. *Flor.* III, 5, 7 (DK22B117) and III, 5, 8 (DK22B118).

22. Cf. Chapter 4ff.

23. *On Medicine* Bk. III 4, 15.

24. Burnet (above, n.11) p. 201 n.4.

25. It is possible that a few genuine fragments have survived. See Diels/Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*⁸, vol. I pp. 214f.

26. W. A. Heidel, *Hippocratic Medicine* (New York 1941) p. 42.

27. In addition to his medical and physiological interests, we have evidence that he was also interested in astronomy (Aēt. II 16, 2.3, II 22, 4, and 29, 3, DK24A4) and the nature of the soul (Aristotle *de Anima* A2.405a29 and Aēt. IV 2, 2, DK24A12).

28. See Appendix A.

29. V 30, 1 (DK24B4): 'Αλκμαίων τῆς μὲν ὑγείας εἶναι συνεκτικὴν τὴν "ἰσονομίαν" τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑγροῦ, ξηροῦ, ψυχροῦ, θερμοῦ, πικροῦ, γλυκέος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, τὴν δὲ ἐν αὐτῷς "μοναρχίαν," νόσου ποιητικὴν. φθοροποιὸν γὰρ ἔκατέρουν μοναρχιάν.

30. The terms *ἰσονομία* and *μοναρχία*, if actually used by him, mark the application of politico-social concepts to the physical sphere in the manner of Anaximander and Heraclitus cf. Heidel (above, n.26) p. 47, and G. Vlastos, "Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies," *Class. Phil.* 42 (1947) pp. 168ff. It should be noticed, however, that other terminology in the passage, viz. *συνεκτικὴν*, is late.

31. Cf. Simplic. *Phys.* 32, 3 (DK31B98); Aēt. V 22, 1 (DK31A78); and Theophr. *de Sens.* 10-11 (DK31A86).

32. Cf. *Anon. Lond. XX* 25.

33. Cf. *Timaeus* 81e6ff.

34. A. E. Taylor, *Commentary on Plato's 'Timaeus'* (Oxford 1928) p. 448.

35. Medicine exercised another important influence upon ethics. As Jaeger has convincingly shown, Aristotle employs medicine as his model for the conduct of ethical enquiry ("Aristotle's Use of Medicine as a Model of Method in his Ethics," *J.H.S.* 77, 1957, pp. 54-61).

36. Parmenides' interest in these matters may be significant. If he could show in the *Way of Opinion* how an equally or even more plausible explanation could be given to the old problems first mooted by the cosmologists and, what is more, how even the most "modern" biological and physiological queries could be plausibly answered upon such a simple, albeit erroneous basis, he would have considerably reinforced his opinion in the *Way of Truth*. After Alcmaeon, we find such physiological questions as the nature of the semen, sex differentiation, the reason for the sterility of mules, the cause of sleep, the mode of nourishment

of the embryo etc. almost standard topics of enquiry among the physicists.

37. Cf. *de Sens.* 25f. (DK24A5).
38. Cf. *in Timaeum* ed. Wrobel p. 279 (DK24A10).
39. Cf. Theophr. *de Sens.* 7 (DK31A86) and Plato *Meno* 76C (DK31A92).
40. Cf. *de Respiratione* 473b1ff. (DK31B100).
41. J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy from Thales to Plato* (London 1914) p. 75.
42. Taylor (above, n.34) p. 282.
43. Cf. Vlastos' review of F. M. Cornford's *Principium Sapientiae* in *Gnomon* 27 (1955) p. 69.
44. Theophr. *de Sens.* 26.
45. *Ibid.*
46. Cf. Aristotle *de Gen. et Corr.* A8, 324b26 (DK31A87). See Appendix B.
47. Cf. Fragment 17, l. 22ff.
48. S. in *Gregor. Naz.*, XXXVI 911 Migne (DK59B10).
49. The more probable interpretation of *Metaphysics* A3, 984a11 (DK59A43): Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένος τῇ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ πρότερος (sc. Empedocles), τοῖς δ' ἔργοις νοστερός . . . is, in our opinion, that Anaxagoras, though older than Empedocles, was later in his philosophical activity. Theophrastus further informs us that Empedocles was "born not much later than Anaxagoras" (cf. Simplicius *Physics* 25, 19 from Theophr. *Phys. Opin.* frag. 3 Dox. 477.17 DK31A7). The latter half of Aristotle's statement is ambiguous and Alexander (in *Metaph.* 28.1-10) interprets νοστερός as meaning "inferior" or "second-rate." This interpretation, though possible, seems to us the less probable of the two. Three reasons lead us to our opinion. In the first place, if πρότερος and νοστερός did have a purely temporal connotation, there would be a greater sense of balance in the sentence. Aristotle would then be giving a good reason why he was considering Empedocles' theories before those of Anaxagoras, viz. despite the fact that the latter was the older of the two, the younger man's work was actually written earlier. Finally, we may notice that Anaxagoras does apparently find a place in his system for Empedocles' four elements. Aristotle tells us that, unlike Empedocles, he did not regard them as primary substances but rather as mixtures of seeds (*de Caelo* III 3, 302a28 DK59A43). Moreover, Fragment B8, where it is maintained that the things in one world are not divided the one from the other, neither the hot from the cold, nor the cold from the hot, seems to be a direct polemic against Empedocles (cf. Burnet [above, n.11] p. 262, and G. Vlastos, "The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras" *Phil. Rev.* 59, 1950, p. 38). Diogenes Laërtius records that the sophist Alcidamas claimed that Empedocles was a "hearer" of Anaxagoras (VIII 56DK14.5). The further claim that Empedocles also "heard" Pythagoras is sufficient to discredit the value of this passage as evidence (cf. Vlastos' review of F. M. Cleve's *The Philosophy of Anaxagoras* [New York 1949] in *Phil. Rev.* 59, 1950, p. 125 n.1). In the Paris MS. of *Metaphysics* A, 985a29-30 the reading is: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν οὖν παρὰ τοὺς πρότερον πρῶτος ταῦτη τὴν αἰτίαν διελὼν εἰσήγεγκεν . . . which seems to testify to the priority of Empedocles' work. The variant reading τὸ τὴν αἰτίαν διελεύν, however, is given by the Laurentian. For a recent discussion of the relative dating of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, which draws the opposite conclusion, see C. H. Kahn, *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology* (New York 1960) p. 163.
50. Aēt. 1, 3, 5 (DK59A46).
51. *Physics* 460, 4 (DK59A45).
52. Cf. Vlastos, "The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras," p. 32.

53. These similarities, previously noticed by W. H. S. Jones (*Philosophy and Medicine in Ancient Greece* [above, n.15] p. 78) and F. Heinimann (*Gnomon* 24, 1952, p. 272), are pointed out at length by Vlastos in his review of Cornford's *Principium Sapientiae* (above, n.43) p. 67 n.2.

54. Vlastos, *ibid.*, points out that although A.-J. Festugière (*Hippocrate l'ancienne médecine* [Paris 1948] p. 53) adduces a number of instances of αὐτὸς ἔφεντοι in the other Hippocratic writings, these refer to things like bread, meat, fish, honey, etc., and not to their constituent δυνάμεις. The only two references to the latter are in the fragments of Anaxagoras and in *Ancient Medicine*.

55. Festugière (above, n.54) p. 54 n.56.

56. Cf. *de Partibus Animalium* D2 677a5 (DK59A105).

57. Cf. Chapter 19.

58. Cf. Theophr. *de Sens.* 32.

59. *Metaphysics* A3, 984a11 (DK31A6).

60. *Phys. Op. Frag. 3 apud Simplicium Physics* 25, 19 (DK31A7).

61. Adopting Scaliger's emendation ὄγδοηκοστῆς ὄγδόης and reading, with Taylor, ἐπὶ Καλλιάδου for ἐπὶ Καλλίου in the Diogenes Laërtius passage (II, 7 DK59A1).

62. Jones (above, n.15) p. 47. The majority of modern scholars are at least agreed that the treatise was written in the fifth century B.C. Hans Diller, however, has argued for a considerably later dating and seeks to show that *Ancient Medicine* was written during the period of Plato's later writings "zwischen dem späten Platon und Aristoteles" ("Hippokratische Medizin und attische Philosophie," *Hermes* 80, 1952, pp. 385-409); but see J.-H. Kuehn, "System- und Methodenprobleme im Corpus Hippocraticum," *Hermes Einzelschriften* 11 (1956) pp. 46-56, and, more recently, F. Heinimann's article "Eine vorplatonica Theorie der Τέχνη," *Museum Helveticum* 18 (1961) fasc. 3 p. 112 n.32.

63. Book I chapters 7 and 8 (DK68B5).

64. Cf. Prometheus' speech in Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* 450ff. (written presumably between 467-458 B.C.).

65. H. Wanner, *Studien zu περὶ ἀρχαίης ἡγετικῆς*. Diss. Zürich 1939 *Sophistisches* pp. 81-92.

66. *Protagoras* 320 C.

67. Cf. J. H. Finley, "The Origins of Thucydides' Style," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 50 (1939) p. 53.

68. Taylor (above, n.34) p. 524.

69. Festugière (above, n.54) p. 59 n.69.

70. Chapter I *sub. fin.* Jones adopts the reading of M κενῆς (Loeb *Hippocrates* vol. I p. 12 and *Philosophy and Medicine* [above, n.15] p. 50). But see Festugière (above, n.54), p. 33 n.12.

71. Cf. Herod. I 29 and IV 95; Aesch. *P.V.* 62 and 944 and Pind. *Isthm.* V 28.

72. Festugière (above, n.34) p. 56.

73. Cf. for example, Xen. *Mem.* 1, 1, 11; *Hipp. Maj.* 281d; *Meno* 85b3. The historian Androtron calls the Seven Sages "sophists" (Aristid. 46 [II 407 Dind.] DK79 1): so too Aristotle, Frag. 5 Rose.

74. Festugière (above, n.54) p. 60. As Festugière says, this passage may be a direct reaction to Empedocles, who sought to introduce this notion of measure into the composition of bodily tissues (*ibid.* p. 43).

75. Diog. L. IX 50 (DK80A1).

76. F. M. Cornford's trans., *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London 1935) p. 70f.

77. Theodorus does at one point complain that they are running Protagoras too hard, but this occurs later in the dialogue (171C-D) where Socrates has turned from his defence of the formula to a criticism of it.

78. If we are correct, then Burnet's query why Protagoras should have used the term *μέτρον* is easily answered (above, n.41, p. 114). Burnet is correct that the phraseology is odd. Cf. Sextus *Pyrrh. Hypot.* 1 216ff. DK8oA14.

79. Aristotle *Metaphysics* B2, 997b32 (DK8oB7).

80. *Ibid.* 1062b12ff.

81. E.g., *Prorrhetic* 1, *Prenotions of Cos*, and *Sevens* (see Jones's Introduction [above, n.7] vol. I p. xii for further references). The dating of this last work is extremely controversial. W. H. Roscher ("Die hippokratische Schrift von der Siebenzahl," *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums* VI, Paderborn 1913) has argued for a mid-sixth-century date, but few, if any, other scholars now accept his views (cf., e.g., Abel Rey, *La Jeunesse de la science grecque*, Paris 1933, pp. 437-438; Franz Boll, *Das Lebensalter*, Leipzig and Berlin 1913, pp. 54-58; and H. Diels, in *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* XXXII, 1911, cols. 1861-66).

82. Cf. Jones (above, n.7) vol. I p. 3, and *Philosophy and Medicine* (above, n.15) p. 96, additional note E.

83. E. Littré, *Oeuvres complètes d'Hippocrate* (Paris 1839-61) vol. I pp. 294-310.

84. F. Steckerl, "Plato, Hippocrates and the Menon Papyrus," *Class. Phil.* 40 (1945) pp. 166-180.

85. Aulus Gellius, however, says (*N.A.* XVII 21) that he was older than Socrates. If this is true, his birth would be before 470 B.C.

86. Festugière's note (above, n.34) p. 64 n.74 seems to us to settle the issue in favour of this view.

87. Galen XV, 9ff.

88. Cf. Chapter I.

TΩ KAI ΕΓΩ:

THE FIRST PERSON IN PINDAR

BY MARY R. LEFKOWITZ

THE victory ode is a curious and somewhat paradoxical form of art. As we know it, from the extant works of Pindar and Bacchylides, it appears to be in the tradition of the songs of the bards and the lyric poets, that is, an address by a single poet to his audience. For example, in the opening lines of Pindar's *Second Olympian Ode* ("Hymns that rule the lyre/which god, which hero, which man shall we sing?"), the "we" is clearly Pindar, since the invocation to "hymns" and the first personal verb "we shall sing" indicate that the speaker is concerned with the composition of song, in other words, that he is a poet. But *O 2* and most of Pindar's other odes were not presented by the poet himself, as were the songs of the Homeric bards, but by choruses, like the dithyramb and the choral odes of tragedy. One may well inquire if the chorus of the victory ode ever speaks for itself, as do the choruses of comedy and tragedy, or does it always remain a musical instrument, allowing the ode to be sung in the person of the poet?

That the chorus might speak for itself was first suggested by the Alexandrian scholars on whose work our present scholia are based. Their proposals were taken up again by scholars in the last two centuries, most recently by Hermann Fraenkel, in connection with passages that, on the surface at least, seem easier to understand if spoken in the person of the chorus.¹ The most celebrated of these disputed cases is the difficult passage *P 5. 72ff.*, which according to the scholia may be taken either way, as self-description by the poet or by the chorus:

But my lovely fame boasts to be from Sparta, whence begotten the Aegidae came to Thera, my fathers, not without gods, but a destiny led them. Having received from Thera a feast with much sacrifice, Apollo Carneius, we pay honor in your festival to the well-founded city of Cyrene.

The lines are well suited to the Cyrenetan chorus which performed *P 5*, since Cyrene was a colony of Thera, and thus her citizens might claim to be descended from the founders of Thera, the Aegidae, and to have

inherited from them the festival of Apollo Carneius. On the other hand, Pindar might be talking about himself and his own ancestry: there was a tribe of Aegidae at Thebes. But if Pindar is speaking, there seem to be several difficulties, at least on a literal level. How can Pindar, a Theban, say that his fame comes from Sparta? How can he say that he is celebrating the feast of Apollo Carneius at Cyrene, when at the time of the ode's performance he was presumably at Thebes?

The problem of who is speaking here could be solved immediately if there were adequate historical information. But the Alexandrians knew few biographical details of Pindar's life, and modern research has added little or nothing. Barring discovery of Pindar's diary, we shall never know for certain whether or not he was in Cyrene when *P 5* was performed. There is very little information, aside from what Pindar tells us here, on the history of the Aegid tribe. The lines could suit both Pindar and the chorus, and on the basis of the available information, arguments on either side are equally inconclusive. Yet it is important to know who the speaker is, since from the passage much valuable information may be derived, not only of an historical nature but, what is perhaps more important, about the presentation and form of the epinician ode.

To re-evaluate the same limited factual material, as even recent scholars have done, is thus a fruitless task. It is necessary instead to consider the problem from another point of view, on a literary rather than on an historical basis. We must look not at the facts behind the first personal statement but at the statements themselves. Is a passage like *P 5. 72ff.* similar in character to passages where we know that the chorus is speaking, as it does in non-epinician, pure choral songs like Pindar's *Paean 4* or Alcman's *Partheneion*? Such a stylistic comparison of choral and bardic statements, based on the evidence we have, the songs themselves, would seem to be a sounder means of dealing with the problem than the old historical approach, as long as so few facts are available. To determine, therefore, by this comparative method, if the chorus ever speaks for itself in Pindar's victory odes, is the purpose of the present study; but it is also hoped that these findings will have wider application: that what is determined here will lead to a greater appreciation of poetic form and purpose in both epinician and pure choral song.

I. INTRODUCTION

A brief survey will show that there are three basic types of first personal statements in Pindar's extant songs: first of all, the formal professional statements by the poet, like the opening lines of *O 2*; then the

more subjective, sometimes intensely personal statements which Pindar often makes about himself and his art; and, finally, the statements which are clearly made by the chorus speaking about themselves, the choral "I's." Statements of the first category, what we might call the bardic "I," occur in nearly every epinician ode, and always seem to have the same function; that is, as in *O* 2.1ff, they introduce a new theme, and at the same time serve as a means of professional identification: "Hymns that rule the lyre/which god, which hero, which man shall we sing?"²

N 9, for example, begins with a first personal invocation that is an announcement both of the song's subject and of the poet's role in the present celebration:

We shall bring the festival *komos* from Apollo and Sicyon to newly founded Aetna, Muses, where the unfolded doors are crowded with guests, to the wealthy house of Chromius — now make sweet the strain of song. (1-2)

In these opening lines the poet declares why his song is written and for whom, and at the same time, by invoking the Muses, indicates that he is the speaker.

In fact, as we examine *N* 9, we discover that every first personal statement serves as an introduction or transition to a new subject, or a conclusion to a previous theme. In the following lines Pindar goes on to develop the subject of his song, by praising his host Chromius for his victory in the chariot race at Sicyon (4-5). But then he turns from the victory to its celebration and the present song.

But there is a saying among men, that the light of a deed well done should not be hidden silently in the ground. A wondrous song of proud words is fitting. But we shall rouse the sounding lyre and the flute above it, a crown to contests of horses, which Adrastus founded in Apollo's honor on the banks of the river Asopus. Mindful of these games I shall pay tribute to the hero Adrastus in sounding praise. (6-10)

It is clear that Pindar is speaking, since he refers to the duties of the epinician poet, to bring the victor fame through song, to lead the chorus and musicians at the victory celebration, to recall the glorious deeds of the past. By speaking of his song, and by referring to himself directly in the first person, he makes a transition from the ode's first subject (Chromius' victory) to a second subject (the founding of Sicyonian games by Adrastus). But he dwells on this subject only briefly, before he once again calls attention to himself, "mindful of which games I pay tribute to Adrastus."

Here again his first personal statement serves as a transition to a new and different subject, the myth of the expedition against Thebes led by Adrastus and Amphiaraus, and the myth itself is brought to conclusion by yet another of Pindar's bardic statements, in the form of a prayer for peace that contrasts sharply with the preceding account of war:

If possible, Zeus, I would cast off to the farthest point the mighty contest of Phoenician spears, this contest between life and death, and I pray that you give a long span of life, well-governed by law, to the children of Aetna, and to bestow upon the people all the joys of city dwelling.

(28-32)

The poet in this instance speaks not of his song but of a second aspect of his role as an epinician poet, his guest-friendship with his patron. Chromius has commissioned Pindar to compose this ode; Pindar is a guest in Chromius' house. Therefore, as a *xenos*, he utters a prayer for the welfare of his host's homeland Aetna, as if it were of concern also to himself, emphasizing his personal interest by his use of the middle voice, ἀναβάλλομαι, as if to say, "I would cast off, for my own sake." This prayer, which brings the listener's thoughts away from the myth to the concerns of the present day, also serves as an introduction to the final section of the ode, in which the poet once again praises the victor and his compatriots, this time for their skill in horsemanship and their honesty. But he concludes his comment abruptly with a gnomic statement, recalling his own presence as a bard whose duty it is to utter moral truths:³

I have spoken a thing hard to believe, for honor, which brings glory, is secretly corrupted by gain.

(33)

The first personal verb and the *gnome* call the listeners' attention away from the general praise of the citizens of Aetna to praise of one particular citizen, the victor Chromius. The poet first praises Chromius for his courage in battle, by comparing him to Hector, and then concludes by stating his hopes for the victor's future:

On other days I shall speak of much more done on dusty land and on the neighboring sea.

(43)

This statement, like the conclusion to the praise of the Aetnaeans above (32-33), is followed by *gnomai*, in this instance warnings about the limitations of mortality. The audience's attention is once more drawn to the poet, proclaiming the victor's fame, cautioning him to be mindful of the gods.

The final lines of *N* 9, like the proem, are in the first person. After turning from his *gnomai* about mortality to a happier theme, the victory banquet with its song, wine, and friendship, Pindar concludes the ode by offering a prayer that his song bring the victor lasting fame:

I pray to sing this *arete* with the Graces, and to honor more than many
this victory in song, throwing my javelin at the target nearest the Muses.
(54–55)

This statement, like the passage which introduced the myth (6–10), is concerned with the power of poetry. But whereas in the earlier passage Pindar stressed the present value of his song, here his emphasis is on the more enduring qualities of his art. Because this *epinikion* has the delight and charm of the Graces, and, as the metaphor of the javelin seems to imply, the moral and aesthetic accuracy that comes of divine inspiration, Chromius' victory will be remembered longer than others': this is Pindar's lasting gift to the victor.

Pindar's first personal statements in *N* 9 therefore have two functions, one structural, the other descriptive in nature. His statements are first of all transitions, which bring together subjects otherwise unrelated: for example, the initial praise of the victor and the myth of Adrastus, the war of the Seven against Thebes and the war between the Aetnaeans and the Etruscans. But the first personal form of these transitional statements also allows Pindar to describe and identify himself as a composer of epinician odes by speaking of his duties in the victory celebration (like leading the *komos*), of his friendship for his patrons, and of the fame his song will bring to them.

By using the first person as a transition and as a means of professional identification, Pindar seems to be drawing on an established tradition, since the "I" statements in the *epinikia* of his contemporary and rival Bacchylides have the same dual function. The practice may have originated with the bards, who almost invariably open their preludes to the gods with a first personal statement:

I will sing of Heracles, the son of Zeus.

(*h. Hom.* 15.1)

I will remember and not be unmindful of Apollo the far-darter.

(*h. Hom.* 3.1)

These initial lines introduce the theme of the prelude, and indicate that the "I" is an *aoidos* whose profession it is to recall the great deeds of the past.⁴ In the same way, the song is generally concluded by a first

personal statement, where the bard again draws attention to his professional abilities:

Farewell, but I shall remember you in another song also.

(*h. Hom.* 2. 95)

Farewell . . . give me victory in this contest, make tuneful my song.

(*h. Hom.* 6. 19–20)

Therefore, traditionally, a reference to the poet's controlling presence indicates a change of subject, the beginning or ending of a theme.

In *N* 9, therefore, Pindar's first personal statements have the same functions as the bards'. His references to himself in this ode differ from the bardic first personal statements only in content, since he speaks as a composer of *epinikia* and as such is concerned not only with recalling myth, but with conducting a victory celebration, and with bringing fame to a living man. It is particularly significant that in *N* 9, at least, he retains the bards' traditional impersonality: he says nothing about his personal life in the ode, but confines his first personal statements to his professional role as an epinic poet.

However, in other instances, Pindar seems to break with the bardic tradition completely, speaking of himself in his odes with an intense subjectivity. An example of such a personal "I" statement is *N* 8.35ff., a passage that follows Pindar's account of Odysseus' deception of Ajax in the contest over Achilles' armor, which caused Ajax' death but won great renown for Odysseus in spite of his treachery. Pindar breaks off his narrative with a gnomic statement:

But hateful deception existed even in those days, which goes hand in hand with deceiving words, a treacherous thinker, a disgrace which does evil, which violates what is shining and stretches forth a rotten glory for men of darkness.

(32–34)

This recalls the *gnome* with which Pindar concluded his praise of the Aetnaeans in *N* 9.33. But here he goes on to speak, as it appears, not as a bard, but about his personal life:

May my way never be like that, father Zeus, but may I keep to the open paths of life, and die leaving fame to my children without disgrace. Some men pray for gold, others for boundless land, but I pray to cover my limbs with earth as one who was pleasing to his fellow citizens, who praised what is praiseworthy, and shed blame upon evil-doers. (35–39)

Superficially, at least, Pindar's words seem to have no direct relation to any of the subjects with which the first personal statements of *N* 9

were concerned. He says nothing about his duties as an epinician poet, or about the victor, or about poetry. But this personal statement has the same structural function as his bardic "I" statements, since it acts as a transition from the myth to the second praise of the victor, like the prayer for Aetna in *N* 9.28ff. For Pindar continues to speak about virtue in the following lines, and goes on to speak of the victor and his father, concluding the ode with a statement about the ability of songs of praise not only to bring fame, but to take away pain and sorrow. Thus even this first personal statement serves as a transition, in spite of its subjective content.

However, this is not its only function. If this "personal" passage is considered in context, it may be shown that it deals at least indirectly with Pindar's role as an epinician poet. Pindar's statement about his own way of life appears to be a specific example of the general *gnomai* which precede it. Ajax was virtuous, but Odysseus tricked him. The poet, in his own life, would prefer Ajax' path to Odysseus'. Thus Pindar's remarks about himself seem to be intended as advice to the victor, like the general *gnomai* which the epinician poet traditionally includes in his song. By stating this advice personally, and expressing it as his own belief rather than as a traditional maxim, Pindar indicates the warmth of his friendship for the victor.

But this passage is an expression of *xenia* in a somewhat larger sense also. For Pindar speaks not only as one *xenos* to another, but as a Theban to an Aeginetan. Aegina, the victor's fatherland, has been conquered and deceived by a former ally, Athens, just as Ajax was defeated and tricked by Odysseus. At the time Pindar wrote this ode, Athens had also invaded Boeotia and defeated Thebes.⁵ Thus by condemning Odysseus, Pindar condemns the tactics of his and the victor's common enemy. His determination to uphold the ideals of the Dorian aristocracy, even in time of defeat and despair, should be the victor's also. His personal remarks are thus not directed at himself alone, but at the whole audience. He and the Aeginetans are united in suffering and in the reaffirmation of their faith in the old moral values. Therefore Pindar's prayer, though subjective in form, is objective in purpose, and is fundamentally concerned with an important aspect of his duties as an epinician poet, that is, to express his *xenia* for the victor.

A personal "I" statement like *N* 8.35ff. thus seems to be simply an extended form of the more traditional bardic statements of *N* 9. But what of the third category of first personal statements, the choral "I's"? In *Paean* 4, which was performed, as Pindar tells us elsewhere, by a chorus of Ceian men in Delos, the subject matter of the first personal

statements seems quite different from any that we have previously considered, since it is concerned not with the poet's several duties but with the action and function of a chorus.⁶

The *Paean* opens with a first personal statement that serves both as an introduction and as a description of the speakers' actions: "I shall dance . . . to Artemis." To dance (*χορεύεσθαι*) is the role of the chorus. The bard is concerned rather with the composition, that is, the singing and relating of song. Only fragments of the next twelve lines are preserved, but where the text resumes, it is certainly the chorus speaking, since they describe who they are in some detail:

Although I dwell on a rocky cliff I am renowned for my accomplishment in Greek games, and I am renowned also because I have some measure of the Muses. My fields bear the grape, life-giving cure of helplessness. I have no horses and have learned nothing about herding.

(19-24)

The speakers identify themselves by describing their homeland, which can only be Ceos, a rocky island, suited for vineyards but not for pasturage, famed for its accomplishments in games and for its poets, Bacchylides and Simonides.⁷ Since the description does not fit Thebes, Pindar cannot be speaking: the "I," as in the opening lines, is surely choral.

But, in spite of its content, the function of this choral "I" statement is not dissimilar to the poet's "I's" in *N* 9, since it serves both as a means of indicating who is speaker and as a transition to a new theme. This choral use of the first person introduces two myths, each about a man who loved his country. First the chorus speak briefly of Melampus, who would not leave his home to rule over Argos. This account is concluded by *gnomai* (fragmentary in the text) on patriotism, and by another first personal statement:

I praise the words of lord Euxantius, who refused the Cretans when they were eager to have him rule over them . . .

(32-34)

The use of the first person introduces the second myth, which is a particularly appropriate example of patriotism, since Euxantius, who refused to rule Crete, was king of Ceos at the time. It seems most probable that this statement also is spoken by the chorus, since they themselves, in the fragmentary line 14, seem to express the same sentiments, declaring, "I will not exchange her (my home) for Babylon."

The song breaks off at the end of Euxantius' speech. But, at least in the surviving text, every first personal statement seems to be spoken by the chorus. These statements introduce new themes, and they describe

what the chorus is doing ("I shall dance") and indicate who they are, by their description of their homeland and by their patriotic references. Choral "I's" therefore perform the same basic functions as the bardic statements, in that they serve as transitions to new themes and as identification of the speaker.

But here the similarity ends. The chorus' first personal statements are more topical, immediate, and concerned with specific physical detail. The poet, on the other hand, as in *N* 9, tends to describe himself only in terms of his art, emphasizing the metaphysical aspects of his song. Furthermore, the subject matter of *Paean* 4 seems very different from that of *N* 9. The purely choral paean seems to be concerned with a single, limited subject, the patriotism of the Ceian chorus. But the *epinikion*, sung in the person of the poet, has for its subject larger themes: the *arete* of the victor in terms of the *arete* of past heroes, war and peace, honesty, courage, and the lasting fame brought to all these by song. It would seem as if the type of speaker were associated with a particular subject matter.

It is by these means that our question about whether or not there can be a choral "I" in Pindar's *epinikia* may be answered. For the choral "I's" of *Paean* 4 may be distinguished, as we have seen, from the statements of the poet in *N* 9 by their content, and by the nature of the song in which they occur. Since chorus and poet have different roles, they will naturally say different things about themselves in their self-descriptive first personal statements, and, if *Paean* 4 is representative of pure choral song, the themes these statements introduce will also be dissimilar. In other words, whether or not a statement is choral will depend upon whether it is concerned with physical description or with poetry, whether it deals with local concerns or with topics of a more universal nature. It remains therefore to be seen whether other choral, bardic, and personal "I" statements have the same characteristics and functions as those already described, for only if the specific ideas set forth in this chapter have universal application will it be possible for us to make a final judgment on the existence or nonexistence of the epiniopian choral "I."

II. THE CHORAL "I"

Although I dwell on a rocky cliff, I am renowned for my accomplishments in Greek games, and I am renowned also because I have some measure of the Muses. My fields bear the grape, life-giving cure of helplessness. I have no horses and have learned nothing about herding.

(*Paean* 4. 19-24)

So the chorus of *Paean 4* describes itself, a factual statement in no way similar to the poet's first personal statements in *N 9* and *N 8*, which even at their most subjective are still concerned with the poet's professional duties. But is this a typical choral "I" statement? The Ceians presented *Paean 4* at the great Ionian festival in Delos, in competition with many other choruses before an international audience, so that to talk about their homeland, the specific character of their own island, and their own local mythology was the most practical way for them to distinguish themselves from their Ionian brethren. But do other choruses, in other situations, make such a point of identifying themselves? Is the same physical self-description and topical subject matter found in other choral songs? To answer these questions we must look at choral "I" statements elsewhere, in non-epinician choral works like *Paean 4*, although outside of drama relatively few of such pure choral songs still survive. Yet even these will be sufficient to give us a fair indication of the character of Greek choral song, particularly if the first personal statements in them may be shown to have the same general features as those in *Paean 4*. For this purpose, it is most logical to begin with his other two extant choral works, and from there to move backward in time to earlier choral song, as exemplified by Alcman's *Partheneion* and Greek folk song, and then forward again to a brief survey of first personal statements in Attic comedy and drama.

Pindar's *Paean 2* was not presented, as was *Paean 4*, at an international festival, but instead in the chorus' own city of Abdera, as a hymn to Apollo on behalf of all her citizens. But even before this audience of compatriots, which surely consisted in part of the chorus members' friends and relatives, the chorus, like the Ceians in *Paean 4*, describes its ceremonial role with its opening words, indicating the precise route the procession will take while the paean is presented.⁸

Abderus, for Ionian folk, I shall pursue this paean from your temple to
the shrine of Apollo and Aphrodite. (1-4)

Since to "pursue" a song probably means to "follow the music in dance," the opening lines of *Paean 2* are simply a more explicit version of the first lines of *Paean 4* ("I shall dance to Artemis," 1-2) and have exactly the same purpose, that is, to establish immediately that the chorus is speaking, and to explain its function in the present ceremony.⁹

In 16ff. (following a break in the papyrus), the chorus members specifically identify themselves as citizens of Abdera, in much the same

way as the Ceians identify themselves in *Paean* 4, by speaking about their homeland:

I dwell in Thrace, a land of vines and fruitful. May great Time never weary in marching firmly forward for me. I am a citizen of a young city, but I have borne my mother's mother, after she was destroyed by enemy fire. (16–20)

Like the Ceian islanders, they describe their homeland's geography ("I dwell on a rocky cliff," *Paean* 4.19). But the Abderitans clearly show that they are speaking to a familiar audience, since they then allude, by means of a rather difficult pun, to a recent attempt by Abdera to re-establish their mother city Teos, after the original settlement had been destroyed by the Thracians. Previously the settlers of Teos had founded a colony in Abdera, so that Teos is the "mother" of Abdera, the "mother"-land of the chorus. Thus in recolonizing Teos, the citizens of Abdera have "borne" again their mother's mother!¹⁰ Only before a local audience in a communal celebration could such an obscure historical reference be at all understood.

In the following stanzas especially *Paean* 2 seems more like an historical pageant than a religious invocation. The chorus resume their dramatic account of Abdera's past, referring first to their continuing struggle against the native inhabitants: "I keep fighting against the enemy" (26). They then tell of the first colonists' war with the same people, and of Abdera's subsequent victory, in accordance with the prophecy of Hecate, quoting Hecate's words without introduction, as would be possible only before an audience that had been acquainted with the oracle since childhood.¹¹ The narrowly patriotic tone is maintained until the end of the song. Although the chorus turn briefly from their account of Abdera's history to praise Apollo, god of the paean, describing his shrines at Delos and Delphi (61–65), in the final lines they return to local concerns, and pray again to their city's eponymous protector, Abderus, for success in their present war against the Thracians:

To me grant blessing with good fame, and go before the army with your might to the last battle. (66–68)

The position of this prayer, at the end of the poem, gives it a special urgency, as if the battle were imminent and the paean sung on the eve of war.¹²

In short, *Paean* 2 is a completely communal poem, in which the chorus identifies itself not only by describing itself directly, but also by

its unwavering concern for its homeland. Although Pindar's characteristic touch is present, in generalizations on success and valor (2-22, 33-36) and in the description of Delphi (63-64), which few Abderitans would have seen, the focus of the song is on Abdera, her history, her wars, her hero. One may compare with *Paean* 2's provincialism the more catholic tone of *Paean* 4, where the chorus speak to the pan-Ionian audience of accomplishments for which the island is internationally famous, her poets and her excellence in games (19-21), where instead of cryptically relating events of significance only to themselves they tell of the hero Melampus, a Thessalian who is mentioned in Homer and thus probably in other epic cycles, and of the Ceian King Euxantius, who refused to leave Ceos to rule over Crete, a figure known also in Cretan mythology.¹³ And even here they do not emphasize specific details of the myth, but recall only Euxantius' general sentiments on patriotism.

But in other respects the two *Paceans* are similar: they even seem to have been composed on the same basic pattern, since in both the chorus on entering explains its present function, identifies itself more fully by describing its homeland, and relates myths about its homeland. Strangely enough, choral self-description seems just as necessary before a local audience as before an audience of strangers; perhaps the chorus members wish to stress their ceremonial role as patriots over their individual identities as citizens. But on the basis of the similarities between these two songs, there is every indication that such a thing as a definitive choral style does indeed exist.

Pindar's Theban *Partheneion*, although composed for an entirely different sort of occasion, seems to have been formed in much the same mold as the two *Paceans*. But, in the maiden song, the chorus members tend to describe *themselves* rather than their country, most naturally perhaps, since they are women. They begin their song with what seems to have been an invocation to Apollo, and then go on to describe in detail their costumes, actions, and even their voices.

But swiftly girding myself in my robe, and bearing in my delicate hands a shining branch of laurel, I will sing the praise of the famous house of Aeoladas and his son Pagondas, making my maiden head bloom with garlands. And to the sound of reedy flutes I will imitate the sirens' cry with my songs.

(5-11)

Even though the use of feminine participles alone would make it clear that females were speaking, the chorus leave little to the imagination ("girding myself in my robe," "delicate hands," "making my maiden head bloom with garlands"). They indicate precisely their role in the

ritual procession: they must bear a laurel branch to Apollo's shrine, while singing in praise of the family of Agasicles the Laurel-boy, the leader of the procession.¹⁴ They tell us that they have good voices, loud and clear as the Sirens', appropriately stressing not the creative aspect of their song (like the poet's "I honor in song," *N* 9.54), but the manner of its performance. The Abderitans and the Ceians also speak of their ceremonial duties ("pursuing the paean," *Paeans* 2.3, and "I shall celebrate in dance," *Paeans* 4.2), but not in such explicit detail.¹⁵

The rest of the maidens' first personal statements are similarly self-descriptive. The text of the next lines is somewhat damaged, but the maidens seem to be making a transition from the myth of the Sirens back to themselves and the Laurel Ceremony:¹⁶

poets (?) may tell of the past in intricate words; Zeus knows the rest. But for me it is fitting to think maidenly thoughts and to speak them with my tongue. I must not forget a fitting song for a man or a woman among whose descendants I am numbered (?). I have come to the dancing place as a faithful witness for Agasicles and his good parents because of their guest-friendship.

(23-31)

The chorus' concern is again with themselves and the part they must play in the performance, although the restrictive phrases "it is fitting," "I must not," and "appropriate song" are strangely reminiscent of the *kairos* statements in the epinician odes, such as *N* 5.14-16, where Pindar is "ashamed" to speak of murder, or *N* 4.33-34, where "a law and the passing hours" keep him from speaking too long. But the maidens' *kairos* is very different from the poet's, since the limitations which the poet imposes upon his song are moral and artistic, pertaining particularly to his creative powers, while the maidens are bound by more physical restrictions, by the very fact that they are maidens and by their present role in the ceremony.¹⁷ That is, they must think and speak only "maidenly things" (25-26), not of past wars or of what is beyond their understanding (24). They must be sure to remember their lines and not to forget to thank their friends and benefactors (27-31); they must join in the dance (29). The maiden chorus, in contrast to the poet, is concerned with little beyond the performance of its song.

In fact their "maidenly thoughts" are far more narrowly confined than the reflections of their masculine counterparts in *Paeans* 2 and 4, since they keep exclusively to the context of the Laurel procession, speaking only about themselves or of the other participants in the ceremony, whom they call upon by name (Aeoladas, Pagondas, Agasicles), and whose family they then praise for its previous accomplishments (31-35?)

and for its services to the state (45–47).¹⁸ They conclude their praise by once more referring to themselves, inviting the Laurel-boy to lead them in dance:

Son of Damaena, lead me, marching with stately step; and daughter first in rank will gladly follow you, going with sandaled feet near the fair-leaved laurel, she whom Andaesistrota trained in intricate devices . . .
(49–53)

They describe their chorus leader in some detail, and even mention by name her trainer Andaesistrota, specific references that would appeal to an audience composed of the family and of the participants in the ceremony.¹⁹ Everyone, it seems, must get his or her due share of glory. Accordingly, in the next lines they praise their poet Pindar.

Do not, having nectar from my spring, thirsting be carried to another's salt stream.
(56–58)

"Nectar" must be the poem itself, as in *O* 7.7–8 ("and I send to victors flowing nectar, the gift of the Muses"), and "spring" the source of their song, the poet — a fresh spring, as opposed to the "salt water" of his rivals.²⁰ Such third personal *σφραγίδες* may also be found in earlier choral songs of this type; surely the poet is justified in allowing himself the same measure of praise as that given to the leader and trainer of the chorus.²¹ But even here the maidens' emphasis is on themselves: Pindar is "my spring."

In making his maiden chorus talk about themselves and keep to subject matter of such specific communal interest, Pindar may be following a traditional pattern, for in Alcman's *Partheneion*, which was performed in Sparta at least one hundred fifty years before Pindar's, the maiden chorus seems to speak of itself in almost the same manner, before a local audience, at a celebration not unlike the Theban *Daphnephoria*. In this song (Alcman 1, Diehl), the Spartan maidens, like the Theban, are primarily concerned with themselves and their present choral role. The first part of the song is lost, and where the papyrus begins the chorus is relating a myth of war and death, which it concludes with a pious statement:

There is vengeance from the gods. Happy is he who weaves the day to its close without a tear. But I sing of Agido's light.
(36–39)

The maidens have no concern with the dark world of the myth; theirs is a world of light and of brightness, of maidenly concerns. Like the Theban maidens, they must "think and speak maidenly things."²²

This is just what they do in the next lines, describing themselves, the leaders of their chorus, and their present actions in the most explicit detail:

But I sing of Agido's light. I see it bright as the very sun which Agido invokes to shine upon us. But our noted chorus leader does not allow me either to praise or blame her, for she [the chorus leader] seems to be pre-eminent, a fine prize-winning horse with ringing hooves of the breed of fleeting dreams. Don't you see? That horse [Agido] is of Venetic breed, but the hair of my cousin Hagesichora [the leader] blooms like unmixed gold, and her silvery face — how can I tell you plainly? That is Hagesichora. And she whose beauty is second to Agido's shall run like a Colaxian horse to an Ibenian. For as we bring the robe (?) to Ortheia, the Peleiades rise, like the dog-star through the night, and fight against us. (36–63)

The chorus speak first about their leaders, depicting their beauty in general, metaphorical terms, as if no further identification were needed. They go on to tell us that they are competing in a contest (which they jestingly call a war) between two rival choruses, the Peleiades (or Doves) and their own team, which was probably called something like the "Horses," as their descriptions of Agido (the horse of Venetic breed) and Hagesichora would suggest.²³ Clearly they are performing before an audience of family and friends. They allude only briefly to their family ties to one another, simply calling Hagesichora "my cousin." We may recall that the Theban maidens, too, seem to have some close connection to the Laurel-boy's family, and that they also make the sort of topical references to themselves and to the other participants in the ceremony that could be fully appreciated only by a local audience.²⁴

But the tone of Alcman's *Partheneion* is more intimate than Pindar's. The Spartan maidens go on to mention each other's names, as well as that of their school-mistress:²⁵

For abundance of purple is not enough to protect us, nor spangled snake of gold, nor Lydian cap, the pride of soft-eyed maidens; not even Nanno's locks will suffice, nor Areta divinely fair, nor Thylacis nor Cleesithera; you will not say, going to Aenisimbrota's, "Let me have Astaphis, let Philylla look at me, or Camareta, or lovely Vianthemis" — Hagesichora protects us. (64–76)

They describe their costume in precise detail, the color of their robes, the shape of their jewelry, their headdresses. Pindar's maidens (as far as our text shows) only refer to their costume in general terms, just as much as is necessary to identify themselves as maidens. Moreover, the Theban maidens do not give us any indication of the size of the chorus,

but Alcman's chorus has ten members, the eight mentioned here, along with Agido and Hagesichora.²⁶

They go on to describe how their two leaders offer prayers to Artemis in the ceremony (78–83), but swiftly turn from this serious theme to joke about themselves:

O leader of the chorus, I could tell you, I myself, a maiden, have shrieked in vain like an owl from the rooftop, although I would speak what is pleasing to the great goddess Dawn, for she is healer of our woes. But from Hagesichora the maidens have attained the desired peace [i.e. victory in the competition]. (82–91)

Hagesichora, as leader and trainer of the chorus, receives more praise than either of her Theban counterparts: she has taught "owls" to sing, and has helped her chorus win their "war" with the Peleiades. The far-fetched metaphors give the passage a humorous tone not unsuited to the occasion or to the age and sex of the chorus members.

In general, we may conclude that although Alcman's maidens seem to think and speak more "maidenly things" than Pindar's, and seem to be performing before a smaller, more congenial audience, the basic character of the two songs is very similar.²⁷ Both maiden choruses identify themselves in their opening first personal statements; both describe their maidenly appearance and explain in detail their choral roles. Both emphasize their desire to speak only about their world and profess not to understand what lies beyond. Both refer specifically to their leader and their trainer, describe their costumes, and make many topical allusions. These similarities in style and content are surely great enough to suggest that there was a formal stylistic tradition in maiden songs to which Pindar and perhaps even Alcman intentionally adhered.²⁸

It is perhaps possible that in the type of ceremony for which *parthenenia* were written, the ritual movements of the chorus in dance and their physical appearance had greater significance per se than in more nationalistic or political celebrations, like those for which *Paeans* 4 and 2 were composed, where praise of the chorus' city, not the actions of the chorus, is of primary importance. But each of the songs so far considered exhibits the same basic features of choral style: we know immediately who the chorus is and what it is doing because the chorus in every case tells us; neither costumes nor a synopsis of actions is required to complete the picture.

If such explicit self-portrayal is necessary for the communal chorus that performs rituals in the full sight of the community, it is certainly essential for the chorus which pretends to be what it is not, like the

choruses which represented the three ages of man in a Spartan pageant, or a chorus masquerading as animals.²⁹ The practice of animal mum-mery in particular seems to date from very early times: we have seen that Alcman's maidens probably called themselves the "Horses" and competed against a team called "Doves."³⁰ In Chios groups of little children who called themselves "swallows" went from house to house begging, singing a song which begins:³¹

The swallow has come! the swallow has come!
She brings a good season; she brings a good year.
She has a white breast and a black back.

(Carm. Pop. 32.1-5, Diehl)

They are careful to describe the appearance of the character that they are imitating, and continue their song in character, in a tone as sportive as that of Alcman's maidens:

Give us some food from your rich house; the swallow won't push away porridge or hardcake. Shall we go away? if you give us something! If you don't, here we'll stay. Shall we carry off your door and your lintel? Shall we carry off your wife? She's not very big, we could easily lift her.

(6-17)

These choral swallows, like the Wasps and Frogs of Aristophanes' comedies, preserve some of their human characteristics, and only with their final words do they reveal their true identity:

If you give us something, may you get more. Open, open the gate to the swallow. For we are not old men, but little children. (18-20)

Since the swallow song is a folk song, and thus has no *σφραγίς* or any reference to a composer, it is as representative as anything extant of the form of the earliest choral songs, which were probably composed and performed informally by communities, before the days of professionalism, when poets and trainers were required.

Animal folk songs like the swallow song are essentially the ancestors of the animal choruses of Attic comedy. Comic choral style is much the same as the swallows': the chorus tends to identify itself soon after it comes on stage, as in the opening lines of Aristophanes' *Frogs*:³²

Brekekekex koax koax! Brekekekex koax koax! Children of the spring
and marsh, we shall cry out a harmonious hymn; my song shall be well
sung, koax koax. (209-214)

His Birds' first words are bird calls (*Birds* 260–262). The Clouds also describe themselves as soon as they enter, but choruses in human form

tend to identify themselves by less direct means, that is, simply by speaking in character. The choruses of the *Acharnians* and *Lysistrata* complain about their old age; the chorus of Mystae in the *Frogs* sing a hymn to Demeter and warn the impure to stay away from their rites.³³ The nonhuman choruses perhaps describe themselves more precisely because they cannot rely too heavily on costuming or action to make them look like birds or frogs or clouds. But all comic choruses, animal and human, characterize themselves completely by what they say about their appearances and actions. In antiquity at least, costume and dancing seem to have been ancillary to the spoken word.

The same elements of choral style are preserved in the *parodoi* of Attic tragedy. The choruses of Aeschylus' *Persians*, *Prometheus*, and *Choephoroe* declare who they are with their first words; the old men of the *Agamemnon* (72–83) and the Egyptian maidens of the *Suppliants* (1–4, 154–160) speak in detail about their appearances and actions, even though there is no direct dramatic necessity for such self-description in either drama.³⁴ Sophocles' old men of Colonus and Euripides' Bacchantes also describe themselves in their opening lines, but in dramas where the chorus' character is less clearly defined, that is, where they play a less active role (as in the *Antigone* and *Medea*), identification is usually left up to other characters, or to the audience.³⁵ Thus even in tragedy, in a form of choral song where local references are out of place, the dominant characteristics of choral song remain: self-description and continuity of speaker. Although the chorus may speak the poet's thoughts, the "I" is always choral.

The conclusions that may be drawn about choral style in general will therefore be the same ones drawn in the previous chapter on the basis of *Paean* 4: (a) that choral first personal statements are characterized by self-description, and thus may be distinguished from bardic statements simply by means of their subject matter; (b) that in songs where choral first personal statements occur, the chorus speaks in character throughout the song, without first personal intrusions by the poet; and (c) that pure choral song of this type seems usually to be intended for some communal purpose.

The reason for this characteristic choral self-description is, as we have seen, that every chorus by its very nature plays a role, because its corporate character is necessarily different from that of its individual components. Therefore it will tend to describe itself, to explain who it is and what it is doing, often in very explicit terms. As a result, the chorus' first personal statements deal only with choral activities, with dancing and singing (*χορεύεσθαι*), with communal ritual, with the *performance*,

but never with the composition of song, since that is the concern of the poet.

Also, on the basis of the songs considered in this chapter, it would seem that when the chorus is speaker in a song, it speaks throughout. The only apparent exception to this rule is the parabasis in early comedy, where the poet seems to speak for himself, in the first person, as in the *parabaseis* of Aristophanes' *Clouds*, *Peace*, *Acharnians*, and *Knights*. This may have been the regular practice in earlier comedies, since in these the poet presumably acted as chorus leader, and delivered the *epirrhema* and *antepirrhema* alone, defending himself against his critics, while the rest of the chorus danced.³⁶ But in each case it is possible to recognize immediately that the poet is speaking by what he says: he is concerned with his own actions, with his poetry and his poetic ability, things which could apply only to himself, not to the chorus. Moreover, these "intrusions" by the poet occur in a set place in the performance, where the audience would be prepared for them.³⁷ But in his later comedies Aristophanes seems to have abandoned the "old style" altogether, allowing his choruses to speak in character throughout and to refer to him only in the third person:³⁸ in these later *parabaseis*, as in the other choral songs of comedy and drama, the traditional characteristics of choral style are preserved.

When we consider also that most choral poems have a primarily communal purpose, we have perhaps a second means of distinguishing choral from bardic song. Most of the "pure" choral poems discussed in this chapter — *partheneia*, patriotic paeans, the choruses of comedy and drama — are intended for communal ritual, but choral songs influenced by epic and monodic tradition, like *epinikia*, are written in praise of individual men, of victory in games, of κλέα ἀνδρῶν. Therefore if choral first personal statements occur in Pindar's odes, not only should we expect the choral speaker to express primarily choral concerns and to describe and characterize himself and his actions, but it would seem that he should speak throughout the ode, and that, in addition, the song itself should be intended specifically for a communal celebration.

III. "I" STATEMENTS IN THE EPINIKION

The epinician ode seems to be cut of a different cloth from the choral songs just discussed. For, at least in *N* 9, the poet seems to speak throughout, and his first personal statements (not to mention the ode itself) have a subject matter that bears little resemblance to choral

"I's" since they deal not with the physical actions of the chorus but with the proper concern of the bard, the expression and purpose of his poetry. In *N* 9, for example, every first personal statement deals in some way with poetry. In most, Pindar speaks of his official duties as epinician poet, to lead the communal celebration (*κωμάσομεν* 1; ἀνὰ δ' αὐλὸν ὅρσομεν, 8), to relate myth (ὧν ἐγὼ μνασθεὶς ἐπασκήσω, 9–10), to ask the gods for blessing (*αἰτέω*, 30), to praise the victor (*φάσομαι*, 43), and to express his friendship (*ἀναβάλλομαι*, 29), all professional statements in direct, explicit language, which in many ways recall the poetic vocabulary of the epic bards' transitional statements (*κωμάσομεν*—ἀείσομαι; *μνασθεὶς ἐπασκήσω*—*μνήσομαι οὐδὲ λήσομαι*; *αἰτέω*). But at the end of the ode, when he speaks of his more general artistic aims, even the language is strikingly different:

I pray to sing this *arete* with the Graces, and to honor this victory beyond many in song, shooting at the target nearest the Muses. (54–55)

This complex, metaphorical diction, which suggests through the imagery of targets that the poet speaks what is accurate and also appropriate to the occasion, is totally unlike any of the relatively straightforward choral statements we have examined.

But do the first personal statements of other epinician odes have the same distinguishing characteristics? In answering this question, it would be well to look primarily at the odes of Pindar's first period, which were composed before he began to develop the deeply personal style exemplified in *N* 8, especially since in these earlier, less individualistic odes may be preserved much of the form of the first *epinikia*. Of these *P* 10, Pindar's earliest extant ode, is perhaps the best example.

In *P* 10, as in *N* 9, the poet's opening first personal statement is concerned primarily with his official duties. After beginning with a comparison of the victor's homeland Thessaly to the great state of Sparta, he stops abruptly:

Why do I boast beyond what is appropriate: But Pytho and Pelinna [the victor's town] and the children of Aleus [his patrons] summon me, wishing me to lead for [the victor] Hippocleas the loud voice of men.

(4–6)

κομπέω implies that Pindar fears that too much talk of human happiness will invite the jealousy of the gods, and that thus his wish is morally *para kairon*. But *para kairon* refers also to Pindar's *Programm*. It is the duty of the poet to speak no more than is appropriate; his purpose is to lead a chorus (*ἀγαγεῖν* is the technical word) in honor of the victor. He

has been summoned by the victor's patrons for this reason, not in order to bestow excessive praise on their homeland.³⁹ This explicit statement of his official duty serves as a transition to praise of the victor and his family (6–21), which he concludes by reminding them of their mortal limitations:

A man is happy and praised by poets if he has won at games and has seen his son win. He can never climb the brazen heavens, but as far as we mortals can obtain glory, he has sailed to the farthest voyage. (27–29)

The limitations are first applied to the victor's father, then through ἀπτόμεσθα to all mankind, including the poet himself.⁴⁰ By expressing the *gnome* in the first person, Pindar joins himself to the audience, and at the same time reminds them of his presence without changing the general direction of thought, using this brief reference to himself as a transition to the myth.⁴¹

Pindar now describes the life of the Hyperboreans, indirectly comparing them to the present company in Thessaly, just as he compared Sparta to Thessaly at the beginning of the ode.⁴² He mentions Perseus' visit to the Hyperboreans, but then concludes abruptly:

To me nothing which the gods have done is past belief or wonder.

(48–50)

To talk of Perseus is a digression; his intention was to compare the Hyperboreans to the Thessalians. The first personal transition turns attention away from the myth to the poet himself:

Hold back the oar, swiftly cast the anchor from the stern to the bottom, a safeguard against the stony reef. For the flower of epinician songs of praise, like a bee, rushes from one theme to another. (51–54)

When he speaks of poetry rather than of his relation to the victor (4–6, 28) or his reverence for the gods (4, 48–50) his language becomes metaphorical. Clearly these words are addressed to himself: the poet is the helmsman of his poem, as the king is the steersman of the ship of state. He must keep his ship of song from going off course, from digressing, in the literal sense of the word.⁴³ In this instance Pindar seems to draw on an imagery implicit in the transitional statements of epic. At least one epic word for song means road (*οἶμος*), and the bards spoke of διελθεῖν, "going through" a story.⁴⁴ But Pindar's emphasis is not so much upon the course of song, but upon how it is traveled, that is, upon himself and his ability to control his subject matter. No theme should be sung παρὰ καιρὸν: the bee takes only what it needs from each flower and then

passes on.⁴⁵ These lines are essentially a metaphorical restatement of his initial *τί κοιπέω παρὰ καιρόν*. He indicates that he has control over his subject matter through the images of steersmanship and the bee, and it is significant that he addresses himself where the epic bard would call upon the Muse (as in *Iliad* 2.484).

His statements about his poetry were symbolic, but when he speaks again of his official duties to the victor and his family, he returns to simple, direct language:

I hope, as the men of Ephyra pour forth my sweet voice by the banks of the Peneios, that I shall make Hippocleas still more wonderful with song, because of his crowns, among his contemporaries and his elders, and a care to the young maidens. (55–59)

He alludes again to his role as chorus leader, and to the poet's traditional duty to bring fame to the subjects of his song. However, his aim in this instance is not to bring the victor the lasting fame which the heroes of epic enjoy, *καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι*, but merely to make the victor admired by his fellow citizens. He is speaking of his duty as epinician poet and chorus leader in a communal celebration, and not of the supernatural powers of his poetry.

He goes on to speak in direct terms of his obligations to his patron, but again uses metaphor for his poetry, in order to express the extraordinary powers of his song:

I trust in the kindly friendship of Thorax, who, busying himself for my sake, has yoked this four-horsed chariot of the Muses, befriending a friend, each leading the other, gladly. (64–66)

Poetry is the chariot of the Muses, in which the poet can ride, together with the goddesses, crossing the human boundaries of space and time. Parmenides set down his philosophy as if he had learned it on a journey into space in a divine chariot, in order to indicate that his ability to think (travel) and his knowledge surpassed the ordinary, and to give his utterances a superhuman quality.⁴⁶ Therefore Pindar is able to travel in the chariot of the Muses to the land of the Hyperboreans, which mortals cannot reach "by ship or on foot" (30). Such distances can only be traversed by song. His patron has an essential role in the production of this song: he has yoked the chariot, that is, provided the horses, but must himself remain on the ground.⁴⁷ It was necessary to employ metaphor to speak of the supernatural powers of poetry, but direct language suffices in this instance, as above, for the poet's relation to his fellow man. He expresses his gratitude for Thorax' hospitality, as re-

quired by the traditional epinician *Programm*, and states that he has come as a friend to a friend, "each leading the other gladly."⁴⁸ This is the ideal *xenia* between patron and poet; Pindar has been accepted as a *xenos* and thus is able to join with the family in the communal celebration. In the final lines of the ode he continues to speak of his relation to Thorax and to the victor's family: his friendship and the truth of what he says may be "put to the touchstone." He concludes: "We will praise his good brothers, guardians of their fatherland," again using simple language (*ἐπαινήσομεν*) for his official duties.

Thus in *P* 10, although the traditional language of epic and lyric poetry seems to suffice for the poet's statements of friendship and of praise for the victor, and his function as leader of the celebration, it is inadequate for statements about the larger purposes of his art, that is, his ability as poet to join together events separate in space and time, to compare Thessaly to the Hyperboreans. This is best exemplified by the two *kairos* statements in the ode: the first, a traditional statement of moral restriction, is phrased in simple language, *τί κοινέω παρὰ καιρόν* (4) but in the second (51–54), which deals with artistic *kairos*, Pindar employs the metaphors of ship and reef, bee and flower, which express not only his control over his subject matter but also his ability to do through the poetic imagination what cannot be done by ordinary means — to unite present and past, and to bring a measure of universal significance to an isolated and transient event like Hippocleas' victory.⁴⁹

The style of the transitional statements of Pindar's later epinician odes have the same basic characteristics. In *N* 5, written about a decade after *P* 10, Pindar still speaks in direct terms of his official duties of leading the celebration and of praising the victor and his family for their accomplishments in games.⁵⁰ But although he continues to use metaphorical language to express his ultimate artistic aims, he seems to place in this ode more emphasis on his own capabilities as a poet than on his poetry.

Pindar begins *N* 5 by stating that he is not a sculptor who makes statues which stand upon their bases idly, and calls upon his song to go forth from Aegina, in the hold of every ship, proclaiming that Pytheas won at Nemea (1–5). Poetry has an advantage over sculpture in that it does not need to remain in one place "doing nothing," but may travel all over the world, as sailors bring the news from port to port, and thus bring the victor universal fame.⁵¹ As in *P* 10, Pindar uses an imagery of ships and distance to express poetry's transcendent powers.

The transition to the myth furnishes a more striking example of Pindar's increased emphasis on his poetical powers. After praising the victor he speaks of the city's great heroes, Peleus and Telamon, who,

along with the hero Phocus, instituted the worship of Zeus Hellanios. Here one would expect Pindar to tell the myth of how Peleus and Telamon killed Phocus, but instead of stating that he will do so, Pindar refuses to go on:

I am ashamed to speak of a great deed not ventured in justice; how they left the famous island, and what god drove those valiant men from Aegina. I will stand still. Not every truth is better for showing her full face. Often silence is the wisest thing for a man to have in mind. (14–18)

He will stand still (*στάσομαι*, returning to the imagery of the opening lines “statues *standing* on their bases,” *ἔσταότ’*), thus stopping the motion of his song; down this road he will not travel. He is in control of his material, and it is not necessary for him, as it was for the bard, to follow a single *οἶμος*, road of song, as the Muse directs.⁵² Since it is not appropriate to a festive occasion nor morally right (*αἰδέομαι*, *δίκα*) for him to speak of murder, he tells only enough to indicate why Peleus and Telamon were exiled from Aegina, and so went on to do their great deeds. But that one road is wrong does not mean he cannot take another:

But if it seems best to praise prosperity or might of hands or iron war,
let someone dig me from here a long pit for leaping: the spring in my
knees is light, and eagles fly beyond the sea. (19–21)

His duty is to praise man’s accomplishments, not to speak of murder. He is explicit about his official duty, to praise (*ἐπαυνῆσαι*), but speaks metaphorically of his poetical powers. His first image, taken from the *pentathlon*, places emphasis on the poet, and his ability to jump long distances, rather than on a vehicle of song. But as if an image of human activity, like the broad jump, were insufficient to express the poet’s supernatural powers, he infers that he can, like an eagle, travel “beyond the sea” to the myth, to the wedding of Peleus and Thetis, where the Muses sang. The distance imagery recalls the chariot of the Muses in *P* 10, in which the poet traveled to the land of the Hyperboreans; but here the emphasis, as in the image of the broad jump, is on the poet, not his vehicle.⁵³ At the end of the poem, he returns to the ship imagery of 2ff. and *P* 10:

But when you come to sing of Themistios, do not shrink back [as you have from praising the Athenian trainer], give out your voice, stretch your sails to the mast, sing that he has won twice at Epidaurus; bear to the doors of the temple of Aeacus grassy crowns of flowers, together with the yellow-haired Graces. (50–54)

Here again the poet must be addressing himself: he is the singer (*ἀειδεῖν*,

50b; δίδοι φωνάν, 51; φθέγξαι, 52b), and he comes with the Graces, who, like the Muses, are the poet's patron goddesses.⁵⁴ As with the myth of Phocus, he cannot go too far down the road of praise for an Athenian at a time when Athens' relations with Aegina are strained; he must shrink back. But nothing is to prevent him from going full speed ahead in praise of the victor's grandfather. He returns in the final lines to an imagery drawn from the games. His song is a victory crown, a symbol of accomplishment and universal renown.

In *N* 5, as in *P* 10, the style of the transitional statements is determined by their subject matter. When Pindar speaks of his duty to praise the victor and his homeland, he is explicit (*ἐπαινῆσαι*, 19; "I rejoice [*χαίρω*] that every city strives for noble deeds," 46), but he uses symbolic language to speak of his powers as a poet, expressing as in *P* 1c, through distance imagery, his ability to bring together through song events separated in space and time ("eagles fly beyond the sea," 21), to recall at a celebration at Aegina the glorious deeds of her ancestors, and his ability to control his subject matter, to speak *kairia* and not tell of murder (*στάσομαι*, 19) or bestow too much praise on an Athenian (*μηκέτι ρίγει*, 50). But in the imagery of *N* 5 he stresses more explicitly the connection of song to fame; his song travels from Aegina on every merchant ship; it is a victory crown of flowers. And, in contrast to *P* 10, where the focus is on his poetry (as in the images of the flower of hymns and the chariot of the Muses), throughout *N* 5 there is a consistent emphasis on himself and on *his* powers rather than on his song's, brought out by metaphors which deal with the nature of his art ("I am not a sculptor," 1) and with his poetic skill, that is, with his ability to control his course (*στάσομαι*, steersman) and to travel great distances (broad jumper, eagle).

But it should be observed that the types of first personal statements so far discussed occur only in *epinikia* proper. The elaborate symbolism, the specific statements of official duty and friendship, that characterize the transitional statements of the epinician odes *P* 10 and *N* 5 do not occur in the transitions of *P* 12 and *O* 14, odes written in the same period of Pindar's life, but intended primarily for religious occasions, where the poet's intention is to praise god rather than men.

Pindar indicates that *P* 12 was performed at the end of a victory *komos* to the temple of Athena in Acragas, where the victor's crown was to be dedicated:

I beg you, lover of brightness, most beautiful of the cities of mortals,
house of Persephone, who dwell beside the banks of Acragas where sheep

are pastured, beside the templed hill — receive graciously with the good will of immortals and men, this crown from Pytho for renowned Midas, [receive] him also, who has vanquished Hellas by the art which Pallas Athena invented when she wove in song the death dirge of the harsh Gorgons. (1-8)

There is only one first personal statement in the ode, the opening prayer, *αἰτέω σε, φιλάγλας* (1). Another first personal transition is not needed, since Midas' victory in flute playing suggests the myth of Athena's invention of the flute. The myth is related in praise of Athena, not of the victor, so that there is no need for the poet to introduce or conclude it with a statement of his ability to join past and present by means of his poetic imagination. Instead, he concludes the myth, and the ode, with pious *gnomai* on the uncertainty of mortal happiness, impersonally phrased, which are appropriate to any occasion. To call attention to himself would be out of place in a dedicatory ode, at a primarily religious occasion.

The statements of *xenia* and of poetic ability characteristic of epinician transitions are absent also in *O 14*. As in *P 12*, Pindar opens with a prayer, here not to the victor's city, but to his patron goddesses:

You who dwell beside the waters of Cephisus, in the place of fine horses, O queens of song and of shining Orchomenus, Graces, guardians of the primeval Minyae, listen, since I am praying. (1-5)

His statement, as in *P 12*, is direct and functional, *κλῦτ’ ἐπεὶ εὔχομαι*. He goes on to praise them for their gifts to mortals, and calls upon them to

look upon this *komos* stepping lightly. For I have come singing of Asopichus in a Lydian mode, since he won at Olympia because of you. (16-20)

Even when he mentions the victor, his concern is primarily with the goddesses' role in his victory. Pindar identifies himself as a poet "singing (*ἀείδων*) in a Lydian mode," but in direct terms.⁵⁵ In a dedicatory ode a metaphorical reference to the transcendent powers of his imagination would be out of place, since his intention here is to praise the Graces, not to bring universal and lasting fame to Asopichus.

Nor can it be argued that the lack of symbolism and relative impersonality of *P 12* and *O 14* are due to their brevity.⁵⁶ The transitional statements of *P 7* have the same characteristics as those of *P 10* and others, although *P 7*, like *O 14* and *P 12*, consists only of a single triad. *P 7* is an *enkomion* written in praise of a victor and his city; its brevity

merely indicates that it was probably intended to be sung on the night of the victory.⁵⁷ The first lines of the poem are concerned with poetry:

(1-3)

The great city of Athens is the best *prooimion* to set up as a foundation of song for the mighty clan of the Alcmeonidae.

It is the poet's task to build the song of praise as a monument to their accomplishments. In *P* 6 he spoke of his song as a shining *θησαυρός*, which could not be destroyed by the elements or the forces of time, implying that his song brings a lasting fame.⁵⁸ He continues to praise the Alcmeonids, first for their past achievements, then, specifically, for their victories:

(10-15)

Five Isthmian victories have brought me, one Olympian, two at Nemea,
O Megacles, of yours and your ancestors. I rejoice in your new good
fortune, but this I grieve, that envy is the requital for good deeds.

The phrase "five Isthmian victories have brought me" recalls *P* 10.4 ("the victor's family bid me to lead"); here again it is part of his *Programm* to state his official position — that he has come to celebrate the victory in song. His close, almost personal emotional involvement ("I rejoice," "I grieve") is reminiscent of his friendship with Thorax (*φιλέων φιλέοντα, ἄγων ἄγοντα*, *P* 10.66). It is the duty of the epinician poet to praise the victor and to be a *xenos* who rejoices in his good fortune.

The subject matter of Pindar's first personal statements thus seems to vary with the purpose of his song. The function of the poet in a dedicatory ode like *P* 12 or *O* 14 is not the same as in an *epinikion* like *P* 10 or a brief *enkomion* like *P* 7, and therefore the poet's statements about himself are also different. That is, in a dedicatory ode the poet's function is to offer prayer, and if he indicates that he is a poet, he does so in a purely traditional fashion, as an *aoidos* (*O* 14.17-18).⁵⁹ But in an *epinikion*, the poet's function is more complex. He must praise the victor, both directly, in the traditional manner, and indirectly, by comparing his accomplishments to great deeds of the past. He must show the sincerity of his praise by expressing his *xenia* for the victor and his family and by showing his readiness to participate in the victory celebration. Thus when Pindar speaks of his poetry in an *epinikion*, he speaks of it not in the traditional terms of the *aoidos*, but in terms of his epinician functions. For to show the relation of present to past, of particular to general, he must use the extraordinary powers of his imagination and speak *kata kairon*, abilities which can only be expressed in symbolic language.

Metaphorical statements about *kairos* and the poetic imagination therefore can occur only in epinician odes. But it is significant that such statements are found only in Pindar's *epinikia*. Bacchylides, Pindar's contemporary and rival, seems to have relied more heavily on epic vocabulary in the transitional statements of his epinician odes. This is particularly evident in his earlier poems, which were composed before he began to imitate Pindar's style, for example, in his thirteenth ode, which was composed for the same occasion as Pindar's *N* 5.

The tone of Bacchylides' *Ode* 13 seems much closer to *P* 12 and *O* 14 than to Pindar's *epinikion* *N* 5 for two reasons: first, that Bacchylides, like Pindar in *P* 12, uses forms of transition which do not refer to himself, and second, that his one first personal statement is, in Pindar's terms, "bardic" rather than "epinician." In fact only one transition in *Ode* 13 refers to the poet: an address to the victor (67) serves as an introduction to praise of the victor's family and of Aegina, and "Sing, O youths" ($\muέλπετ\hat{\imath}$ $\hat{\omega}$ $\nuέοι$, 190) is a transition to the myth. These indirect transitions may be compared to Pindar's transition by suggestion in *P* 12, the dedicatory ode, where the myth of Athena's invention of the flute is introduced by mentioning a victory in flute-playing (*P* 12. 6). But in the *epinikia* *P* 10 and *N* 5, Pindar refers to himself in every transition.

Bacchylides speaks in the first person only at the end of the ode, and even there he speaks of himself and his poetry in the traditional language of epic.⁶⁰

In this hope [for further victory] I too trust, and in the Muses of the crimson veil, and show forth this (new-woven gift?) of songs; and I honor the splendor-loving friendship which Lampon (has provided?) for me. And if flowery Cleio has in truth instilled this (friendship?) in my heart, songs delighting-in-words will proclaim him to all the people.

(220–231)

This is an "epinician" statement, in that Bacchylides demonstrates his *xenia* for the victor by showing that he shares in his hope for further success (220–221), and in that he expresses gratitude for his patron's hospitality to him (224–225). The content and style of his statements about *xenia* resemble Pindar's, but when Bacchylides speaks of his poetry, it is in the manner of the bards rather than of Pindar in his *epinikia*. The phrase "show forth" a song ($\phiαίνω \dots \tilde{v}μυον$, 223) has no metaphorical significance, but seems to be simply a means of indicating that he is a poet, a composer of new and original song. In *P* 1 Pindar

uses a similar term to address the Muse, without referring to the extraordinary powers of his poetic imagination:⁶¹

Come then, let us find a song for the king of Aetna [Deinomenes] which shall be his own ($\phi\lambda\iota\omegaν \epsilon\xi\epsilon\nu\rho\mu\epsilon\nu \nu\mu\nu\omegaν$). (58–60)

Bacchylides goes on to speak of “honoring” ($\gamma\epsilon\rho\alpha\iota\rho\omega$) his patron’s *xenia*, but this too is a traditional duty of all poets, epic and epinician alike (see *O* 3.2, *I* 8.69, *I* 2.17).⁶²

His metaphors, too, are traditional and convey only their traditional meanings.⁶³ His songs ($\alpha\omega\iota\delta\alpha\iota$) are “delighting-in-words” ($\tau\epsilon\rho\psi\iota\epsilon\pi\epsilon\hat{\iota}s$) — the singers of epic also refer to the ability of their song to bring joy ($\tau\epsilon\rho\psi\iota s$) and enchantment ($\theta\lambda\xi\iota s$).⁶⁴ Even Bacchylides’ term for divine poetical inspiration, “instill” ($\epsilon\nu\sigma\tau\alpha\zeta\epsilon\nu$), is used in Homer as a general term for inherited qualities. Thus $\epsilon\nu\sigma\tau\alpha\zeta\epsilon\nu$ here has no symbolic overtones; it is simply an idiom, not the water of fame sprinkled by Pindar in *I* 6 and *I* 5.⁶⁵ Perhaps Bacchylides uses traditional epic language where Pindar uses symbolic because he does not think of poetry in Pindar’s terms. His duty is to praise the victor, to thank him for his hospitality, to make him well known in his immediate circle; he does not envision a broader significance to his art. But Pindar must employ metaphor to express what the traditional language cannot express: the power of the poet’s imagination to bring through myth and *gnomai* lasting and universal significance to a transitory and isolated event. Even in his later works Bacchylides seems to employ metaphor only when he is imitating Pindar, and then invariably his metaphor lacks the original’s intended meaning.⁶⁶

Bacchylides’ *Ode* 13 is therefore similar in tone to Pindar’s dedicatory odes *P* 12 and *O* 14, because of its lack of emphasis on the poet and his imaginative powers. It is particularly significant that Bacchylides refers to himself only once in the entire ode, whereas in *N* 5 (and *P* 10) virtually every transition refers to Pindar. As a result, the Aeginetan audience which heard both Bacchylides 13 and *N* 5 would have been far more aware of Pindar’s presence. Pindar is there at every turn, speaking of his epinician duties, guiding the course of his song. *N* 5 is thus more subjective than *Ode* 13, since it seems to be concerned almost as much with Pindar’s ability as an epinician poet as with the celebration of a victory.

Pindar’s emphasis on himself and on his poetry is even stronger in *I* 5, which he composed a few years after *N* 5. In this ode, as in *N* 5 and *P* 10, Pindar calls attention to himself in every transition. But it is significant that in *I* 5 his emphasis in his transitions is always on his

poetic ability to speak *kairia* or on the powers of his imagination or both, that is, upon the purely Pindaric rather than on the traditional aspects of his art. His official duties of leading the *komos* and of expressing *xenia* for the victor seem in this case to be secondary. Instead, he shows a complete awareness of the full range of his poetic powers, which he expresses in a varied imagery, no longer relying (as in *P* 10 and *N* 5) on metaphors of distance alone.

Pindar is particularly concerned in *I* 5 with *kairos*. He begins *I* 5 with an invocation to Theia, the divine brightness reflected in man's glorious achievements, in war and in athletic contests. But this brightness is only reflected; he breaks off the comparison with a warning *gnome* cautioning the victor Phylakidas, as he warned the victor's father in *P* 10. 21-29, that man must be mindful of his mortality. He goes on to mention the victories won by Phylakidas and his brother at the Isthmus and at Nemea. Then, after this long introduction, he first speaks of his own function:

My heart is tasting hymns not unlinked to the Aeacidae. I have come with the Graces for the sons of Lampon to this well-governed city. And if she (Aegina) has turned onto a clear path of god-given deeds, do not hesitate to mix in song an appropriate boast in recompense for their toil. For even among heroes the brave fighters have gained from the spoken word. They have been famous in [the sound of] lyres and in the ringing harmony of flutes for an infinite time. And as they are worshiped they have given poets; with the aid of Zeus, foundation for their songs. (19-29)

This is essentially a *kairos* statement, even though Pindar does not employ in it the familiar metaphors of motion and rest. He speaks of selecting the proper theme to praise the victor as "tasting" (*γεύεται*), which implies not only that he chooses what is appropriate, but that he also enjoys his task, since he is a *xenos* of both the victor and his city (in *I* 6.20 he stated that it was a "certain law" for him, as a Theban, to praise Aegina). He speaks briefly in direct, traditional terms of his official position, that he has come to Aegina "with the Graces" for Phylakidas and his brother, that is, as official epinician poet. Then he returns to the imagery of "tasting," addressing himself, as the context indicates.⁶⁷ His "appropriate boast" that something of the divine is reflected in man's *arete* is described as a *krater* of wine and water which the poet mixes for the victory celebration — in *I* 6 he had spoken of mixing a *krater* of song, and had prayed that he might pour a libation from another song-*krater* for another victory.⁶⁸ This imagery of wine

and water, drawn from the celebration itself, seems to connote not only the recognition (as a toast to Aegina's bright fame) but also the joy of victory. To bring joy and fame are the traditional functions of the epinician poet, but in this instance Pindar has associated by means of his imagery these traditional aspects of his art with his own personal emphasis on *kairos*.

To speak *kairia* in this instance is to show that there is something immortal in all human achievement in general and in this victory in particular. To say more would be morally ("do not seek to become Zeus," 14) and artistically inappropriate, since his use of metaphor indicates that he is speaking about artistic *kairos* as well. He continues to talk in general terms about the traditional duties of the *aoidoi*: to praise the heroes of old in song, each in the land where he is worshiped. In Aegina one sings of the Aeacidae (34–35), and on this particular occasion he will sing of Achilles:

Drive for me, now from earth. Tell me, who killed Cycnus, Hector, and
Memnon, fearless general of the Ethiopians . . . (38–41)

He seems to address the Muse in the manner of the epic bards:⁶⁹

Tell me now, Muses who dwell in the halls of Olympus, who first went
against Agamemnon. (*Iliad* 11. 218–219)

But Pindar does not address the Muse by name, as the bards invariably do. His tone is abrupt, implying that he commands rather than invokes the Muse, that he steers the course of his poem and has ultimate control over his subject matter. As in *P* 10.65, his imagery expresses his ability to transcend distances in space and time through his imagination, to compare victories in the Trojan war to a victory in games at the Isthmus.

But in this instance his journey through space and time is short. After listing only briefly some of Achilles' accomplishments, which have brought glory to Aegina, he returns to earth to praise the victor and his family a second time, as required by the traditional *Programm*. His emphasis in the transition to this new theme is not so much on the powers of his imagination as on his general ability to speak *kairia*.

My tongue is ready to speak and has many arrows for me to sing of the
Aeacidae. Even now the city of Ajax, Salamis, would bear witness that she
has been saved by her sailors in the bloody hailstorm of countless men's
death. But, nonetheless, quench boasting with silence. Zeus gives both
good and bad, Zeus who is master of all. But in the lovely honey [of song]
even such honors [in war] yearn for the joy of victory in games. (46–54)

Pindar implies in this passage that the whole of his poetic art is to discern and to speak what is appropriate. This seems to be expressed by the metaphor of arrows, which conveys at once the ideas of distance and accuracy, of the powers of his imagination and of the appropriateness of his praise.⁷⁰ He is ready (*ἀρτεπῆγ*) to tell many myths in praise of the Aeacidae, but has chosen to list only some of Achilles' triumphs in war. He goes on to indicate the reason for his choice. In the past Achilles brought glory to Aegina by his victories, and now in the present day Aeginetans have won a great victory at Salamis. He has mentioned only those myths of the past which have significance for the present; that is, he has used with special accuracy the transcendent powers of his poetic imagination.

To speak *kairia* is thus to use the imagination with an exact precision, a perception of what is significant, and a certain moral sense. For he continues: "But, nonetheless, quench boasting with silence" (51). High praise of human accomplishment is foolish, since man's fortune is uncertain (*Ζεὺς τὰ τε καὶ τὰ νεμει*, 52; cf. *τί κομπέω παρὰ καιρόν*, *P* 10.3). Therefore he does not allow himself to continue the comparison between Aegina's present *arete* and Achilles'. But the metaphorical language of this statement indicates that Pindar is concerned with artistic as well as moral *kairos*.⁷¹ In *I* 5, as in *N* 5.14ff., he will stop before he speaks *para kairon*. To say more about war in a victory ode would be as inappropriate as going on to describe Phocus' murder. But to mention Aegina's recent victory in war enhances the joy of her present victory in games: "in the honey of song these honors [in war] also yearn for the joy of victory in games" (54).⁷² Each victory, as it were, is a symbol of the other. To speak *kairia* is to show the relation of Achilles' victories in the Trojan war to Aegina's victory at Salamis and to Phylakides' victory in the Isthmian games, without departing from the traditional limits of his subject matter, without incurring the envy of the gods, and without offending his listeners. Therefore *kairos* is in itself the entire purpose of his art.⁷³

He moves from this general praise of Aeginetan *arete* to speak specifically of the victor's family. His language, when he speaks of his official duties, is simple and explicit: "I praise Pytheas also" (*αἰνέω*, 59; cf. *N* 5.19 *ἐπαινήσαι*, and *P* 10. 64). But in the concluding lines he alludes once more to the powers of his poetic imagination, again addressing himself, as at the end of *N* 5:

Take for him [the victor] a crown, bring him a fleecy headband, and
send him together with these a new winged hymn. (62–63)

A song, like a garland and a white fillet, is an emblem of victory and of universal recognition (cf. *N* 5 end). *πτερόεντα* ("winged") recalls the Homeric *ἔπεια πτερόεντα* ("winged words"), but in this instance it has symbolic meaning as well: song is winged, like an arrow (47) or a bird (*N* 5.21). Only through song and its ability to join together events separated by space and time can the poet bring lasting significance to the victory celebration.

Looking back over *I* 5, we may conclude that the first personal statements in this ode deal with essentially the same subjects as those of *N* 5 and *P* 10, but in *I* 5 Pindar places more conscious emphasis on himself, and on his purpose as a poet. This is indicated by the fact that every transition in *I* 5 contains a symbolic statement about Pindar's ultimate artistic aims, so that the ode is as much concerned with the poet himself as it is with the celebration of a victory. In *I* 5 he attempts to define and express the very nature of his poetic ability, through an imagery more varied than in any of his earlier poems. He uses metaphors drawn from diverse sources, each of which expresses a different aspect of his art. The metaphors of water-wine and honey stress the ability of his song to bring joy to the victory celebration; the metaphors of wreath and fillet his ability to bring fame; the metaphors of wings and the chariot of the Muses express the transcendent powers of his poetic imagination. His artistic aims are further defined by the metaphors of arrows and water. His words must travel distance with accuracy; the rain of his silence will fall upon the fires caused by excessive praise and by reference to a subject traditionally inappropriate to a victory celebration. His *kairos* is thus to use his poetic imagination within the limits imposed by morality and the traditional restrictions of epinician subject matter. None of these ideas is in itself new. In his earlier poems, *P* 10, *N* 5, and *I* 6, Pindar spoke of *kairos* and his imagination in the same or very similar metaphors. But *I* 5 is unique in that Pindar uses all the imagery of previous odes to express every, rather than one particular, aspect of his art (in contrast to *N* 5 and *I* 6).

In his first period Pindar's transitional statements (like those in *P* 10 and *N* 5) deal with his role as an epinician poet, either in terms of his traditional official duties or in terms of powers of his art which are so extraordinary that they cannot be described in traditional language. Statements about the poet's official obligations to the victor seem to be part of a traditional epinician *Programm* (as in Bacchylides' *Ode* 13). But symbolic *kairos* statements like those in *P* 10 and *N* 5 occur only in Pindar. This unique emphasis on his poetic ability, on his ultimate artistic aims, imparts to his odes a peculiarly subjective tone, clearly

seen in *I* 5. Because the poet speaks in his own person rather than in the chorus', because he speaks about himself rather than about his community, Pindar's early *epinikia* bear more resemblance to monodic elegy than to the communal choral song previously considered. The similarity of *epinikion* to elegy becomes even more pronounced in Pindar's second and third periods, when his transitional statements become even more subjective.

IV. PINDAR'S PERSONAL "I"

But what of Pindar's more personal statements, such as the very subjective passage *N* 8. 32ff., discussed in the Introduction? At first glance, a statement like this would seem to be unrelated to Pindar's more impersonal epinician "I" statements, since it seems to differ from these markedly in both style and content, being at once more topical and more explicit than even the most personal statements of *N* 5 and *I* 5. Concerned as the *N* 8 passage is with Pindar's own moral conduct, it does not seem to deal directly with the traditional subject matter of an epinician ode, the poet's official duties or his ultimate artistic aims. What then is the function of such a statement in an ode composed primarily for a public occasion? Is it a digression or a structural part of the ode? In considering this question Schadewaldt has shown that the more subjective statements fit into the structure of an epinician ode because they are, like other first personal statements, primarily transitional. He suggests therefore that they are developed from what we have called epinician "I" statements.⁷⁴ It is possible, however, to go still further, to show that these intensely subjective statements ultimately deal with traditional epinician subjects, such as the poet's *xenia* for the victor, or his poetic ability; and that therefore they retain the same stylistic character as the transitional statements of *P* 10, *N* 5, *I* 5, and *N* 9.

It may be shown that the subjective passage *N* 8.35ff. is ultimately concerned with Pindar's *xenia* for Aegina, but the relation of this passage to a traditional epinician *xenia*-statement seems remote, since *N* 8 and the odes considered in section III are well separated in time, and thus in artistic development. However, in an ode like *I* 8, which was written only a few months after *I* 5, Pindar's personal statements, in spite of their subjective and topical nature, seem to deal directly with Pindar's *xenia* for the victor and his relation to the community — in short, with the traditional subject matter of the epinician ode. The interpretation of this passage is sufficiently difficult to require detailed ex-

amination, in order to determine both what Pindar is saying and in what way his seemingly personal and political sentiments pertain to his official role as an epinician poet.

In contrast to *I* 5, written short months before, *I* 8 opens not with a highly symbolic statement about the glory of man's achievements, but with a long, explicit subjective statement:

For Kleandros and his friends, young men, go and awake the victory celebration beside the shining porch of his father Telesarchus, as a glorious recompense for his toil, and as reward for his Isthmian victory, and because he discovered his might at Nemea. For this purpose I too, although grieved at heart, am asked to call upon the golden Muse. But since we have been released from great sorrows, let us not find ourselves without victory garlands, and do not brood upon private sorrows, but, having turned ourselves from evils we can do nothing about, let us bring before the people of Aegina some sweetness even after suffering; because some god has turned aside for us the stone of Tantalus over our heads, a burden unendurable for Greece. However, for me on the one hand the passing of the fear has put an end to my heavy concern, but on the other it is always better to look at the thing at hand, for a crooked life-span hangs over men, twisting the path of life. But even these things may be healed for men with freedom. It is necessary for a man to have good hope. It is necessary for one born in seven-gated Thebes to present the flower of the Graces in Aegina, because they were the twin daughters of Asopus, the youngest, and were pleasing to King Zeus. (1-20)

He speaks first about his role in the victory eelebration. In *P* 10, *I* 6, and *I* 5 he took this role for granted, calling himself without hesitation "dispenser of victory celebrations," banquet master of *krateres* of song, and the like. Previously he had considered himself a ready participant in the celebration, but in the opening lines of *I* 8 he places himself apart from the celebrating Aeginetans. He commands the youths to begin the *komos* in honor of the victor and his friends, even though we should expect him to address this command to himself (as in *N* 9.1).⁷⁵ He then goes on to speak of himself, stressing his separation from the others with his initial words *τῶ καὶ ἐγώ*, "wherefore I too, although grieving at heart, am asked to call upon the Golden Muse." The passive *αιτέομαι*, "am asked," emphasizes his hesitation to join the celebration (cf. *P* 10, *ἄγων ἀγοντα*), and the simple, straight-forward terminology indicates that he is not concerned with his poetic ability, but with his official duties.⁷⁶ He hesitates because as a Theban he laments (*ἀχνύμενος θυμόν*) his city's defeat at Plataea, whereas the Aeginetans are rejoicing in a double victory: their triumph at Plataea, and Kleandros' success in

games. The easy *xenia* of his earlier odes (e.g. *P* 10, *φιλέων φιλέοντα*) is now no longer possible. Aegina and Thebes have been fighting on opposite sides. Before he can join the celebration he must re-establish the old *xenia* which he took for granted in *N* 5 and *I* 5, by finding new ties and reasserting the old between himself and the *komos*.

He first demonstrates his friendship for the Aeginetans by exhorting himself to forget his personal sorrows. He is “grieving at heart,” “but” ($\delta\acute{e}$ here has its usual mild adversative force) “since we have been freed from great sorrows, let us neither find ourselves without victory crowns nor nourish private cares.” Both the form and content of these lines indicate that they are addressed to the poet himself rather than to himself and the Aeginetans together, as the first person plurals *πέσωμεν* and *δαμωσόμεθα* might at first seem to indicate. *πέσωμεν*, although plural, is in a clause coordinate (*μήτε . . . μήτε*) with a singular imperative, *θεράπευε*, which here, as in *N* 5 and *I* 5, must be self-address. A second indication that Pindar is speaking of himself may be found in the symbolic *όρφανίᾳ στεφάνων*. *στέφανοι* are most naturally taken as the symbolic crowns of poetry (as in *N* 5.54, *I* 5.62) rather than actual victory crowns, which the Aeginetans on this occasion surely did not lack.⁷⁷ The line is thus appropriate only to the poet, whose duty it is to bring emblems of fame to the victor. And since these lines are addressed to Pindar, then *μεγάλα πένθεα* must be, contrary to the interpretation of the scholiasts, Pindar’s sorrows for Thebes and Aegina’s enmity, which is now terminated by the end of the war.⁷⁸ The *κάδεα* which he advises himself not to cherish must be the “cares of his heart” caused by Thebes’ defeat, because of which he describes himself as *ἀχνύμενος θυμόν* (5).⁷⁹ The cessation of hostilities has made it possible for him to sing the praises of an Aeginetan victor, to put aside his *private* cares in order to join in a *communal* celebration.

He goes on to speak of his duties as a communal poet, commissioned to compose and lead a victory ode for a public victory celebration:

but since we have left off evils we can do nothing about, let us perform before the people something sweet, even after struggle. (8-9)

There is no transition to indicate that Pindar is not speaking to himself. *ἄπρακτα κακά* are thus the evils which caused his *πένθεα* and *κάδεα*, but he will stop speaking of these ($\delta\acute{e}$ again has adversative force) and turn his attention to his official duty as an epinician poet “to perform before the people something sweet” (*γλυκύ τι δαμωσόμεθα καὶ μετὰ πόνον*). It is significant that here his emphasis is on the performance and reception, not the composition, of his song. That *δαμοῦσθαι* has to do with the actual

performance of a choral ode seems to be indicated in Aristophanes' *Peace* 797, where the poet speaks of this *parabaseis* as δαμώματα, and in later Attic Greek inscriptions, where the verb means "publicize."⁸⁰ Pindar's choral ode must be "sweet even after struggle," that is, it must bring χάρις to his audience in spite of the fact that it must be performed so soon after a war between his state and theirs.⁸¹ It is significant that he does not speak here, as he did in his earlier odes, of his ability as a poet, but emphasizes the communal rather than the personal side of his art. He frequently calls attention to the chorus, addressing them in the opening lines and again at the end of the poem (*γεραιρέτε νιν*, 69; ὀλίκων τις . . . πλεκέτω, 72–74) in place of a first personal transition. His commands "wake the celebration," "someone weave him a bright garland" (1–3, 72), are direct, as if the chorus were not only present but in this instance somewhat more than a mere instrument.

Having stressed the fact that, because the war is over, political barriers between Aegina and Thebes no longer exist for him, he goes on to speak of a new bond between the two states, between himself and his audience: freedom from a common evil. He has been able to put aside his sorrows and join in the Aeginetan celebration, "because some god has turned aside the stone of Tantalus from above our heads, a burden unendurable for Greece." The end of the war, of the Persian danger, has freed not only Pindar from his sorrows, but also Aegina, and all of Greece. The mention of the commune serves as a transition from the personal "I" of the preceding lines to the general first person plural here, which seems, like the βροτὸν ἔθνος ἀπτόμεσθα of *P* 10.28, to include all the audience. The Persians endangered both their Greek enemies and their Greek allies; war causes suffering to both sides, and, significantly, it is πένθεα and καδεα, that is, his emotions, not his politics, which Pindar mentions in the preceding lines.⁸² The war, which separated politically the joyful Aeginetans and the grieving Pindar, is, in terms of suffering, a bond between them.

After speaking for the whole assembled company, if not for all of Greece, Pindar returns to his personal feelings: ἀλλά, as always, indicates a transition in thought.

But for me the passing of the fear has put an end to my heavy concern.
(12–14)

In these lines he reaffirms what he has said before. The end of the war has put an end to his "heavy concern" for Greece and past events. This

is cause for rejoicing, but in contrast to this ($\muέν . . . δέ$) he warns of the future: man's life is uncertain (cf. *P* 10.25ff.):

but it is always better to look at the thing at hand; for a crooked life-span hangs over man, twisting the path of life. (14-15)

The imagery of $\deltaόλιος αἰών . . . ἐλίσσων$ consciously recalls the stone of Tantalus above, which twisted the course of Greece's history.⁸³ He goes on to express a sentiment which would appeal to Aeginetans and Thebans both:

but even these things [the twistings of life] may be healed for men with freedom. (16-17)

The Aeginetans won freedom for themselves at Plataea, and he implies that these lines are also a prayer that Thebes be allowed to retain her former independence, by adding:

it is necessary for a man to have good hope; it is necessary for one raised in Thebes to offer the flower of the Graces in Aegina. (17-18)

The parallel $\chiρή δέ . . . \chiρή δέ$ seems to indicate that the subject of the first clause is the same as that of the second, that is, $\alphaνδρί$ = Pindar = Theban, who must keep hoping that Thebes will be allowed to retain her former independence.⁸⁴ The desire for freedom is common to all mankind, to Aeginetans and to Thebans. This is another bond between *komos* and poet.

In the next lines he recalls the oldest bond of *xenia* between the two states:

It is necessary for one born in Thebes to present the flower of the Graces in Aegina, because they [Thebe and Aegina] were the twin daughters of [one] father Asopus, the youngest, and they were pleasing to King Zeus. (17-20)

Thebes and Aegina are bound together by ancient racial ties, which have endured and will endure longer than any political alliance or division. It is significant that here he mentions Thebe and Aegina by name, and explicitly states that they were twin sisters. In *I* 6 and *I* 5 he evidently considered it unnecessary to relate a myth of which his audience was well aware, but takes the close racial ties of Aegina to Thebes for granted: "it is a law for me to shower the Aeacidae with praise" (*I* 6.19-21), "my heart tastes hymns of the Aeacidae" (*I* 5.20).⁸⁵ However in *I* 8, at a time when Aegina and Thebes have been political enemies, he emphasizes the ancient ties and relates the myth in some detail.⁸⁶ More-

over, he specifically refers to himself as "one born in Thebes," whereas in his earlier odes his allusions to his citizenship were indirect, as "I give them to drink the water of Dirce" (*I* 6.74). His primary concern in these lines, as above, is to show his *xenia* as a Theban towards the Aeginetan *komos*. It should be noted that here again when he speaks of his poetry, his emphasis, as in $\gamma\lambda\nu\kappa\upsilon\tau\iota\delta\alpha\mu\omega\sigma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\theta\alpha$ (9) above, is on the *presentation*, the "offering forth" (*προνέμειν*) of his song to the Aeginetan audience, not on his personal poetic ability.⁸⁷

Therefore in *I* 8 every personal statement, no matter how topical or specific it may seem, has to do with Pindar's willingness to perform his official duties. He expresses more concern than ever before with the actual public presentation of his song ($\delta\alpha\mu\omega\sigma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\theta\alpha$, 9; *προνέμειν*, 18); he is at pains to re-establish the *xenia* which existed between Aegina and Thebes before the war, by reaffirming their old racial ties, and by recalling the ideals and suffering shared by all the Greeks, Theban and Aeginetan alike. In other words, the long personal proem of *I* 8 is in form and purpose a necessary development of *P* 10's $\phi\lambda\acute{e}\omega\eta\phi\lambda\acute{e}\omega\eta\tau\alpha$, and what we defined in the Introduction as the *personal* "I" is a direct derivation of the *epinician* "I."

But for our purposes it is particularly important to observe how the choral victory-*prosodion* *I* 8 is a personal apology as well as a communal victory ode: that is to say, subjective as well as objective in purpose. As such *I* 8 bears more resemblance to the elegies of Solon than it does to the communal maiden-songs of Alcman, but it differs from elegy in that personal allusions are restricted to the traditional subject matter of the *epinician* first personal statement.

Almost all of Pindar's postwar odes show this basic trend toward the personal. As the traditional transitional statement becomes more subjective, so the ode itself becomes less expressive of communal feeling, and more the poet's personal vehicle; that is, the separation between poet and *komos* which we observed in *I* 8 becomes more apparent. An ode like *N* 4 is much more a personal apology than a communal celebration. One senses in *N* 4 very little communal participation on the poet's part; his concern is not with confirming his friendship for the Aeginetans, but with defending his ability as a poet. In reaffirming friendship, he necessarily speaks of his ties with the commune (as in *I* 8); his aims are primarily objective. But in defending his poetic ability, he speaks of what is his alone. This is not to say that his personal remarks in *N* 4 are more of a digression than those in *I* 8. They deal with his ability to speak *kairia*, and both in style and function resemble the more impersonal *kairos* statements of his earlier odes.

The deeply personal statements of *N* 4 do not, as in *I* 8, follow the poet's opening words of praise to the victor, but seem to grow out of a *kairos* statement following the "first praise." In the lines immediately preceding this *kairos* statement, Pindar speaks of the old friendship of Telamon and Heracles, thus recalling indirectly an old mythic bond between Aegina and Thebes. It is now no longer necessary to defend these old ties in a more explicit manner. Heracles and Telamon were victorious over the giant Alcyoneus, but only after suffering great losses; in great undertakings one must expect setbacks (1-32). Since he has told as much of the myth as is necessary to prove this point and to confirm his *xenia* with Aegina, he changes his theme, and in so doing seems to embark upon a personal apology.

But a law holds me back from speaking out too long and the approaching hours, and I am drawn in my heart by a spell to touch on the new moon festival. (33-35) Although the deep sea holds you by the waist, stand firm against plots. We will seem to enter the lists in the light of day far stronger than our enemies. Another man, looking on enviously, revolves in the dark his empty thought, which has fallen to the ground. But for me, whatever excellence Lord Destiny has given me, I know well that coming time will bring it to its fated completion. (36-43)

This passage is sufficiently obscure to warrant careful examination, which will show that the subject of the entire statement is Pindar's poetic ability, and in particular, his ability to speak *kairia*.

The first three lines are clearly a *kairos* statement, resembling in function and in imagery the *kairos* statements of *P* 10 and *N* 5. All these statements convey the idea of stopping (*έρυκει*, *N* 4.33; *κώπαν σχάσον*, *P* 10.51; *στάσομαι*, *N* 5.16; *ρίγει*, *N* 5.5ob) before going wrong, be it in legal terms, as in this instance, or in terms of distance on land (*N* 5.16) or on sea (*P* 10.51, *N* 5.51). But in *N* 4.33 Pindar is concerned with more than the inner structure of his ode; time outside, the "approaching hours," also prevent his continuing with this myth; that is, he has a deadline to meet.⁸⁸ The explanation of the scholiasts, based on Aristarchus, that this ode was to be performed at a new moon festival in Aegina is surely correct, especially since the symbolic language "I am drawn in my heart by a love-charm" indicates that he is talking about poetry.

The following lines are more obscure, but he still seems to be concerned with his ability to speak *kairia*. According to the scholiast, Pindar says in effect in 36-40, "I shall not digress, but tell my myths for a purpose, and therefore I shall triumph over other poets, who do di-

gress," that is, who tell myths primarily for the sake of telling a good story. This interpretation has been disregarded by recent scholars, in spite of the fact that it seems to be well supported by the text. The emphatic conjunction *έμπα* indicates that Pindar is talking about the same subject as in the lines immediately preceding, namely, *kairos*. His use of symbolic language throughout this passage indicates that he is still speaking about poetry; indeed, the wrestling imagery, "has you about the waist," "enter the lists," and so forth, is reminiscent of the broad-jump image of his *kairos* statement in *N* 5.

According to this view, the "enemies" of whom Pindar speaks in a terminology more of war than of games (*δάιοι, ἐπιβούλίαι*), are critics of his poetry. He is not able to defend himself in person, since one of his adversaries is the deep sea, which keeps him from Aegina: *ἐπιβούλίαι*, "plots," "treachery," seem to suggest that this criticism takes place behind his back, if not in his absence.⁸⁹ Over these critics Pindar will triumph; he emphasizes his symbolic victory in imagery of light and dark (*ἐν φάει, σκότῳ*) and high and low (*ὑπέρτεροι, χαμαὶ πετοῦσαν*), which always have in his poetry associations of good and evil, success and failure.⁹⁰ His victory is contrasted to the defeat of one particular adversary, the *ἄλλος ἀνήρ*, who surely is a rival poet, since the phrase "rolling over empty thought" (*γνώμαν κενεὰν κυλίνδει*) would seem to suit unsuccessful poetic activity, especially if compared to the description of Pindar's own creative powers in the proem of this ode, *ὅτι κε σὸν Χαρίτων τύχα | γλῶσσα φρενὸς ἔξελοι βαθείας*, "what the tongue with the aid of the Graces draws from the deep heart" (7-8). This implies a divine inspiration, a depth and sincerity that contrast sharply with his rival's "empty thought." The difficult "fallen to earth" (*χαμαὶ πετοῦσαν*) — otherwise unexplained — would well support the interpretation that in this passage Pindar is defending his use of myth, if it is taken as an image of wrestling, like *ἔχει μέσσον* (36). The "other man," Pindar's rival, rolls his defeated, fallen opponent over and over; that is, he dwells too long on an already spent subject.⁹¹

The scholiast suggests that the other poet is Simonides, who "dresses," that is, does not use myth as symbol and example. It has been observed that this criticism could also apply to Bacchylides, whose myths do not have symbolic purpose, and only in some cases seem to be used as examples of pertinent *gnomai*.⁹² Pindar speaks contemptuously of both poets in *O* 2: they are "two jackdaws," but he is an "eagle, bird of Zeus" (*O* 2.87). In *P* 2.72ff. he seems to call Bacchylides an "ape." But in both these cases his imagery accuses them of *imitating* his works, but does not criticize them for their use of myth.⁹³ Pindar's adversary

in *N* 4 might also be a third man, unknown to us, perhaps a local Aeginetan poet, since Pindar is aware at the end of this ode and in *O* 8.54-55 that his praise of the Athenian trainer Melesias will incur displeasure among the Aeginetans.⁹⁴ Whoever is intended, for our purposes it is particularly important to note that even when speaking of contemporary poetic rivals, here and in *O* 2.87ff. and *P* 2.72ff., he calls no one specifically by name, but uses the symbolic language which he employs for all statements of his poetic ability.⁹⁵

The last lines of this personal passage express an inward confidence in his destiny:

whatever *arete* Lord Fate has given me, I know well that coming time will bring it to its destined fulfillment. (41-43)

He needs, and seeks, no outside approval, but knows within himself that what he achieves through his poetic *arete* will be permanent and meaningful. This is in sharp contrast to the ability of his adversary, who has no wrestling-*arete* in song, who is not inspired by the gods, but who must depend upon the approval of his public, namely Pindar's other critics, the δάϊοι who "plot" against him. It is perhaps significant that Pindar stresses *kairos* again at the end of the myth which the present personal passage introduces:

Into the dark west of Gadiz one may not pass. Turn back again the gear of your ship toward Europe. There are no means for me to go through the whole story of the children of Aeacus. (70-72)

He speaks no longer defensively, but in the distance terminology so characteristic of his earlier odes. At the end of the myth his subject is the same as that at its beginning: that is, artistic *kairos*.⁹⁶ In criticizing his use of myth his detractors questioned the very essence of his art.

Two conclusions may be drawn from this study of *N* 4. (1) Pindar's defense of his use of myth in 33-41 is essentially a personal version of his earlier, more traditional *kairos* statements, which it resembles in content, form, and symbolic style, even to the point of retaining the imagery characteristic of these earlier statements, such as *N* 5.16. Therefore his counterattacks against his critics are no more unsuited to the subject matter of an epinician ode than are his statements about the Persian War in *I* 8. (2) The intensely subjective nature of his self-defense turns this ode into what might almost be called a personal apology in epinician form. The *komos* and communal celebration are not mentioned. He speaks in each transition of his ability as a poet, referring only once to his official position ("I come as a ready messenger of strong

games," 74), and in this instance again his emphasis is on praising the victor, that is, on his personal rather than his communal obligations to the victor.

By using transitional statements as a means of personal expression, by speaking only of his poetic ability or of his more personal official duties, Pindar gives *N* 4 an inward and subjective tone. Yet in spite of this there is every indication that this ode was intended to be performed in public, at a victory celebration — indeed, if it were not so intended his self-justification would be unnecessary. Nevertheless, it is possible to see from the tone of *N* 4 how the epinician form could be used as a poetical letter — that is, as an ode composed as a personal message to a former victor, never intended for a public choral performance. An excellent example of such a letter is *P* 3. There is no victory mentioned in this ode; it seems rather to be intended as consolation to Hieron for the grave illness which he suffered in his last years.

But *P* 3 is of interest to us not only as an example of how a communal poetical form may be developed into a purely personal means of expression. We may inquire why in this instance he retained the epinician form, when more traditional forms of personal expression like the elegy were available to him. In the course of this letter of consolation Pindar gives specific information about himself that at first sight would seem to have little relation to the traditional subjects of an epinician ode: he tells us he lives next door to a shrine of the Great Mother, and seems to use a first personal statement to give Hieron advice. However, a careful examination of the ode as a whole will show that Pindar's personal statements in *P* 3, like those of *N* 4 and *I* 8, are ultimately related to traditional epinician subjects, his *xenia* for Hieron and the expression of his higher artistic aims.

In the opening lines of *P* 3 Pindar both expresses his friendship for Hieron and identifies himself as a poet:

I would wish that Chiron now dead were living, if it were proper to
utter from my tongue this prayer common to all mankind. (1-3)

Although it is suitable ($\chiρεών$) for most people to wish for a miraculous cure for Hieron, that is, to be concerned primarily for his physical well-being, Pindar cannot offer such a prayer. He sets himself apart from other men, because he is a poet, as he implies in the emphatic "from my tongue" ($\alphaμετέρας \alphaπὸ γλώσσας$).⁹⁷ He cannot ask the impossible, but must offer another kind of consolation.

He goes on to develop this general theme in myth. Coronis was loved by Apollo, but lusted after a mortal; her son Asclepius was bribed to

bring a dead man back to life. Both sought to do what they should not have done, and both were punished for their transgressions. Pindar concludes:

It is necessary for us to seek from the gods what is fitting for our mortal thoughts, knowing what is at hand, and of what destiny we are. (59–60)

He thus applies the *gnome* “do not seek the unattainable” to all mankind, recalling his own presence by using the first person, as he did in *P* 10.28:

of whatever glory we mortals attain, he [the victor] has sailed to the farthest port.

In *P* 10 he applies this general *gnome* about the limitations of mortality specifically to the victor’s fortunes, but in *P* 3, although the advice “do not seek the unattainable” could well apply to Hieron, he addresses it to himself:

Do not, dear soul, rush after immortal life, but drain your possible ability. If Chiron still lived, and my songs would cast some spell on his heart, I should have persuaded him to provide even now [in our day] for good men a healer from fiery diseases, an Asclepius or even an Apollo. And I should have come, cutting across the Ionian sea, to Syracuse and King Hieron [whom he praises as a generous ruler and a kind host]. If I had come bringing golden health and a *komos*, a glory for the garlands of Pythian games, which Pherenikos won at Kirrha then, I say that I should have come to Hieron a light brighter than the star of heaven, having crossed the deep sea. (63–77) But I will pray to the Great Mother, the holy goddess whom, along with Pan, maidens often celebrate beside my door in nightly ritual. And if, Hieron, you know how to comprehend the straight meaning of words, you know that you understand from men of the past that the gods give two sorrows along with every good. Foolish men cannot bear this becomingly, but the good do, by turning the good outside.

(78–85)

The first lines of this long, complex personal statement are clearly addressed to himself, since there is no break between these lines and the preceding first personal statement *οἴας εἰμὲν αἰσθάς*, and because he goes on to speak of Hieron in the third person in the lines following. This interpretation is further supported by his use of symbolic language, *ἀντλέω*, “drain,” which indicates that *μαχανά* must refer to Pindar’s poetic ability, as in *P* 8.34, *N* 7.22.⁹⁸ Thus Pindar concludes the myth by restating what he implied in the opening lines; that he must not, as a

poet, seek the unattainable (as did Asclepius when he tried to restore the dead to life), but concern himself with his profession. Since he cannot bring Hieron immortality, he must do what he can through poetry.

In the next lines (63–77) Pindar explicitly applies for the first time his general theme “do not strive for the unattainable” to his relationship with Hieron. In lines 63–67 he recalls the opening lines of the ode, but in this instance he states explicitly what he implied in ἀμετέρας ἀπὸ γλώσσας (2), that his *songs* cannot persuade Chiron to send good men an Asclepius. He goes on to give this general statement specific application: he himself would have come to his *xenos* Hieron by now, in spite of the great distance which separates Thebes from Sicily, were it possible for him as a poet to bring Hieron a physical cure. The use of the aorists *πιθον*, *ἔμολον*, in the apodosis of this conditional sentence emphasizes the fact that Pindar is speaking not of general improbability, as in the opening lines (“I should wish, if it were right”), but of specific impossibility, with relation to real events in past time.⁹⁹ He would have come, had it done any good; the fact is, that he did *not* come.

In the following lines (*ἀλλά*) he becomes more specific about his relation to Hieron in the past. If he had brought Hieron health and a victory celebration when Hieron won Pythian victories in 482 and 478, then he would have come as a “light.” In this image both ideas are combined. Light in Homer is a symbol of rescue; in Pindar it is also a symbol of fame, because a light “farther-shining than the brightest star” can be seen by men throughout the world.¹⁰⁰ Here again the aorists *κατέβαν* and *ἐξικόμαν* bring out the fact that the opportunity for Pindar to have celebrated these victories is past. He was not commissioned to celebrate them, nor was he able to bring Hieron health in his younger days, to prevent his suffering in later life.¹⁰¹ But he stresses his friendship for Hieron, as he did in line 68, by stating that he would have come, had he been commissioned, had he been able to help. By means of conditional sentences he is able to express that as poet and *xenos* he is willing to help his sick friend, but, at the same time, is and was unable to do so.

He then changes the direction of his thought, as the conjunction *ἀλλά* indicates, turning from the impossible to the possible. Although he was not able to bring Hieron health or to celebrate past victories, he is nevertheless able to express his concern and *xenia* in other ways. It is possible for him “on the one hand” (*μέν*) to pray to the Great Mother, not for a miraculous cure or immortal life, but in her capacity as a goddess of death. Her shrine is by his house; he does not need to cross the sea to

ask her aid.¹⁰² He can also ($\delta\epsilon$) give Hieron advice. Hieron should understand that the gods give mixed blessings, and that a good man knows how to endure evil. He illustrates this point with the myths of Kadmos and Peleus. The Muses sang at the former's wedding, the latter married a goddess; both had direct contact with the gods, but still suffered unhappiness afterward.

He concludes with general *gnomai*:

mortals must accept what the gods give them. Man's fortune changes. The *olbos* of men does not remain sound for long, when it comes greatly swollen. (104–107)

His use of medical imagery ($\sigma\omega\varsigma$, $\epsilon\piι\beta\rho\iota\sigma\omega\varsigma$) here suggests that these *gnomai* are intended for Hieron, who, with the exception of his sickness, has had a happy and successful life; who is a king and has won at games.¹⁰³ But, instead of addressing Hieron specifically, he seems to give this advice to himself, by continuing in the first person, just as at the end of the first myth (59–60) he went on to address himself, rather than the king.

I shall be small in small circumstances, great in great. I shall pay honor to the *daimon* [destiny] which is watching over my mind, cherishing it according to my ability. If god would give me luxuriant wealth, I should have hope to find fame which would be high in the future. Nestor and Sarpedon, the talk of men, we know from the sounding words which skilled carpenters [of song] join together. Their *arete* blooms late in famous song. It is easy for few to accomplish this. (107–115)

The first lines seem to be a particularization of the general doctrine he derived from the myths of Kadmos and Peleus. Pindar too will accept what the gods give, by “paying honor” to his destiny. But by “*daimon* that always watches over me in my mind,” Pindar seems to mean in particular his destiny as a poet, since “ability” ($\mu\eta\chi\alpha\nu\eta\varsigma$) in line 63 means specifically poetic ability, and the *daimon* watches over his “mind” ($\phi\rho\acute{e}\nu\varsigma$).¹⁰⁴ But whereas in 61–63 he placed emphasis on his poetic capabilities, in this instance he concentrates on his attitude toward his destiny. We may compare to this statement *N* 4.41–43, where he seems similarly at one with his fate when he says, after proclaiming his superiority over his poetic rival:

but as for me, whatever *arete* Lord Destiny has given me, I know well that coming time will bring it to its appointed conclusion.

Some comparison here between Pindar's attitude and Hieron's is surely

intended. The poet accepts and understands his limitations; Hieron, as may be inferred from this ode, *P* 1, and *P* 2, does not.

He continues the indirect comparison between himself and Hieron in the following lines, changing the point of comparison slightly (as δέ would indicate) from their attitudes toward destiny to that destiny itself. Pindar adds: "but if a god would give me great wealth, I would have fame which would be high in the future." But this possibility is remote, and the effect of the conditional ὄρέξαι and ἐλπίδ' ἔχω κεν after the future indicatives ἔσσομαι and ἀσκήσω ("I will be small"; "I will pay honor") is striking. But we may infer that Hieron, since he has πλοῦτος, can have the "high fame" of which Pindar speaks.¹⁰⁵ He goes on to define "high" fame as the lasting and universal fame the heroes of epic enjoy. Nestor's and Sarpedon's fame has endured because epic poets sang of them — the general "I" γινώσκομεν recalls the poet's presence. Their *arete* has survived for generations, like a flower that blooms late, beyond its season. He implies in the final line of the ode that he has given the fame in song to Hieron which the epic bards gave to Nestor and Sarpedon. Composing the song is a highly skilled art, as he implies by the imagery of "which the wise carpenters joined together." Therefore only a few can accomplish it, and he is one of the few. Thus in this final indirect reference to himself he recalls his earlier first personal statements: he could wish for a miraculous cure (1-3, 63-67); he could try to wish for the impossible, to bring immortality to Hieron (61-62); he could attempt to alter the course of past events (68-76). But instead, as Hieron's *xenos*, he will pray for him and advise him to accept his fate (77-83). And since he is a poet, he can use his poetic abilities to bring Hieron enduring fame in song. This is his greatest consolation to Hieron.

We may conclude, therefore, that all the first personal statements in *P* 3, no matter how subjective they may seem in their specific detail, are in general purpose concerned with traditional epinician subjects, the poet's *xenia* and his professional ability. But because this ode was clearly intended as a private message to Hieron and not for public performance, Pindar speaks only of those aspects of his art which concern Hieron alone; that is, he speaks not of his communal role, but of his *xenia* for an ex-patron and former victor, and of his ability to bring his *xenos* Hieron lasting fame.

For this reason *P* 3 has the intimate tone of elegy rather than the consciously public tone of the epinician. Even in deeply subjective odes like *I* 8 and *N* 4 one is aware that Pindar is addressing himself to a commune, but in *P* 3 Pindar's first personal statements, his myths, and his *gnomai* are all directly concerned with Hieron. We may compare to

P 3 Theognis' elegiac poems, where every personal observation or reminiscence, every general statement, is directed either as admonition or advice to the poet's young friend Cyrnus. In *P* 3, although Pindar addresses to himself the *gnomai* drawn from the myths, his personal statements seem intended almost as advice to Hieron. Pindar understands his mortal limitations and is willing to accept what the gods give. But Hieron, he implies, does not. Hieron would seem to wish to hear the sort of consolation Pindar will not give him, as the almost apologetic tone of Pindar's unreal conditions would seem to indicate.¹⁰⁸ In this context it would be difficult indeed not to regard statements like "do not seek after immortal life" (61–62) and "I shall be small in small circumstances" (107) as at least indirect examples of conduct.¹⁰⁷

But these two statements, since they are directly concerned with Pindar's *μηχανή*, his poetic ability, seem intended as self-justification and encouragement as much as paradigms of proper behavior. In *P* 10 and in his earlier poems Pindar took it for granted that his audience understood what he said, that they were united by a common purpose and common tradition. But in *P* 3 he assumes no such relationship with Hieron. He repeats his central theme over and over, as if he were teaching Hieron a lesson. But now Pindar is alone with his destiny as a poet and alone with his Muse. His close relation to his *daimon* ("cherishing the *daimon* which *watches over* me in my heart") takes the place, it would seem, of the close friendship between victor and poet (*φιλέων φιλέοντα*, *P* 10) of which he was assured in his earlier odes.

Thus in Pindar's hands the epinician ode has been changed into a mode of personal expression. Pindar brings about this transformation by speaking subjectively about himself where the traditional epinician *Programm* permits him to speak in the first person, that is, in his transitional statements. But even his most personal references to himself, to his own politics, to his personal critics, to his attitude toward the gods, and to the landmarks of his own neighborhood do not change *I* 8, *N* 4, and *P* 3 into "lyric" odes. All Pindar's personal statements deal ultimately with his official role as poet.¹⁰⁸ They are essentially elaborations of the traditional motives of earlier odes like *P* 10, *N* 5, and *I* 5; they are concerned with *xenia* and the poet's ability to speak *kata kairon*. Pindar often expresses his most subjective sentiments in terms of his earlier metaphors. The only difference is that in his later odes like *I* 8, *N* 4, *P* 3, and *N* 8 Pindar chooses to emphasize the personal rather than the communal aspects of his art. But for our knowledge of Pindar's thought, and for the history of Greek literature in general, this is a very significant difference.

V. CONCLUSION

The findings we have reached may be summed up briefly as follows: All Pindar's first personal statements, choral, epinician, and personal, have the same basic functions, serving both as introductions to new themes and also as statements about who is speaking. It is by means of the latter function that it has been possible to determine whether an "I" is choral or bardic in a given song. For since poet and chorus have very different roles, they say different things about themselves in their first personal statements. The choral "I" is more purely descriptive: the chorus tend to portray themselves in their choral role, to depict in detail their personal appearance and their prescribed actions. But the poet's "I" deals with the poet's official duties and with the powers of his art. It is on this basis alone that we have distinguished choral from bardic statements in the previous chapters, and that we have been able to know, for example, that in *Paean* 2 the chorus speaks, but in *I* 5 the poet.

Furthermore, it is of great significance that choral and bardic "I" statements occur in different types of song. There is a clear generic distinction between a pure choral song like *Paean* 2 and the epinikion *I* 5. *Paean* 2 is limited in scope, composed on behalf of and performed by a community, for a special communal occasion. But the *epinikion*, which is composed for an individual and presented in the person of the poet, is concerned with praising the deeds of one man in relation to the glorious deeds of others; its scope therefore is universal, for it celebrates both the glory of the individual and of mankind in general. The occasion of the song thus determines who will sing it: the chorus speaks only in songs intended for a specific communal purpose, the poet on occasions of international significance. There is no intermixture of the two types: in choral songs the chorus speaks throughout, and in the epinician odes which we have considered, Pindar is the only speaker.

If, therefore, there were any choral "I's" in Pindar's *epinikia*, they could be distinguished by means of their content, since the speaker would describe his physical appearance and his choral actions. In addition, these choral statements would occur in odes in which the chorus speaks throughout, and the tone of these songs and the occasion for which they were composed would be specifically communal in nature. But it may be shown that in none of Pindar's *epinikia* can these requirements be met. There is no choral "I" in Pindar's epinician odes.

In the first place all of the "I" statements attributed to the chorus by the scholiasts may be disqualified on the grounds that none of them is

particularly descriptive of choral action, and that none occurs in an ode which has other choral statements or a special communal purpose. We might take, for example, *N* 9.1, "we shall bring the festival *komos* from Apollo and Sicyon, O Muses, to Aetna," which is identified unequivocally by the scholiasts as a λόγος ἀπὸ τοῦ χοροῦ.¹⁰⁹ But this line has none of the characteristic of the choral "I." Indeed it seems much more like an Homeric invocation to the Muses than like the opening lines of the choral *Paeans* 2 or 4. Significantly no reference is made to any specifically choral action here or, for that matter, elsewhere in the ode. *κωμάζειν* means only "to celebrate in song" and may be used appropriately of any participant in a *komos* — poet, chorus member, or a silent friend.¹¹⁰

But more definite indication that *N* 9.1 is not a choral "I" lies in the fact that none of the other "I" statements in the ode is choral, and in that the ode as a whole is concerned with an individual and not with the affairs of a community. As we observed in the Introduction, the other first personal statements in *N* 9 deal with the epinician poet's official duties — of leading the festival chorus: "let us raise the sounding lyre and the flute above it" (8), or of bringing fame to the victor: "I pray to sing this *arete* with the Graces, and to honor the victory above many in words, shooting at the target nearest the Muses" (54–55). This last statement especially, with its reference to the poet's patron goddesses the Graces, and its characteristic *kairos* imagery, could only be spoken by the poet.¹¹¹ Moreover, the characteristic provincialism of the true choral ode is nowhere present. The "I" of *N* 9 is concerned with praising the *arete* of an individual in games and in war, in relation to the deeds of the hero Adrastus (10) and to the universal ideals of courage (34–42) and of *olbos* justly deserved (44–47). The one specific reference to the affairs of the city of Aetna is a general prayer for peace and good government and prosperity, which could be spoken as well by a *xenos* as by a citizen of Aetna (28–32).¹¹²

Therefore it seems most unlikely that *N* 9.1 is a choral "I" statement. Perhaps the scholiasts or their sources were misled by the fact that *κωμάσομεν* ("we shall bring the *komos*") is plural. But in both choral and monodic song first person singular and plural are interchangeable; that is, grammatical number gives no indication of the real number of speakers. Content is the only sure means of determining who and how many are speaking.¹¹³

In other cases, however, the scholiasts' attribution of an "I" statement to the chorus seems to have been based primarily on the statement's content, for example, *I* 7.37ff., where, after praising the victor,

Strepsiades, the poet goes on to speak a eulogy on the victor's uncle, who died fighting for Thebes (27-30):

But you, son of Diodotus, died praising Meleager, Hector, and Amphiarus, fighting in the front ranks, where the bravest men cling to the strife of battle with their last hopes. But I suffered a sorrow unspeakable (*ἔτλαν δὲ πένθος οὐ φατόν*, 37), but now the Earth-shaker has granted me fair weather after the storm. I shall sing, binding flowers to my hair. But may the anger of the gods not shatter my joy. (31-39b)

The scholiast states briefly that *ἔτλαν* is either a first personal statement by the chorus, or a third personal statement about the dead man's relatives, "they suffered sorrow unspeakable."¹¹⁴ The latter interpretation is possible but unlikely, since the *ἔτλαν* clause seems to be correlative with the following clause, "but now Poseidon has given me," which refers specifically to the first person. *ἔτλαν* is therefore a first person, but is it a choral "I" or the poet's?

Perhaps most significant is the fact that the scholiast gives two different interpretations, since it indicates that he was not relying upon a definite attribution of this line to the chorus in his text, but was only trying to explain what he considered to be a difficult passage. The problem seems to be, "Why should Pindar say that *he* suffered when the victor's uncle died, when only the victor's family and friends could be concerned?" The explanation may lie in some historical fact unknown to us, for example, that Pindar was related to the victor's family. But the passage may also be explained more directly as a statement of *xenia*, both on a personal and on a political level. As a friend of the victor, the epinician poet is always affected by the victor's fate (as in *P 3*). But in this instance the fact that both poet and victor are Thebans strengthens the bond of *xenia* to the point where the victor's loss is the poet's also. As a Theban, Pindar would regret the loss of a valiant countryman, especially in a time of crisis for Thebes. He seems to indicate that Thebes was defeated in the battle, probably the battle of Oenophyta, in 457 B.C.¹¹⁵ But a Theban victory in games would give him hope that the gods' favor had returned, that "fair weather" had followed the "storm." Thus Pindar may sing, binding flowers to his hair, and pray that the gods not disturb his joy (38b-39b). *I 7. 37*, "I suffered sorrow unspeakable," thus may be a personal as well as a choral "I" statement.

But in view of the rest of the poem, the only possible interpretation is that Pindar is speaking. For immediately after this passage, he seems to

continue to speak in a personal vein, explaining his attitude toward life:

Following the joy of each day I approach old age gently and my fated life-span. For we all die alike, but our fates are diverse. (40-43)

As in *P* 3.107ff., Pindar seems to be describing his own *Weltanschauung* as a gentle admonition to the victor.¹¹⁶ Then he links his own fate to the victor's and to mankind's, with the general first personal statement "we all die alike." These solemn, reflective lines are far more appropriate to a poet whose official role is to comment on man's achievements and who himself is approaching old age, than to the victor's young friends in the *komos*.

He goes on to speak briefly of mortals who seek to transcend their mortal limitations, like Bellerophon, and then concludes by praying for another victory:

Grant to us, Loxias, glorious in your golden hair, a flowery crown at Pytho also. (49-51)

As in 37-38b above, Pindar joins himself to the victor's family in his prayer. A second victory at Delphi would, like the present victory at the Isthmus, bring joy not only to Strepsiades' friends and family, but to his homeland as well. In one man's triumph Pindar sees hope for the whole state.

But though Pindar speaks in these last lines for the whole *komos*, the *komos* does not speak for him. None of the first personal statements in the ode have the characteristics of choral "I" statements: no choral actions, like dancing, are ever mentioned, and there is no physical self-description. When old age is mentioned, it is not as a means of identification, but in the larger context of man's limitations and of moral *kairos*. Moreover, *I* 7 is an *epinikion*, a song written in praise of an individual. It is patriotic in tone, but not localistic. Pindar does not refer to Oenophyta by name, or even to the enemy Athens; he does not even state directly that Thebes has been defeated. Instead he recalls, in his opening lines, the great events of Thebes' past (1-19); he praises the courage of the victor's uncle in relation to famous heroes who also died in battle (24-36); he sees in young Strepsiades' victory hope that man may triumph over his circumstances. One may contrast to *I* 7 the narrow and immediate concern of the chorus of *Paean* 2 with their forthcoming battle against the Thracian enemy, and their emphasis on actual history rather than on the more glorious mythological past. The Abderitan chorus is interested only in a particular, present need, but the poet in *I* 7 gives the specific universal significance, by seeing in Strepsiades'

single victory a symbolic victory for all of the Thebes, for all mankind, for now and for all time.

For the same reasons, the much-contested passage in *P* 5 that was briefly discussed above would seem to be a personal statement of *xenia* and not, as some scholars have argued, a choral "I."¹¹⁷ Again, the most positive indications that the chorus does not speak come not from direct historical or stylistic evidence, but from the fact that *P* 5 is a proper *epinikion*, and that the other first personal statements in the ode are clearly the official epinic平ian "I's" of the poet.

P 5 was composed in 461 for the king of Cyrene, Arcesilaus, and the passage in question follows the myth of the founding of Cyrene by Battus. The prophecies of Apollo were thus fulfilled, and here Pindar breaks off his account to sing of the god's powers.

Apollo provides men and women with healing from heavy diseases; he gave them the lyre, and gives the Muse to whomever he wishes, bringing lawfulness without discord into their hearts; and he controls the dark prophetic chamber — by means of this he settled the sons of Aegimius [the Dorians] in Lacedaemon and in Argos and in bright Pylos. But my lovely fame boasts to be from Sparta, whence begotten the Aegidae came to Thera, my fathers, not without gods, but a destiny led them. Having received from Thera a feast of much sacrifice, Apollo Carneius, we pay honor in your festival to the well-founded city of Cyrene.
(63-81)

As in *I* 7, the scholiasts suggest two interpretations for the passage beginning "but my lovely fame . . .," but do not attempt to choose between them. They simply state that "the passage is spoken by the chorus of Libyans or by the poet."¹¹⁸ Again the cause of their confusion seems to be in the content of the passage. The lines at first sight seem perfectly suited to the chorus — Cyrene was a colony of Thera, and so Cyrenetans might well claim to be descended from Thera's founders, the Aegidae, and to have inherited her religious customs.¹¹⁹ But if Pindar speaks these lines, there seem to be several difficulties. How can Pindar, a Theban, say that his fame comes from Sparta? How can he say that he is participating at the festival of Apollo Carneius in Cyrene, when at the time of the victory celebration he was probably in Thebes?

The answers to these questions will become apparent if we consider the passage in its total context. *P* 5 has, from the outset, the content, tone, and form of an *epinikion*. The opening theme is the relation of

olbos and *arete*; both of these Arcesilaus has, and a glorious ancestry, and also a victory song.

You are blessed because, having won at Pytho, you have received this *komos* of men, the delight of Apollo. But do not forget when you are celebrated in song by this *komos* near Aphrodite's shrine in Cyrene, to hold the god responsible for everything, and to love Carrhotus best of your friends. (23-26)

The reference to victory song serves as a transition from praise of Arcesilaus to praise of his charioteer and uncle Carrhotus. Pindar's subject is again *arete*, courage and skill, and the song that gives these meaning:

Carrhotus, the fair-haired Graces set you ablaze with glory. You are fortunate, because you have the memorial of mighty words after your great struggle, for among forty swift chariots you brought back your chariot whole, with heart unfearing, and now you have come to the plain of Libya and your father's city from your glorious victory. (45-53)

The duty of an epinician poet is to make brave deeds remembered, by speaking of them in relation to ideal virtues and to the great accomplishments of the past. These impersonal transitions, with their reference to victory song, have no counterpart in any pure choral song.

Pindar now turns to the myth, with the *gnome* that no mortal has ever been free from suffering. He goes on to tell of Battus' struggles in founding Cyrene, and then follows the passage about Apollo and the Aegidae. In this context the true function of this passage may be seen. The previous transitional statements are worded impersonally, but now, suddenly, the poet speaks subjectively about himself, emerging from the background and joining himself to the victor and the *komos*, in spirit if not in actual physical presence.

For *P* 5.72ff. may also be interpreted as a statement of *xenia*, where the poet emphasizes through myth his racial ties with the victor's city. One may compare *I* 8.17-20, where Pindar speaks of the racial ties between Thebes and Aegina:

It is necessary for one raised in seven-gated Thebes to offer forth the flower of the Graces in Aegina, because they were the two youngest daughters of one father, Asopus, and pleasing to king Zeus.

But in *P* 5 Pindar speaks not only as a Theban, but more particularly as a member of the clan of the Aegidae:

But my lovely fame boasts to be from Sparta, whence begotten the Aegidae came to Thera, my fathers, not without gods, but a destiny led them. (72-76)

The Aegidae were an important aristocratic clan in Thebes, to whom Pindar gives prominent mention in his list of Thebes' glories in the proem to *I* 7, where he tells of how they came to the aid of the Spartans in the conquest of Amyclae, and successfully defended them (12–15).¹²⁰ Thus Pindar says, referring to the glorious accomplishments of his clan, that his "fame boasts to be from Sparta," but he mentions it not so much for the sake of his own glory, but because it was an important event in the history of Cyrene. That is, some of the Aegidae remained in Sparta, and their descendants went on to colonize Thera, and Thera, as Pindar's Cyrenetan audience would know, was the "mother city" of Cyrene. Therefore Pindar, as an Aegid, is related by blood to the Cyrenetans. However, he does not make this connection explicit, but emphasizes instead a second, larger bond, that of Dorian religious heritage.

He goes on to state that he and his audience are bound not only by ancestral ties, but by a common reverence for Apollo:

Having received from Thera a feast of much sacrifice, Apollo Carneius,
we pay honor in your festival to the well-founded city of Cyrene.

(77–81)

The present occasion, the festival of Apollo, has special significance for Pindar and for all the members of the audience. He states, in 60–62b, at the beginning of this transitional passage, that Apollo led Battus to Cyrene. But Apollo has also played an important role in the history of other Dorian cities: Sparta, Argos, and Pylos were all founded by his prophecies (60–72). Moreover, "a destiny," that is, the will of the gods, led the Aegidae to Thera (76). Pindar is also a Dorian, and the servant of Apollo, as he recalls by implication in his praise of Apollo ("he gave men the lyre, and he gives the Muse to whom he wishes," 65). Apollo, then, is a second bond between Pindar and the *komos*. By speaking in the first person, he emphasizes the spirit of kinship and communion which he first establishes in myth. Even though he is not present, he joins with his fellow Dorians the Cyrenetans in worshiping the great god, speaking, as in *I* 7.49–51, both for himself and for his audience.

The following lines seem to confirm this interpretation. After the passage about the Aegidae, Pindar goes on to speak of the other settlers in Cyrene, the sons of Antenor, and Battus, who founded the present dynasty of kings, who lie buried in the Agora:

They hear somewhere with their buried hearts beneath the earth of [Arcesilaus'] great *arete*, sprinkled with the soft dew of songs, [an *arete* which is] their *olbos* and a joy well-earned and shared with their son

Arcesilaus. It is fitting for him to call upon Phoebus in the song of young men, since he has from Pytho this joyous victory song, a respite from expenditures. Wise men praise him: I speak what others say. (98–108)

This transitional statement has all the characteristics of an official epinician “I.” The poet speaks of his praise as water (cf. *I* 6.64), of his *epinikion* as a respite from pain (cf. *I* 8.1).¹²¹ His subject is Arcesilaus’ *arete*, and he goes on to praise him in specific detail, for his mind, courage, and strength, and for his skill in poetry; he encourages him to continue striving for good things, and prays for his *olbos* to continue, concluding the ode, as he concluded *I* 7, with a brief prayer for future victory:

I pray Zeus to give this prize at Olympia also to the descendants of Battus [Arcesilaus and Carrhotus]. (124)

These first personal statements deal with the official duties of the epinician poet. There is nothing in them, or in the content of this latter half of *P* 5, which bears any resemblance whatever to pure choral song.

In brief, if Pindar intended the chorus to speak in *P* 5.72ff., he would be making an extraordinary departure from tradition and from his usual style. In the first place, this passage would not even perform the basic function of a choral statement, that is, to define the speakers’ choral role by describing their actions and physical appearance, since it deals with the ancestry of the whole *komos*, of poet, audience, and chorus, and of a festival in which they all are participating. In addition, as a choral statement this passage would have no structural purpose in the ode, but would be an essentially meaningless digression. However, as a personal statement by the poet, it is a meaningful expression of *xenia*, which joins the poet to his audience by more than formal official ties. After the passage the tone of the ode is warmer, and Pindar’s praise of Arcesilaus is stated in more direct and personal terms. Moreover, there are no other choral statements in *P* 5. All the transitional statements refer to poetry or to the official duties of the epinician poet, and the song itself has a purely epinician subject, the *arete* of the victor and of his charioteer. Although there are abundant local references, no specifically local concerns are exposed. The ode deals instead with general significance of the victory, its meaning not only for Arcesilaus and the *komos* at the present moment, but for all men, now and forever.

For the same reasons, the other passages questioned by the scholiasts are best interpreted as personal statements by the poet. There is no reason why *N* 1.18ff., *P* 9.97ff., *P* 8.56ff., and *P* 8.98 should not be spoken by Pindar. Moreover, the other “I” statements in these odes unquestionably are spoken by the poet, and each ode has the traditional

form and subject matter of an *epinikion*.¹²² Only in one case is the text difficult to explain as a statement by Pindar, and that is at the end of *N* 7, the ode containing Pindar's very personal apology to the Aeginetans for his criticism of Neoptolemus.¹²³

For they say that Zeus begot Aeacus in the womb of his mother [Aegina], guardian of my auspiciously named fatherland, and for you, Heracles, a kind *xenos* and brother. (84–86b)

The scholiasts are justifiably confused by this passage, since Pindar cannot call Aeacus the guardian of his fatherland, Thebes. Aeacus is rather the guardian of the city Aegina, which is named after his mother. There is no evidence that he had any cult, or for that matter, any connection with Pindar's city Thebes, other than his friendship with Thebes' great hero, Heracles. Therefore either the Aeginetan chorus is speaking, or there is a fault in the manuscript tradition.¹²⁴

The latter theory is supported by the context in which these lines occur, for Pindar is the speaker elsewhere in the ode, and the myth of Heracles' and Aeacus' friendship is used to emphasize the friendship of Thebes for Aegina rather than vice versa, and is therefore more appropriate to the poet.

Forgive me. If for the victor's sake I cried aloud, raising myself too high, I am not too harsh to set things right. It is a light task for me to make garlands. Strike up the music! For you the Muse binds gold and white ivory and the lily flower drawn from the dew of the sea. Mindful of Zeus at Nemea, sound forth the mixed strains of song in peace. It is fitting [for us] to sing of the king of the gods on this ground [Aegina] in a soft voice. For they say that he [Zeus] begot Aeacus in the womb of his mother, guardian of my auspiciously named fatherland, and for you, Heracles, a kind *xenos* and brother. Of the things given between man and man, we should say that to be a neighbor loving in steadfast mind is a joy more worthy than others for his fellow neighbor. If Zeus also sustains this, grant, you who conquered the giants, that Sogenes wish to dwell in your favor beside his father . . . in the holy street of his ancestors . . . for he has his house within your precincts, on either hand as he goes forth.

(75–94)

At first the speaker is clearly Pindar, defending, as in *N* 4. 35ff., the nature of his art. If he seems to distort myth, it is in praise of a victor, and since this is the purpose of his art, he must be forgiven. But he is also willing to apologize for having offended the Aeginetans. He then returns to the present celebration ("strike up the music"), and goes on to speak of his obligations to the present victor. As a poet his duty is to

bring to the victory a universal and lasting significance, and, characteristically, he expresses this function of his art in metaphorical language. His song is made of the gold of heroic achievement, of the white of fame, and of red coral lifted from the sea, a symbol of life, his song's triumph over death.¹²⁵

The next lines have all the outward characteristics of a statement of *xenia* in myth, like his references to Aegina and Thebe's parentage in *I* 8, and to his ancestors the Aegidae in *P* 5, since the myth in this case is used particularly to express Thebes' friendship for Aegina. Aeacus and Heracles were not only friends, but, through Zeus, half-brothers. However, in relating Aeacus' origins, the speaker addresses Heracles, which would seem particularly appropriate for a Theban, especially in view of Pindar's remark about himself in *P* 9: "a man is a fool, if he does not defend Heracles with his lips" (*P* 9.87). By means of a *gnome* on good neighbors, he gives the myth specific application to the present. The victor's house is located between two shrines of Heracles, and Pindar calls upon the deified Theban hero to protect the Aeginetan victor. Thebes and Aegina, Pindar and the victor, are thus joined by present as well as by past ties, and the emphasis on Heracles throughout the passage seems to indicate that these lines were intended to be spoken by the Theban poet.

It would seem therefore that the text of line 85 must be emended, perhaps from ἐμῷ (my) to ἐᾶ, "guardian of his own city."¹²⁶ Emendation should always be a last resort, but in this case the alternate interpretation is still less satisfactory. The line does not have any peculiarly choral characteristics. Moreover, an intrusion by the chorus at this point in the ode would not add anything, but would in fact obscure a crucial statement of *xenia* for the Aeginetan victor, which was especially necessary at this time, when Pindar's use of myth had been criticized in Aegina.

There is no historical certainty in matters of literary interpretation, but it would seem extremely odd if a choral statement were to occur in *N* 7, where such a statement would be inappropriate, where all the other statements are by the poet, and in an ode which in form and content has all the characteristics of a traditional *epinikion*.

Perhaps, then, the ghost of the epinician choral "I" may at last be laid to rest, first, because when we considered supposedly choral passages like *N* 9.1ff., *I* 7.37ff., *P* 5.72ff., and even *N* 7.85, we found (a) that the very idea of the choral "I" seems to have no foundation in ancient tradition, but on the contrary, appears to be based on sheer guesswork by the scholiasts, who wrote hundreds of years after both

epinikia and pure choral songs had ceased to be composed;¹²⁷ (b) that the content of these passages is in each case better suited to Pindar than to the chorus, since as statements by the poet they have an important structural function in the total context of the ode, but as choral statements they serve only as purposeless interruptions, which do not even perform the function of real choral statements; that is, to portray the physical appearance of the speakers. Thus to construe these passages as choral would do violence to the artistry of Pindar, a poet who is always keenly aware of the demands of *kairos*.

However, the proof that there is no choral "I" in Pindar's *epinikia* lies not in interpretation of the text alone, but also in the very nature of choral and of epinician poetry. As we have seen, pure choral songs and *epinikia* are composed for different purposes and deal with different types of subject-matter, which in each case seem to require a different type of first personal statement, since in choral songs, which deal primarily with local and communal concerns, the chorus speaks throughout, but in *epinikia*, which deal with the universal significance of human excellence, the speaker is always the poet. Each type of first personal statement is thus associated with a particular subject matter, so that the topical, descriptive "I" of the chorus could not occur in an *epinikion*, any more than the poet's official expressions of *xenia* and statements about his art could occur in choral songs like *Paean* 2. It is very unlikely that Pindar would seek to go against tradition by having the chorus speak in an *epinikion*, in which every other transitional statement refers to himself, especially when such an intrusion would have no meaningful function in the ode. Therefore to allow the chorus to speak in odes like *I* 7 or *P* 5 would violate what we have observed to be an otherwise consistent principle, that there is no change of speaker within an *epinikion* or a pure choral song.¹²⁸

To determine the origins of this generic distinction between pure choral and monodic song is beyond the scope of this study, and perhaps of any study, in view of the paucity of evidence available. But on the basis of what we have observed about Pindar's *epinikia* and about choral song in general, it is possible to offer at least a hypothetical explanation of why in an epinician ode only the poet may speak. It may at first seem somewhat paradoxical, at least in Plato's terms that "the city is the man writ large," that the larger group, the chorus, is confined to the smaller subject. But the chorus of a song like *Paean* 2 or the Theban *Parthenion* is composed of a group of private citizens, who by their very nature cannot speak with the great authority of a poet like Pindar, who has from the Muses skill in song and divine knowledge and memory,

who knows from the Muses and from his travels the myths and legends of all Greece, not just of his own community. He alone has the qualifications to speak on a general theme, since, unlike a private citizen, his knowledge is not limited to one local area and he is not restricted by the ordinary man's lack of artistic ability. He alone has the authority to give advice, to express *gnomai* to the subjects of his song, either objectively, as in *I* 5.14 ("do not seek to become Zeus"), or subjectively, as in *P* 3.59 ("do not, dear soul, strive for immortal life"). It is perhaps because of this intense concern with himself, as poet and citizen, that Pindar's choral odes seem by comparison much less successful. He has little interest in the local and the temporal; his poetry reaches its greatest heights in personal statements like *I* 8.1ff., where he puts aside immediate concerns, and turns to eternal values.

On the other hand, the Swallows have no such pretensions in their song; they simply describe themselves and what they are doing. In choral song composed by a professional poet, however, some elements of "poetic" style are occasionally present; thus Alcman's maidens proclaim the *gnome* "there is vengeance from the gods" (1.36), the Abderitans of *Paean* 2 utter similar pious statements, and, as we have observed, the praise of the Laurel-bearer's family in Pindar's *Partheneion* is not unlike the praise of the victor's family in an *epinikion*.¹²⁹ But the general tone, the subject matter, and the first personal statements of each of these songs are all completely choral in nature. The essential distinctions are always preserved.

In the light of this evidence, it is difficult to explain why *epinikia* were usually performed by choruses, in spite of their subject matter, and in spite of the fact that the poet speaks in his own person throughout. Perhaps the early *epinikia* were purely choral in form, concerned with the celebration and the immediate importance of the victory. But with the growth of humanism in Greece, seen particularly in the invention of monodic *enkomia*, like Ibycus' ode to Polycrates, or Simonides' *skolion* to Scopas about the "good man," greater international importance was attached to victories in the games. Thus the presence of a professional poet was eventually required at the victory celebrations, a poet who would naturally, like his predecessors the epic *aoidoi*, speak in the first person, and concentrate not on local affairs but on the universal significance of the victory. Clearly such a transformation must have taken place sometime in the sixth century, since Simonides, Bacchylides, and Pindar all treat the *epinikion* as a virtually monodic form.

But Pindar did not, like Bacchylides, rely exclusively on the bardic

tradition in his epinician statements. He understood the form so well that he was able to transcend it, developing the imagery implicit in Homeric statements about poetry, and inventing special metaphors of his own. He also drew on the tradition of first personal statements in epic and lyric poetry, where the poet speaks not as a professional but as a private citizen, thus incorporating the personal into the official statements of his odes. To say that choral statements occur in his epinician odes is not only to misunderstand the epinician form, but to do Pindar great injustice as a poet.

NOTES

The present article is based on a dissertation of the same title, a summary of which appears in *HSCP* 66 (1962) 259–262. I am indebted to my thesis adviser, Professor John H. Finley, for virtually all that is good in this study; and also to my colleague Professor Barbara P. McCarthy for her sound advice.

The following works, which I have found particularly helpful, will be cited hereafter by author's name only, unless otherwise indicated: L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar* (London 1930–1932); J. H. Finley, *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Martin Classical Lectures 14; Cambridge, Mass. 1955); H. Gundert, *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf* (Frankfurter Studien zur Religion und Kultur der Antike 10; Frankfurt a/M 1935); W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikion* (*Schriften der königsberger gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswissen. Klasse* 5.3, 1928–1929); U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922), cited hereafter as Wilamowitz, *Pindaros*.

Unless otherwise noted, the English translations are my own, and the references to the text of Pindar are from C. M. Bowra, ed., *Pindari Carmina cum Fragmentis*, ed. 2 (Oxford 1947).

1. On passages questioned in the scholia, see section V; also H. Fraenkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (Amer. Philol. Assoc. Monographs 13; New York 1951) 541–542.

2. On the use of the first personal statement as a transition, see Schadewaldt 300 and passim. On the types of "I" statements in Pindar, see especially Finley 25–26; and Fraenkel (above, n.1) 605 n.12.

3. The duty of the poet from Homer on is to relate the truth, e.g. *Iliad* 2.484–493 and Hesiod, *Theog.* 22–34. Gnomic statements occur in virtually every type of song, including choral song, e.g. Alcman 1.36 and Pindar's *Paean* 2.20–22 (see section II).

4. On the development of Pindar's transitional statements from the first personal statements of the epic bards, see Schadewaldt 276 and 334. The first person may have been used as an introduction even in pre-Homeric epic, see above, n.62.

5. On the date of N 8, see N. O. Brown, "Pindar, Sophocles and the Thirty Years' Peace," *TAPA* 82 (1951) 1–28. On the ode as a whole, see Finley 150–156.

6. There seems to be no doubt that *Paean* 4 is spoken in the person of the chorus: see B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* V (London

1908) #841, p. 18; Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 474; O. Schroeder, *BPW* 28 (1908) 164; and Farnell I 303. Pindar refers to *Paean* 4 in *I* 1.1–8 (composed around 458 B.C.), where he states that he has postponed writing a song for the “island men in craggy Ceos” in order to celebrate the victory of a fellow Theban.

7. The statement “and I have some measure of the Muses” seems to be a somewhat condescending reference to the great poets of Ceos, especially in the mouths of their countrymen. But Pindar was hardly cordial to his old rivals, Bacchylides and Simonides, in his earlier days. See notes 66, 92, 93, and accompanying text.

8. On the date and setting of *Paean* 2, see especially Farnell I 298–301; and S. L. Radt, *Pindars Zweiter und Sechster Paian* (Amsterdam 1958) 13–19. Although the words “from you . . . to . . .” ($\sigma\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\nu \dots \pi\acute{a}\rho$) seem to describe an actual procession route (see Radt 27; and U. von Wilamowitz, *Sappho und Simonides* [Berlin 1913] 246), it is possible that the chorus’ dance was mimetic (as in frag. 96; see below, n.9), depicting rather than actually being a part of the procession. This could be indicated by the fact that *Paean* 2 has the triadic structure of a formal “standing” *epinikion*, like *Paean* 4 (and cf. the paean performed for Odysseus by the Phaeacians in *Odyssey* 8. 250–264 in a single area, “a holy dancing place”), instead of the monostrophic structure of *prosodia* like *Paeans* 1 and 5, *I* 8, etc. But perhaps the shrines of Abderus, Apollo, and Aphrodite were located in the same area, within a short distance of one another.

9. For the metaphor “pursuing the paean” ($\pi\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\delta\acute{\iota}\omega\acute{\xi}\omega$), see frag. 96 (Bowra): “Following the curved track of the song ($\kappa\alpha\mu\pi\acute{u}\lambda\omega\mu\acute{e}\lambda\delta\acute{\iota}\omega\acute{\kappa}\omega\nu$), imitate, whirling with your feet in the contest, the Pelasgian horse or the Amyclean dog.” The same metaphor of pursuit is used in *N* 5.24 of lyre playing: “chasing ($\delta\acute{\iota}\omega\acute{\kappa}\omega\nu$) the strings of a lyre with a golden plektron”; and in *I* 4.3 of epinician praise: “there are many ways for me to pursue your *aretaī* in song” ($\acute{\nu}\mu\acute{e}\tau\acute{e}\rho\acute{\alpha}\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{e}\tau\acute{a}\acute{\nu}\mu\nu\acute{\omega}\delta\acute{\iota}\omega\acute{\kappa}\epsilon\nu$). On the basis of these two passages, Jurenka (“Pindaros neugefundener Paean für Abdera,” *Philologus* LXXI [1912] 182) interprets $\pi\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\delta\acute{\iota}\omega\acute{\xi}\omega$ (*Paean* 2.3) as a metaphor of poetic composition, and assumes that Pindar is the speaker. But since the contexts of frag. 96 and of *Paean* 2 indicate that the “pursuer” must move with his feet, to pursue a song must surely mean to dance. The earliest paeans were accompanied by dancing, as the word $\pi\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha$ itself (from $\pi\alpha\acute{\iota}\omega$, to “strike, stamp”) seems to indicate. The bard Demodocus sings a paean to the stamping of Phaeacian athletes in *Odyssey* 8. 250–264; see the scholium *ad. loc.*, and also E. Diehl, *RhM* 89 (1940) 111. On the present passage see Radt (above, n.8) 26–28; I. Mueller, *Quomodo Pindarus chori persona usus sit* (Diss. Freiburg, 1914) 12; H. von Arnim, “Pindar’s Pāan für die Abderiten” *Wiener Eranos* (Vienna 1909) 8–9; Wilamowitz, *Sappho und Simonides* (above, n.8) 246; and Farnell (above, n.6) I 298 — who all believe that the chorus is speaking in *Paean* 2.3ff, but cf. Schroeder [above, n.6] 163; and A. Puech, *Pindare* (Paris 1952) IV 101.

10. The interpretation of 16–20 as a reference to Abdera’s recolonization of Teos is suggested by Radt (above, n.8) 33–39. The papyrus reading $\mu\acute{a}\tau\acute{r}\delta\mu\acute{a}\tau\acute{e}\rho'$ $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\acute{e}\kappa\omega\nu$ (“I bore my mother’s mother”) has not been accepted by most other scholars, the principle of *lectio difficilior* notwithstanding. Most accept the substitution of $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{i}\delta\omega\nu$ (“I saw”) for $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\acute{e}\kappa\omega\nu$ which is proposed by Grenfell and Hunt (above, n.6) 83, and the interpretation that “mother’s mother” means Teos’ colonizer, i.e. Athens; see Farnell II 395. However, if the chorus is speaking here as citizens, rather than in the person of their city, they would not be speaking of

Abdera's "grandmother," but of their own — the mother of their mother-homeland Abdera, namely Teos. Pindar speaks of the city Stymphalis as *ματροπότερη* (*O* 6.86) because Stymphalis founded a settlement at Thebes, Pindar's motherland (*I* 7.1); see Radt 37–38. The chorus speak as citizens here, as in *Paean* 4; *νεόπολις* need not be a noun, as Liddell and Scott take it, following Grenfell and Hunt, but could be an adjective "young in city," analogous to the adjectives *ρυσίπτολις*, *περσέπτολις* etc.

11. The chorus' somewhat oratorical praise of their ancestors is concluded by the refrain "ἰεὶ paian, iei! may paian never leave us!" that ends each triad (45), but the third triad opens abruptly with what seems to be a prophecy quoted without introduction (46–50): "But he will pound him [the enemy] to dust as he comes with his small array against the mighty army. And it happened on the first day of the month. The kindly maiden-goddess rose-footed Hecate kept announcing the prophecy (*λόγον*) that was wishing to come to pass." See Grenfell and Hunt (above, n.6) 86; Schroeder (above, n.6) 170; Wilamowitz, *Sappho und Simonides* (above, n. 8) 251; and Farnell II 396. The beginning of the next line "but now again . . ." seems to indicate that the prophecy refers to some accurately predicted event in past time, but Radt (above, n.8) 73, on the grounds that the imperfect *ἄγγελλε* may express action still continuing, holds that the prophecy applies instead to the future. In any case Hecate's prediction was considered sufficiently important and familiar to the audiencee to be quoted in such a heraldic manner, without introduction. An unintroduced quotation of this kind is rare in Greek poetry, which retains by and large the formalism of oral poetry, where speeches are clearly framed (e.g. "then he said . . . so he spoke"). In Pindar's other works direct quotes are always introduced and concluded by special phrases (e.g. *P* 4.138, 156), but in Bacchylides' *Ode* 13 Athena's speech, which ends with a prophecy that concludes the triad (55–57), is followed directly in the next triad by a narrative transition to the present victory, without the usual concluding "so she spoke." Perhaps the triad break was a sufficient transition, especially where, as in *Paean* 2, there is a formal refrain.

12. In the *Odes* Pindar expresses patriotic concern for Thebes and Aegina, and in the first part of his life an affection for Athens. But to imply that *N* 8 through the imagery of the Odysseus-Ajax myth that Aegina has been unjustly treated by Athens is very different from praying openly for her defeat. Moreover, Pindar had no personal involvement, racial or cultural, with Abdera. These lines are appropriate only to the chorus. See Farnell II 396; von Arnim (above, n.9) 18; Wilamowitz, *Sappho und Simonides* (above, n.8) 252; Grenfell and Hunt (above, n.6) 85; but cf. Schroeder (above, n.6) 169–170.

13. On Euxantius in Cretan myth, see Apollodorus *Bibl.* 3.1.1 and Farnell I 304. Bacchylides (2.8) calls Ceos "the island of Euxantius." Pindar's version of the Melampus myth conflicts with Homer's (*Odyssey* 15.225), but a similar version seems to occur in what may be a fragment of an epinikion of Simonides; see G. Zuntz, "De Pap. Berol. 13411," *Aegyptus* 15 (1935) 282–296, frag. b and c especially. For this reason, Farnell's suggestion (II 397) that Pindar may have written *Paean* 4 in haste, without checking his sources, may be unwarranted.

14. On the festival of the *Daphnephoria*, see especially Farnell I 332–333.

15. In *Odyssey* 12.165ff. the Sirens sing a loud shrill song which, as Pindar's maidens go on to say in 12ff., has power to soothe the wind and waves. See Farnell II 427 and below, n.27.

16. The most natural interpretation of the difficult $\omegaν\ \thetaάλεσσων\ \epsilonν\ κειμαι$ (or possibly $\epsilonνκειμαι$) seems to be "among whose descendants I am numbered (i.e., belong)." Farnell's translation "whose scions are dear to me" seems less likely, since $\epsilonνκειμαι$ does not have the meaning "be devoted to" until the second century B.C., and $κειμαι\ \epsilonν$ never seems to have that meaning, whereas both $κειμαι$ and $\epsilonνκειμαι$ frequently mean, respectively, "be" and "be in" from Homeric times on; see *LSJ*. If this interpretation is correct, the participants and the patrons would all be members of the same family; see Farnell II 427, and below, n.19.

17. The meaning of *kairos* for the poet will be treated more fully in the next section.

18. Farnell (I 333) comments on the similarity of the praise of the Laurel-bearer's family in this *partheneion* to praise of the victor's family in an *epinikion* or *enkomion*.

19. $\thetaυγάτηρ$ (daughter) might possibly indicate that Andaesistrota was the mother of the chorus leader, and thus related to the other participants in the ceremony; see above, n.16.

20. The tentative interpretation of nectar as Pindar's poetry and salt water as his rivals is suggested by Farnell II 431.

21. All of Alcman's extant *σφραγίδες* seem to be indirect; e.g. "Alcman agrees that he was a glutton" (49), "we maidens praise our lyre player" (20), "you weren't a country fellow" (13), and see also 92. One might compare to this practice the "indirect," later *parabaseis* of Attic comedy, where the chorus leader speaks about the poet to the audience, e.g. "our teacher never goes to the theater" (*Acharnians* 628–629), "the poet now wants to criticize his audience" (*Wasps* 1016), etc.

22. On "but I sing of Agido's light" (Alcman 1.39) as a transition, see D. L. Page, *Alcman, The Partheneion* (Oxford 1951) 44.

23. On the interpretation of 50–63, see Page (above, n.22), 45ff; and also C. M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, ed. 2 (Oxford 1961) 46–60. Hagesichora is a champion race horse (45–49), Agido a Venetic courser (51), the maiden second in beauty to Agido is like a Colaxian horse, and all the maidens follow Hagesichora as horses follow a trace-horse (93–95). Bowra would identify them with the Leukippides ("white-horses") mentioned in Pausanias 3.13.7, who raced with another team of maidens at the festival of Dionysus in Sparta. The other team, the Peleiades, might be "doves" or the constellation — Dionysus is associated with both birds and stars. See also Page 52–57.

24. On the possible relationship of the Theban maiden-chorus to one another and to the other participants in the ceremony, see above n. 16 and n.19.

25. On Aenisimbrota see Page (above, n.22) 65. Page suggests that $\kappaλεννά$ ("well-known," 44) and $\tauείρει$ ("pines for," 77, Lobel's reading for $\tauηρεῖ$, "defends," which is adopted by most other editors) may be erotic references, probably spoken in jest. But cf. Bowra (above, n.23) 61.

26. The eight maidens mentioned in 70–76, plus Agido and Hagesichora, are probably the $\piαλδων\ δέκ'$ ("ten children") of mutilated line 99; see Page (above, n.22) 46.

27. To the siren simile in Pindar's Theban *Partheneion* (above, n.15.), cf. also Alcman 10: "The muse cries out, the shrill voiced Siren ($\lambdaίγεια\ Σειρῆν$). But I [the poet] didn't need to call on her, since you maidens yourselves have breathed into me such a loud voice."

28. Further evidence of such a tradition may be found in another ritual song of Alcman, of which only a fragment survives, where the chorus members again identify themselves and describe what they are doing: "Artemis in my heart I desire to utter a hymn to you, if ever before another gold-bright maiden was pleasing to you, clashing bronze-cheeked cymbals in her hands" (frag. 60). The chorus gives such a detailed picture of itself that it would seem that there were some ritual significance in the description of its actions, especially since the maiden choruses in Delos, the sacred island of Apollo and Artemis, are also said to have used cymbals in their songs (*h.Hom.* 3. 161–162).

29. The Spartan pageant is described by Plutarch (*Lycurgus* 21). Three choruses, representing the three ages of man, proclaimed in turn their usefulness to the state. The old men say: "we were once strong young men;" the young men: "we are that, if you will look;" and the youths: "we will be much better someday" (*Carm. Pop.* 17).

30. On the "Horses" and "Doves," see above, n.23. On animal mummery, see G. Norwood, *Greek Comedy* (Boston, 1932) 7–10; and L. Radermacher, "Aristophanes' 'Frösche,'" *Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Phil.-Hist. Klasse) 198.4 (1922) 4–11.

31. A fragment of a Samian begging song (*Carm. Pop.* 1) has some similarity to the Chian swallow song (*Carm. Pop.* 32). It is said to have been composed by Homer, and was also sung by children: "I come, I come every year like the swallow. I stand here barefoot; give quickly."

32. The Wasps also describe their stings, but for dramatic effect, not until 403–407. When they first enter, they describe themselves only as old men, who fought at Marathon (23off.). Fragments of two other comic animal choruses are preserved: in Crates' *Animals* (frag. 17) the chorus proclaim that it is wrong to "eat us;" the chorus of Eupolis' *Goats* say that they eat "everything and . . ." (frag. 14).

33. For self-description by "human" choruses in comedy, see *Acharnians* 210–220; *Lysistrata* 254ff.; and also *Thesmophoriazousae* 329–331; *Ecclesiazousae* 285–289; *Ploutus* 257–258. The chorus of the *Clouds* describe themselves in greater detail; see especially 275, 290, 299.

34. For self-identification by Aeschylus' choruses see *Persians* 1–4; *Seven* 79, 110–111; *Choephoroe* 22–31; *Prometheus* 129–135. The sleeping Eumenides are first described by the Priestess, then further identified by Clytemnestra.

35. For example, the choruses of the *Oedipus at Colonus* (118ff.), *Bacchae* (64ff.), and of Euripides' satyr-play the *Cyclops* (41ff.) identify themselves. But the choruses of Sophocles' *Antigone* (162), *Ajax* (201), *Electra* (129), and of Euripides' *Medea* (214), *Heracleidae* (71ff.), and *Hippolytus* (58ff.) are identified by other characters.

36. The parabasis of the *Peace* in its present form seems to be a reworking of part of the *Wasps* parabasis, with third person changed to first person. See J. van Leeuwen, *Aristophanis Pax* (Leiden 1936) 121; also his *Aristophanis Vespa* (Leiden, 1909) 90; W. Kranz, "Parabasis," *RE* 36² (1949) 1125; and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Über die Wespen des Aristophanes," in *Kleine Schriften* (Berlin 1935) I 296–299. In the present text of the *Clouds* parabasis, which is a revision of the original version, the poet speaks again in the first person, as if he were returning to the old form in order to address his audience more directly. See J. van Leeuwen, *Aristophanis Nubes* (Leiden 1898) vi–viii, 89; and on the problem in general see Kranz, "Parabasis," 1124–1126. There may be a

change from choral speaker to poet in the *Acharnians* and *Knights parabaseis*, but possibly it is only a change from indirect to direct discourse; see J. van Leeuwen, *Aristophanis Acharnenses* (Leiden 1901) 115: "Ipsa poetae uerba relaturus coryphaeus oratione indirecta coepit (656), nunc in directam delabitur." But this would also reflect the old practice. On the delivery of the parabasis by the poet-chorus leader, see A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb, Tragedy, and Comedy* (Oxford 1927) 255, 296–297; F. M. Cornford, *The Origin of Attic Comedy* (London 1914) 121–124; A. Körte, "Komödie," *RE* 21 (1922) 1244; W. Kranz, *Stasimon* (Berlin 1933) 26–27; and W. Kranz, "Parabasis" (above, n.36) 1125. Athenaeus (14.622b) tells about a ritual in which the *phallophoroi* march into the *theatron*, and "then running forward, they used to make jests at whomever they chose — but they did this standing still." According to Norwood (above, n.30) 13, this was probably the original form of invective; later a poet was commissioned to do the job, and the survivals of it are seen in the Attic parabasis. See also Cornford 42–47, 124.

37. The chorus often inform the audience when the parabasis is about to begin, by announcing that they will remove their robes and begin their "anapests," e.g. *Acharnians* 627, *Knights* 503, *Peace* 729, *Birds* 684; and Pherecrates, frag. 79. On the origin of the term "anapests" see Kranz, *Stasimon* (above, n.36) 26.

38. The critical parabasis spoken in the poet's person seems to have gone out of fashion after 421 B.C. Aristophanes says in his *Amphiaraus* (frag. 30): "I know that I'm doing something old-fashioned (*ἀρχαῖον τι δρῶν*); I'm well aware of it." See Körte (above, n.36) 1243–1244. The choruses of Aristophanes' later comedies speak in their own character in the parabasis, e.g. the Mystae in the *Frogs* declare: "it is just for the holy chorus to advise and teach good to the city" (681–682); and see also *Birds* (684–722), *Lysistrata* 626, *Thesmophoriazousae* 785–813. There is no parabasis in his last plays, the *Ecclesiazousae* and the *Ploutos*.

39. To the bard's intellectual and moral *kairos*, compare the purely physical *kairos* of the chorus of Theban maidens (above, section II).

40. ἀγω in the sense "lead a chorus" occurs also in *O* 13.29; cf. Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 11, the word *χοραγός* (Aleman 1.44) and the names Agido and Hagesichora (see Page [above, n.22] 64). The word ἀπένω, here translated "call upon," seems strange in this context. In Homer it means simply to call aloud (e.g. *Odyssey* 10.83, 9.399, 17.271), but in Pindar it seems almost always to mean "invoke," that is, to call upon in a religious manner, e.g. on the gods in *O* 1.74, *P* 5.104, and *O* 5.19, and on Hieron as a savior in war in *P* 2.19. Thus perhaps Pindar implies here that he is on a divine mission, that he is indeed ἀοίδημος *Πιερίδων προφάτας* (*Paean* 6.6).

41. Similar "general" first personal statements which include all mankind occur also in *I* 8.13–15 and *P* 3.59–60 (see below, section IV), *N* 6.1b–7, *P* 8.95–97, *P* 9.106–107, frags. 109.6–7 and 107.15(?). All are transitional, introducing a new subject. (An incomplete list with a brief commentary may be found in E. des Places, *Le Pronom chez Pindare* [*Etudes et Commentaires* 3; Paris 1947] 9).

42. On the paratactic comparison of Thessaly to the Hyperboreans, see Finley 28.

43. The image of the ship of state first occurs in Alcaeus (frags. 119–120), and is employed frequently in Attic drama (e.g. Aeschylus' *Seven*, Sophocles'

Oedipus Tyrannus) in political contexts (see also *P* 10.72 and *O* 1.86). But the image of the poet as steersman of song seems to be Pindar's own invention. It occurs also in *N* 5.50–52, *N* 4.70, *P* 11.39–41, *P* 2.63–64; but cf. Bacchylides 12.1–4, where the Muse is steersman of the poet's mind, and 16.1–4, which recalls *N* 5.2–3, where the Muse sends the poet a ship laden with song.

44. Narrative song is described in road terminology in Homer and Hesiod, e.g. *Odyssey* 8.73–74 “the Muse inspired the bard to sing κλέα ἀνδρῶν, a lay (οἴμη) whose fame now reached the heavens”; and *Iliad* 19.185 “you have gone through (δικέο) everything fairly and explained it” (cf. also *Iliad* 9.61). In the Homeric hymns the *aoidoi* speak of “moving over” (*μεταβαίνειν*) to another hymn (*h.Hom.* 9.9, 5.292). On the origin and development of road imagery, see Otfried Becker's exhaustive study, “Das Bild des Weges,” *Hermes Einzelschriften* 4 (Berlin 1937). Road terminology is consciously used by Xenophanes (7.1), Parmenides (2.1–2, 5.), who speak of embarking on new road-themes; see also Empedocles 35.1–2. Pindar's many elaborations of this basic imagery are considered in detail by Becker 69–70; see also Schadewaldt 272 n.1, and E. Diehl (above, n.9) 88–89.

45. ἄωτος (literally, “blossom”) was probably suggested by the bee simile, but seems to have no metaphorical significance here. See Farnell II 219; F. Schwenn, *Der junge Pindar* (Berlin, 1940) 10; and *LSJ*.

46. Parmenides is perhaps the first poet to speak of himself in such close association with the divine. But it is impossible to say whether the idea of the Muse's chariot as a vehicle for the mortal poet was original with Pindar. There are, however, no earlier extant occurrences of the image. Homer speaks of the gods' wondrous chariots (e.g., the chariot of Hera and Athena in *Iliad* 8. 374–396), but in Hesiod the Muses seem to travel from earth to Olympus on foot (*Theogony* 68ff.). Pindar speaks of the Muse's chariot frequently in his odes, e.g. *I* 8.62, *I* 2.2, *O* 6.22, *N* 1.7, *O* 9.80, and is imitated by Bacchylides (5.177). See also Farnell II 72–73; Becker (above, n.44) 71; Schadewaldt 272 n.1; and Schwenn (above, n.45) 22.

47. Poor Thorax evidently cannot go along on the ride! *ποιηνύω* (“be busy, bustle about,” from *πνέω*, “breathe”) seems to be an odd word to use in praise of Thorax, since in Homer it is always used of servants hurrying about to help their masters; see *LSJ*.

48. It is interesting that “here in his first poem he asserts his full equality with the great noble” (Farnell II 220). He addresses Hieron in much the same manner. But Pindar was also an aristocrat, as *P* 5.72ff. seems to indicate; see Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 124.

49. On the meaning of victory in Pindar, see Finley 57–58, 40–41.

50. On the date of *N* 5, see Farnell I 185–186; and Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 168.

51. “But upon every ship and in every boat, sweet song, go forth from Aegina, proclaiming that Pytheas won . . .” (*N* 5.2–3). The song is almost personified in these lines: it “marches forth” (*οτείχω* is used of people elsewhere in Pindar, e.g. *N* 9.20, *N* 1.25 and 65, frag. 84.66); it “proclaims.” These animate verbs help bring out the difference between the motive, living song, and the immobile, lifeless statue.

52. The relationship of the Homeric bard to the Muse is clearly expressed in *Iliad* 2.484–494: “Tell me now, Muses, who dwell in the halls of Olympus, for you are goddesses, are there and know everything, but we hear rumor only and

do not know anything — [tell me] who were the rulers and leaders of the Greeks. I could not speak their multitude nor name them, not if I had ten tongues or ten mouths, a voice unbreakable, and a heart of bronze within me, if the Olympian Muses, the daughters of Zeus did not recall what went on beneath Ilion.” The Homeric bard repeats directly what he is told (this is exemplified also in the formulaic phrases ἔννεπέ μοι, ἔσπερέ μοι; see below, n.69). Pindar expresses the same reverence for the Muses’ knowledge in *Paean* 6.51–57, but in his terms the poet seems to be in closer association with them, since he makes a clear distinction between their relationship to poets and to other mortals: “The goddesses can impart [literally, persuade] these things to poets, but it is impossible for mortals alone to discover them.” (*Paean* 6.51–52). On this passage, see also Radt (above, n.8) 124–130.

53. On the broad jump as a metaphor of distance, see also Schwenn (above, n.45) 191.

54. Pindar begins *Paean* 6 by praying to Apollo: “I pray with the Graces and with Aphrodite that you receive me, spokesman in song for the Pierian Muses” (*Paean* 6.2–6). The Graces are the companions of the Muses in Hesiod, *Theogony* 64, and *h.Hom.* 27.15; they sing with the Muses at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis (*Theognis* 15), and are therefore, along with Aphrodite (who sings with them in *Cypria*, frag. 6), the patron goddesses of poets (see *O* 14, and also Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 151–152). Pindar’s reference to the Graces here (*N* 5.54) thus seems to be a certain indication that these lines are addressed to himself. The scholia, however, suggest that this passage might be addressed to the leader of the chorus, and this interpretation has been adopted by some recent scholars, e.g. Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 169–170; and Farnell II 280. But Pindar gives explicit directions to his chorus leader only once in the *Odes*, *O* 6.84–92, and then calls him by name, so that the transition is clearly indicated: “My mother’s mother Stymphalis draws me here, flowery Metope, who bore Thebe, whose lovely water I drink as I weave a varied song for fighting men. Now rouse your comrades, Aeneas, first to sing of Hera Partheneia, then to decide, if we escape with our true words the old taunt ‘Boeotian swine.’ You are a straight messenger, a vessel of the fair-haired Muses, a sweet mixing-bowl (*krater*) of loud-sounding song.” In his other poems also he almost always indicates by direct means when his commands are addressed to others, e.g. by an explicit *τύ* or *ὦμε* (as in *P* 8.6, *O* 1.114, *I* 6.19), or by means of proper names (as in *O* 12.13, *P* 5.45, etc.). The only possible exception might seem to be *P* 1.85ff., where he switches from self-address (“if you sing *kairos*, gathering up the ends of many strands in a short space . . .,” 81–82) to advising Hieron (“but all the same, envy is better than pity, do not neglect what is splendid. Guide your people with a just tiller . . .,” 85–86). But a transition is indicated by the strong adversative phrase “but, all the same” (*ἀλλ’ ὅμως*) and by the content: *kairos* is the poet’s concern, but the envy of citizens and just government is the ruler’s.

55. Although the context clearly indicates that the speaker is an epinician poet, I. Mueller (above, n.9) 41, attributes these lines to the chorus, principally because there is no concrete evidence that Pindar is speaking. This view has met with little acceptance (e.g. Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 151 n.1).

56. All of these shorter odes and longer monostrophic odes like *I* 8 seem to be *prosodia*, “processional songs;” see W. Christ, *Pindari Carmina* (Leipzig 1896) lx. But the particular purpose of each ode can be determined only by its subject matter.

57. The scholia indicate that *P* 7 was probably sung at Delphi, at a celebration shortly after the victory; see Christ (above, n.56) 189.

58. For light as a metaphor of fame, cf. *I* 4.44–46: “A word spoken walks in immortality, if it has been spoken well; it goes both over the fruitful earth and across the sea, a fiery light (*ἀκτίς*) of noble deeds, unquenchable always.” Light in Pindar is always associated with the gods. They dwell in the “brazen heaven,” but mortals live below in semi-darkness (*N* 6.1–7, *P* 10.27–29). Light is thus a metaphor of the divine, of the divinity reflected in man’s glorious achievements (e.g. *I* 5.1–6, *I* 4 throughout, *P* 11.45, *P* 5.45, *P* 8.95–97), and of the immortality of the fame which these achievements bring (e.g. *N* 3.64), especially fame in song (as in *I* 4.45, and also *N* 4.82–85, *N* 3.77–80, *N* 8.34). See also Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 201–203; Gundert 7, 11–14, 29; Finley, esp. 51–55, 100–102, 144–146; and G. Norwood, *Pindar* (Sather Classical Lectures 19; Berkeley, 1945) 191–194.

59. Perhaps Pindar places particular emphasis on himself in *O* 14 because the song is dedicated to the poet’s patron goddesses, the Graces (see above, n.54), whereas in *P* 12 he has no special ties with Athena. The tone of *O* 14 is much warmer, as if he were acquainted with the victor, and familiar with the shrine of the Graces in Orchomenos, a village not very far from Thebes.

60. The text of the end of Bacchylides 13 is mutilated. In line 226 the substantive of *τάν* is missing. R. C. Jebb, *Bacchylides, The Poems and Fragments* (Cambridge, Eng., 1905) suggests *χάριν*; *ξειλαν* would also be possible. B. Snell, *Bacchylidis Carmina cum Fragmentis*, ed. 7 (Leipzig, 1958) attempts no restoration.

61. “Show forth,” that is, “express,” “reveal” a song or story is an idiomatic phrase common to prose and poetry. Empedocles uses the phrase to introduce a new section of his work (frag. 131.3–4): “Now, Calliope, stand beside me as I pray, and as I show forth my good account about the blessed gods (*ἀγαθὸν λόγον ἐμφαίνοντι*).” Cf. also Herodotus 1.116.5: “he set forth the true story” (*ἔφανε τὸν ἔοντα λόγον*), and 1.191.1; also *Iliad* 18.295, and Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus* 721.

62. If the decipherment by H. D. Ephron, “The *Jēsōn* Tablet of Enkomi,” *HSCP* 65 (1961) 39–107, is correct, the idea of honoring in song occurred in pre-Homeric epic. The tablet deals with the voyage of the Argo, and the first lines seem to mean “I honor the voyage of the far-wandering Argo” (*ainetan guon timaka wanaktos Argohos aioloio*); see Ephron 59.

63. On Bacchylides’ metaphors, see below, n.66.

64. The adjective *τερψιεπής* “delighting-with-words” seems to be a *ἀπαξ λεγόμενον*, but the idea is Homeric, e.g. *Iliad* 9. 186–189: “They found Achilles delighting (*τερπόμενον*) his heart with the shrill lyre . . . with this he was delighting (*ἐτερπεν*) his heart, and sang the famous deeds of men.” See also *Odyssey* 17.385, and Hesiod, *Theogony* 917. On *θέλξις*, see especially *Odyssey* 1.337, where Penelope asks the bard Phemius, since he knows “many other ways to charm mortals” (*θελκτήρια βροτῶν*), to sing another song, because the present song grieves her. On the subject of the purpose of Homeric song in general, see also E. E. Sikes, *The Greek View of Poetry* (London 1931) 1–4; and W. Kraus, “Die Auffassung des Dichterberufs im frühen Griechentum,” *Wiener Studien* 68 (1955) 66–78.

65. To Bacchylides’ “if Cleio has instilled . . . into my heart” (13.228–229) compare *Odyssey* 2. 270–271, where Athena says to Telemachus: “. . . from now

on do not be cowardly or foolish, if indeed your father's noble fighting spirit has been instilled (*ἐνέστακται*) in you." The word occurs also in Herodotus 9.3.1, and in *P* 9.63. Bacchylides' relationship to the Muses seems to be identical to that of the Homeric bard; see above, n.52 and also his invocations to the Muse in 12.1-4 and 16.1-4 (above, n.43).

66. For example, the merchant ship of *N* 5.3 (see above, n.51) becomes in Bacchylides simply a container of song sent by the Muse to the poet (16.1-4); also the eagle of *N* 5.21, who traverses great distances in song, reappears with descriptive elaboration in Bacchylides 5.16-30, but Bacchylides follows his description of the eagle with a slightly rephrased version of the opening lines of Pindar's *I* 4 "so now also many ways are open for me on all sides to praise your song," which makes his eagle a metaphor of choice and versatility, rather than of an artistic ability to bring together events separated by space and time. On Bacchylides' "uncomprehending" imitations of Pindar, see C. M. Bowra, *Problems in Greek Poetry* (Oxford 1953) 79-81. All close verbal parallels have been collected and compared by W. K. Prentice, *De Bacchylide Pindari artis socio et imitatore* (Diss. Halle 1900). (*Ode* 5 was written in 476; *Dithyramb* 16 seems to be later than Sophocles' *Women of Trachis*, which may be dated as late as 435; see Snell [above, n.60] 47*-48*).

67. On self-address, see above, n.54.

68. On the *krater* imagery in the proem of *I* 6, see especially Schwenn (above, n.45) 202-203.

69. To Pindar's "tell me who killed Cycnus" (*I* 5.43-44) compare also *Iliad* 1.1, 2.484ff, 14.508, 16.112, *Odyssey* 1.1, *h.Hom.* 19.1; and also *O* 11.16 and *P* 1.58.

70. On arrow imagery, cf. *O* 2.83, *O* 9.1ff., and see also Schwenn (above, n.45) 19.

71. Water is associated with artistic *kairos* also in *I* 6.20: "it is a certain law for me to rain praises (*ρωνέμεν εὐλογίαις*) upon Aegina." Because of its ability to reflect light, water seems to be a symbol of the poet's powers of bringing fame, as in *N* 7.12, *P* 5.99, *I* 7.19. See Finley 52-53, and above, n.58. The metaphor first occurs in Pindar and seems to be used by him in *I* 6 almost as a *σφράγις*, since he concludes the ode: "I give them to drink the water of Dirce . . ." (*I* 6.74); see Schwenn (above, n.45) 216-217.

72. The phrase *καὶ τοιαῖδε τιμai* is usually taken as "and such honors in games," as if referring to the *following* lines about the athletic prowess of the victor's family, i.e. "and such honors in games welcome the song of victory in games." But the interpretation of the phrase as "and such honors in war," as if referring to the *preceding* lines about Aegina's victory at Salamis, gives excellent sense, and may suit the context better — Pindar is principally concerned here with whether or not it is *kata kairon* to mention Salamis in a victory song, not (as elsewhere) with the ability of song to bring joy and enduring significance to a victory celebration (e.g. *P* 1.92ff. This is what Schadewaldt calls the "Sieg-Lied" motif; see pp. 294-295, 277n.1). I am grateful to Mr. Peter Westervelt for suggesting to me this second interpretation.

73. On *kairos* as the essential purpose of Pindar's art, see *P* 9.76-79: "Great *aretaī* are always long stories, but the devising of a short tale on a long theme is well-received by the wise. And, in the same way, *kairos* is the crown of everything." He goes on to cite Iolaus' aid to Athens as an example of an action *kata kairon*, and then defends his own praise of Athens for her role in the Persian war

as appropriate under the circumstances. See Farnell I 138, II 205–206; also Finley 110–113.

74. On the development of the personal “I” from the formal epinician first personal transition, see Schadewaldt 288–297 and *passim*; and also Finley 25–26.

75. *I* 8 ι κλεάνδρῳ ἀλικίᾳ τε may mean either (a) “for Kleandros and the young men” or (b) “for Kleandros and his youthfulness.” Support may be found for (a) in *P* 1.74, where ἀλικίᾳ seems to have a collective meaning (cf. also the collective meaning of *νεότας* in *I* 8.75). But elsewhere in Pindar ἀλικίᾳ has its more usual meaning “youthfulness,” and therefore most editors have taken the phrase as a kind of hendiadys, i.e. “for the youthful Kleandros,” but this also seems difficult. Farnell (II 376) observes in support of (b) that in *I* 8 Pindar places particular emphasis on Kleandros’ youth, e.g. the last line: “for he did not hide his youthful manhood (*ηβαν*) under a hole, without trying noble deeds.” But the poet also pays more attention than usual to the *komos*, as if in his present awareness of communal differences, he wished to stress the local citizens’ role in the celebration (see pp. 212–213). Perhaps he has in mind two separate groups of young men: a chorus whom he addresses ὦ *νέοι* (1), and a group, the ἀλικίᾳ, who participate in the celebration without singing, to whom he refers also in 72–74: “let one of the youths (ἀλικῶν) weave for Kleandros a soft crown of myrtle for the *pankration*.”

76. Although Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 197, takes *αἰτέομαι* as a middle “I beg leave,” it seems more natural to take *αἰτεόμαι* as a passive “I am asked,” i.e. commissioned, cf. *P* 10.4–6, “Pytho and Pelinaion and the sons of Aleus summon me;” see Farnell II 377.

77. On the interpretation of the imperative *θεράπευε* as self-address, see Farnell II 377; and above, n.54.

78. According to the scholiasts, the “great sorrows” refer to the deaths of the victor’s relatives in the war. But it seems unlikely that even peace would free mourners from their sorrow, especially when it comes such a short time after the deaths. The same would hold true for Theban losses. The *πένθεα* therefore must refer to something which peace could end, namely, Pindar’s regrets about Thebes’ political alliance with the Persians. See also Farnell II 377.

79. *κᾶδος* refers specifically to one’s personal sorrows also in *O* 1.110 and *O* 7.5; and see LSJ.

80. In *Peace* 796–797, δαμώματα clearly refers to songs sung before the citizens of Athens: “Such δαμώματα [i.e. songs like mine] of the fair-haired Graces must the wise poet sing, when the spring swallow makes her nest and warbles [i.e. at the March festival of the Greater Dionysia].”

81. Pindar is particularly concerned with the reception of his ode by his audience: γλυκύ, “sweet” is emphasized by its position at the beginning of the line and its separation from the modifying καὶ μετὰ πόνον. Bardic song was traditionally pleasing (*τερπομένη*) and delightful (*ἰμερόεις*); see above, n.64. Hesiod speaks of the γλυκερή αὐδῆ of the bard (*Theog.* 96); cf. also *Iliad* 1.249: “Nestor, the clear-voiced orator of Pylos, whose voice (αὐδῆ) flows from his tongue more sweetly than honey.” Pindar often speaks of his song, or of the instruments of his song, as sweet, e.g. *N* 9.3, *N* 5.2, *I* 2.7, *O* 10.3, *N* 4.45, *O* 10.94, and cf. Bacchylides frag. 21.4, *Ode* 2.12.

82. Suffering is a major theme of *I* 8, brought out also in the myth. Zeus’s and Poseidon’s decision brings sorrow to Thetis, who must marry a mortal; her son, Achilles will die in war. See Finley 29–30; and also *HSCP* 63 (1958) 128–130.

83. Archilochus also seems to have used the Tantalus myth in a political context, perhaps in connection with the colonization of Paros: "may the stone of Tantalus not hang over this island" (frag. 55); see Farnell II 377. It is significant that Pindar follows this version of the myth, rather than the account in *Odyssey* 11.582ff., where Tantalus' suffering is not caused so much by fear as by longing. The "stone" version first occurs in Archilochus, and may have been invented by him, as Pausanias suggests (10.13.12). See also Alcman 72, Alcaeus 32, and the scholium on *O* 1.91.

84. On the political significance of *I* 8.15–16, see Farnell II 378.

85. Pindar's *xenia* for Aegina is expressed more indirectly in *N* 5.7–8, and very explicitly in his later odes, e.g. *N* 7. 50–52, *N* 8.13, and especially *P* 8.98, where he calls upon "Aegina, dear mother."

86. On Pindar's increased emphasis in *I* 8 on the ties between Thebes and Aegina, see Finley 58.

87. In its only other occurrences *προνέμειν* has the meaning "present" or "offer forth," e.g. Aeschylus, *Eum.* 313, "no anger from us falls upon the man who presents (*προνέμονται*) clean hands;" Sophocles, *El.* 1384, "see where Ares presents himself (*προνέμεται*) breathing blood." Thus there seems to be no reason to take *προ-* in *I* 8 as temporal, so that *προνέμειν* would mean "assign beforehand" (as *LSJ*) or "offer first and foremost" (as Farnell I 283).

88. According to the scholium on *N* 4.53, the ode was to have been completed in time for the new-moon festival, and this explanation is accepted by Farnell II 266.

89. *N* 4.36 ("Although the deep sea holds you by the waist, stand firm against plots") has two possible meanings. (1) According to the scholiast, it may be taken literally, as if to say "although the salt sea keeps me from Aegina, I must fight my rivals there;" see also Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 403. (2) The deep sea could be a metaphorical sea of troubles and misunderstanding, cf. the sea-danger imagery of *N* 6.55–57, *O* 6.100–101, and *O* 12.11–12; see Finley 105.

90. Light is always associated with victory in Pindar (see above, n.58), darkness with defeat (e.g. *I* 4.53, *I* 8.77). Height also seems to be a metaphor for *arete*, achievement, and fame, e.g. *P* 3.111, *P* 2.60, *N* 3.20, *N* 8.43, *O* 2.24, *O* 4.3, *O* 5.1, *I* 5.45.

91. *πίπτω* is used of a wrestling fall also in Simonides 153. *πετοῖσαν* is an aorist participle, and thus probably refers to past time, a *gnome* that *has fallen*, rather than Farnell's "so tosteth barren maxims about that fall idly to the ground" (I 175) or Lattimore's "drives the vain shaft of his opinion in darkness, wavering to drop groundward" (R. Lattimore, *The Odes of Pindar* [Chicago 1947] 105). According to these translations, the *gnome* of Pindar's rival is like an arrow or javelin, which are both characteristic metaphors of *kairos*, as in *I* 5.46–47 (above, n.70). But although the interpretation "rolls about his *gnome* like an arrow which has fallen to the ground" is possible, "roll about" and "fallen to the ground" are terms particularly appropriate to wrestling, and in this sense would continue the wrestling metaphor of 36–37 "has you by the waist," which seems to be repeated also in 93–96 (see below, n.94).

92. "This seems to refer to Simonides, since he likes to use digressions (*παρεκβάσεις*)" (schol. on *N* 4.60). See Farnell II 267, and on the application of this criticism to Bacchylides also, see Finley 105.

93. On Pindar's criticism of Bacchylides and Simonides for imitating him, see C. M. Bowra, *Problems in Greek Poetry* (above, n.66) 74–81.

94. Pindar states quite explicitly at the end of *N* 4 that anyone who praises the Athenian trainer Melesias is in for trouble (93–96): “Thus one might oppose strife in praising Melesias, twisting the words, not to be thrown down and dragged in argument; one who thinks kindly of friends, but who will be a fierce second in the battle against his detractors.” Pindar speaks here of verbal criticism in terms of wrestling (*ἔριδα στρέφοι, πλέκων, ἔφεδρος*); perhaps this is an aspect of the wrestling match to which he alluded in 36–41 (see above, n.91). Pindar mentions Melesias also in *O* 8.54–55: “If I have run up in song the glory of Melesias from his training of young men, let envy not throw a rough stone at me.” *O* 8 was written in 460 B.C.; Aegina was finally conquered by Athens in 457/6. *N* 4 would thus seem not far apart from *O* 8 in time, since in both odes Pindar speaks of fighting with the enemies of Melesias. H. T. Wade-Gery, “Thucydides, the Son of Melesias,” *JHS* 52 (1932) 211–212, suggests that *N* 4 antedates *O* 8, on the grounds that in *O* 8 the criticism takes on a more violent form; in both odes, certainly, Pindar is waging a *personal* battle. The fact that Pindar does not attempt to justify his praise of Melesias in *N* 6 would seem to indicate that this ode was written well before hostilities between Athens and Aegina broke out.

95. In *epinikia* direct criticism of one’s rivals is evidently *para kairos*. Bacchylides does not mention Pindar or any other contemporary by name in his odes, but the writers of lyric and communal choral song placed no such restriction on themselves, e.g. Sappho 149, or any of Aristophanes’ *parabaseis*. Corinna seems to criticize another poetess (her teacher?) in one of her maiden-songs: “I blame clear-voiced Myrtis, because, although she is a woman, she entered a contest against Pindar” (frag. 15). In other songs she criticized Pindar for his “Atticism” (schol. on Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 72c), and for the brevity of his myths (Plutarch, *Glor. Ath.* 4 p. 347). Pindar is reputed to have called her *σῦν* (a *Boeotian* swine?) when she beat him in a contest at Thebes, but this was not in an epinician ode (Aelian, *Var. Hist.* 13.25). At any rate, the whole tradition of rivalry between Corinna and Pindar is very late and perhaps historically inaccurate; see D. L. Page, *Corinna* (Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies, Supplementary Paper #6; London 1953) 30–31, and *passim*. Similarly, epinician poets do not identify *themselves* directly, but refer to themselves only in connection with their official role; see below, n.108.

96. *N* 4 has a chiasmic, ABCBA construction. Pindar first speaks of his ability to bring fame (“words live longer than deeds,” 6–8), then of *kairos* (36–40), which introduces the myth. Another *kairos* statement follows the myth (69–72), and at the end of the ode Pindar again refers to his ability to bring fame through song (“I shall set up for your uncle Callicles a *stele* whiter than Parian marble,” 80–81).

97. The phrase *ἀπὸ γλώσσας* seems to be emphatic in *O* 6.13: “for you, Hagesias, the praise is fitting, which Adrastus spoke with his own tongue (i.e. which Adrastus himself spoke) to Amphiaraus.” Cf. also Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 813, and see Farnell II 42.

98. *μηχανή* can mean any intellectual ability (e.g. *P* 1.141, *P* 8.75), but it refers specifically to Pindar’s poetic ability in *P* 3.109 and *P* 8.34–35, and to Homer’s in *N* 7.22.

99. On unreal conditions with imperfect in the protasis and aorist in the apodosis, see H. W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1956) §2310.

100. In Homer light is the symbol of the saving of life, of victory in battle. Patroclus wishes to be a light (*φῶς*) to the Greeks (*Iliad* 16.39, 95–96, 17.615, 11.797, 15.741). Eumaeus greets Telemachus, returned from his journey, as a “sweet light” (*Odyssey* 16.23). See C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass. 1948) 128–146. Pindar speaks in frag. 99b.3 of the “shining light of peace.” Fame is a far-shining light in *O* 1.93–94 (cf. 23 and 1ff.); *N* 3.83, 64; *P* 6.14–15.

101. “Golden health” and Asclepius are two different things; the former refers to general well-being (as in *O* 5.23), the latter to a specific cure. Pindar did not bring Hieron lasting health when he came to Sicily years ago, nor can he provide him with a cure today. But cf. Schadewaldt, 332–333; and Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 282–283.

102. According to the scholiasts, Pindar instituted the cult of the Great Mother in Thebes, after he saw a vision of her in the mountains; see Farnell II 141–142, 459. On the Great Mother as goddess of death, see Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford 1909) III 302–306.

103. The image of unhealthy *olbos* does not occur again in Pindar, but is frequent in tragedy, e.g. Sophocles, *O.T.* 105–107: “Pride, once overstuffed with many things, unseasonable and unprofitable, climbs to the highest ramparts, falls to a horrible doom, which its feet cannot escape.”

104. On *μηχανή* as poetic ability, see above, n.98. *ἀσκέω* and *ἐπασκέω* in Pindar usually seem to mean “worship, pay honor to,” e.g. *O* 8.22, *N* 11.8, *N* 9.10, frag. 184.4. In frag. 84.53 it seems to mean “practice” (“whom Andaisistrota trained in clever ways”), which Farnell II 61–62, believes is its basic meaning elsewhere. *ἀμφέπω* always means to “guard” or “watch over,” e.g. *O* 1.12, *P* 9.70. On this passage in relation to Pindar’s *Weltanschauung*, see H. Gundert, “Der alte Pindar,” *Mnemosynon Theodor Wiegand* (Munich 1938) 12.

105. “If the god were to give me. . . . I might have hope to find high fame in the future”, seems to be a type of Future-less-vivid condition, as it were, a “future” unreal; see Smyth (above, n.99) §2334b. On the metaphor of height, see above, n.90.

106. Farnell, II 136, interprets Pindar’s references to his ability to bring fame in 106ff. not as a consolation, but as a request for money. But this seems a rather inconsonant distortion of the text, since the tone of the rest of the ode is warm and objective. Pindar is concerned primarily with Hieron’s problems, with Hieron’s health and happiness, not with his own personal finances. Wilamowitz’ suggestion (which Farnell himself criticizes, II 136) that Pindar says that he will pray to the Great Mother because Hieron gave him the means to establish the cult, also seems to lack support from the text; see Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 270–272.

107. “I shall be small in small circumstances, great in great, etc.” is not an “if I were you” admonition, but a gentler comparison, since it is advice for Pindar himself as well as for Hieron. The aristocratic world no longer has the moral standards that Pindar believed it to have in *P* 10; he must now look within himself, and he offers his own standards as a guide for Hieron’s conduct also. On this first personal advice, cf. Schadewaldt, 333; Finley, 90–92; Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 284 (“Zuletzt lenkt Pindar vorsichtig in die Weise zurück, was er dem Hieron sagen will, in erster Person auszusprechen”).

108. Pindar in his *epinikia* speaks of himself only in relation to his official role as poet, but Bacchylides uses a traditional personal *σφράγις* in his *Ode* 3: “And

along with the truth of your glory [Hieron], men will also sing of the charm of the honey-tongued nightingale of Ceos" (96–98). Bacchylides does not mention Ceos here to recall *xenia*, as Pindar would mention Thebes in Aegina. His sole aim is to identify himself, to indicate that he is the composer of the ode. (Cf. the *σφραγίς* of Ibycus' ode to Polycrates: "And you, Polycrates, will have fame undying, just like my fame in song" [frag. 3. 46–47]). Pindar seems to give such "unrelated" personal information about himself only in songs intended for public competition, as a necessary means of self-identification. For instance, in his frag. 61.18–19, a dithyramb performed at Thebes, Pindar boasts of his renown throughout Greece; in frag. 63, a dithyramb performed at the Athenian Greater Dionysia (where a dithyrambic contest was held), he states specifically that this is the second time that he has come to Athens to compete in the festival (9–10). Cf. also *Paeon* 6.1–18, which was performed along with the paeans of other poets at a festival in Delphi. Some means of direct identification was clearly necessary at public competitions, in order to distinguish one poet from another. Bacchylides, in his *Dithyramb* 19 (probably performed at the Greater Dionysia) also identifies himself at the beginning of his song: "weave then something new in lovely, wealthy Athens, o distinguished Ceian mind" (8–11). The bard of the Homeric hymn to Delian Apollo describes himself in detail as the "blind man from Chios" (*h.Hom.* 3.165–175). *aoidoi* competed yearly at the festival in Delos, and the bard's question "who, maidens, seemed to you the sweetest of the singers" (169–170) is virtually a request for a prize; see Allen, Sikes, and Halliday, *The Homeric Hymns*, ed. 2 (Oxford 1936). But Pindar evidently considered this type of direct personal reference unnecessary in *epinikia*, which were not performed in competition, but before an audience that knew in advance who he was.

109. Schol on *N* 9.1a: ἀπὸ τοῦ χοροῦ ὁ λόγος.

110. Although the emphasis in *N* 9. 1–4 is on the composition of song, the verb *κωμάζω*, "bring a *komos*," is used by Pindar also of the victor (*O* 9.4, *N* 11.28) and of the victory *komos* itself (*N* 4.24, cf. *N* 10.35). But in the first and second person singular it always refers to the poet (*I* 3.8, 90; *P* 9.89, *I* 7.20).

111. As in *N* 9.54–55, Pindar frequently concludes with a prayer (see Farnell II 315) either for himself as a poet (*O* 1.115, *O* 6.105, *P* 2.96) or for the victor's family and city (*O* 8.86–88, *O* 13.115–115b, *P* 5.124, *P* 8.98–100, *I* 7.49–51), a practice derived from the formulaic conclusions of the bards' *prooimia*, e.g. the poet's prayer for victory in *h.Hom.* 6.19–20 (cf. also "I beseech you in song," *h.Hom.* 16.5, 21.5) and the more general prayers for prosperity in *h.Hom.* 2.490–494, 11.5, 15.9, 20.8, and 31.17.

112. Pindar's general prayer for the welfare of the Aetnaeans in *N* 9.28–32 may be compared to the belligerent prayer for victory of the Abderitan chorus in *Paeon* 2.66–68 (above, n. 12).

113. Content alone distinguishes a general "we," like *I* 8.11: "some god has turned aside for us the stone of Tantalus over our heads" from a plural statement that could apply only to Pindar, like *I* 8.9 "let us bring before the people of Aegina some sweetness even after suffering" (see above, section IV). "I" and "we" are interchangeable in choral song (the chorus most often speaks in the singular) and also in elegiac and lyric poetry (e.g. Xenophanes 2.13, where *ἡμετέρη σοφίη* can only mean "my poetry").

114. Schol. on *I* 7.51: ὁ τῷ ἀποθανόντι διαφέρων ἐγώ ὁ χορός, φησίν, ἔτλαν. η̄ οἱ σοὶ οἰκεῖοι.

115. On the date of this ode, see Farnell I 277–280; also Gundert, “Der alte Pindar” (above, n. 104) 1–2. This is a time of defeat and sorrow, as Pindar states in the proem (16–19): “The old glory sleeps, and men are unmindful of what does not come forth as the high perfection of poetry yoked to sounding streams of words.”

116. On *P* 3.107–111, see above, n. 107; and cf. also *N* 8.35–39, the personal statement of *xenia* discussed in the Introduction.

117. For a summary of the scholarship on *P* 5.72–82, see especially Farnell II 177–179 and Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 477–479, who both agree that Pindar is speaking, but cf. Fraenkel (above, n. 1) 541–542, who attributes these lines to the chorus. The idea that there is a choral “I” here and elsewhere in Pindar’s *epinikia* has received little support in this century, but in the nineteenth century studies attempting to prove that the chorus was speaking in *P* 5 were widely acclaimed, among which the most influential seem to be the following: F. Thiersch, *Pindarus Werke* (Leipzig 1820) I 139–166; G. Gilbert, *Studien zur altspartanischen Geschichte* (Göttingen 1872) 64–71; K. O. Mueller, *Orchomenos und die Minyer*, ed. 2 (*Geschichte Hellenischer Stämme und Städte* I; Breslau 1844) 323–328; L. Bornemann, “Über die Aegiden, von denen angeblich Pindar stammte,” *Philologus* 43 (1884) 79–85; and F. Studniczka, *Kyrene, eine altgriechische Göttin* (Leipzig 1890) 73–85. Attempts to show that Pindar was speaking received somewhat less attention, e.g. Tycho Mommsen, *Pindaros: zur Geschichte des Dichters und der Parteikämpfe seiner Zeit* (Keil 1845) 10–13; G. Hermann, “Über die Aegiden, von denen Pindar abstammte,” in *Opuscula* (Leipzig 1877) VIII 93–98; F. Mezger, *Pindars Siegeslieder* (Leipzig 1880) 230; A. Rehm, “Pindar und die Aegiden,” *Commentationes Philologicae* (Munich 1891) 146–159. In this century Imre Mueller, *Quomodo Pindarus chori persona usus sit* (Diss. Freiburg 1914); F. Dornseiff, *Pindars Stil*, (Berlin 1921) 83–84; J. Sandys, *The Odes of Pindar* (Loeb Classical Library, London 1937) 240 n.2, along with Fränkel, have restated the nineteenth century arguments for the choral “I.” But all these studies deal only with the internal evidence in the text of the passage itself, and do not take into consideration the nature of choral and “bardic” style as a whole.

118. Schol. on *P* 5.96a: ὁ λόγος ἀπὸ τοῦ χοροῦ τῶν Λιβύων ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ.

119. On Thera’s colonization of Cyrene see the scholia on *P* 5.96b, and Callimachus’ *Hymn to Apollo*. 67–76: “But I shall call you Carneios. For my ancestors’ country Sparta was your first shrine, Carneios. Your second was Thera, and your third the city of Cyrene. From Sparta the sixth generation from Oedipus led you to a colony in Thera, and from Thera Aristoteles brought you to the land of Asbystis (Cyrene).”

120. On the Aegidae in Thebes and the conquest of Amyclae, see the schol. on *I* 7.51 and Farnell II 178. Callimachus (above, n. 119) refers to the Theban origin of the Aegidae, which Herodotus seems to confirm when he states that the Aegidae in Sparta “because their children never survived, built a shrine, on the advice of an oracle, to the Furies of Oedipus and Laius. The same thing was done also by their descendants in Thera” (4.149.2).

121. On the metaphor of the water of praise in *I* 5 and *I* 6 see above, n. 71.

122. The other passages questioned by the scholiasts are *P* 9.97–103 (see Farnell II 210–211 and Wilamowitz, *Pindaros*, 266), *N* 1.18 (Farnell II 243–245), *P* 8.78 (Farnell II 195–197 and Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 441), and *P* 8.98 (see

especially Gundert 33). All these passages are clearly statements of *xenia* by the poet.

123. On the date of *N* 7 and Pindar's criticism of Neoptolemus, see J. H. Finley, "The Date of *Paean* 6 and *Nemean* 7," *HSCP* 60 (1951) 61–80. On the structure of the ode as a whole, see also Schadewaldt 300–323.

124. Schol. *N* 7.123a: "Pindar seems at this point to be turning about in the ode. For sometimes he speaks in his own person against those who criticize him about Neoptolemus, sometimes he brings on the chorus of Aeginetans saying 'guardian of my fatherland.' For Pindar was not an Aeginetan."

125. On the imagery of white, gold, and coral in *N* 7.76, see Finley 102.

126. I can suggest only one interpretation of the ms. reading, based on the scholium *I* 7.18a: "But the Aegidae were Phlegraean originally, a tribe in Aegina." Thus in *N* 7 Pindar could call Aeacus "guardian of my *clan*" (the meaning of *πάτρα* in *P* 8.38 and *N* 6.35b), and in *P* 8.98 Pindar's "Aegina, dear mother" could have a more literal meaning. But the scholium may be based on the similarity of the names Aegina and Aegidae (cf. scholia *I* 7.18c and *P* 5.101c, where the Aegidae are said to be an Athenian tribe, named from king Aegeus). Most editors of the text (including C. M. Bowra in the *O.C.T.*) accept Hermann's emendation of *ἐμὰ* to *ἐἡ*; see Farnell II 301. But B. Snell in the Teubner and A. Turyn in his edition keep to the manuscript tradition; and Schadewaldt observes (321 n.3): "We cannot condemn the text just because we do not understand it."

127. The scholiasts' approach to a passage like *P* 5.73ff. is misleading, since they consider the text too literally, and outside of its proper context. Pindar is not attempting to give a genealogy of his race, accurate in every detail, but to show by means of a general allusion to his ancestry his friendship for the victor and Cyrene. Viewed literally and out of context, a personal "I" statement like *P* 3.107ff. ("I shall be small in small circumstances, great in great") seems like a purposeless subjective outburst, but in context, as we have seen, it has a very important function in the structure of the ode, as a deeply personal expression of Pindar's friendship for Hieron.

128. A possible exception to the rule that change of speaker is always clearly indicated in *epinikia* and pure choral song is *Paean* 2.46–48, the oracle of Hecate. But even there the transition seems clear enough; see above, n.11.

129. On the "epinician" tone in the praise of the Laurel-bearer's family in Pindar's Theban *Partheneion*, see above, n.18.

AGAMEMNON 1346–71, 1649–53

BY GARRY WILLS

I. 1346–71

OBJECTING to Carl Robert's norms for criticizing the end of Aeschylus' *Septem* (especially the argument from excellence to authenticity), H. Lloyd-Jones thinks it enough to mention *Agamemnon* 1346ff. to prove that, in an undoubtedly genuine passage, Aeschylus could absurdly blunder.¹ Fraenkel, after quoting Platt's comment that the only improvement of this passage would be its loss, ruefully prefaces his own suggestions with these words:

But a scholar who has set himself the task of writing a plain commentary is not at liberty to indulge in such fastidiousness even if he wished to do so; he must endeavour to understand and explain the text as best he may . . . Why did the poet at this fatal moment present the Elders in helpless torpor instead of allowing them at least the modest gesture of determination which many of his modern readers have interpolated? The question cannot be answered with confidence.²

Méautis makes a virtue of the grotesque quality in these lines, and calls the scene “la caricature de ces assemblées délibérantes.”³ Others try to brush away the difficulty by imagining some show of action at the end of the twenty-six-line pause.

This embarrassment of the commentators cannot be taken lightly. The lines in question do not fill some inconsequential backwater of the trilogy's advance. They are inserted at the very crisis of the play. Some try to excuse Aeschylus by making the climax occur earlier — during the Cassandra scene, for instance, or the stichomythic interchange between Clytemnestra and Agamemnon.⁴ But these earlier scenes only increase the certitude that the climax is reached where the logic of the action makes us expect it, when Agamemnon is murdered. They point up from all directions the significance of the death that is to follow — its significance as a sacrifice (vv. 973–74) and as punishment (vv. 910ff.), as the unnatural overthrow of man by woman (vv. 1125–29, 1231ff.), as a death linked to past evils (vv. 1095–97, 1184–93) and to future retribution (vv. 1279–81, 1316–26). Aeschylus himself has mobilized his

dramatic resources to point the way to this climax, and if vv. 1346–71 seem bathetic rather than climactic, it is because he has not risen to his own demands.

Before pronouncing on Aeschylus' success, however, it is best to be certain of his intent, even on the most basic level of technique; and even on this level there have been two schools of thought concerning the form of this passage, and especially the assignment of lines to speakers.

There was the school that considered the passage an undistributed utterance of the entire Chorus — a school of thought now discredited, because of the obvious division of the passage into discrete distichs, but with one argument of credit in its arsenal: the argument that in no other place does a Greek tragic chorus disintegrate into its individual components, expressing discord among themselves.⁵ Antiphonal interchanges between hemi-choruses express only that internal conflict and vacillation proper to soliloquy or dramatic utterance of any kind. In short, the Greek chorus is, in terms of the drama, a person, not an assembly. The normal function of the “solo” spokesman, whether coryphaeus or other individual, is to speak for the whole group where more rapid interchange is desired than the regular choral mode of statement would allow.

Even where we most expect division within the chorus, we do not find it. The abrupt and profound change in the role of the Eumenides is effected simultaneously in the whole group. When, in the *Septem*, half the Chorus goes off with Antigone and the other half with Ismene, there is no opposition expressed, between the sisters or their choral attendants. Despite the temptation to read the Sophoclean conflict into this disputed ending, there is no textual basis for dividing the mind of the Chorus: the two groups, which have just mourned the brothers in common (vv. 1054–65), depart in different directions because the two-fold burial must take place at different points. Both deaths, and so both tasks, are a *kourov ἄχος* (v. 1070) according to the first group, and the second group agrees with the former's norms (vv. 1072–73).

Those who, like Headlam and R. D. Murray, find a “party of Hypermnestra” entering a minority report in Aeschylus' Chorus of suppliant Danaids base their conjectures on a reconstruction of the Danaid trilogy which, in fact, confirms the unity of the tragic chorus. Hypermnestra does not step out of the Chorus as an individual; this is the reason men must invent a “party” to express what they take to be her views. But we know from the myth that only Hypermnestra broke faith with her sisters' conspiracy. After emphasizing the importance of Hypermnestra's *unique* act in his interpretation of the trilogy, R. D.

Murray cannot consistently speak of "that part of the chorus which symbolizes Hypermnestra's rebellion."⁶ If the Chorus is forced, in the extant play, to consider the possibility of submission, it does so only in its corporate character. It is a proof of the Chorus' solidarity that a person as important in later developments as Hypermnestra cannot speak as an individual while appearing as part of the Chorus.

Despite such evidence for the treatment of the chorus as a unit, most editors now make up that second school of opinion which distributes vv. 1348-71 among twelve different and differing persons. This raises the question that seems unanswerable: why did Aeschylus resort to such an unusual technique at such an inopportune moment?

A major attempt at an answer has been that of the scholars (Fraenkel cites Klausen, O. Müller, Wecklein) who feel, with Méautis, that the democratic process is for some reason represented and caricatured in this interchange — for no conceivable reason, and in contradiction to the divine sanction given the voting process in the trial scene of the final play. Such an interpretation, sacrificing drama to sociology, is based, to a great extent, on a false comparison between vv. 1370-71 and the Dobree-Hermann reconstruction of *Supplices* 604. The difference between the votes (by metonymy, *χείρ*) that are multiplied in the latter passage and a person's *πλησμονή ἐπωέσεως* should be obvious. Tucker, in his commentary on the *Supplices* passage, can establish a parallel only by making the speaker in the *Agamemnon* imagine himself as a balloting-urn in which the votes are being deposited!⁷ Fraenkel rightly denies specifically political meaning to *πληθύνειν* in this place.⁸ Once this is established, the entire picture of a voting procedure falls to pieces.

Since almost everyone now believes that there is a debate of some kind depicted in these lines, every finesse has been invoked for it.⁹ But many accept the situation only to throw up their hands with Lloyd-Jones; or accept it and direct their attention elsewhere, shamefacedly mumbling through the twenty-six lines, then making the Chorus do what, it appears, Aeschylus should have made it do in the first place — draw swords, and charge the door. Gilbert Murray is at least forthright about this: he imports the words "Break in, then" into his translation. Others (O. Müller, Hermann, Wilamowitz, A. Y. Campbell are cited by Fraenkel) put these heroics in the stage directions.

The effect of these silent (or, in Murray's case, nearly silent) better thoughts on the part of the Chorus is to make the preceding lines more vulnerable. If all the indecision and paralysis of those lines are not after all intended by the speakers, then the poet is maladroit beyond the kindest editor's ministrations. All shifts meant to disguise the Chorus'

9*

inactivity at this point are bound to fail, because Aeschylus took some pains to emphasize the paralysis. Working from this uncomfortable fact, it is possible, I think, to add a third interpretation to the two already considered. I suggest that the distichs are spoken by individuals, but by individuals performing their normal function as spokesmen for the entire group.

The obvious objection to this view is that different opinions are advanced in rapid succession. But this is common enough in the chorus when it speaks out of its inner confusion. Not only do the entire tradition and character of choral speech support this interpretation, the passage is shaped to bear it out. There is not simple opposition in the speakers, but a ruminative journey through connected thoughts. After the first flash of recognition and resolve in vv. 1346–47 — “The deed is done. What shall *we* do?” — there is a subtly delineated retreat into a dishonesty that will not recognize what has been done, and a cowardice that does not propose to act. The scene is not one of group debate but of an individual’s “rationalizings” under the pressure of fear.¹⁰

The first speaker advises the group to begin the procedure against a criminal by having that cry raised which legally establishes that a crime is being committed. He is seconded by the next speaker, who suggests the next step (not δέ . . . γε “introducing an objection,” as Page puts it; δέ additive, γε with ὅπως τάχιστα) in the prosecution of the crime — identification of the criminal in his act.¹¹ But the third speaker suggests the first and key deflection of purpose on which all rationalizing depends. He does not raise objections to the proposal; he simply translates its clear program into generalities:

ψηφίζομαι τὸ δρᾶν τι· μὴ μέλλειν δ' ἀκμῆ.

By substituting the action itself as one’s object of consciousness, instead of the *τέλος* which sets one in motion, the speaker begins that consideration of activity which is the psychological barrier to activity.

As soon as action itself is brought to the forefront of one’s mind, its opposite — delay — appears with it. The next speaker removes things even further from effective response — from *τὸ δρᾶν* to *όρᾶν*:

*όρᾶν πάρεστιν φροιμιάζονται γὰρ ὡς
τυραννίδος σημεῖα πράσσοντες πόλει.*

A pointed word for action is used, but this time to describe the conspiratorial measures being taken by the murderers. With a common psychological stratagem, the Chorus continues to speak as if it were

giving motives for immediate action, though it is really marshaling objections to it, and by this very process causing the objections to become valid.

In the lines of the next speaker the Chorus becomes conscious that it is "stalling" (*χρονιζομέν*), while others see nothing respectable in delay and have not sleepy hands.¹² At this point, the Chorus has spent enough time on the *general* proposition that one should act, to pretend that it has no *specific* plan it can consider. This step the seventh speaker takes (v. 1358), adding that the initiative seized by another cannot be regained; the usurpers "have the jump," events are under their achieved and continuing control (v. 1359). The next speaker carries this train of thought to its goal: once an action has taken place, no action on another's part can undo it.

The Chorus must recognize, in the eighth distich, the prospect of living under this *fait accompli*, a prospect to which the ninth speaker objects that death is preferable (not, notice, the attempt to restore right rule or prosecute the criminals, but the simple surrender of death).¹³ But this harsh threat can be dismissed from the mind, as the demands of action were dismissed. Using the same kind of taunt it had directed against Clytemnestra's trust in the beacon, the Chorus turns to skepticism and satire: "Merely from indication of outcries shall we play the seers and claim the man is dead?"

ἢ γὰρ τεκμηρίουσιν ἐξ οἰμωγμάτων
μαντευούμεσθα τἀνδρὸς ὡς ὀλωλότος;

The last remnant of reality is thrust out of the unwilling mind, which will no longer recognize the fact perceived as obvious in v. 1346, where it needed no further description than the simple *τοῦργον*.

The eleventh speaker says one cannot even talk about the problem (far less take action) without more knowledge, and retreats into one of those choral maxims (here, on the nature of certitude) which are rendered irrelevant by the pressure of events. Then the final speaker pronounces the bathetic conclusion, approaching the level of farce. "All things considered, I prefer this: to conduct an exact inquiry into the condition of Agamemnon."¹⁴ The word *πληθύνομαι* has confused commentators because they see the passage in terms of a debate, so that the final speaker's means of reaching a conclusion for the group must be externally oriented, as in L-S-J's desperate "follow the majority."¹⁵ Even Fraenkel, who denies the possibility of any balloting, still thinks within the framework of debate, and quotes Conington and H. Stein to the effect that a *weighing* of two proposals in the scale somehow

underlies the use of this word, with one side "prevailing" as it fills the scale. But when the speeches are conceived as expressing the movement of the Chorus as a whole, and reaching the internal completion of a single mental process, then the "filling" can be accepted as a psychological metaphor, not turned outwards to some process of counting or weighing or forming a majority. The Chorus is "full of praise for one out of all possible opinions" because it has successfully expelled all objections to delay.

Aeschylus, then, used the fundamental conventions of the chorus for a new purpose — the articulation in some detail of the Elders' flight from the most pressing and obvious reality. Even without the tradition of the solidarity of the chorus, Shakespeare employed a similar device in his crowd scenes, sampling, in the statements of individuals, the course of veering opinion in an entire group, exposing fickleness or some other weakness in the group. Aeschylus, wishing to present an internal failure in his Chorus at the peak of the play's action, could only have done this as he did, since the deploying of the whole Chorus in united statement would have been too formal and static, and there was no actor on stage with whom the Coryphaeus could exchange comments.¹⁶

I propose, therefore, that Aeschylus not only wanted to emphasize the inactivity of the Chorus at this point, but that he did this with great care, in a finely wrought and coherent passage of some length. This still leaves the question: *why* did he arrange this effect at the climax of the play; why must the Chorus fail so spectacularly and completely at the very instant the king dies? These questions involve the interpretation of the entire play, and that involves the interpretation of the entire trilogy; but the questions can at least be correctly framed when the detailed design of this passage is understood, and a brief answer can be sketched.

The Reason for Inaction at 1346 ff. Each choral group in the *Oresteia* is itself an image of the course of action covered, the stage of development reached, in the individual play. The Chorus of the Erinyes represents, by rapid adjustment of its energies to a new order, a transformation of the retributive into a constructive process. The Chorus of mourning women — slaves, war-captives, attendants at a tomb, turned toward death and the past and crying for death as a punishment for the past — represents the obsession and compulsion that set the key for the next, retributive stage of the trilogy. By contrast with these compelled events and this feminine, enclosed world, the first play is open, active, and masculine. It is full of heroic echoes from Troy. The Chorus represents that eternalization of the heroes' deeds in memory and song (*εἰναι καὶ*

ἐσσομένοισιν ἀοιδή)¹⁷ which is the afterlife of Homeric man. They come before us asserting their office, which is to chant the oracle-inspired expedition of kingly men (vv. 104–6). They balance against their physical frailty a growing strength of song (v. 106), casting themselves in the traditional role of the singer or seer whose weakness is compensated by divine gifts (*θεόθεν καταπνείει*, v. 105); in the role, that is, of Homer's Demodocus, of the legendary Homer himself, or of Teiresias. They try to assure Cassandra of the blessing they are themselves meant to bestow:

ἀλλ' εὐκλεῶς τοι κατθανεῖν χάρις βροτῷ [(v. 1304)].

But this Chorus has lived beyond its time (*τὸ ὑπέρυμηρων*, v. 79), like night's dreams prolonged into the daytime. They have come to doubt the glory of the deeds they exalt in song. Already they voice what would become the classic taunt against the Trojan War — that it all took place for one woman.¹⁸ Helen's beauty was a flattering dream (vv. 681–749), turning men into pale simulacra of themselves (v. 415), making them grope among dreams (vv. 420–26), leading them on a childish chase (v. 394), wearing them invisibly away (vv. 465–66), changing them into ashes through the foolish commerce of war (vv. 437–44). Under the grand phrases of the Chorus there is a sadly recurrent burden of unreality. The whole war was a delusion. The prosperity and success of Agamemnon is a delusion (vv. 1331–42). The Chorus tries to warn the King that he must test those who feign friendship (vv. 807–9), for they have themselves become doubtful of fire-signals, and women's reports, and men's loyalty, and war's grandeur, and wealth's advantages. In the person of the King, the world of simple assertion and heroic thrust reaches its fated conclusion in simple expenditure. Agamemnon calmly assures the Chorus that he will do everything, then enters the house to be cut down by a woman's strength — the revenge of Helen through her sister (vv. 1455–61, 1468–74), the conquest made by conquered Troy. The Elders can do nothing, now, but repeat their master's lack of response to reality. And so, at the very moment of his murder, they talk of action and make all action impossible. This is the true end of Agamemnon, of the world he ruled and signified.

The Chorus of Elders is the only one in the trilogy whose song does not effect something. The Erinyes sing their *ὕμνος δέσμιος*; and the hypnotic *κορμός* of the avengers in the second play is a "wail that seeks out its victim" (*Cho.* 330). The Chorus of the *Agamemnon*, on the other hand, recognizes the ineffectual nature of its words, the tongue's limited *μοῖρα* (vv. 1025–29).¹⁹ They seem to think always in terms of

evanescence, of things dimmed and rubbed out.²⁰ As late as in their farewell to Cassandra, they tried to keep up the fiction of their song's function; but with the death of the King, the last remnant of the heroic myth disintegrates in the group that was to perpetuate it. The singers of man the conqueror are reduced to helpless inactivity, their song unable to save the King from death or themselves from doubt. Their earlier odes, like the War they celebrated, were a useless expenditure of effort, a draining away of manhood, leaving only shadows. In the second play, energy is pent up, saved instead of expended, turned single-mindedly toward its task. These growing pressures are channeled to constructive purpose only in the diverted fury, the recruited energies, of the final Chorus. The Eumenides, too, lose their cherished conception of their own role; but they find a new world. The Elders can only watch the old world die.

II. 1649–53

The interpretation so far given of the Chorus' role clashes with the old men's apparent display of courage in the final scene, where they give Aegisthus taunt for taunt, and answer his threat of swords with their own swords (the same ones they drew in the earlier scene as it is re-written by editors and translators). But there are four major problems which make this last bit of bravado as insecurely founded in the text as was that earlier charge on the doors. These are:

- (1) the impossibility in Greek iconography of portraying old men, especially old men with staves, as sword-bearers;²¹
- (2) the doubtful assignment of lines in the manuscript (which alters the attribution of v. 1651) and in the various editions;
- (3) the use of *λοχῖται* in v. 1650;
- (4) the use of *πρόκωπος* in v. 1652.

Fraenkel, after listing all the objections to the sudden appearance of swords at this juncture, still has to construct his text on the assumption that they *do* appear:

I made a persistent effort . . . to try every possible means of getting away from the assumption that the Chorus carried swords. But every attempt led to absurd results.

Yet Fraenkel points the way to solution by his sound discussion of *λοχῖται* in v. 1650,²² which makes him follow Stanley in assigning the line to Aegisthus. Aegisthus speaks both the lines which open this

trochaic section (vv. 1649-50). Once this is established, the prohibitive objection to the Chorus' having swords makes it clear that v. 1651 is also part of Aegisthus' command to his guard. After his address to the Chorus in v. 1649, he calls his men in with the two parallel (*not adversative*) lines beginning *εἰλα δή*. These brisk lines were probably meant to fill the interval it took for the guard to enter and deploy itself in relation to the Chorus. Some such stationing would be expressed by the transition from *λοχῖται* to *πᾶς τις*. We know that the tetrameter was used for the entrance of new characters, especially in pursuit or attack.²³ Editors have not sufficiently noticed this usage, here, because of the give-and-take, as in stichomythia, that begins between Aegisthus and the Elders at v. 1652. At that line the Chorus opens its first retort with *ἄλλα κάγω*, picking up Aegisthus' threat with a resignation that has been their only mode of protest throughout the play: when Aegisthus has his men ready their swords, the old men say "I, too, am ready to your hand; nor turn away from death." The passage is usually taken to mean "I too am hilt-in-hand" (that is, *have* hilts in their hands), though the word is used elsewhere only as it is in v. 1651²⁴ — of the sword that is grasped, not of the man grasping it. The new use of the term in v. 1652, pitted against the normal use in v. 1651, underlines by verbal point the tragic significance the old men are giving to the word. The Chorus, recalling its mournful prediction of vv. 1362-65, calls itself *πρόκωπος* as Cassandra had called herself, in a parallel and equally novel phrase, *εὐμαρὲς χείρωμα*.²⁵ Compare Aeschylus' use of *χείρος* in *Poxy.* 2256, 53:4, and *Supp.* 507.

Not content with giving *πρόκωπος* the active sense of *εὐχείρος* or *πρόχειρος*, Thomson read the latter into his text. But, aside from all other objections, there is no point in making the Elders say they will draw their swords *and not oppose death*. On the other hand, the application in another sense of a word raised by one's interlocutor is effective, and characteristic of such interchanges.²⁶

In v. 1653 Aegisthus calls the Elders' metaphor and mention of their own death an omen, and instead of the proper *εὐφημεῖτε* adds his own *tu dicens*. By the words he takes upon himself the odious role which their threat implies — that is, he does exactly what Pelasgus would not do when the Danaids threatened to die at his country's shrines. Then, just as Aegisthus is about to fulfill the ominous statement the Chorus has made, Clytemnestra dramatically intervenes, addressing him, not the Chorus, reasserting her control over the action.

Such a distribution of lines not only offers an interpretation which Fraenkel did not consider in his desperate attempt to rid himself of the

swords; it removes all four of the major problems listed, and preserves the character and significance of the Chorus as these have been traced in the previous stages of the drama. The old men do not, in the final scene, acquire a new activity and purpose, any more than they produce swords from nowhere. At the end they remain phantoms, remnants of an age that is as irrevocably dead as Agamemnon the King.

NOTES

References to the *Agamemnon* are to Page's text.

1. H. Lloyd-Jones, "The End of the Seven Against Thebes," *C.Q.* n.s. 9 (1959), p. 113: "Had Robert been able to discuss with equal lack of inhibition, say, the scene in which the chorus of the *Agamemnon* debates whether they should enter the palace and find out whether a murder is taking place, he would, I suspect, have gone far beyond the Aristophanic Euripides in the severity of his criticism."
2. E. Fraenkel, *Aeschylus, Agamemnon: Commentary* (Oxford 1950), pp. 642–43.
3. G. Méautis, *Eschyle et la trilogie* (Paris 1936) p. 198.
4. Of the latter scene, for instance, Denys Page writes: "This scene, and in some degree the whole play, reaches its climax here" (*Aeschylus, Agamemnon*, ed. J. D. Denniston and D. Page [Oxford 1957] p. 151).
5. Fraenkel (above, n.2), p. 634, n.1.
6. R. D. Murray, *The Motif of Io in Aeschylus' 'Suppliants'* (Princeton 1958), p. 84.
7. T. G. Tucker, *The 'Supplices' of Aeschylus* (London 1889), p. 122. Cf. *Ag.* 813–17.
8. Fraenkel (above, n.2), pp. 641–42.
9. Fraenkel dutifully invents alternative explanations (p. 643): "It may be assumed that Aeschylus and his audience did not care for the belated display of an energy which could not have the faintest influence on the course of events. It is also conceivable that the inactivity of the Elders in this scene is meant to set off the surprising vigour with which they rise against the insolence of Aegisthus at the end of the play." These explanations do not, as Fraenkel admits, give satisfaction. Furthermore, they are contradictory: if the Athenian audience did not approve a futile display of violence, they would like it no better at the end of the play, where it is as ineffective against Aegisthus as it could possibly be at this point.
10. The clever Guard of the *Antigone* undergoes something like this Chorus' paralysis in inner argument. He says he was impeded by thought's pauses ($\piολλάς γὰρ ἔσχον φροντίδων ἐπιστάσεις$, v. 225). His mind spoke up, but in several senses ($\psiυχὴ γὰρ ηῦδα πολλά μοι μυθουμένη$, v. 227), turning him back and forth in his long traversing of a short distance (vv. 231–32). But the end of this process ($\tauέλος$) was a clear victory ($\epsilonὐικησεν$) for one plan, to come ($μολεῖν$, v. 233). This passage should remove any doubt that the language of *Ag.* 1346–71 can be used of a single character's indecision and inner division.
11. For the legal *clamor* in v. 1349 cf. W. Schulze, *Kleine Schriften*

(Göttingen 1934), p. 182, n.4. On δέ and γε (v. 1350) cf. J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford 1934), p. 153, top paragraph.

12. The vexed passage of δέ τῆς μελλοῦσι κλέος πέδον πατοῦντες seems based on the characteristically Greek apprehension of the ambivalence or unpredictability of qualities motivating human action — an apprehension that invalidates Page's comment: "that Delay may be assumed to be a good thing is hardly tenable in the light of 1353 μὴ μέλλειν δ' ἀκμήν" (above, n.4, p. 194). Although this ambivalence is recognized by all scholars in individual words as isolated phenomena, it may be well to bring a few of these words together, to show the general tendency at work in less familiar examples (like the passage here in question).

(1) ἐλπίς has a double character throughout Greek literature. The two ἐλπίδες are distinguished in *Erga* 500, *Antig.* 615-17, *Rep.* 330e8-331a2. In Thucydides, ἐλπίς is the characteristic quality of Athens (I.70), though in the funeral oration it is an ambiguous thing outside the realm of concrete virtue (II.42.4) — see Gomme *ad loc.*, who cites I.43.6 for the good, and III.45.4 for the bad ἐλπίς. The good ἐλπίς is referred to in Eur. *H.F.* 105-6, and identified with Orestes in *Cho.* 236, 699, 777. The bad ἐλπίς is mentioned by Theognis (v. 637) and Simonides (Stob. 96.16) and Pindar (*Ol.* 12.5-6). Its ambiguous quality is perfectly exploited by Aeschylus in *Prom.* 252 and *Ag.* 11, 262 (answered in 266).

(2) πειθώ can have the whole gamut of ἐλπίς, as we see from its use in the *Oresteia*. It is evil in Clytemnestra (*Ag.* 943; cf. 385), transitional (retributive) in *Orestes* (*Cho.* 726), and triumphantly good in Athena (*Eum.* 885, 970).

(3) There is a distinction between the good and the bad αἰδώς in Homer (*Il.* 24.44-45), Euripides (*Hipp.* 385-86), and Plato (*Charm.* 161ab).

(4) In Hesiod (*Erga* 11-26, 317-19) there is a good ἔρις as well as a bad; and, based on the two ἔριδες there are two δίκαι — ιθεῖα and σκολιά (vv. 7, 9, 219, 225-26, 230, 250, 263-64; cf. Solon, D. 3.37, 24.19). The good ἔρις replaces the barren conflicts of the *Oresteia* in Athena's triumph (*Eum.* 974-75). For Heraclitus, ἔρις was δίκη (frag. 86). Cf. Soph. *O.T.* 879-81.

(5) πλοῦτος has a double meaning from Solon (D. 1.9-13) to Aristophanes. Aeschylus, like many poets, usually assigns the sinister meaning to πλοῦτος (as opposed to δόλος). But he exploits the double sense to express the therne of Helen's deceptiveness (*Ag.* 741).

So, here, Aeschylus presumes two kinds of μελλώ, and refers to the respectable one (ἔχων κλέος), as Hesiod referred to the respectable ἔρις: τὴν μέν κεν ἐπαινέσσει νόησας/ἡ δ' ἐπιμαρτή, *Erga* 12-13. The significantly placed νόησας emphasizes the paradoxical character of the statement. Although μελλώ is not a word as familiar as ἐλπίς, the verb μέλλειν is markedly tugged in two directions, since it marks the imminence of action, yet can also mean the substitution of intention to act for the fulfillment of action. These two nearly opposite meanings ("be about to" and "delay") are both present in the more normal form of μελλώ — μέλλησις — as in the verb. And the ambiguity in the word perfectly catches the Chorus' mode of delaying by deliberating (to use a similar ambiguity in English, of *deliberately* delaying).

13. This is a reaction typical of these old men when they run into difficulty, as in vv. 539, 1448-51, 1538, 1652.

14. *Ag.* 1370-71. Of εἰδέναι κυροῦνθ' ὅπως Murray remarks *mira constructio*, though its meaning is easily grasped. The same thing is true of the ἵν πῶς of v. 1347, the πρὸς δῶμα . . . βοήν of v. 1349, the πέρι of v. 1359. These words,

combined with the stilted expressions *ἐπαινεῖν . . . πληθύνομαι* and *τῆς μελλοῦς κλέος*, suggest that a stiff and formal mode of speech is intended, corresponding to the unreality of the Elders' rationalizings. Such irregularities are not caused by "Aeschylean vigor" or liveliness of expression, but by a lifeless linking of phrases, so that the joints do not meet evenly.

15. One of the difficulties with this interpretation is that, if the speeches of the Elders are considered in a voting context, the "majority of the speakers (1-5, 8, 9) are in favor of immediate action" (Fraenkel, above, n.2, pp. 643-44). This suggests the difficulty of treating the passage politically. The progression of thought has put any realistic consideration of action far in the background by vv. 1370-71.

16. The depth of the Chorus' retreat from reality in this place is paralleled by earlier refusals to face disagreeable facts, including that *volte-face* which has troubled so many at vv. 475ff. Cf. vv. 1098-99, lines which conveniently dismiss the endorsement of omens made in the parodos. Winnington-Ingram compares these passages in "Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 1343-71," *C.Q. N.S.* 4 (1954), pp. 23-30, though he misses the degree of interrelation by treating vv. 1348-71 as a debate.

17. *Od.* 8.579-80, echoed in *Theognis* 251, Callimachus *Hymn* 5.12, *Theocritus* 12.11, 16.45-46. Cf. *Il.* 6.357-58, *Pind. Nem.* 6.29-30, *Eur. Troades* 1242-45, *Theocritus* 17.6-8, 11-20. (This whole tradition is considered at length in *Theocritus* 16).

18. *Ag.* 62, 448, 800. Cf. *Eur. Troades* 368-72, 498-99, 730, 780-81, and *Aristoph. Aves* 1639. In the *Agamemnon*, Helen's formula — *γυναικὸς διάτι* — is neatly transferred to Clytemnestra in the lament over Agamemnon's death, then strengthened in this new application by *πρὸς γυναικός* (vv. 1453-54). This naturally leads into the ephymnium on Helen, *μία πολλὰς δλέσσασα* (vv. 1456-57).

19. Fraenkel (above, n.2, p. 464) takes the *μοῖρα* limited by other *μοῖρα* in v. 1026 to be the Chorus' personal "scope" as opposed to that of the gods. Page (above, n.4, p. 159) takes it as one link attached to other links in the chain of destiny. But the sequel (vv. 1028-33), by an Aeschylean mannerism often noticed since Casaubon first pointed it out, explains the pregnant language that precedes it. The *μοῖρα* of speech (here, a speech made to one's master, on this public occasion, watched over by the Queen) checks the *μοῖρα* of the heart (loyalty and fear for Agamemnon). Only if the heart could bypass the tongue could the Elders reach and perhaps rescue the King: "Were not one prerogative pitted against another by the gods, to keep each from encroaching on the other, my heart would bring to light those things which the tongue cannot speak yet." The same adjustment of different *μοῖραι* is the problem in *Cho.* 857-58: *ιπὸ δ' εὐνόλας πῶς ἵστον εἰποῦσ' ἀνύσωμαι*; It may also underlie the hyperbole in *Ag.* 37-38.

The hampering of open statement has been a continuous theme in the *Agamemnon*, felt in varying degrees by everyone since the Watchman first sounded this note (vv. 36-39). The Chorus in particular has veiled its words, checked its own and others' statements. This explains the construction in vv. 615-16, which are too banal or too outspoken in their present state, and which should read, I think:

αὔτη μὲν οὕτως εἶπε, μανθάνοντι δέ
τοροῖσιν ἔρμηνεῦσιν—εὐπρεπῆ λόγον [εἴπω understood].

The Chorus begins to speak its mind, but loses courage in midsentence and

appends the flat contradiction of their statement's drift to this point. The *σοι* of the ms. was probably inserted by someone who did not understand the opposition intended by δέ but suspended before the statement's completion. The understood εἴπω follows from the clear lines of antithesis, since μανθάνοντι δέ has, here, the contradicting force of ἄλλως; so that, after αὐτη μὲν οὔτως εἴπε we have ἔγώ δέ ἄλλως εἴπω hinted at and then partially withdrawn — as it must be when the Chorus speaks against its mistress. The passage is the Chorus' version of the Watchman's μαθοῦσιν αὐδῶ κού μαθοῦσαι λήθομαι.

20. Cf. vv. 384, 392, 415, 420-26, 265-66, 546, 695, 1573. This is a habit of thought which Cassandra strikingly endorses at vv. 1327-30.

21. Fraenkel discusses this, and cites Beazley's correspondence on the matter (above, n.2), pp. 782-83.

22. *Ibid.* p. 783, n.2. Page, answering Fraenkel's contention that λοχῖται is always used of a literal body of armed men, simply repeats that λόχος was used of tragic choruses, from which he thinks it a natural step for the old men (of all people) to call themselves λοχῖται. He overlooks the fact that the broad use of λόχος is an example of that tendency to call crowds by any term which means a united group — as in English we use herd, army, swarm, in a general way, where the use of the distributive words (cows, soldiers, bees) would instantly be felt as ludicrous. This natural tendency can be seen in the *Supplices*, where ἑσμός is used indiscriminately of good and bad crowds (vv. 30, 223, 684), and where μέλισσαι would be entirely out of place. (It is precisely because an undignified image is sought that we have μύρμακες in Theocritus 15.45). It is hard to believe that the natural term for Aegisthus' guard (cf. *Cho.* 768) is not used first to refer to that guard. Page also objects that Aegisthus would not call his men φίλοι, but this probably means nothing more than "trusty." If more were meant by the word, it might have the same motive that Clytemnestra feels in *Cho.* 717, where she assures the "stranger" that the rulers of the house do not lack friends. Usurpers must point to or invent "popular support."

23. E.g., *Acharn.* 204ff. (*schol. ad loc.*, ll. 26-27), *Eur. Hel.* 1621ff., *Or.* 1506ff.

24. And as αὐτόκωπος is used in *Cho.* 163.

25. *Ag.* 1326. The τυμβοχόα χειρώματα of *Sept.* 1022, though not a parallel use of the word, shows that Aeschylus could use the noun with a general sense taken from χείρ, without that close derivation from χειροῦσθαι which Fraenkel thinks necessary. (Fraenkel does not treat the *Septem* passage as authentic, but see the Lloyd-Jones article cited in note 1 above, with discussion of this phrase.)

26. Cf. Walther Kranz, *Stasimon* (Berlin, Weidmann 1933), p. 23, for the tendency of stichomythia and similarly balanced passages to repeat words from speaker to speaker. He gives examples only from Aeschylus, but see, for instance, *Trach.* 71-72, 233-35, 239-40, 888-89. A natural resource of the dramatist is to add or alter meaning as he echoes the word. Cf. the richly interwoven passage at *Sept.* 961ff.

SOME GREEK TEXTUAL PROBLEMS

BY ROBERT RENEHAN

To Werner Jaeger
ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΩΙ ΜΑΘΗΤΗΣ
ΕΥΨΥΧΕΙ

SINCE the passages to be considered are not related to one another, I prefix a list of them: (1) Euripides *HF* 385–388; (2) Xenophon *HG* 5.4.54; (3) Aristotle *Politics* 1281^b 21ff.; (4) Theocritus *Id.* 11.51; (5) Epictetus *Diss.* 2.5.11–13; (6) Lucian *Ver. Hist.* 1.7.75–76; (7) Galen *De elementis ex Hippocratis sententia* 2.5 (I 507–508 Kühn); (8) Basil *In Hexaemeron* (selected passages); (9) Gregory of Nyssa *De Opificio Hominis* cap. 27 (*PG* 44.225 B–C).

I. EURIPIDES *HF* 385–388

πέροιν δ' ἀργυρορρύταν "Εβρον διε-
πέροισ' ὄχθον, Μυκηναίω πονῶν τυράννω.

These lines are from a choral passage in which the labors of Herakles are recounted. The meter shows that a short syllable has fallen out after διεπέροισ'. Wilamowitz, in his famous edition of the play, corrected the words to read

πέροιν δ' ἀργυρορρύτων "Εβρον διε-
πέροισ<εν> ὄχθων

Murray in his Oxford edition of Euripides followed Wilamowitz, and this is strong authority, to be sure. By chance, however, we know Murray's reasons for accepting Wilamowitz' conjectures here, and they are not especially decisive. E. H. Blakeney's school edition of this play¹ had been read through in proof by Murray, who made some annotations on the text in the margin. Blakeney prints selections from these as an appendix to his edition. There (p. 169) he records Wilamowitz' reading of this passage and Murray's comment: "better and nearer to LP" [that is, than the very unlikely changes which Blakeney, following some of the older editors, had printed in his text].

Jaeger, in an article in which he demonstrated that it is a stylistic

feature of Greek poetry to strengthen the prepositional element of a compound verb by a seemingly redundant adverb,² rightly objected to Wilamowitz' reading on various grounds: διεπέρασ<εν> must then be intransitive³ and πέραν must be taken as a preposition governing ὅχθων; this removes the stylistic "Verstärkung" (πέραν . . . διεπέρασ<εν>) and seems less elegant. Furthermore, although the correction of ὅχθον to ὅχθων is paleographically easy, that of ἀργυροπρύταν to -ων is not. (Wilamowitz could have avoided this last objection by emending to ἀργυροπρύτᾶν, the "Doric" genitive plural.)⁴ Jaeger is surely correct in defending the transitive construction given by the manuscripts; I am reminded of the lines from Callimachus (*Hymn.* 6.13-14) — τρὶς μὲν δὴ διέβας Ἀχελώιον ἀργυροδίναν, | τοσσάκι δ' ἀενάων ποταμῶν ἐπέρασας ἔκαστον. Jaeger himself in his article proposed to read:

πέραν δ' ἀργυροπρύταν "Ἐβρου διε-
πέρασ<εν> ὅχθον

"Ἐβρου ὅχθον he understands as a periphrasis for "Ἐβρον. Against this, however, is the adjective ἀργυροπρύταν: epithets of this type (ἀργυροδίνης, χρυσορρόης etc.) are so often coupled with *names* of rivers that it seems a little awkward to describe "Ἐβρου ὅχθον, even understood as a periphrasis, as ἀργυροπρύταν. But be that as it may, Jaeger, in giving this interpretation, thought that "Ἐβρον, which he took from Wilamowitz' apparatus, was the reading of the manuscripts (L and P); actually the manuscripts have the accusative "Ἐβρον. When I pointed this out to him, he thought that his interpretation was still possible, since a corruption of -ον to -ον would be easy, but inclined rather to interpret "Ἐβρον . . . ὅχθον as an instance of the σχῆμα Ιωνικόν (governing both accusatives, as whole and part, by the verb).⁵ The objection to this is stylistic: in such constructions the part is added because it is emphatic. Here in context ὅχθον has no apparent emphasis and seems otiose.

Since none of these solutions seems fully convincing, I do not hesitate to propose another one. As was observed above, we would expect the epithet ἀργυροπρύταν to go with the name of the river; as the words now stand in the manuscripts it does, so that the text up to "Ἐβρον is probably sound. The thought of these lines should be that Herakles crossed the Hebrus while toiling for Eurystheus; this thought can be completely expressed without any mention of the ὅχθον which, as I have said, seems otiose. I therefore conjecture

πέραν δ' ἀργυροπρύταν "Ἐβρον διε-
πέρασ<ε>, <μ>όχθον Μυκηναίω πονῶν τυράννω.

It will be observed that this reading preserves the "adverbiale

Verstärkung"; attention should also be called to the alliterative effect of *μοχ-* . . . *Μυκ-*. The omission of *εμ* (perhaps through an intermediate corruption to *εν* by false division) is not difficult, and psychological factors, after the mention of a river, could have influenced the change to *δχθον.*⁶ *πονεῖν* and *μοχθεῖν* with case-forms of *πόνος* and *μόχθος* as cognate accusatives are common in Euripides' style. I quote only *Hipp.* 1367-9: *μόχθους δ' ἄλλως | τῆς εὐσεβίας εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπόνησα.*

Further examples may be seen at *Andr.* 133-4; *Hec.* 779; *Hel.* 1446; *Hipp.* 301; *Ion* 103-4, 134-5; *Or.* 1615; *Fr.* 136.4. Finally, though the construction is different, it is perhaps worth noting the collocation which occurs below in the *Herakles* (l. 830): *ἐπεὶ δὲ μόχθους διεπέρασ'* *Εύρυσθέως.*

II. XENOPHON HG 5.4.54

Θρασέως δὲ παρακολουθούντων τῶν πελταστῶν, οἱ ἡσαν μισθοφόροι τοῖς Θηβαίοις, καὶ τὸν Χαβρίαν ἀνακαλούντων, ὅτι οὐκ ἡκολούθει, ὑποστραφέντες οἱ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων ἵππεῖς, ἥδη γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς ὄρκους συνεστρατεύοντο, ἐδίωξάν τε αὐτοὺς πρὸς ὅρθιον, καθάπερ ἡκολούθουν, καὶ ἀπέκτειναν αὐτῶν μάλα πολλούς.

In this passage *καθάπερ ἡκολούθουν* literally rendered, is meaningless. Jaeger⁷ first observed this and, as a further argument against it, pointed out that Xenophon does not normally use *καθάπερ* (but rather *ὡσπερ*).⁸ He therefore conjectured *καθ' ἄπερ* = "where." This restores the sense, but is perhaps still not quite right. In such expressions the simple relative pronoun is used: in Xenophon, for example: *καθ' ὅν*, *καθ' οὓς*, *καθ' ἣν*, *καθ' ᾧ*.⁹ I have been unable to find a single instance of *καθ' ἄπερ* alone meaning "where" in any author. I therefore conjecture *καθ' ἀ παρηκολούθουν*. This gives the correct idiom *καθ' ἀ*, and the compound *παρακολουθεῖν* (= "to follow at one's heels") is more appropriate in this context; it is the verb used a few lines above of these same peltasts. The corruption of *καθ' ἀ παρηκολούθουν* to *καθάπερ ἡκολούθουν* is an easy and understandable one, especially if we recall that the words were originally written without division, breathings, or accents.

Since this usage of *κατὰ* with the neuter pronoun (*καθ' ἀ*, *καθ' δ'*) is not recognized by LSJ,¹⁰ I give here some examples which I have observed (the first of the two examples from Dio Cassius should be especially noted, because the context is quite similar to that of our passage): *οὐ θέλεις οὖν, καθ' ἀ ἵστης εἰ τοῖς θεοῖς, ἐκεῖ που τίθεσθαι τὸ ὀγαθόν;* Epictetus *Diss.* 1.12.27; *Πραξιτέλης μὲν γὰρ ἦ Φειδίας ἡ τις ὄλλος ἀγαλματοποιὸς ἔξωθεν μόνον ἐκόσμουν τὰς ὕλας, καθ' ἀ καὶ ψαύειν*

αὐτῶν ἡδύναντο . . . Galen 2.82 Kühn; . . . ἐπικατέδραμον ἀνέλπιστοι, καὶ καθ' ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ Καῖσαρ ἦν ἐτράποντο καὶ ἔφυγον . . . Dio Cassius 39.3.1; . . . ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ ἐντεῦθεν τῶν Βρεττανῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Τάμεσον ποταμόν, καθ' ὁ ἔს τε τὸν ὥκεανὸν ἐκβάλλει . . . Dio Cassius 60.20.5.

III. ARISTOTLE *Politics* 1281^b 21ff.

διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότερον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειεν ἂν τις διὰ τούτων καὶ τὴν ἔχομένην αὐτῆς, τίνων δεῖ κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν. τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν ὅσοι μήτε πλούσιοι μήτε ἀξιώματα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδὲ ἔν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἀσφαλές (διά τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δι' ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῦν ἀνάγκη τὰ δ' ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτούς); τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερόν (ὅταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχωσι, πολεμίων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην). λείπεται δὴ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς.

I conjecture that in the final sentence we read

λείπεται δὴ <τὸ> τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς.

In this passage Aristotle considers three possibilities: (a) τὸ μὲν μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἀσφαλές; (b) τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερόν; (c) λείπεται δὴ <τὸ> τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς. The omission of τὸ before τοῦ by haplography is a very easy paleographical error; such errors are not uncommon in our manuscripts of the *Politics*; for example, 1253^b 11; 1260^b 17; 1275^b 7; 1324^a 18.

This conjecture, though slight, is of interest as illustrating the danger of a mechanical use of dictionaries in textual criticism. Bonitz, in his great *Index Aristotelicus*, lists a number of places where λείπεται is followed by the infinitive without the article, but gives no example of the articular infinitive with this verb. This would seem to exclude the proposed <τὸ> immediately. Yet an example of the articular construction occurs in this very book of the *Politics* (1288^a 28–29): ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτον ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. Another example, from Aristotle's dialogue *Protrepticus*, is preserved by Iamblichus:¹¹ ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐδενὸς χρεία οὐδὲ τῶν ἀλλων τινὸς ὄφελος ἀν γένοιτο, μόνον δὲ καταλείπεται τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅνπερ καὶ νῦν ἐλεύθερόν φαμεν βίον εἶναι.

IV. THEOCRITUS *Id.* 11.51

αἱ δέ τοι αὐτὸς ἐγὼν δοκέω λασιώτερος ἥμεν,
ἐντὶ δρυὸς ξύλα μοι καὶ ὑπὸ σποδῶ ἀκάματον πῦρ·

καιόμενος δ' ὑπὸ τεῦς καὶ τὰν ψυχὰν ἀνεχοίμαν
καὶ τὸν ἐν' ὄφθαλμόν, τῷ μοι γλυκερώτερον οὐδέν.

(11.50-53)

In line 51 I once conjectured — for a reason that will appear — ὑπὸ σποδῶ (taking *σποδῶ* as the Doric genitive). Since then I find that Wilamowitz in his OCT edition of the *Bucolici Graeci* actually did read *σποδῶ*. Editors generally, however, and, most recently, Gow,¹² read the dative *σποδῷ* which the manuscripts give. In such a case manuscript authority is of little weight; when medieval scribes began to write *iota mutum* again, they naturally took *σποδῶ* to be the dative and wrote it *σποδῷ*, since *ὑπὸ c. dat.* was much the commoner construction. Consequently, Wilamowitz, accepting *σποδῶ* into his text, did not even feel it necessary to record the reading *σποδῷ* in his apparatus!¹³

From the passage itself we cannot decide between genitive and dative, (although the rarer genitive seems more poetic). The solution is to be found in Homer (reminiscences of whom occur often in Theocritus), and it is strange that it has not been observed before. These lines, spoken by the *Cyclops Polyphemus*, recall the famous episode in *Odyssey IX*, in which Odysseus and his companions *burn out the eye* of the *Cyclops Polyphemus*; there the following line¹⁴ occurs:

καὶ τότ' ἔγὼ τὸν μοχλὸν ὑπὸ σποδοῦ ἥλασα πολλῆς

The genitive *σποδῶ* should therefore be read both here and in *Id. 24.88*, where the expression recurs. Also, the use of *ὑπὸ c. gen.* in *Id. 16.16* *ὑπὸ κόλπου* (here not the Doric form) — which Ahrens (apparently following the variant *κόλπω*) needlessly changed to the dative — is hereby confirmed.

V. EPICTETUS *Diss. 2.5 11-13*

Epictetus here, as often, is expounding the Stoic doctrine that we should be completely indifferent to externals which are not in our power (*τὰ ἀδιάφορα, τὰ ἀπροσίρετα*); instead, all our care and attention should be devoted to that which admits a choice on our part (*προσίρεσις ἐπ' ἐμοῖ*). He illustrates this by the example of a sea voyage. In such a situation we are able to choose the pilot, the sailors, the day, the proper time (*καιρός*). As all these circumstances admit of *προσίρεσις*, we should exercise great care in handling them; but —

εὗτα χειμῶν ἐμπέπτωκεν. τί οὖν ἔτι μοι μέλει; τὰ γάρ ἐμὰ ἐκπεπλήρωται.
ἄλλου ἔστιν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, τοῦ κυβερνήτου. ὅλλα καὶ ἡ ναῦς καταδύεται.

τί οὖν ἔχω ποιῆσαι; ὁ δύναμαι, τοῦτο μόνον ποιῶ· μὴ φοβούμενος ἀποπνίγομαι οὐδὲ κεκραγώς οὐδ' ἐγκαλῶν τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλ' εἰδώς, ὅτι τὸ γενόμενον καὶ φθαρῆναι δεῖ. οὐ γάρ εἴμι αἰών, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος, μέρος τῶν πάντων ὡς ὥρα ήμέρας.

(I have given the text according to Schenkl's second Teubner edition.) In the last sentence for *αἰών* read *Aἰών*. There is a reference here to Aion, the god of eternity. The appropriateness of the reference is manifest: instead of pointing the contrast between mortal man and the immortal gods of the Greeks in general, Epictetus contrasts him specifically to that divinity who personifies life everlasting.

This Aion, "eine schillernde und schwer fassbare Gestalt," as Nilsson says, is a rather obscure figure, since he is never really precisely defined. An Eastern origin and connections with the Iranian god Zirvan Akarana have often been affirmed of him; on the other hand a passage in Plato's *Timaeus*¹⁵ — a work whose influence on later Greek thought cannot be overestimated — has unquestionably influenced certain aspects of Aion. For example, there is a well-known inscription (of the time of Augustus) from Eleusis, which records the erection of an image of Aion;¹⁶ Nilsson¹⁷ observes of this inscription that "Dieser Aion ist nicht der Gott des Mithrazismus, stammt aus dem 'Timaeus' des Platon, er hat nichts mit den Weihen zu tun." However, it is not my intention to discuss the many problems which surround this deity, but merely to call attention to the fact that he was in existence and well known long before Epictetus (and lasted long after him).¹⁸

Since making this conjecture, I have come upon some pleasant support for it: in his old commentary to Epictetus, Schweighäuser refers at this place¹⁹ to a work on Manicheism by a certain De Beausobre;²⁰ that scholar, in a chapter entitled "Des Eons en général, et de ceux des Valentiniens en particulier," makes the following observations:²¹ "Arrien fait dire à son Epictéte, Je ne suis pas un Eon, mais un Homme: Je suis une partie de l'Univers, comme une heure est une partie du Jour. Il faut que je vienne et que je passe comme cette heure. Aion veut dire dans cet endroit un Dieu, un Immortel. Notez qu'Arrien florissoit sous Adrien dont il fut fort aimé, et sous lequel s'éleverent les Partisans, mais non les Inventeurs de la Doctrine des Eons."

Thus De Beausobre too understood that there is a reference to a deity here; his explanation, however, is not, I think, completely correct. He interprets *Aἰών* as "*un Eon*," that is, as one of a number of Eons.²² With respect to this meaning of Aion, Nock has observed the following:²³ "... Complication is introduced by the use of *αἰών* in Christian literature as a term descriptive of a whole category of supernatural beings,

like *δαιμῶν* or *πνεῦμα* . . . It has been recognized that this use has a Semitic background, and it does not appear in texts which are in no relation to Judaism or Christianity. The term then appears in various Gnostic systems to indicate the several members in their chains of hypostases."

That Epictetus was referring to one of these esoteric "Eons" — in whom the notion of eternity often passed into the background²⁴ — rather than to the Aion, *Aeternitas*, is much less likely and much less appropriate in context. Finally, I may call attention to a similar sentence which occurs in the Septuagint; in Hosea 11.9 is found the expression διότι Θεὸς ἐγώ εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος.

VI. LUCIAN *Ver. Hist.* 1.7.75–76

... ὁ ποταμός. ἦν δὲ καὶ ἵχθυς ἐν αὐτῷ πολλοὺς ἴδειν, οἵνῳ μάλιστα καὶ τὴν χρόαν καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν προσεοικότας· ἥμεως γοῦν ὀγρέυσαντες αὐτῶν τινας καὶ ἐμφαγόντες ἐμεθύσθημεν ὀμέλει καὶ ἀνατεμόντες αὐτοὺς εὐρίσκομεν τρυγὸς μεστούς. ὕστερον μέντοι ἐπινοήσαντες τοὺς ἄλλους ἵχθυς τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος παραμιγνύντες ἐκεράννυμεν τὸ σφοδρὸν τῆς οἰνοφαγίας.

Among the wonders recounted by Lucian in his *Verae Historiae* is a river of wine which he tells us he found on a marvelous island in the Atlantic. In the Greek passage given above he explains what happened when he and his men ate some fish from the river. The final sentence *ὕστερον . . . οἰνοφαγίας* has been thought corrupt. The Teubner editor Nilén asks in his apparatus "qui pisces? quae aqua?" Jaeger,²⁵ noting that two good manuscripts (Γ and Ω) omit *τοὺς ἀπὸ* considered these words a "byzantinische Interpolation." He would read *τοῖς ἄλλοις ἵχθυσι τοῦ ὕδατος παραμιγνύντες* where the genitive *τοῦ ὕδατος* would be partitive = "some water." However, interpolations are usually made to clarify; to judge from the results, *τοὺς ἀπὸ* would be a distinctly infelicitous interpolation.

The words given in the manuscripts are sound, though perhaps obscure (the omission in a few manuscripts of *τοὺς ἀπὸ* is probably only a mechanical lipography: the copyist's eye jumped from *τοὺς* to *τοῦ*). The words *τοὺς ἄλλους . . . ὕδατος* mean: "the other fish — in contrast to the 'wine-fish' — those, that is, which come from water." *τοῦ ὕδατος* with the article does not refer to some specific body of water, it means "water" as an *element*, hence the article (this seems to have misled Nilén). This same usage occurs two lines below: *τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς κτλ.*

What is the sense? Jaeger rightly understood that there was a reference here to the Greek practice of tempering wine by mixing it with water. But there is a difference in this case; we are dealing with solids: an *οἰνοφαγία*, not an *οἰνοποσία*. Just as Lucian tempers liquid wine with liquid water, so here he tempers his “wine-fish” with “water-fish.”²⁶ The mixing, of course, is achieved by placing the fish on a plate side by side (*παραμιγγύντες*). This is a legitimate type of *μῖξις*, the various kinds of which were studied in great detail by the philosophers;²⁷ in Philo of Alexandria, for example, we read the following:²⁸ ἀλλ' ή μὲν *μῖξις* ἐν *ξηραῖς*, ή δὲ *κρᾶσις* ἐν *ὑγραῖς οὐσίαις* δοκιμάζεται. *μῖξις* μὲν οὖν σωμάτων διαφερόντων ἔστιν οὐκ ἐν κόσμῳ παράθεσις . . . *κρᾶσις* δ' οὐ παράθεσις, ἀλλὰ . . . ἀντιπαρέκτασις . . . ως ἐπὶ οἴνου καὶ ὕδατος φασι γίνεσθαι. This custom of serving different varieties of fish together is still practiced in Mediterranean countries; in Italian such a dish is called *fritto misto*.²⁹

VII. GALEN *De elementis ex Hippocratis sententia* 2.5 (I 507–8 Kühn)
φυσικὴ γάρ ἔστι τις δύναμις ἐλκτικὴ τῶν οἰκείων ἔκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων
ώσπερ ἐν τῇ λίθῳ τῇ ἡρακλείᾳ τοῦ σιδήρου.

Although this sentence, as it now stands, will construe, nevertheless the simple dative *ἔκάστῳ* answered by the prepositional phrase *ἐν τῇ λίθῳ* is very awkward: moreover *ἔκάστῳ* is ambiguous by position: it would seem to go with *τῶν οἰκείων* (rather than with *ἔστι*) and in context this is not good. Clearly a preposition has dropped out after *οἰκείων*; we must read *ἐν* *ἔκάστῳ* to balance *ἐν τῇ λίθῳ*: “For there is in each being a certain natural power, which attracts whatever is akin, just as in the magnet *(there is a natural power which attracts) iron*.” The insertion of *ἐν* is confirmed by a parallel passage in Galen’s *Nat. Fac.* (II 45 K): *τάχα γὰρ ἂν αὔτῃ [the magnet] ποτὲ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν ἐπισπάσαιτο πιστεύειν, εἶναι τινας ἐν ἔκάστῳ τῶν σωμάτων ἐλκτικὰς τῶν οἰκείων ποιοτήτων δυνάμεις.*

I have noticed a number of other examples of this mode of expression in the *Nat. Fac.*:³⁰

1. . . . τὸ ἐν ἔκάστῳ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι τινα δύναμιν ἐπισπαστικὴν τῆς οἰκείας ποιότητος.
2. . . . ως ἔστιν ὅλως τις ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικουμένοις δύναμις ἐλκτική.
3. . . . ως ἐν ἔκάστῳ τῶν τοῦ ζῷου μορίων ἔστι τις δύναμις.
4. . . . τὴν καθεκτικὴν δύναμιν ἐν ἔκάστῳ τῶν ὄργανων οὖσαν.
5. . . . ως ἐν ἔκάστῳ τῶν ἀρτηριῶν ἔστι τις δύναμις.

Paleographically, the omission of *ἐν* and other small words occurs constantly; thus in the first parallel cited above (II 42 K), one manuscript (M) has inadvertently omitted *ἐν* and in the third parallel (II 143 K) *ἐν* is missing in two manuscripts (M and the first hand of P). A more difficult passage from the *Nat. Fac.* is the following (II 157–158 K):

ἄπαντ' οὖν ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα καὶ τῇ γαστρὶ καὶ ταῖς ὑστέραις καὶ ταῖς κύστεσιν εἶναι τινας ἐμφύτους δυνάμεις καθεκτικὰς μὲν τῶν οἰκείων ποιοτήτων, ἀποκριτικὰς δὲ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων.

Such is the text printed by Helmreich,³¹ who follows the reading of L and M; O (followed by Kühn) instead of *ταῦτα καὶ* has *τοῦτα ἐν*. It is clear from the examples cited above that a preposition would be expected here, nor can we avoid the difficulty by construing the datives with *ἐμφύτους*, which is *attributive* here ("there are certain innate faculties," not "there are certain faculties which are innate in"). But to read, with O, *ταῦτα ἐν* involves hiatus, which Galen regularly (with certain exceptions such as the articles) avoids.³² Whether we are to read *ταῦτα, ἐν* (justifying the hiatus by the slight pause in sense), correct to *ταῦτ' ἐν*,³³ or regard *καὶ* as a vestige of an original *καν* (common in Galen) must remain doubtful. What is clear is that, in the light of the parallels and the testimony of O, *ταῦτα καὶ* of L and M is wrong.

One final point in the original passage from the *de elem. ex Hipp. sent.*: in his edition of this work,³⁴ Helmreich reads in the beginning of the sentence *φυσικὴ γάρ ἔστι τις δύναμις κτλ.* This is the reading of L, the best manuscript, and of a Paris manuscript which contains only excerpts (P). The other mss. (CIMOV) — which earlier editors followed — have *φυσικὴ γάρ τις ἔστι δύναμις*. Again, the parallels given above show that Helmreich chose the correct variant. However, he divides the mss. of this little work into two families: LIM (P) and COV. The erroneous inversion *τις ἔστι* is not likely to have occurred twice independently (once in an ancestor of IM and again in an ancestor of COV). This suggests that the stemmatic relationships are more complex than Helmreich represents them to be (a glance at his apparatus will show numerous cases where CIMOV agree against L).

VIII. BASIL *In Hexaemeron*

The nine homilies *In Hexaemeron*, on the six days of Creation in Genesis, were among the most popular of Saint Basil's works;

unfortunately, there is still no critical edition of them.³⁵ In the absence of such an edition, I propose here a few small changes.

περιελάμπετο δὲ ἀήρ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐγκεκραμένον ἔαυτῷ ὅλον διόλου εἰχε τὸ φῶς, ὁξείας τὰς διαδόσεις τῆς αὐγῆς ἐπὶ τὰ ὅρια ἔαυτοῦ πανταχοῦ παραπέμπων (pp. 44 C-45 A)

By convention *διόλου* written *coniunctim* is adverbial and means “altogether”; it is better to read here *ὅλον δι’ ὅλου* [sc. τοῦ ἀέρος]. For the idiom cf. below, 184 A: *τὰ ἔντομα . . . ὅλα δι’ ὅλων τρέφεται τῷ ἀέρι.*

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀναλαβόντες ζητῶμεν πῶς ὁ θεὸς διαλέγεται. Ἄρα τὸν ἡμέτερον τρόπον, πρότερον μὲν ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων τύπος ἐγγίνεται τῇ νοήσει, ἐπειτα μετὰ τὸ φαντασθῆναι, ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τὰς οἰκείας καὶ προσφυεῖς ἐκάστου σημασίας ἐκλεγόμενος ἐξαγγέλλει; εἴτα τῇ ὑπηρεσίᾳ τῶν φωνητικῶν ὄργάνων παραδοὺς τὰ νοηθέντα, οὕτω διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἀέρος τυπώσεως, κατὰ τὴν ἔναρθρον τῆς φωνῆς κίμησιν, ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ νόημα σαφηνίζει; (pp. 55 C-56 A)

The passage from *πρότερον* on is quoted by the Byzantine doxographer Meletius Monachus (ninth century?).³⁶ For *φαντασθῆναι* he has *φαντασι-ωθῆναι*, which is the reading of several Basilian manuscripts; it should be received into the text here. *φαντάζεσθαι*, though it may mean “to form an image,” “to imagine,” had also developed a pejorative sense, “to imagine,” meaning “to suppose incorrectly.” So Basil uses it above, p. 4 A: *οὐρανοῦ γὰρ καὶ γῆς ποίησις παραδίδοσθαι μέλλει, οὐκ αὐτομάτως συνενεχθεῖσα, ὡς τινες ἐφαντάσθησαν, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν λαβοῦσα. φαντασιοῦσθαι*, on the other hand, was a technical term of later Greek cognitive theory;³⁷ Basil uses it below, 61 C: . . . δεδιδαγμένοι παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς, μηδὲν ἐπιτρέπειν ἡμῶν τῷ νῷ πέρα τῶν συγκεχωρημένων φαντασιοῦσθαι.

In place of *παραδοὺς* the manuscripts of Meletius are divided between *παραδίδοὺς* and *διαδίδοὺς*; comparison with our passage of Basil confirms *παραδίδοὺς* for Meletius. In Basil we should correct to *παρα<δι>δοὺς*; the present is better and the corruption easy. A certain Eustathius, who, about 400, made a still extant Latin translation of Basil's *In Hexaemeron*, also seems to have read the present: “et post hoc ministeriis vocalium officiorum (=ὄργάνων) cogitata manifestantes . . .”³⁸ Finally *ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ νόημα σαφηνίζει* should mean something like “in the secret place (or: in secret) he explains his thought.” In context this is nonsense; the restoration of an article which Meletius has preserved sets everything right: *<τὸ> ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ νόημα σαφηνίζει.*

For the meaning of this expression, compare below, 56 C, where Basil

speaks of *τῶν ἐν καρδίᾳ νοημάτων*. The opening words of Basil's homily *in illud attende tibi ipsi*³⁹ should also be compared, especially the expression ὥσπερ ἔκ τινων ταμιείων, *τῶν τῆς καρδίας κρυπτῶν*. These phrases derive from the New Testament; compare especially Matthew 6.6:⁴⁰ σὺ δὲ, ὅταν προσεύχῃ, εἴσελθε εἰς τὸ ταμιεῖόν σου, καὶ κλείσας τὴν θύραν σου πρόσευξαι τῷ πατρί σου τῷ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ· καὶ ὁ πατήρ σου ὁ βλέπων ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ ἀποδώσει σοι.

... ὀψόμεθα τὴν διακόσμησιν τοῦ παντός; οὐρανὸν μὲν ἵσταμενον . . . ὥσεὶ καμάραν γὴν δὲ . . . αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐδραζομένην ἀέρα κεχυμένον μαλακὸν καὶ ύγρὸν τῇ φύσει . . . ὕδατος δὲ φύσιν κτλ. (p. 80 B-C)

Here read ἀέρα <δὲ>; the connective seems to have fallen out before κεχυμένον. Eustathius gives “*caelum quidem . . . terram autem . . . aeremque . . . aquam vero . . .*”⁴¹

πῶς ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς πάντα μετ' ἀκριβείας ἐπέλθοι, ὥστε καὶ κατιδεῖν τὰς ἴδιότητας κτλ. (p. 113 A)

Strict Atticists will be immediately offended by the use here of the simple optative to denote potentiality; those familiar with late Greek prose will see nothing strange in it. Nevertheless, Basil's style is quite “classical” and he normally uses ἀν; if we recall that in this idiom the ἀν is usually placed immediately after πῶς, ἀνθρώπινος becomes revealing. Read πῶς <ἀν> ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς . . . ἐπέλθοι. πῶς ἀν c. opt. is common in Basil; I need quote only 176 A below: πῶς ἀν σοι πάντα δι' ἀκριβείας ἐπέλθοιμι κτλ.

... τῇ ἀλλαγῇ ἦν Παῦλος ἄπασι κατεπαγγέλλεται. (p. 185 A)

The manuscript variant *πᾶσι* should be read in place of ἄπασι *propter clausulam* (to avoid the rhythm $\underline{\quad} \underline{\quad} \underline{\quad} \underline{\quad}$): compare I Cor. 15.51 πάντες οὐ κοιμηθησόμεθα, πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγησόμεθα.

IX. GREGORY OF NYSSA. *De opif. hom. cap. 27* (PG 44.225 B-C)

φυσικῇ γάρ τινι σχέσει καὶ στοργῇ πρὸς τὸ συνοικῆσαν σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς διακειμένης, ἔστι τις κατὰ τὸ λεληθὸς αὐτῇ διὰ τῆς συνανακράσεως τοῦ οἰκείου σχέσις τε καὶ ἐπίγνωσις, οἷον σημείων τινῶν παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπικειμένων, δι' ὧν ἡ κοινότης ἀσύγχυτος μένει διακρινομένη τοῖς ἴδιάζουσι. τῆς τοίνυν ψυχῆς τὸ συγγενές τε καὶ ἴδιον ἐφ' ἑαυτὴν πάλιν ἐλκούσης, τίς πόνος, εἰπέ μοι, τῇ θείᾳ δυνάμει κωλῦσαι τῶν οἰκείων τὴν συνδρομὴν, ἀρρήτῳ τινὶ τῇ τῆς φύσεως ὄλκῃ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἐπειγομένων;

Gregory here wishes to establish that there is nothing impossible in the doctrine of the reunion of bodies with their souls at the final ἀνάστασις

νεκρῶν. For, Gregory explains, even after the separation of the body into its *στοιχεῖα* at death, the individual soul and its body still retain a natural aptitude for and attraction toward each other; certain *σημεῖα τοῦ . . . συγκρίματος* always remain in the soul. Especially in view of this natural relationship, Gregory maintains, there is no difficulty for God in finally reuniting soul and body. *κωλῦσαι* gives the opposite sense here;⁴² Löwenklau conjectured *ἀνύσαι* and Oehler *κυρῶσαι*,⁴³ but neither has any probability. I thought of *κελεῦσαι*; later I found that this had also occurred to H. Hand (*Ausgewählte Schriften des heiligen Gregorius I.* 292. n.2). Hand however rejected it in favor of Oehler's *κυρῶσαι*; nevertheless *κελεῦσαι* seems to me to be the most probable conjecture.

κελεύειν and other verbs and nouns of commanding (for example, *προστάττω*, *κέλευσμα*, *πρόσταγμα*, *ἐπίταγμα*) are used of God quite frequently in the Judeo-Christian Greek writings; this is perhaps seen most clearly in the exegetical works on Genesis. Philo, for example, treating of the fifth day of Creation in his *de opificio mundi*⁴⁴ has the following sentence: *παντοῖα οὖν ἵχθύων γένη καὶ κητῶν κελεύει [ὅ θεὸς] συνίστασθαι κτλ.* In the Judeo-Christian, *Oracula Sibyllina* (8.448) it is said to God that *πάντα δ' ὁμοῦ στοιχεῖα κελεύσματι πείθετο τῷ σῷ*.

More specifically, Gregory and his brother Basil use such expressions often;⁴⁵ I quote only one passage from Basil's fourth homily *In Hexaemeron*.⁴⁶ (It was the incomplete state of this set of homilies which prompted Gregory to write his *de opificio hominis*.) Basil is considering a difficulty involving the elemental waters: *ἔπειτα πῶς, φησίν, εἰς συναγωγὴν μίαν ἐκελεύσθη [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ] τὰ ὕδατα συνδραμεῖν κτλ.* The parallelism here is clear: *τὰ ὕδατα* does not refer to ordinary water; it refers to one of the four *στοιχεῖα*.⁴⁷ In Gregory *τῶν οἰκείων* refers to the *στοιχεῖα*,⁴⁸ and *συνδραμεῖν* answers to *συνδρομὴν*: both are technical terms of the Greek doctrine of the *στοιχεῖα*.

Paleographically, a confusion between *κελεῦσαι* and *κωλῦσαι* is easy enough; it may have arisen from a misreading of the uncial *ΚΕΛ* as *ΚΩΛ* (*ο* and *ω* being pronounced alike), but this is not necessary. One grammatical point: *κελεύειν* most often takes an infinitive. This is so not because of any grammatical restriction, but simply because of the word's meaning: we usually command someone *to do something*. The accusative with *κελεύειν* is common enough,⁴⁹ and here *τὴν συνδρομὴν* with its active meaning (= "the running together") equals *συνδραμεῖν*.

Another possibility is that *μὴ* has dropped out after *δυνάμει* (*μει* and *μη* were pronounced identically in later Greek).⁵⁰ The sense would be: "What trouble is it for God not to prevent this reunion, inasmuch as

these *cognata* by their very nature are tending to reunite?" This seems to me stylistically a bit awkward. Furthermore, on the very next page (228 C) Gregory speaks of God "giving the signal" for this *συνδρομή*: *τοιοῦτόν τι χρήναι νομίζω καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον σύγκριμα διανοεῖσθαι εἰ μόνον γένοιτο παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ ἐνδόσιμον, αὐτομάτως τὰ κατάλληλα μέρη τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐπανακίνασθαι.*

NOTES

1. Euripides *Hercules Furens* (Edinburgh and London 1904).
2. "Adverbiale Verstärkung des Praepositionalen Elements von Verbalkomposita in Griechischen Dichtern," *RhMus* 100 (1957) 378–85, now reprinted in Jaeger's *Scripta Minora* (Rome 1960) II 517–24.
3. To interpret *διεπέρας* alone as = *equos traiecit* (i.e. in reference to the horses of Diomedes, which appear immediately before in the chorus) seems excluded.
4. The nominative of this word is surely *ἀργυρορρύτης* despite LSJ: cf. Jaeger, *Scripta Minora* II 385, n.4.
5. For this construction cf. Wilamowitz's *Herakles*⁴ III 43–44.
6. The conjecture *μόχθον* in various combinations has been put forward before; see Paley's edition of Euripides² (London 1880) III 35. In the *apparatus* to Murray's OCT (as I saw after making this conjecture) *διεπέρασε μόχθον* is listed as an emendation by Musgrave. What Musgrave actually read was *ἔξεπέρα μόχθον*; see *Euripidis Tragoediae Fragmenta Epistolae . . . curavit C. D. Beckius* (Leipzig 1788) III 600. However, since he took *ἔξεπέρα* as transitive = *transportavit equos*, he apparently construed *μόχθον* with *πονῶν* and this should be acknowledged.
7. *Hermes* 64 (1929) 34–35 = *Scripta Minora* II 20.
8. Jaeger observes that *καθάπερ* is common in fifth-century inscriptions and is appropriate to solemn, official language. It occurs in *Mem.* 1.2.29 and *Eq.* 4.5; the first instance he thinks may be part of a gloss, the second he explains as perhaps due either to Platonic influence or to the older technical literature from which this work derives. Still, the word also occurs in *An.* 5.4.28 and 5.6.26.
9. The references are respectively *Cyr.* 4.2.18; *An.* 7.3.23; *Cyr.* 6.2.22; *HG* 1.7.29.
10. H. Stephanus in his *Thes. Gr. Ling.* s.v. *καθά* recognizes this usage; he cites (without page-reference) one passage from Galen: *πάσης μὲν οὖν χειρουργίας ἐκκοπούσης ὅγκον παρὰ φύσιν ὁ σκοπός ἔστιν, ἐν κύκλῳ πάντα τὸν ὅγκον περικόψαι, καθά τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντι πλησιάζει.* Cf. also Stephanus s.v. *καθό*.
11. In his own *Protrepticus*, c. 9 (p. 53.5–7 Pistelli) = V. Rose, *Aristotelis Fragmenta* (Leipzig 1886) p. 69.2–5.
12. Both in his OCT edition of the *Bucolici Graeci* (Oxford 1952) and his separate edition and commentary of *Theocritus* (Cambridge 1952). See his note on this passage.
13. And, conversely, Gow felt no need of mentioning the reading *σποδῶ* which K (= *cod. Ambrosianus* 886) gives.
14. *Od.* 9.375.
15. 37 D.
- 10 + H.S.C.P.

16. *IG II² 4705 = SIG³ 1125.*
17. *Gesch. d. Griech. Religion* (Munich 1950), II 331.
18. For an account of *Aἰών* see PW s.v. *Aion*; *Reallex. f. Antike u. Christentum* (Stuttgart 1950) s.v. *Aion*; M. P. Nilsson, *op. cit.*, II 478 sq.
19. *Epicteti Dissertationum ab Arriano Digestarum Libri IV . . . ed.* Johannes Schweigaeuser (Leipzig 1799), II 382.
20. I. De Beausobre, *Histoire Critique de Manichée et du Manicheisme* (Amsterdam 1734).
21. I 573.
22. The words *un Eon* of themselves need not imply more than one Aion; we may say, e.g., "I am not a Zeus" without implying more than one Zeus. That De Beausobre has in mind a number of Eons is clear from the context; compare his chapter title cited in the text ("Des eons . . .") and the last words of his quoted: ". . . la doctrine des Eons." Furthermore, the Greek, e.g., for "I am not a Zeus" is *οὐκ εἴμι τις Ζεύς*; cf. LSJ s.v. *τις* A.II 6b.
23. *Harv. Theol. Rev.* 27 (1934) 89–90.
24. In Valentine's Gnostic system, for example, typical Aions were *Σιγή*, *Ἐκκλησία*, *Πίστις*, *Μίχης*, *Ηδονή* (*ap.* Epiphanius, *PG* 41.476 B sq.). That immortality was not the predominant aspect of such "hypostases" is clear.
25. *Hermes* 64 (1929) 39–40 = *Scripta Minora* II 24–25.
26. For those who demand verisimilitude of Lucian and wonder where such "water-fish" came from, he tells us in this chapter that he came upon this river when he had gone inland from the shore not much more than "three stades"; in other words, the Atlantic Ocean was less than a half-mile distant.
27. Cf., e.g., Von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* II 151ff., and Usener, *Epicurea* p. 207.12–26.
28. *De Confus. Ling.* 184–85 (2.264.23–25 Cohn and Wendland) = *SVF* 2.153.28–29.
29. The Loeb editor Harmon seems to have understood this passage correctly.
30. The pages in Kühn, vol. II, are respectively 42, 60, 143, 177, 204.
31. Galenus, *Scripta Minora* III ed. G. Helmreich (Leipzig 1893) 215.6–9.
32. Cf. Helmreich in the *Praefatio* of his edition of Galen's *De Usu Partium* (Leipzig 1907), I xiv: "Magni in arte critica exercenda momenti ratio est, quam Galenus ad hiatum evitandum secutus est. Dubium enim non est, quin illum quam diligentissime fugerit."
33. I assume from Helmreich's silence that O has *ταῦτα ἐν*, not *ταῦτ' ἐν*; inspection of the manuscript here would be useful. Of course, if O does have *ταῦτ' ἐν* it should be accepted into the text.
34. *Galeni de elementis ex Hippocratis sententia libri duo rec.* G. Helmreich (Erlangen 1878) p. 69.2–4.
35. The homilies *In Hexaemeron* are in *PG* 29 (to which my page numbers will refer). The most recent edition is that of Stanislas Giet in *Sources Chrétienennes* 26, *Homilies Sur L'Hexaéméron* (Paris 1950). This edition has a very useful introduction and notes, but the text itself is essentially that of Migne (cf. the introduction, pp. 73–77). A critical edition, to be included in the collection *Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller*, has been promised by E. Amand de Mendieta and S. Y. Rudberg; see p. xi of their edition of *Eustathius* (*Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Altchristlichen Literatur*, Band 66 = V. Reihe, Band 11, Berlin 1958). So far as I can discover their edition has not yet appeared.
36. *PG* 64.1105 B–C.

37. Cf., e.g., the Index to Von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Leipzig 1924) s.v. *φαντασιόματα*.

38. Page 32.21–22 (I quote by page and line of the edition referred to in note 35).

39. PG 31.197 C–D.

40. Cf. further, e.g., Matt. 6.4, 6.18; I Cor. 14.25, and, in the LXX, Prov. 20.27.

41. Page 46.27ff. Several manuscripts, however, read *aerem* for *aeremque*; the manuscript tradition has not yet been thoroughly studied, so that I have followed the judgment of the editors, who read *aeremque*.

42. For the construction cf. Gregory's *De Anima et Resurrectione* PG 46.80 D: *τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ καὶ νοερῷ τίς πόνος διαπτῆναι τὸ χάσμα*; 45 D sq.: *οὐδὲν πόνος τῇ νοερᾷ φύσει ἐκάστῳ παρεῖναι*. Cf. also 124 D; I cite these passages to show that the corruption is probably in the infinitive rather than in some other part of the sentence.

43. “*κυρῶσαι* ist Conjecturalverbesserung des Herausgebers. Die Ausgaben und die von ihm eingesehenen Handschriften bieten *κωλῦσαι*. Löwenklau (Leunclavius, der Verf. der Baseler Ausgabe *per Ioann. Oporinum* v. I. 1567, aus welcher der Morel'sche Text abgedruckt ist) vermutete *ἀνύσαι*.” F. Oehler, *Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, I Theil, *Gregor von Nyssa* (Leipzig 1859) III 156, n. 1.

44. *Philonis Alexandrini Opera* ed. Cohn and Wendland (Berlin 1896–1916) I p. 20.20; cf. p. 12.16.

45. For Gregory cf. PG 44.85 D; 88 C; 113 C; 113 D; 221 B; PG 46.17 A. For Basil, cf. PG 29.36 B; 49 C; 81 B; 81 D; 84 B; 104 A; 104 B; 149 C; 180 B.

46. PG 29.81 B.

47. PG 29.85 C: *οὐ τοίνυν τὰ τυχόντα τῶν ὑδάτων ἀθροίσματα ή τῆς συναγωγῆς ἐμφαίνει προσηγορία, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἔξεχουσαν καὶ μεγίστην, ἐν ᾧ πᾶν τὸ στοιχεῖον ἀθρόον διαδείκνυται*.

48. This is made explicit at the beginning of the chapter: 225 A; cf. PG 46.48 A.

49. Cf., e.g., the construction in PG 44.64 B; Galen 19.18 (Kühn) *τάναντία κελεύειν*; the sophist Stagirius in a letter to Gregory (*Greg. Nyss. Epistulae* ed. G. Pasquali², Leiden 1959, p. 84.9) *τὴν δόσιν κελεῦν*.

50. This possibility occurred also to Mr. Seth Benardete of Brandeis University. Mr. Benardete and Prof. Wendell Clausen of Harvard University both very kindly read this paper, and I would like to express my thanks to them.

RICHARD BENTLEY

A TERCENTENARY COMMEMORATION*

By G. P. GOOLD

THE man whose memory we have assembled to honor is in the general esteem held to be the greatest of classical scholars. Before he was born no man had succeeded so well in mastering, interpreting, and correcting the written memorials of antiquity; after he was dead, the knowledge of them accumulated and further discovered by the learned proved too vast for a single man to bring beneath his command. Yet, whether we look before or after, we shall find none who for intellectual brilliance is to be compared with Richard Bentley, who was born in the county of Yorkshire, England, exactly three hundred years ago. There is little deserving of note attaching to his education at Wakefield Grammar School and St. John's College, Cambridge: his mother taught him Latin. Among his companions at Cambridge was the prodigious William Wotton, who at six years of age read Latin, Greek, Hebrew, together with some Arabic and Syriac ("some observe, not too much, I will answer for it," says De Quincey); he matriculated at nine and graduated at thirteen; but, as seems to be the frequent fate of boy-wonders, his meteoric powers were soon spent, and he was plunging into mediocrity at the age when Bentley's steadier and no less splendid star was to appear in the ascendant.

There was at Cambridge no eligible vacancy for Bentley on graduation; and he was appointed first to the headmastership of Spalding Grammar School. But his promise had not passed unnoticed. Within a year a former fellow, Dean Stillingfleet of St. Paul's, invited him to become a private tutor to his son. Stillingfleet, a prominent champion of the Anglican Church against the forces of materialism and the Pope, was already marked out for high preferment. And we may safely suppose that Bentley's obvious affection for his patron (of which the sepulchral inscription in Worcester Cathedral affords a shining testimony) was met on the other's side by an avuncular admiration. Besides the Dean's

* A lecture given before the Classics Club of Harvard University on April 11, 1962.

personal influence, which was to intercede powerfully on his behalf at a later stage, Bentley enjoyed the unrestricted use of a library which he contrives to mention in his epitaph on Stillingfleet as one of the finest in existence. His duties seem not to have been onerous, and he applied himself diligently to establishing the foundations of his scholarship. In times like ours, when the thwarting regulations of a constricting syllabus corrupt in the young at an early stage the pure and spontaneous cultivation of learning, and unforgivably hold on the ground the brilliant student who should be aiming at the stars, it may provoke feelings other than wonder to read Bentley's own account of his labors on the Old Testament: "I wrote, before I was twenty-four years old, a sort of *hexapla*, a thick volume in quarto, in the first column of which I inserted every word of the Hebrew Bible alphabetically; and, in five other columns, all the various interpretations of those words in the Chaldee, Syriac, Vulgate Latin, Septuagint, and Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, that occur in the whole Bible. This I made for my private use, to know the Hebrew, not from the late rabbins, but the ancient versions; when, bating Arabic, Persic, Ethiopic, I read over the whole *Polyglot*. And I made, too, another volume in quarto, of various lections and emendations of the Hebrew text, drawn out of these ancient versions, which, though done in those green years, would make a second part to the famous Capellus's *Critica Sacra*."

After the revolution of 1688 Dean Stillingfleet was raised to the See of Worcester; Bentley, who took orders in 1690, accompanied his pupil to Oxford, where he next engages our attention digesting the resources of the Bodleian Library. From correspondence we learn of a desire to edit the fragments of all the Greek poets, with emendations and notes, as a single great work, and of a project of editing the lexicons of Hesychius, Suidas, and the Etymologicum Magnum in three parallel columns: this would occupy three folio volumes; a fourth is to contain Pollux, who cannot be reduced to an alphabetical order, together with Eroton, Phrynicus, and other lexicographical material. Editions of Philostratus, Lucretius, and Manilius are also in hand. Only one of these editions was realized; and the promptings of envy, ever ready to detract from greatness, might induce in us a conviction that these titanic designs were no more than the vain fantasies of a daydreamer. The fact is, however, that a large part of the work involved in all these enterprises was actually done. The margins of his books were filled with valuable notes and emendations, and this enabled him on several occasions to perform seemingly incredible feats of extemporaneous production. Many years later, in a letter to a German scholar, he revealed that he had

as a youth identified all the Biblical glosses in Hesychius and had enclosed them in square brackets; hence he could give him a list without more than the effort of transcription. There is good reason to believe that his copies of Pollux, Callimachus, Menander, and Lucretius were laden with original annotations of similar value. The initial portion of Philostratus was even prepared for the press, but Bentley, who set much store on attractive typography, was so disgusted with the proof-sheets that he abandoned the project. Only the *Manilius* saw the light of day, though many years were to elapse before publication: this was his most successful work, and many indications conspire to suggest that the best part of the notes was executed in these early years.

But of all this the academic world of 1690 knew nothing, and it was quite unprepared for Bentley's public debut. So one may style the *Epistola ad Joannem Millium*, a dissertation appended to an edition of Joannes Malelas of Antioch, a Greek historian of the eighth century. If the *Epistola* is not the greatest of Bentley's productions, it is certainly Bentley at his best, and it best illustrates the versatility of his genius, for here is displayed Bentley the collector of Greek poetic fragments, Bentley the chronologer, Bentley the lexicographer, Bentley the metrician, Bentley the palaeographer, Bentley the epigraphist, Bentley the New Testament scholar, Bentley the emendator, above all Bentley the classical scholar, thoroughly at home in every field he touches, from Greek epic to Byzantine historiography, from *Furius Bibaculus* to *Martianus Capella*.

Let us for a moment transport our attention from the genius of Richard Bentley to the sublunary intellect of Joannes Malelas. To call Malelas' literary progeny a history is rather like calling *lucus a non lucendo* comparative philology; but he aspired at any rate to compose a history of all mankind, beginning with Adam and ending with the reigning emperor. By the early seventeenth century the only extant copy of the work was a manuscript in the Bodleian library, which had lost the initial and the final quires: the surviving portion commences with the death of Hephaestus and Helius's reign of 4407 days over the Egyptians; after a fascinating struggle to combine mythology and reality, the author reaches historical times, which are rapidly traversed until the age of the Christian emperors, when the chronicle is enriched with an increase of detail, though not of accuracy; it breaks off five years before the death of Justinian. In the hope of retrieving some valuable fact from this rubbish-heap, John Gregory, an Oxonian of learning, had undertaken an edition in the reign of Charles I. On his death in 1646 the project devolved upon Edmund Chilmead of Christ Church, who translated the

chronicle into Latin and equipped it with a commentary. The work was all but ready for printing when Chilmead's lucubrations were disastrously terminated by the impact of the civil war: expelled from the university for his royalist sympathies, he eked out a precarious existence as a mendicant instrumentalist until his death a few years later. For several decades his manuscript lay neglected on a shelf in Oxford, but in 1690 the Curators of the Sheldonian Press judged that the time was ripe for publication, and entrusted the edition to the general supervision of Dr. John Mill. It was whilst the work was printing that Bentley's interest was attracted; and he was shown the proof-sheets on condition that he communicate to Mill such reflections as occurred to him.

Bentley's *Epistola*, which is written in Latin and occupies a hundred pages, is not so much a commentary on the old chronicler as a set of dazzling essays pegged upon a random set of appalling howlers: it forms a kind of counterpart in reverse to Bernard Silvester's commentary on the first six books of the *Aeneid*. We are regaled with a continuous stream of brilliant discoveries from first page to last. Sir Richard Jebb, who for many years till his death in 1905 filled with distinction the Chair of Greek at Cambridge, says: "Taken as a whole, Bentley's Letter to Mill is an extraordinary performance for a scholar of 28 in the year 1690." By your leave, Professor, I should say that it is an extraordinary performance for a scholar of any age at any time, whether taken as a whole or in part. And it shows a knowledge of some things, Semitic languages, for example, which you never acquired to your dying day.

Bentley commences by explaining several garbled Orphic fragments, which the old donkey of Antioch had misunderstood, producing among his sources an amazingly apposite quotation from an unpublished manuscript of the Neoplatonist Damascius. Turning to Malelas' citations of Attic drama, he reveals his complete mastery of the vast and far-flung evidence. Malelas had mentioned that Euripides had brought out a play about Pasiphaë: "I do not speak without weighing my words," says Bentley, "but I am positive that *no* ancient writer mentions a *Pasiphaë* of Euripides." The quest for the name of the play of Euripides alluded to becomes a chase which sends Bentley to a scholiast on Aristophanes (incidentally corrected) and to Porphyry (whose corrupted quotation of Euripides is corrected and assigned to the *Cretans*). The anapaestic metre of Porphyry's quotation is then considered. Now, anapaestic systems, as every undergraduate knows, are subject to the principle of synaphea: but from late antiquity to Bentley's day, knowledge of this principle had perished. Bentley formulates the rule, and modestly observes that giants like Scaliger and Grotius have sinned

against it. The content of the verses leads Bentley on to discuss and emend passages in Pliny's *Natural History*, Theophrastus' *History of Plants*, and the geographical compilation of Solinus. Later Malelas refers to the *Meleager* of Euripides, and Bentley, who knows of the *Meleager* from Hesychius, suddenly launches forth into a magisterial critique of that venerable lexicon. In Bentley's time scholars consulted Hesychius with much the same uncritical awe as an ancient Greek consulted the Delphic oracle. Bentley reveals what a hotch-potch the lexicon really is. Mind you, even from Hesychius' prefatory letter to Eulogius one might confidently surmise that he had compiled his dictionary with more energy than discrimination, though whether any particular error in the work is to be ascribed to the ignorance of Hesychius himself or the carelessness of his transcribers and interpolators it is not even today always possible to determine. However, Bentley's inspection of the lexicon exposes mistakes in multitudes, including several amusing blunders which Hesychius, deceived by his corrupt texts, has conscientiously inserted in strict alphabetical order. Our critic takes leave of the lexicographer by remarking that he could contribute some 5000 emendations to a new edition. This was no idle boast, as his copy of Hesychius, now in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge, testifies.

Towards the end of the *Epistola*, in which more than sixty classical authors are explained and corrected, he lucidly states a law of his own discovery concerning the orthography of certain proper names in Latin; Quintilian, who did not know of the existence of this law, is convincingly refuted for appearing to cast doubt upon its validity. The last few pages contain a personal tribute to Mill, whose edition of the New Testament he earnestly desiderates (a difficult passage in the Epistle to the Galatians being incidentally emended, if not with certainty, for he later seems to have withdrawn it, at least with reason and circumspection).

The *Epistola* secured Bentley's fame at once; compliments from Graevius and Spanheim, the two most outstanding scholars of the day, flowed in. Let their praises suffice. It is not for the modest to extol the scholarship of the Letter to Mill. But without risking the charge of presumption one may award Bentley credit for a virtue which can be taken for granted in a village schoolmaster though not in a university professor. In this, as in all his other works, Bentley never exhausts his reader with mastodontic learning or eludes him with highbrow discourse; he never sets out to impress with footnotes or patronize with arrogant condescension: he writes in language which, if rich in substance, is simple in form, and never fails to admit the reader to the inmost workings of his intellect, treating him as an equal and chatting (rather than lecturing)

to him in intimate tones, grave and gay, earnest and relaxed, as occasion demands.

This was the year and this the publication which, according to Housman, began the great age of English scholarship which lasted for a century and a half and was ended by the successive strokes of doom which consigned Dobree and Elmsley to the grave and Blomfield to the bishopric of Chester. Housman omitted to add, what in view of his failure in Greats he might feelingly have included, that these same catastrophic years culminated in the establishment of the honours systems of examination still essentially in force at Oxford and Cambridge. As a Canadian tribute in this tercentenary year of Bentley's birth, the *Epistola ad Joannem Millium* is being reprinted by the University of Toronto Press.

Bentley's theological lectures attract little notice today, but at the time they gained him a reputation in the public regard as great as the *Epistola* had won from academic circles. Most conspicuous, and characteristic of Bentley as an exegete, is the forceful simplicity with which the most abstruse problems are handled. Nor is any room left for doubt as to his high authority in the fields of theology or philosophy or, for that matter, natural science. Jebb has shown that by way of ancillary reading to his study of Lucretius Bentley had earlier digested Newton's *Principia*: this mighty work is now brought into service to attack the materialist philosophy which had recently found strong expression in Hobbes' *Leviathan*. Over some of his lines of argument Bentley consulted Newton himself, and the brief but memorable correspondence is still preserved. Bentley's *Confutation of Atheism* (1692) consolidated for him the favour of powerful allies. On one occasion an aristocrat who had met Bentley at Stillingfleet's table remarked to his host: "My Lord, that chaplain of yours is certainly a very extraordinary man." "Yes," replied Stillingfleet, "had he but the gift of humility, he would be the most extraordinary man in Europe."

In 1692 was also published Sir William Temple's *Essay upon Ancient and Modern Learning*, wherein in championing the side of the ancients that noble gentleman had ventured the statement that the Epistles of Phalaris were superior in wit and genius to all other letters ancient or modern. Oxford is still today the cockpit of classical scholarship; and the resultant logomachy led to the hasty production at that seat of learning of an edition (with soon a second and then a third) of the Epistles of Phalaris, nominally the work of the Honourable Charles Boyle, but in reality the effort of a confederacy committed to the opinion that the Letters were genuine and written in the sixth century B.C.

In 1697 Bentley entered the fray with his celebrated *Dissertation on the Epistles of Phalaris*. The work, which is written in Bentley's bold and pugnacious English, is such a sustained and crushing refutation of his adversaries' position that it is astonishing that, even after Bentley's enlarged version of 1699, in fact even after Bentley's death, the issue could ever have been in doubt. The *Phalaris*, which is as necessary reading for the classical scholar as the university calendars (none of which mentions it) are for aspirants to success in examinations, repeated the miraculous performance of the *Epistola*. Half a dozen pages would have sufficed for the pulverization of the Boylian thesis, with perhaps as many more for the abusive retaliation which Oxonian dignity demands. However, through some six hundred pages Bentley turns on the searchlight of his incomparable intellect, and in clear terms and unanswerable logic reveals an infinite number of anachronisms which date the letters to the Christian era: he points out that according to Boyle Phalaris names towns which were not built, quotes books which were not written, and speaks a Greek which was not yet spoken. Bentley's treatment of individual topics has been likened to a series of monographs, evincing such a masteay of the subject, lucidity of expression, and capacity for original thinking as would today bring fame to a large classical department. Among these may be named his chapters on the age of Pythagoras, the origins of Greek tragedy, the coinage of Sicily, and the appendices on the letters of Themistocles, Socrates, and Euripides. Even so, the intervention on Boyle's side of Swift and other odious creatures ensured a prolongation of the heresy amongst the vulgar, though not with any scholar of repute.

Bentley's redoubtable qualities as a fighter had been displayed in print and in pulpit. He was now to invite comparison with the legendary tyrant Phalaris himself. Some years previously Stillingfleet is reported to have mused: "We must send Bentley to rule the turbulent fellows of Trinity College. If anybody can do it, he is the person; for I am sure that he has ruled my family ever since he entered it." In 1700 he was indeed appointed Master of Trinity College, Cambridge; and the story of Bentley's career is henceforward transformed into an astounding double life, his rule of the college on the one hand, and his activities in scholarship on the other, both existences stimulating wonder and at every turn challenging belief.

His mastership did not commence with happy augury. To the outgoing Master, Dr. John Montague, who had been appointed Dean of Durham, had been voted (after his resignation was submitted, but before it took effect) a dividend of £170. Administrative experience, it may be,

had not enforced upon Montague the wisdom of celerity in collecting dues, for he unfortunately failed to pick up his cheque before quitting the college. Immediately upon arrival Bentley claimed the sum, and by terrifying the bursar, who refused to hand it over, with a threat of impeachment before the Archbishop of Canterbury, he actually obtained the money. Dean Montague not unnaturally demurred, and even spoke of litigation. But Bentley had accurately sized up his man, and when he simply held on to the money, the Dean's remonstrance gradually evaporated into silent acrimony. Resurrecting the dead letter of the college statutes, Bentley forthwith extorted from the fellows other dues amounting to £110. Next he secured the renovation of his lodge at a cost four times that voted for the purpose. It would be a tiresome, and here an impossible, task to rehearse the full list of his contumelious actions against the fellows, whom he treated like helots, his highly questionable fiats on financial affairs, and his flagrant violation of college statutes. A particularly glaring example was the merciless economy he enforced on the fellows' incomes and perquisites, whilst continuing, himself, to commandeer for his Master's lodge the college's food and fuel, a traditional privilege, but not designed for four aristocratic students he took in as boarders at the outrageous price of £200 each. Matters came to a head in 1709, when Bentley, announcing his plans for a redistribution of the college's annual revenue, proposed that his own dividend should be increased from £150 to £800. Taken aback at the outcry, he reduced his proposed share to £400, and then (with certain conditions) to a mere £200. But the fellows had had enough. Led by Edmund Miller, a lay fellow, whom Bentley immediately expelled on a technical quibble, the fellows laid before the Visitor of the college an indictment comprising 54 counts. For nearly five years Bentley staved off by various stratagems the dreaded hour. At last in May 1714 the trial was held in the great hall of Ely House in London. Five counsel, including Miller, were employed by the fellows, and three by Bentley. After six weeks the trial adjourned for judgment. The judge, Bishop Moore, had during the proceedings intimated from the throne of the tribunal that he condemned the Master's conduct; and no doubt the fellows were already savouring in their imaginations the long cherished revenge which a verdict of guilty would execute on their behalf. But the Bishop was old and frail, and the judgment hall cold and draughty; he had caught a chill during the lengthy sittings; he was confined to his bed; week after week the fellows waited: On July 31, the Bishop expired. The very next day the entire nation was stunned by the death of Queen Anne. The British Crown passed to the House of Hanover. The political world

swung full circle. Ministers fell; ministers rose. The troubles of Trinity College were dismissed. Just so does Fortune favor her favorite sons.

Bentley's escape had been narrow, for a sentence of deprivation against him was found among the Bishop's papers. The new Bishop of Ely, Dr. Fleetwood, took a different line from his predecessor. He took the line of weakness; and soon Bentley, who needed little encouragement, was once more ruling the college and its inmates in despotic fashion. The feud flared up again, the fellows being led this time by Dr. Colbatch, a Senior: he is represented by Jebb as being a man of integrity, by De Quincey as being a malicious old toad; and in view of the uninterrupted ill feeling which had existed in Trinity College since Bentley's induction I should say that it is a case of *neuter falso*. For a further three years Bentley effected the postponement of a Petition to the Privy Council, which was eventually resubmitted by Miller. Again did Bentley slip out from the very jaws of disaster, on this occasion after scandalous negotiations with Miller, who was persuaded to withdraw the petition by a princely bribe of £528, paid by Bentley out of college funds. At the same time he helped himself to £500 for his own costs.

By now Bentley was being hard pressed on other fronts. Colbatch had been joined in his fight against the Master by Conyers Middleton, the biographer of Cicero, an elegant writer, a talented scholar, indeed the most respectable and the most dangerous of all Bentley's enemies. With others he had been compelled to pay Bentley a high and totally unauthorized fee for an honorary degree. At this indignity he embarked on a resolute campaign for the recovery of his money and, although he seems not to have been reimbursed, he achieved a distinctly gratifying success with a motion, passed by the university, depriving Bentley of his degrees. By this aroused to demonic fury, the Master

jam tandem invadit medios et Marte secundo
terribilis saevam nullo discrimine caedem
suscitat, irarumque omnis effundit habenas.

Protracted litigation in the Court of King's Bench exacted apologies and a fine from Middleton, inflicted a fine and a week's imprisonment on Colbatch, and finally in 1724 brought the university to its knees. Yet upon decarceration Colbatch began to agitate in Trinity for one last combined attack. After the lapse of nearly twenty years, Bentley was once more arraigned at Ely House; and on April 27, 1734, he was found guilty of dilapidating the college goods and violating the college statutes. He was sentenced to be deprived of his Mastership. He was

now in his 73rd year. Any other man would have been crushed by the blow, but Bentley, a man of Themistoclean resource, contrived to turn disaster into victory. According to the statutes, which, touching the matter, are either carelessly phrased or textually corrupt, the sentence required to be executed by the Vice-Master: Bentley intimidated this stooge into resigning, and promptly filled the vacancy with a trusted crony, Dr. Richard Walker. Still monarch of all he surveyed, Bentley remained till his death eight years later in possession of the Mastership, exercising its authority and enjoying its revenues, whilst every trick which fury and rancor could alternately invent was employed, but employed in vain, to force Walker to execute the sentence of deprivation. The long struggle was abandoned by his enemies in 1738, though not by Bentley, who made the college pay his full legal expenses. These amounted to four thousand pounds.

This is the extraordinary background we must bear in mind as we turn to Bentley's major contributions to scholarship. When one considers the stormy atmosphere of Trinity in 1709 and 1710, special admiration must be evoked by his work on the fragments of Menander and Philemon, composed, as he himself tells us, *opera extemporali*. An edition of the same material had just been issued by the Dutch scholar, John Le Clerc, an able but arrogant man, and a prolific reviewer, over whose name poisonous critiques, indited with an air of lofty superiority, were to be regularly expected. We do not know how he incensed Bentley. But in the event the latter amassed a collection of penetrating notes on each single fragment, the whole amounting to a devastating exposure of Le Clerc's pretensions. Inscribed with the pseudonym, Phileleutherus Lipsiensis, and equipped with brief instructions for printing, the parcel of sheets was mysteriously thrust into the hands of Le Clerc's worst enemy, Peter Burman of Utrecht, who, pausing only to add a scurrilous preface of his own, gleefully launched from the press these heaven-sent thunderbolts. The polemical circumstances cloud the fact that this is one of Bentley's most felicitous works, signally attesting his instinct for Greek, his sensitivity to metre, and his astonishing faculty for divining the sense of allusive or fragmented passages; and it is this volume, together with his work on Aristophanes, that has led many scholars to regret that he did not devote his main endeavors to this field — though not for these reasons was the edition sold out of stock within three weeks.

Greater fame, or notoriety, attends Bentley's edition of Horace (1711). To record that the traditional text is altered in more than seven hundred passages, of which on an extravagant estimate one in twenty may be

accepted, is to defer to the common superficial judgment which makes no difference between Richard Bentley and A. Y. Campbell. Bishop Monk, whose pious biography of the Master ranks as a literary classic, discloses a much juster appreciation of the work than it has been generally accorded: he emphasizes Bentley's care over orthographical trifles, his attention to the correct titles and dates of Horace's publications, strange contrast to the evident haste with which the work, at least in its written form, was compiled; however, "a person, who at first rejects his correction and declares a preference for the old reading, will sometimes be surprised to find his opinion changed on perusing the note, and be compelled to acknowledge the justice of the emendation." Jebb's appraisal, on the other hand, is misleading, and gives little idea of the depth of Bentley's notes. Discussing the conjecture *male ter natos*, line 441 of the *Ars Poetica*, he objects to the word order: but Bentley has anticipated this very objection, and rebutted it with four apposite examples from Horace himself. He also reproves Bentley for branding as moles those who could not see the truth of his conjecture: but, even to allow the justice of the complaint, the statement was made, not by Bentley, but by Graevius, whose words Bentley is citing. Of line 60 of the same poem, which Bentley had appreciably altered, Jebb says: "nothing could be less open to suspicion": but Bentley gives and supports with full discussion two adequate reasons for suspicion, neither of which Jebb notices. Let us give ear to Nettleship's brief mention: "It was from Haupt, and from no English professor or tutor, that I first learned to appreciate the greatness of Bentley. He was chiefly known to the ordinary English student of scholarship as having proposed a number of untenable emendations in the text of Horace. It was not generally known that more may often be learned from the facts collected in a note by Bentley, though his conclusion may be erroneous, than from the cautious dissertations of safer commentators." Bentley's *Horace* is not merely a spirited work — what verve and vigor in his note on *vulpecula* in the seventh of the epistles! — it is also a defiant one, and he herein utters his defiant confiteor: *nobis et ratio et res ipsa centum codicibus potiores sunt.*

More important, and recognized as such, though still awaiting a worthy encomium, is his *Terence* (1725), in which he retrieved from the corruptions of the Middle Ages and the despair of contemporary scholars the complex prosody of Roman comedy. Bentley had other matters on his mind at the time, and the notes were written at the rate of one play a week. But see, if you will, his annotation on the *Heautontimorumenos*, act 2, scene 2, line 3 (line 232 of the continuous numeration), for

a sample of his services to Terence; and say, if you can, why the conjecture is not even recorded in the Oxford text.

Hundreds of brilliant and certain emendations were given by Bentley to other scholars for publication in their editions, or were afterwards found in the margins of his books. Even to restrict oneself to those authors in which Bentley thus made sizable contributions, one would have to mention Aristophanes, the *Bucolici Graeci*, Callimachus, Cicero, Hephaestion, Hierocles, Lucretius, Nicander, Ovid, Plautus, Pollux, Seneca, and Silius Italicus. Of the posthumous edition of Lucan, not to be numbered among Bentley's successful enterprises, it is proper to speak with some reserve, for it was undertaken rather in order to deny Burman the use of his materials than from any ardor to publish them. Still, he made some splendid corrections, *Belgis* at 1.463 and *Albit* at 1.481, for example, which Housman has recommended with a warm acceptance.

The greatest book written in Greek is the New Testament, though a Chinese who studied Greek in the classics departments of Occidental universities might well become an old man without ever discovering the fact. Such neglect has never been the practice of the scholars commanding our veneration: Lachmann was to set the seal of his approval on this view with an outstanding edition; and Wilamowitz insisted on the place of St. Paul in the most elementary study of Greek thought; and perhaps I may take it on myself to echo some words of a review by Günther Zuntz, whose textual study of the *Corpus Paulinum* is a notable product of our age, when in the great universal language of learning he declares: "Niemand kann lebhafter als der Rezensent wünschen, dass Altphilologen — wie einst Bentley, Valckenaer, Lachmann, Blass, Corssen — sich an der Neutestamenttextkritik beteiligen möchten."

Bentley's "Proposals for Printing," advertising the gigantic design of his New Testament, appeared in 1720 and aimed at reconstituting the Greek text "exactly as it was in the best exemplars at the time of the Council of Nice; so that there shall not be twenty words, nor even particles, difference." The publication of his proposals — even though they remained unrealized — directed the efforts of others along profitable lines. The large folio volume containing Bentley's collations remains in the library of Trinity College; it is impracticable to publish it as it stands, but a century ago Mr. A. A. Ellis published an invaluable excerpt, containing Bentley's emendations and choice of variants.

A special interest is claimed by Bentley's opinion on the disputed verse of the Heavenly Witnesses in the First Epistle of St. John.

Bentley, who of course proposed to delete the verse, made it the subject of his prelection, when with brazen effrontery (for his candidature was illegal) he elected himself in 1717 to the Regius Professorship of Divinity; and the disputed verse was also to form the subject of the *Letters to Travis*, Porson's attempt to emulate the *Phalaris*. It is when compared with Bentley's that the inferiority of Porson's stature is revealed, for whereas Bentley never kills our interest with an excess of rhetoric, but sustains it by pouring forth discovery after discovery, Porson in the *Letters to Travis* becomes, as Darwin became for Shaw, "tedious in the manner of a man who insists on continuing to prove his innocence after he has been acquitted. You assure him that there is not a stain on his character, and beg him to leave the court; but he will not be content with enough evidence: he will have you listen to all the evidence that exists in the world."

In the course of the *Phalaris* controversy, Bentley had declared: "No man was ever written out of reputation but by himself." These words were now to recoil upon their author. Exactly what impulse drove Bentley in an evil hour to edit *Paradise Lost*, we do not know, but the cryptic remark *non injussa cecini* at the end of his commentary lends colour to the legend that the work was commissioned by no less exalted a personage than Queen Caroline herself, who desired that our critic's genius should be displayed within the confines of her literary acquaintance.

Sunt bona, sunt quaedam mediocria, sunt mala plura. Of his eight hundred or so conjectures, two are certain, and some half-dozen probable: the rest range from the plausible but improbable to the down-right inconceivable. It is astounding, but it is a fact, that Bentley's understanding of his native tongue and his acquaintance with native letters were inferior to his command of the classical languages and literatures: he does not know, for example, that the nominative case is employed in English for the absolute construction, nor recognize that the principles of ancient and of English metre rest upon utterly different foundations; he attempts the impossible task of forcing upon English words the rigid prosody of Latin and Greek. So it is that, having persuaded himself that the blind poet had been imposed on by an interfering amanuensis, he proceeds to reckless emendation redolent more of syllogistic than poetical muses:

Milton's strong pinion now not Heav'n can bound;
Now, serpent-like, in prose he sweeps the ground:
In quibbles Angel and Archangel join,
And God the Father turns a school divine.

Yet justice demands some clarification of the censure which has been meted out to "slashing Bentley with his desp'rate hook." It is not for modern Miltonic scholarship to say *Racha* to Bentley: recent criticism furnishes some pretty quaint notions of what Milton was about; and our own day and age has witnessed, and for aught I know applauds, Professor Empson's analysis of the Fall, in which he unmasks as the culprit, not Adam, nor Eve, nor Satan, but, in the best traditions of the detective story, the very last person one would have thought of: God. Unlike Empson's, the absurdity of Bentley's conclusions does not in itself prove his arguments and observations to lack truth or value. Not once, but many times, Milton stands convicted of inaccuracy of fact, illogicality of thought, incoherence of grammar, and even inelegance of form. If such imperfections are irrelevant to the poet's positive achievement and cause no reduction in our estimate of him as the greatest of English poets, their detection scarcely redounds to Bentley's discredit. The vast majority of Milton's admirers, like the vast majority of the admirers of any genius, surrender their critical faculties when they make their allegiance: and their admiration, which began as the alert recognition of excellence, ends by becoming the glassy-eyed admiration of sheep. Bentley was not of this ilk: he possessed in a supreme degree the ability to detect falsehood and nonsense in false and senseless language, however enchanting and rapturous that language might be.

Bentley's work on Milton provides one excellent example of the strength and the weakness of the classical scholar in the realms of literary criticism. There is a second, which forms a curiously close parallel to Bentley's *Milton*, and may help us to understand it a little better. I refer to the Homeric Question. Tradition records, and afterages have generally accepted, that a single poet, one named Homer, composed both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*; and generations upon generations of admirers have definitively placed Homer's genius in that highest class which is secure from detraction. However, just as Bentley's attention was drawn to Milton's imperfections, so the last two centuries of textual scholarship have discovered the imperfections of Homer; and just as Bentley was unable to reconcile Milton's imperfections with acceptance of his genius, and visited upon some vampire of his imagination responsibility for mutilating Milton's poem, so the analytical school, which has long dominated Homeric scholarship, conjures up similar phantoms of editorial depravity as a means of averting its criticisms, all fundamentally correct, from the Maeonian bard. *O miseras hominum mentes, o pectora caeca!* But the truth is that the greatest and noblest of humans are not immune from points of vulnerability and

moments of failure. Poor old Homer, stitching his epics under we know not what primitive conditions, condemned by the limitations of his time and medium to innumerable flaws from the first book of the *Iliad* to the last of the *Odyssey*, now stands revealed as a man and not a god. And so does Bentley, the editor of Milton.

Bentley's edition of *Paradise Lost* appeared in his seventy-first year. A little later, unruffled by either the adverse reception of the work or the menacing machinations of Colbatch, he fell to preparing an edition of Homer, collating manuscripts, studying the scholiasts and lexicographers, and composing annotations with an energy of which a younger man might be justly proud. Though the edition never saw the light, many of his notes and corrections (which cover the whole of the two epics) were subsequently published in the learned journals. But he made one capital discovery, namely that the sound expressed in some dialects by the digamma had existed for Homer, and accounts for a vast number of metrical peculiarities: this truth, which today seems so obvious, had eluded detection for two thousand years.

Bentley's last published work, and his best, was the edition of Manilius which was brought out under his nephew's supervision in 1739. In reality it was the product of a period forty years earlier, when publication had been thwarted by "the dearness of paper and the want of good types, and some other occasions." Manilius' claim to the world's notice rests less upon the efficacy of his doctrine or the clever elegance with which this celestial abracadabra is robed in hexameters than upon the greatness of his devoted but blasphemous disciples. A solitary manuscript of the treatise survived the hazards of the dark ages and parented three copies before itself perishing. But the text was deplorably corrupted, and constituted the sternest of challenges to intellectual endeavor. The first of Manilius' strokes of fortune was to fall into the hands of Scaliger, the greatest of the sixteenth-century scholars and Bentley's nearest rival, whose exhaustive commentary and removal of seemingly countless errors enabled the real difficulties to be isolated. On Bentley's performance A. E. Housman, the most gifted Latinist of modern times, a man not given to extravagance of praise or affection, has eloquently pronounced what I anticipate as posterity's final verdict. "*Lucida tela diei*: these are the words that come into one's mind when one has halted at some stubborn perplexity of reading or interpretation, has witnessed Scaliger and Gronouius and Huetius fumble at it one after another, and then turns to Bentley and sees Bentley strike his finger on the place and say 'thou ailest here, and here.' Had Bentley never edited Manilius, Nicolaus Heinsius would be the foremost critic

of Latin poetry; but this is a work beyond the scope of even Heinsius. Great as was Scaliger's achievement it is yet surpassed and far surpassed by Bentley's: Scaliger at the side of Bentley is no more than a marvellous boy. In mere quantity indeed the corrections of the critic who came first may be the more imposing, but it is significant that Scaliger accomplished most in the easiest parts of the poem and Bentley in the hardest. The firm strength and piercing edge and arrowy swiftness of his intellect, his matchless facility and adroitness and resource, were never so triumphant as where defeat seemed sure; and yet it is other virtues that one most admires and welcomes as one turns from the smoky fire of Scaliger's genius to the sky and air of Bentley's: his lucidity, his sanity, his just and simple and straightforward fashion of thought."

On the death of Bentley's wife in the following year (1740), his two daughters took up residence in Trinity Lodge; and in the *Memoirs* of Richard Cumberland, a grandson, we have an engaging account of these last years. Bentley was an indulgent grandfather. "Once, and only once," says Cumberland, "I recollect his giving me a gentle rebuke for making a most outrageous noise in the room over his library and disturbing him in his studies; I had no apprehension of anger from him, and confidently answered that I could not help it, as I had been at battledore and shuttlecock with the Bishop of Ely's son. 'And I have been at this sport with his father,' he replied, 'but thine has been the more amusing game; so there's no harm done.'" His ordinary style of conversation was naturally lordly, and he affected the habit of addressing his friends and family with the pronouns *Thou* and *Thee*. Dr. Walker, the Vice-Master, was a favored companion, with whom we are told that Bentley enjoyed smoking, a practice he adopted in his seventies; in his study he generally wore a hat with an enormous brim to protect his eyes. Both hat and Walker are immortalized in the *Dunciad*.

... As many quit the streams that murmur fall
 To lull the sons of Marg'ret and Clare Hall,
 Where Bentley late tempestuous wont to sport
 In troubled waters, but now sleeps in Port.
 Before them march'd that awful Aristarch;
 Plow'd was his front with many a deep remark:
 His hat, which never vail'd to human pride,
 Walker with rev'rence took, and laid aside.
 Low bow'd the rest: he, kingly, did but nod.

His family life was as serene as his public life was stormy. Joanna, his favorite child, a beautiful girl in spite of her nickname "Jug," who in-

herited more of her father's spirit than was then deemed proper in the female sex, had married in 1728 Denison Cumberland of Trinity. And their son, the aforementioned Richard Cumberland, besides achieving fame as a prominent and versatile author, invites notice as being the grandfather of Frederick Cumberland, the architect of University College, Toronto. What facet of Bentley's many-sided character is principally reflected in that many-styled edifice (which an Oxford wit has pronounced to be the strongest argument for the unity of Homer) it may not be easy to agree. Certain it is that all of us who are privileged to work in it will regard the association as enhancing its strangely inspiring and endearing atmosphere.

Bentley was spared the mortification of a lingering decline. In June 1742, the eighty-first year of his life, he officiated as one of the examiners for the Craven scholarships; and it is recorded that in the election of one of the two scholars he firmly overruled the Regius Professor of Greek, who entered a strong but unavailing protest upon the ground of the young man's insufficiency in learning. A month later Bentley was seized with a pleuritic attack. Medical aid was summoned, but arrived too late. The consummate spirit had flowed back to the burning fountain whence it came.

Richard Bentley was not one of those men famed solely for this or that particular achievement. Sooner or later the name of the discoverer, the inventor, the pioneer, and even, in the field of art, the artist, perishes when his work is assimilated or surpassed or outshone. But a few great geniuses bequeath to the future some enduring aura of their vitality. They are remembered not only as names, but as persons. Bentley is one of these. It was his boast that when he departed he might say of Trinity College, what Augustus had said of Rome, *lateritium inveni, marmoreum reliqui*: and the improvements, architectural and academic, which he effected in the college certainly justify this claim. But the memory of his Mastership survives for more than this, censured maybe, but with a censure that partakes of admiration, such as that with which we convict Robin Hood of larceny. Yet this is a secondary consideration. Bentley receives our homage as being the hero of classical scholarship, some much-loved sportsman, as it were, whose performance has set an all-time record. His contributions to knowledge have even now been but imperfectly absorbed into the common stock; hundreds of his emendations still await the decision of the commonwealth of scholars; a great number, many enough, await even recognition. His aspirations are by no means attained by his successors; the edition of the New Testament which he envisaged has not yet appeared, whilst of the works which he

edited or commented upon (and I am not forgetting *Paradise Lost*) few, if any, are available in such definitive form that the learned are absolved from the task of studying what he said. But in this commemorative lecture, wonder must take the place of appraisal: wonder at the degree of his knowledge, his intellect, his inventiveness, his divination; wonder at the breadth and depth of his interests, an exemplary corrective to the paralysing specialization of our times. Should we consult the written memorials of his academic activity, which have indelibly influenced the course and perceptibly quickened the pace of classical scholarship, perhaps we also, whatever paths of learning we pursue, will be invigorated and inspired by the genius of Richard Bentley: splendid, titanic, audacious, triumphant.

AN ARCHAIC BRONZE RELIEF OF A HOPLITE IN THE McDANIEL COLLECTION

BY DAVID GORDON MITTEN

THE Alice Corinne McDaniel Collection of Classical Objects was presented to the Department of Classics, Harvard University, by Professor Walton Brooks McDaniel in memory of his wife, with a fund for the acquisition of further objects. In 1961 the Department acquired a well-preserved archaic bronze relief of a hoplite.¹ The figure wears a bell-shaped cuirass and a modified Corinthian helmet with a towering crest (pl. I). In spite of the loss of the legs and the ends of the arms, the warrior is clearly shown in a posture of attack. His left arm, bent at the elbow, probably held a round shield; his right arm is extended and probably held a raised spear. His head, shown in profile, contrasts sharply with the treatment of his arms and cuirass, which are seen from a completely frontal viewpoint.

The preserved height of the hoplite is approximately 0.118 m. The relief was cast in a sheet of bronze ca. 0.02 m. thick, which was then decorated by incision. The back of the relief is concave and has a hook for fastening to a background, perhaps the wall of a large bronze vessel. The surface of the bronze has acquired a lustrous dark green patina, which is somewhat pitted and cracked on the left arm and at the break just below the lower edge of the cuirass. The stump of the right arm is roughly tooled and appears to be unfinished. The elbow of the left arm is connected to the cuirass by an untrimmed bit of bronze from the casting.

The bottom of the warrior's cuirass ends in a convex roll; a strange upturned projection appears at the right shoulder. The chest muscles are modeled as two slightly swelling convex curves. The helmet, a modified Corinthian form with projecting cheek-pieces but without the normal elongated nose-guard, is outlined by a delicate raised ridge running completely around it. A convex roll, decorated with short vertical incisions, serves as the socket for a towering crest, which is marked with finely incised lines radiating from the socket, probably in imitation of horsehair. The rear tip of the crest hangs behind the upraised right arm.

The profile of the warrior is carefully finished, with smiling, upcurving lips, protruding nose and chin, and enormous frontal eye, in which the pupil and eyebrow are emphasized by incision. The eye is disproportionately large for the head and gives the whole face a wide-eyed, good-natured appearance. Three diagonally incised curls, hanging from under the helmet, form a symmetrical pattern over the chest.

A close parallel to the McDaniel hoplite is furnished by a well-known bronze group in relief, probably a handle for a large bronze vessel, in the Pesaro Museum (pl. II 1).² Two warriors, fighting over a fallen hero lying on his face, are supported by serpents. The warrior on the left is almost identical to the McDaniel hoplite; he wears a pointed beard, however, and his helmet is topped by a pointed crest socket rather than by a roll and crest.³ The right arm is upraised and presumably held a spear; the left is bent in the customary position for holding a shield. These similarities indicate that the McDaniel hoplite belonged to a similar group, although the hook in its back suggests that its group may have been a relief decoration on the body of a vessel rather than a handle.

Marconi has carefully discussed the handle from Pesaro and its companion piece, a group of a hoplite, shown frontally, between two horses and supported by serpents.⁴ The heraldic composition of two hoplites fighting over a fallen third is a favorite subject in archaic vase-painting; perhaps the best-known example is the Rhodian Euphorbos plate.⁵ The origins and development of this theme in bronze-working are, however, much disputed. They have been sought both in "Ionic" workshops and in various local Italian and Greek schools in South Italy showing "Peloponnesian" influence.⁶ The inspiration for such elaborate heraldic compositions and the origin of their use as attachments for large bronze vessels began around 600 B.C. with lavishly decorated bronze vessels such as the hydria from Grächwil, now in Bern, which is commonly thought to be Tarentine work.⁷

The case for Lakonian influence upon schools of bronze-working in Italy has been recently strengthened with the discovery of a large krater with relief decoration in a chariot tomb at Vix, in the Côte d'Or region of southern France.⁸ Joffroy has tentatively assigned this masterpiece of bronze-working to a workshop in Lakonia or in one of the Lakonian colonies of Magna Graecia.⁹ The date of the tomb has been set at around 500 B.C. or a little before; the krater itself may date from around 525 B.C.¹⁰

The neck of the Vix krater is decorated with a frieze of attached figures of hoplites alternately walking and driving chariots. The walking hoplites (pl. II 2) show a strong resemblance to the McDaniel and



PLATE I. Bronze Relief of a Hoplite in the McDaniel Collection.



PLATE II 1. Bronze Relief Group in the Pesaro Museum.



PLATE II 2. Bronze Hoplite Relief from the Frieze of the Vix Krater.

Pesaro reliefs, but represent a more developed stage of the same motif. The body is now shown in complete profile. The eye and the profile of the face are more nearly in correct proportion to the helmeted head. The cuirass and limbs are more naturally modeled, and the hair falls down the back of the neck in a flowing, corrugated mass instead of hanging over the chest of the cuirass in three stiff, symmetrical curls. Similar walking hoplites have been found at the sanctuary of Apollo at Mt. Ptoon in Boeotia¹¹ and at the Heraion on Samos.¹² A small statuette of a hoplite in a private collection in Lugano, shown in three-quarter view, is also close to the Vix figures but slightly later, around 510 B.C.; it is considered a product of a Lakonian or Tarentine workshop.¹³

The date of the McDaniel warrior may be securely fixed at around 550 B.C. or slightly earlier both by its stylistic identity with the Pesaro group and by closely similar heads of hoplites on contemporary Attic black-figure vases. The long-nosed, large-eyed profile may be compared with those on a *dinos* by the Painter of Acropolis 606,¹⁴ while the hair hanging in curls from under the helmet resembles that of Achilles on a handle-plate of the François vase.¹⁵

Although the McDaniel hoplite relief cannot with certainty be attributed to a specific Greek bronze workshop, it is in all probability the product of a South Italian Greek workshop under strong Lakonian influence. It provides an important early example of the development of a major theme in archaic Greek bronze sculpture and decorative relief work, which was to reach its culmination a quarter of a century later in the hoplite reliefs from Vix. The frequency of such military subjects in archaic Greek art and the variety of their representation in different media are forceful reminders of the warlike nature of Greek society in the archaic period and of the fondness of the Greeks for scenes of combat, which evoke both the heroic ideal of the Homeric tradition and the turbulent contemporary struggles of the emerging city-states.

NOTES

1. *Kunstwerke der Antike: Auktion XXII, Münzen und Medaillen* (Basel, May 13, 1961; no. 67) p. 37, pl. 21. I am indebted to Dr. Herbert A. Cahn for allowing me to utilize data from the description of the hoplite relief in this auction catalogue, and to the Department of Classics through Professor Mason Hammond for encouraging me to publish it. The photograph of the relief for plate I was taken by the photographer of the Fogg Art Museum, Harvard University.

2. P. Marconi, "Importazione e produzione di bronzi plastici nel Piceno," *Bulletino d'Arte* 30 (1936-37) pp. 58-59, figs. 1-2. Fig. 1 is reproduced here as Plate II 1. Cf. also D. Randall-MacIver, *The Iron Age in Italy* (Oxford 1927)

pl. 30; K. A. Neugebauer, "Reifarchaische Bronzefasen mit Zungenmuster," *Römische Mitteilungen* 38-39 (1923-24) p. 403.

3. This pointed tubular socket probably supported a curving crest like the one worn by the fallen warrior in the handle from Pesaro.

4. P. Marconi, "Importazione etc." pp. 58-59.

5. E. Pfuhl, *Malerei und Zeichnung der Griechen* III (Munich 1923) pl. 27, 117.

6. P. Marconi, "Importazione etc." p. 74 n.1, summarizes the varying opinions on the Pesaro handle.

7. K. Schefold, *Meisterwerke Griechische Kunst* (Basel 1960) pp. 17, 144-145; W. Lamb, *Greek and Roman Bronzes* (London 1929) p. 138. Lamb mentions here the influence of early Lakonian bronzes in the motif of a winged Artemis between lions ("mistress of the animals").

8. R. Joffroy, *Le Trésor de Vix (Côte d'Or)* (Fondation Eugène Piot, *Monuments et Mémoires* XLVIII 1, Paris 1954) pp. 1-68; pls. I-XXXII; figs. 1-9. Plate XXIV figs. 1 and 2 are reproduced here as plate II 2.

9. Joffroy, *Le Trésor* p. 30.

10. Joffroy, *Le Trésor* pp. 48-49, dates the Vix tomb about 500 B.C. on the basis of the Italo-Greek objects and Attic black-figure vases found therein. On p. 21, he dates the krater in the second half of the sixth century B.C.; its close correspondence in style and development to the warriors of the Siphnian Treasury at Delphi, combined with the dating of the Attic pottery and other objects found with it between 530 and 515 B.C., makes a date around 525 B.C. extremely likely for the Vix krater.

11. No. 7388 in the National Archaeological Museum, Athens. Joffroy, *Le Tresor* pl. XXIV, 3-4; M. Holleaux, "Fouilles au temple d'Apollon Ptoos," *BCH* 11 (1887) pl. IX.

12. E. Buschor, *Altsamische Standbilder* III (Berlin 1934) p. 48, Abb. 170-171. Buschor believes that this small statuette may have been brought to the Heraion from Sparta.

13. K. Schefold, *Meisterwerke* pp. 37-38, 178 (no. 179).

14. J. D. Beazley, *The Development of Attic Black-Figure* (Berkeley 1951) p. 38; pls. 13, 1-2, 14, 1.

15. Beazley, *Development* pl. 11, 2; p. 36. Beazley, p. 26, dates the François Vase to ca. 570 B.C.

SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS FOR THE DEGREE
OF PH.D.

JAMES ALBERT COULTER — *Plato and Sophistic Myth:
Studies in Plato's Apology and Symposium* *

THE present thesis is concerned with two problems of Platonic interpretation: the one touches on the elucidation of two specific texts, the *Apology* and the *Symposium*; the other is of a more general nature.

Specifically, I have sought, in the first two chapters of this thesis, to explain what I consider to have been a significant connection between the *Apology* and the *Symposium*, on the one hand, and, on the other, the works of two philosophers, Gorgias and Antisthenes, with whom Plato had a lively polemical relationship. With respect to the *Apology*, I have reexamined the theory first proposed in detail by Gomperz, and subsequently considered by other scholars, that Plato, in the composition of the *Apology*, drew to a considerable degree on Gorgias' *Defense of Palamedes*. In so doing I have questioned the prevailing interpretation, according to which Plato adapted the *Palamedes* to his description of Socrates' trial in order to lend mythical weight and dignity to the event. I have suggested that Plato, by embedding in Socrates' speech numerous verbal echoes of Palamedes' defense, was aiming rather at a thorough refutation of the rhetorical position which lies at the basis of Palamedes' defense. Furthermore, in order to demonstrate that such a concern with the methods of Gorgianic rhetoric may be assumed for Plato, I have discussed that portion of the *Gorgias* which is concerned with this question. I have also attempted, in order to reinforce the probability of a Platonic adaptation of the *Palamedes*, to show that the position attributed to Gorgias in the *Gorgias* is identical, in main outline, with that which can be derived from Palamedes' statements in the *Defense*. A further conclusion, which I have urged, is that the *Apology* and the *Gorgias* are closely connected to one another in their common concern with rhetoric: the one, the *Gorgias*, is a theoretical refutation; the other, a literary polemic, implies by the force of its verbal adaptations an identical refutation.

* Degree in Classical Philology, 1961.

In the chapter on the *Symposium*, or rather on Alcibiades' encomium of Socrates at the end of this work, I have tried to point to a process of literary adaptation similar to that which was at play in the composition of the *Apology*. In this case, the problem is not rhetoric, but love and its relation to wisdom, and the work which I conjecture Plato to have drawn upon is Antisthenes' *Herakles*, now, however, lost save for several small fragments. I have tried especially to show that there is some probability that in the *Symposium* Plato combined in the figure of Socrates, as he is envisaged by Alcibiades, the two mentors of Achilles in the *Herakles*, Chiron, the wise centaur, and Herakles, the embodiment of Cynic virtue.

In the third and final chapter, I have attempted to sum up the broader implications of these literary adaptations. Setting these in the wider context of Plato's rejection of mythical *paradeigmata* as an acceptable form of ethical instruction and validation, I have tried to show how Plato has created in Socrates a dramatic counter-ideal to popular, mythically inspired values, achieving this by masking Socrates with the features of the mythical heroes of works whose pretensions he questioned. Such a conception of Socrates, I have argued, is consistent both with Plato's analysis of the sources and inadequacies of popular morality and with his understanding of Socrates as the revolutionary thinker who attempted to place the question of moral values on a surer and more scientific basis.

DAVID GORDON MITTEN — *Terracotta Figurines from the Isthmian Sanctuary of Poseidon**

Among the finds of the University of Chicago's excavations at the Isthmian Sanctuary of Poseidon are 335 inventoried terracotta figurines, 175 of which are described and discussed in this study. Most of these figurines were recovered from deposits of debris associated with the destruction of the archaic temple of Poseidon at the end of the first quarter of the fifth century B.C. and belong to the sixth and late seventh century B.C., the period of the establishment of the Isthmian Games as a regular pan-Hellenic athletic festival and of the first great flowering of the sanctuary.

Although two Mycenaean and three Geometric terracottas are included in the collection, the figurines cover a restricted time span of about one hundred and fifty years, with the majority of the archaic figurines concentrated in the last quarter of the seventh and the first half

* Degree in Classical Archaeology, 1962.

of the sixth century B.C. Most of the figurines are handmade, with horse-and-riders being the most numerous class, and bulls, miscellaneous animals, and boats also common. Scattered offerings later than the archaic temple are represented by moldmade figurines, chiefly of men and women.

The overwhelming preponderance of Corinthian over imported figurines points to the dominant position which Corinth held in the supervision of the Isthmian Games and of the sanctuary and to the diversified supply of ceramic products made available to the users of the sanctuary by the Corinthian coroplastic industry. Products of at least two major ceramic centers can be identified, those from the workshops of the Potters' Quarter, excavated by the American School of Classical Studies some thirty years ago, and those of the "Asklepieion Factory," a major source of terracotta figurines of horsemen during the first half of the sixth century B.C. The exact location of the latter workshop is still unknown. In addition, some of the terracotta bulls found at the Isthmian Sanctuary may have been produced by manufacturers of architectural terracotta tiles, as they are made from clay similar to that used in archaic rooftiles. The few imported figurines include Argive, Attic, and Boeotian products. Only one piece of Eastern Greek origin has been recovered.

The Isthmian terracottas constitute the only major collection of terracotta figurines obtained from one of the four major pan-Hellenic centers of athletic festivals. They differ from the terracotta material found at other regional sanctuaries, such as Perachora, the Argive Heraeum, and the precinct of Artemis Orthia at Sparta, in that handmade animal figurines are the most numerous category represented.

The Isthmian figurines include several outstanding examples of Corinthian coroplastic art of the archaic period which reflect contemporary sculptural achievements in other media and which contribute substantially to our knowledge and appreciation of the versatility and skill of Corinthian sculptors.

Finally, the terracotta dedications indicate certain possible connections with the Isthmian Games and with the cult of Poseidon. It is probable that some of the figurines were dedicated by contestants; thus, the representations of horsemen and chariots may be linked with horse races and chariot contests. The high percentage of handmade horses may reflect the importance of Poseidon *Hippios* at the sanctuary, while the numerous terracotta bulls may represent sacrificial animals. The interesting boat models are perhaps to be considered votive offerings for sea voyages or for safe portage across the Isthmus.

WILLIAM F. WYATT, JR — *Metrical Lengthening in Homer**

The Homeric poems contain many linguistic features which differ from later Greek usage. In this dissertation I have concerned myself with but one class of words that differ phonetically from the same words in later Greek. The difference between the Homeric form and its later counterpart can always be expressed in the terms: long vowel or syllable in Homer corresponds to short vowel or syllable in later Greek in forms in which comparative linguistics reconstructs a short vowel or syllable. These words have been subsumed under the heading of metrical lengthening.

Wilhelm Schulze, the first scholar to delimit rigorously what forms are to be considered metrically lengthened, felt that metrical necessity, and metrical necessity alone, caused this lengthening. Since ὄνόματα could not be used in dactylic poetry, the poets arbitrarily lengthened the initial syllable. Other scholars have felt that a linguistic explanation for the lengthening must also be provided, but have accepted in the main Schulze's explanation of its motives. No one, however, has endeavored to explain what constitutes metrical necessity. If the poets chose to use ὄνόματα, then they had to lengthen a syllable in it — though it need not have been the first — but there was no necessity, metrical or other, of using the word at all. Hence metrical necessity applies only after the poet had chosen to use a word of impossible metrical shape: it is the poet's choice of a word that requires elucidation. It seems unlikely that he could have chosen a word unless he had some reason to believe that it existed in a metrically possible form. In other words, before he could use οὐνόματα, he had to feel that such a form existed. He could not make it up.

Words containing a metrically lengthened initial syllable can be conveniently separated into two classes, those beginning with a vowel and those with consonantal initial. The most striking fact about words with vocalic initial is that they began with a vowel not only in Greek, but in Indo-European as well: very few of them once began with s-, i- or u-. Words with initial vowel frequently contain in the Homeric poems themselves the initial vowel lengthened as a result of a perfectly regular morphological process. The initial vowel of the second element in a compound was lengthened, as in ἀνώνυμος. There are a number of metrically lengthened forms beside which there occur compounds with the negative prefix, such as ἀνήρ: ἀνήνορα, ἡνεμόεις: νήνεμος, ἡλιτόμηνος: νηλειτίδες, and it seems clear that the metrically lengthened form results

*Degree in Classical Philology, 1962.

from the abstraction of the long vocalism from the negative compound. This was possible because lengthening did not always take place after the negative prefix, as is proved by ἀνόλεθρος. And since ἀνόλεθρος was to be analyzed as ἀν- plus ὅλεθρος, so ἀνώνυμος was analyzed as ἀν- plus ὄνυμος, which resulted in *ἄνομα. The vowel quality was then assimilated to the quality of the non-compounded form ὄνομα, but the quantity remained that of the compound. This resulted in the οὔνομα of our texts.

The second category of lengthening affects primarily words beginning with a consonant, but this is due largely to chance. Certain secondary derivatives in Indo-European showed a long vowel corresponding to a short vowel in the nouns from which they were derived. This lengthening process, or more accurately the insertion of -e- before the vowel of the base-form, was continued in full force only in the Indo-Iranian languages. But Greek has a few instances of this vrddhi strengthening in its patronymic formations, as well as in a few other words. If one assumes the continuation of vrddhi in Greek, then the relation *Πρίαμος*: *Πριαμίδης* becomes quite regular. Lengthening in patronymics and a few other forms represents an archaism, a continuation in the verse of an ancient morphological process long since dead in the colloquial language.

*ἄνομα was assimilated to οὔνομα, but not all metrically lengthened forms were so assimilated. Meister in his *Homerische Kunstsprache* formulated a rule covering the divergence in vowel quality between the assimilated ἀνήρ and the unassimilated ἡνορέη: if the metrically lengthened vowel occurred in a word which was current also in later Ionic, or in the Homeric poems themselves, with a short vowel, the lengthened vowel was ᾱ-; if, however, the word was Homeric only, it was ḷ-. I would restate this rule as follows: The lengthened vowel is assimilated to the quality normal in prose when the word containing the lengthened vowel is identical in function and in form with a prose word. Hence ἀνήρ and οὔνομα, corresponding to ἀνήρ and ὄνομα, are quite regular, as is ἡνορέη since it differs in function and in form from ἀνήρ. A corollary to my restatement of Meister's formulation is: If a lengthened vowel remained unassimilated because the word in which it appeared differed in form or function from the prose word, the lengthened vowel could be felt to characterize the type of formation in which it occurred. ἡνεμόεις owes its initial vowel to the compound νήνεμος; it was not assimilated to *ἀνεμόεις by the vowel quality of ἄνεμος because it differs from that word formally and functionally. Thereupon the poets felt that the long initial vowel characterized formations in -εις, and created ἡμαθόεις. Metrically

lengthened forms, once created, gave rise to other metrically lengthened forms.

Metrically lengthened forms are not the only forms in the Homeric poems that oppose a long vowel to the short vowel of later Greek. There are also many archaisms which survived from the remote past because they were embedded in formulas. The poets were accustomed to singing these latter forms, and felt that the long vowel was archaic, traditional, and hence desirable. Their creation of new forms with a long vowel by the process described above of abstracting the long vocalism from compounds was fully in accord with the archaic tendencies of the heroic tradition. Archaism and innovation were on precisely the same level to the Homeric poet. The term metrical lengthening is, therefore, a bad one because inaccurate. It implies that it was the meter that caused the poets to lengthen short vowels: it was not, but was rather the archaizing inclination of the poets. Hence one could term such lengthening "poetic lengthening," but I prefer a less colored, more descriptive term. I propose "epic lengthened grade" as a cover-term for all cases of long vowels in the Homeric poems that correspond to short vowels in other dialects. If one wishes to separate innovations from archaisms, he might term the poetic innovations "extensions of the epic lengthened grade."

INDEX OF AUTHORS

VOLUMES 1-67 (1890-1963)

The supplementary volume of *Athenian Studies* is referred to as *A.S.*

- Alexander, P. J., Letters and speeches of the Emperor Hadrian, 49.141-177
— Church councils and patristic authority, the iconoclastic Councils of Hiereia (754) and St. Sophia (815), 63.493-505
Allen, F. D., Gajus or Gaïus? 2.71-87
— On *πεῖραπ ἐλέσθαι* (Σ 501) and the *manus consertio* of the Romans, 4.151-167
— On *os columnatum* (Plautus, *Miles Gloriosus* 211) and ancient instruments of confinement, 7.37-64
— Memoir of, 9.27-36
— Posthumous papers, 9.37-60
Allinson, F. G., Lucianeia, 12.181-190
Amory, A. R., Omens and dreams in the *Odyssey* (diss.), 63.517-519
Anderson, A. R., Heracles and his successors, a study of a heroic ideal and the recurrence of a heroic type, 39.7-58
Anderson, W. D., Paideia and ethos in Hellenic music, with special reference to literary evidence regarding the modes (diss.), 63.507-510
Armstrong, C. J., De epithetis compositis apud epicos Latinos (diss.), 47.209-211
Avery, M. W., De numeris lyricis Graecis qui in carminibus quibusdam nuper repertis audiuntur (diss.), 39.109-111
Babbitt, F. C., The use of $\mu\eta$ in questions, 12.307-317
- Babcock, A. R., The position of the copula and of the colorless ancillary verbs in Greek (diss.), 61.157-159
Baker, D. G., Animals on the coins of Greek cities (diss.), 43.167-168
Baker, W. W., De comicis Graecis litterarum iudicibus, 15.121-240
Ballentine, F. G., Some phases of the cult of the nymphs, 15. 77-119
Band, A. J., Aristophanes: the comedy of issues (diss.), 65.343-345
Bandler, B., Memoir on Robert Stroock, 51.303-309
Bapat, P. V., Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga: a comparative study (diss.), 43.168-170
Barrs, J. T., The ancient names, local, personal, and divine, of Dacia and Moesia (diss.), 47.211-214
Bassett, E. L., De metaphonia Latina (diss.), 53.171-174
Bassett, S. E., *ὑστερὸν πρότερον Ὁμηρικῶς* (Cicero, *Ad Att.* 1.16.1), 31.39-62
Bates, W. N., The date of Lycophron, 6.75-82
— Ionic capitals in Asia Minor, 10.29-31
— Notes on the old temple of Athena on the Acropolis, 12.319-326
Beeler, M. S., The phonology of Venetic (diss.), 49.265-268
Behr, C., Old Comedy and the free state (diss.), 65.345-348
Bennett, H. C., Jr., On the systemization of scholia dates for Pindar's Pythian odes, 62.61-78

- Berman, A. A., The transmigrations of form: recurrent patterns of imagination in the *Odyssey* and the *Aeneid* (diss.), 65.348-351
- Bernardete, S., Vat. Gr. 2181: an unknown Aristophanes manuscript, 66.241-248
- Berry, E. G., The *De liberis educandis* of Pseudo-Plutarch, 63.387-399
- Beye, C. R., The catalogue as a device of composition in the *Iliad* (diss.), 65.351-353
- Bisbee, H. L., The Tyrrhenians in Pisa and Triphylia, and their conquerors, the Minyan Pelopes (diss.), 46.203-204
- Blake, R. P., Some Byzantine accounting practices illustrated from Georgian sources, 51.11-33
- Blake, W. E., De Menandri ironia (diss.), 35.171-172
- Blegen, C. W., Athens and the early age of Greece, *A.S.* 1-9
- Bloch, H., Studies in historical literature of the fourth century B.C., *A.S.* 303-376
- The Roman brick-stamps not published in volume XV, 1, of the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, 56-57.1-128
- Indices to the Roman brick-stamps published in volumes XV, 1 of the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* and 56-57 of the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 58-59.1-104
- The exegetes of Athens: a reply, 62.37-49
- Sette Bassi revisited, 63.401-414
- Boak, A. E. R., The Roman *magistri* in the civil and military service of the Empire, 26.73-164
- Imperial coronation ceremonies of the fifth and sixth centuries, 30.37-47
- Some early Byzantine tax records from Egypt, 51.35-60
- Boegehold, A. L., Aristotle and the dikasteria (diss.), 63.526-528
- Bonner, C., A study of the Danaid myth, 13.129-173
- Bonner, R. J., The use of hemlock for capital punishment, *A.S.* 299-302
- Botsford, G. W., The trial of the Alcmeonidae and the Cleisthenean constitutional reforms, 8.1-22
- Bowra, C. M., Pindar, *Pythian* 2, 48.1-28
- Brady, T. A., A head of Sarapis from Corinth, 51.61-69
- Brewster, F., Ithaca: a study of the Homeric evidence, 31.125-166
- Asteris, 33.65-77
- The νποζώματα of ancient ships, 34.63-77
- Ithaca, Dulichium, Same, and wooded Zacynthus, 36.43-90
- The raft of Odysseus, 37.49-53
- The arrangement of oars in the trireme, 44.205-225
- Bridge, John, De quibusdam libris Suetonianis qui ex fonte Z emanaverunt (diss.), 41.183-186
- Bridge, Josiah, συγγενῆς ὁφθαλμός, 11.141-149
- Brink, C. O., Plato on the natural character of goodness, 63.193-198
- Bromberg, A. R., A phylax vase in the McDaniel Collection, 64.237-245
- *Concordia*: studies in Roman marriage under the Empire (diss.), 66.249-252
- Brooks, R. A., Ennius and Roman tragedy (diss.), 60.291-294
- Bruere, R. T., De Ovidii *Metamorphoseon* aliquot codicibus recensendis (diss.), 47.215-216
- The manuscript tradition of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, 50.95-122
- Bryant, A. A., Some Plautine words and word-groups, 9.121-125
- Greek shoes in the classical period, 10.57-102
- Boyhood and youth in the days of Aristophanes, 18.73-122
- Buck, F. H., A comparative study of postpositions in the Mongolian dialects and in the written language (diss.), 61.186

- Burrage, C., Studies in the Minoan hieroglyphic inscriptions: the Phae-stos whorl, 32.177-183
- Bury, J. B., *Magistri scriniorum, ἀντιγραφῆς, and ῥεφερενδάριοι*, 21.23-29
- Bryne, J. A. P., S.J., *Codices recentiores* of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (diss.), 64.259-262
- Callahan, J. F., Basil of Caesarea, a new source for St. Augustine's theory of time, 63.437-454
- Capps, E., The *Nemesis* of the younger Cratinus, 15.61-75
- Carey, F. M., *De scriptura Floriacensi* (diss.), 34.193-195
- Carpenter, M., The origin and influence of the Christmas kontakion of Romanos (diss.), 41.191-192
- Carspecken, J. F., Apollonius Rhodius and the Homeric epic (diss.), 60.294-296
- Cary, E., The manuscript tradition of the *Acharnenses*, 18.157-211
— Collations of the manuscripts of Aristophanes' *Aves*, 29.77-131
— Collations of the manuscripts of Aristophanes' *Vespae*, 30.1-35
- Cavarnos, J. P., The psychology of Gregory of Nyssa (diss.), 58-59, 219-221
- Chambers, M. H., Thucydides and Pericles, 62.79-92
— Studies in the veracity of Thucydides (diss.), 62.141-143
- Charlton, D. J., S.J., The portrayal of youthful character in Homer (diss.), 61.159-161
- Chase, A. H., Quomodo amicitiam tractaverint tragici Graeci quaeritur (diss.), 41.186-189
— The metrical *Lives* of St. Martin of Tours by Paulinus and Fortunatus and the prose *Life* by Sulpicius Severus, 43.51-76
— The influence of Athenian institutions upon the *Laws* of Plato, 44.131-192
- Chase, G. D., The origin of Roman praenomina, 8.103-184
- Chase, G. D., The form of nominal compounds in Latin, 11.61-72
- Chase, G. H., The shield devices of the Greeks, 13.61-127
— An amphora with a new καλός-name in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, 17.143-148
- Clark, S. B., The authorship and the date of the double letters in Ovid's *Heroides*, 19.121-155
- Clarke, H. W., The lion and the altar: myth, rite, and symbol in the *Odyssey* (diss.), 65.353-355
- Cleasby, H. L., The *Medea* of Seneca, 18.39-71
- Cole, A. T., Jr., The anonymous Iamblichus and his place in Greek political theory, 65.127-163
— The political theory of Polybius and its sources (diss.), 65.356-359
- Colker, M. L., A critical edition of Walter of Châtillon's *Alexandreis* (diss.), 61.162-164
- Commager, H. S., Jr., Lucretius' interpretation of the plague, 62.105-118
- Coulter, J. A., Plato and Sophistic Myth: Studies in Plato's *Apology* and *Symposium* (diss.), 67.307-308
- Cram, R. V., De vicis Atticis (diss.), 28.225-227
— The Roman censors, 51.71-110
- Crawford, F. S., Jr., Quo modo Graeci vocales *e* et *o* designaverint (diss.), 49.268-271
- Daitz, S. G., The *De Chersoneso* and the *Philippica quarta* of Demosthenes: the texts and their relationship (diss.), 61.164-166
- Daux, G., Athènes et Delphes, *A.S.* 37-69
- Davidson, G. F., Quo modo et qua ratione poetæ scaenici Graeci Euripides Menanderque personas in scaenam introduxerint (diss.), 43.170-173
- Deas, H. T., The *Scholia vetera* to Pindar, 42.1-78

- Dinsmoor, W. B., The tribal cycles of the treasurers of Athena, *A.S.* 157-182
- Doctors of Philosophy in Classical Philology and Classical Archaeology of Harvard University, 1875-1909, 21.161-167
- Dolin, E. F., Jr., Parmenides and Hesiod, 66.93-98
- Dow, S., A red-figured lekythos with the καλός-name Φαινππος, 41.63-72
- Athenian decrees of 216-212 B.C., 48.105-126
- Chryseis, a study of the evidence in regard to the mother of Philip V, 48.127-180
- Aristotle, the kleroteria, and the courts, 50.1-34
- The first enneēteric Delian Pythaïs, 51.111-124
- Corinthiaca, 53.89-119
- Corinthiaca, 60.81-100
- οἱ περὶ τὸ Διογένειον, 63.423-436
- The Athenian anaprapheis, 67.37-54
- Three athenian decrees: method in the restoration of preambles, 67.55-75
- The Athenian honors for Aristonikos of Karystos, "Alexander's ΣΦΑΙΠΙΣΤΗΣ," 67.77-92
- Downing, J. K., The treatise of Gregory of Nyssa *In illud: tunc et ipse filius*, a critical text with prolegomena (diss.), 58-59.221-223
- Dyer, L., The plot of the *Agamemnon*, 7.95-121
- Plato as a playwright, 12.165-180
- The Olympian council house and council, 19.1-60
- Earle, M. L., Notes on the *Bacchae* of Euripides, 5.45-48
- Edson, C. F., Jr., The Antigonids, Heracles, and Beroea, 45.213-246
- Perseus and Demetrius, 46.191-202
- Chryseis, a study of the evidence in regard to the mother of Philip V, 48.127-180
- Edson, C. F., Jr., Macedonica, 51.125-136
- Elder, J. P., De Servii commentariis Danielinis, ut aiunt, in *Aeneidos libros primum et secundum confectis* (diss.), 51.315-318
- The missing portions of the *Commentum Einsidense* on Donatus's *Arte grammatica*, 56-57.129-160
- Notes on some conscious and subconscious elements in Catullus' poetry, 60.101-136
- "Non iniussa cano," Virgil's sixth *Eclogue*, 65.109-125
- Elderkin, K. M., Chachrylion and his vases, 35.75-136
- Elliott, K. O., Text, authorship, and use of the first Vatican mythographer (diss.), 53.174-176
- Ellis, A. W., Reliefs from a sarcophagus, decorated with an Amazonomachy, in the Fogg Museum (diss.), 47.216-218
- Else, G. F., Lucretius and the aesthetic attitude, 41.149-182
- Quo modo Plato ideas expresserit (diss.), 45.247-250
- The terminology of the Ideas, 47.17-55
- Aristotle on the beauty of tragedy, 49.179-204
- Ephron, H. D., The *Jēsōn* tablet of Enkomi, 65.39-107
- Hygieia, Tharso, and Iaon: the Phaistos Disk, 66.1-91
- Etheridge, S. G., Plutarch's *De virtute morali*: a study in extra-Peripatetic Aristotelianism (diss.), 66.252-254
- Evans, E. C., Quo modo corpora voltusque hominum auctores Latini descripserint (diss.), 41.192-195
- Roman descriptions of personal appearance in history and biography, 46.43-84
- Literary portraiture in ancient epic, 58-59.189-217
- Everett, W., Studies in the text of Lucretius, 7.21-36
- Catullus vs. Horace, 12.7-17

- Fales, D. C., Jr., The arena bath area at Curium in Cyprus: a study of Roman and early Christian architecture (diss.), 63.513
- Falk, K., Lucretius as an Epicurean poet (diss.), 66.254-256
- Feldman, L. H., Cicero's conception of historiography (diss.), 61.167-169
- Ferguson, W. S., Bibliography of works to July, 1940, 51.1-9
- Fernald, M. L., Arthur Stanley Pease, the botanical explorer, 60.11-21
- Finley, J. H., Jr., Quo modo poetae epicci Graeci heroas sententias fabulas moribus publicis accommodaverint (diss.), 44.233-238
- Milton and Horace, a study of Milton's sonnets, 48.29-73
- Euripides and Thucydides, 49.23-66
- The origins of Thucydides' style, 50.35-84
- The unity of Thucydides' *History*, A.S. 255-297
- The date of *Paean* 6 and *Nemean* 7, 60.61-80
- Pindar and the Persian invasion, 63.121-132
- Fishman, P., The vocalism of Messapic (diss.), 45.250-256
- Fiske, G. C., Notes on the worship of the Roman emperors in Spain, 11.101-139
- The politics of the patrician Claudi, 13.1-59
- Lucilius, the *Ars Poetica* of Horace, and Persius, 24.1-36
- Cicero's *Orator* and Horace's *Ars Poetica*, 35.1-74
- Flacelière, R., Les rapports d'Athènes et de l'Aitolie au III^e siècle avant J.-C., A.S. 471-481
- Flagg, I., Iambic composition of Sophocles, 12.59-68
- Fobes, F. H., De libris aliquot Suetonianis (diss.), 23.167
- Folliot, F., De principiis cultus imperatorum Romanorum quaestio; quid indigenum quidve extraneum videatur (diss.), 38.143-147
- Foster, B. O., Notes on the symbolism of the apple in classical antiquity, 10.39-55
- Fowler, A. M., Expressions for "immortality" in the early Indo-European languages, with special reference to the Rig-Veda, Homer, and the poetic Edda (diss.), 51.318-321
- Fowler, H. N., Plutarch *περὶ εὐθυμίας*, 1.139-152
- The dates of the exiles of Peisistratos, 7.167-175
- The origin of the statements contained in Plutarch's *Life of Pericles*, Chapter 13, 12.211-220
- Fowler, W. W., Observations on the fourth *Eclogue* of Virgil, 14.17-35
- Fraser, A. D., The Greek helmet (diss.), 35.172-173
- Freed, E. D., Quotations from the Old Testament in John (diss.), 65.359-362
- Freeman, W. H., De Ovidi carminum amatoriorum textus historia quaeritur (diss.), 23.168-170
- Fuchs, H., Der Friede als Gefahr, zum zweiten Einsiedler Hirtengedichte, 63.363-385
- Gallary, L. N., The Latinity of the Dacian inscriptions (diss.), 51.321-322
- Geer, R. M., Quatenus *Vita Vergiliانا* Aelio Donato attributa re vera Suetonio Tranquillo debeatur quaeritur (diss.), 37.99-100
- Gelsing, M. G. H., De Codice Vergiliano Bernensi 165 (diss.), 40.199-200
- Gifford, N. M., The palmette design in Greek art (diss.), 39.111-113
- Gillespie, W. H., On the relation of the Codex Vetus to the Codex Ursinianus of Plautus, 9.109-115
- Gillingham, A. G., The prooemia in Cicero's works on philosophy, politics, and rhetoric (diss.), 60.297-299

- Goldman, H., The *Oresteia* of Aeschylus as illustrated by Greek vase-painting, 21.111-159
- Gomme, A. W., The Old Oligarch, A.S. 211-245
- Goodwin, W. W., On the origin of the construction of *oὐ μή* with the subjunctive and the future indicative, 1.65-76
- On some disputed points in the construction of *ἔδει*, *χρῆν*, etc. with the infinitive, 1.77-88
- On the extent of the deliberative construction in relative clauses in Greek, 7.1-12
- The Battle of Salamis, 17.75-101
- Goold, G. P., Richard Bentley: A Tercentenary Commemoration, 67. 285-302
- Grant, J. R., De decretis Atticis quae e memoria scriptorum veterum tradita sunt (diss.), 58-59.223-226
- Grant, M. A., Cicero's *Orator* and Horace's *Ars Poetica*, 35.1-74
- Greenberg, N. A., The poetic theory of Philodemus (diss.), 62.146-148
- The use of *poema* and *poesis*, 65.263-289
- Euripides' *Orestes*: an interpretation, 66.157-192
- Greene, W. C., Quid de poetis Plato censuerit (diss.), 28.227-230
- Plato's view of poetry, 29.1-75
- The spirit of comedy in Plato, 31.63-123
- Fate, Good, and Evil in early Greek poetry, 46.1-36
- Fate, Good, and Evil in pre-Socratic philosophy, 47.85-129
- Dramatic and ethical motives in the *Agamemnon*, 54.25-33
- The spoken and the written word, 60.23-59
- Platonism and its critics, 61.39-71
- Publications 1911-1954, 62.1-5
- The paradoxes of the *Republic*, 63.199-216
- Greenlee, J. H., The Gospel text of Cyril of Jerusalem (diss.), 58-59. 227-228
- Greenough, J. B., The *fauces* of the Roman house, 1.1-12
- Some Latin etymologies, 1.93-105
- Some uses of *neque* (*nec*) in Latin, 2.129-141
- Accentual rhythm in Latin, 4.105-115
- Latin etymologies, 4.143-149
- Early Latin prosody, 5.57-71
- Some features of the contrary to fact construction, 7.13-20
- Memoir of Frederic de Forest Allen, 9.27-36
- Some questions in Latin stem formation, 10.1-17
- The religious condition of the Greeks at the time of the New Comedy, 10.141-180
- On ellipsis in some Latin constructions, 12.1-5
- Biography and works of, 14.1-16
- Gulick, C. B., De Scholiis Aristophaneis quaestiones mythicae, 5.83-166
- Omens and augury in Plautus, 7.235-247
- The Attic Prometheus, 10.103-114
- Two notes on the *Birds* of Aristophanes, 10.115-120
- On the Greek infinitive after verbs of fearing, 12.327-334
- Gummere, R. M., Walt Whitman and his reaction to the Classics, 60.263-289
- The Classics in a brave new world, 62.119-139
- Hack, R. K., The law of the hendecasyllable, 25.107-115
- The doctrine of literary forms, 27.1-65
- Hale, W. G., Syllabification in Roman speech, 7.249-271
- The origin of subjunctive and optative conditions in Greek and Latin, 12.109-123
- Halliday, W. R., Who was the ὑπεκκαύστρια at Soli? 36.165-177

- Hammond, M., Corbulo and Nero's eastern policy, 45.81-104
 — Pliny the Younger's views on government, 49.115-140
 — Septimius Severus, Roman bureaucrat, 51.137-173
 — Ancient imperialism: contemporary justifications, 58-59.105-161
 — Germana patria, 60.147-174
 — Plato and Ovid's exile, 63.347-361
 — Res olim dissociabiles: principatus ac libertas — liberty under the early Roman Empire, 67.93-113
- Hammond, W. A., On the notion of virtue in the dialogues of Plato, with particular reference to those of the first period and to the third and fourth books of the *Republic*, 3.131-180
- Hanfmann, G. M. A., Socrates and Christ, 60.205-233
 — Ionia, leader or follower? 61.1-37
 — Lydiaka, 63.65-88
- Harland, J. P., The Peloponnesos in the Bronze Age, 34.1-62
- Harrington, H., The prototypes of the designs on Roman lamps (diss.), 46.204-206
- Harrison, C. T., The ancient atomists and English literature of the seventeenth century, 45.1-79
- Haskins, C. H., A list of text-books from the close of the twelfth century, 20.75-94
 — The Sicilian translators of the twelfth century and the first Latin version of Ptolemy's *Almagest*, 21.75-102
 — Further notes on Sicilian translations of the twelfth century, 23.155-166
 — Mediaeval versions of the *Posterior Analytics*, 25.87-105
- Hatch, W. H. P., The use of ἀλιτήριος, ἀλιτρός, ἄραιος, ἐναγής, ἐνθύμιος, παλαμυνάος, and προστρόπαιος: a study in Greek lexicography, 19. 157-186
 Hatch, W. H. P., A manuscript of Jerome's *De viris illustribus* belonging to the General Theological Seminary in New York, 23.47-69
 — On the relationship of Codex Augiensis and Codex Boernerianus of the Pauline epistles, 60.187-199
- Havelock, E. A., Parmenides and Odysseus, 63.133-143
- Hayley, H. W., The social and domestic position of women in Aristophanes, 1.159-186
 — Quaestiones Petronianae, 2.1-40
 — The κότταβος κετακτός in the light of recent investigations, 5.73-82
 — Varia critica, 7.215-222
 — Notes on the *Phormio*, 11.159-161
- Healey, R. F., S.J., Eleusinian sacrifices in the Athenian Law Code (diss.), 66.256-259
- Heidel, W. A., Antecedents of Greek corpuscular theories, 22.111-172
 — Hippocratea, 25.139-203
- Herbert, K. B. J., Ephorus in Plutarch's *Lives*: a source problem (diss.), 63.510-513
- Hewitt, J. W., The propitiation of Zeus, 19.61-120
- Hill, E. H., Etruscan small bronzes of the Archaic period (diss.), 50.126-127
- Hodgman, A. W., The versification of Latin metrical inscriptions except Saturnians and dactylics, 9.133-168
- Hoffleit, H. B., Quo modo originem mali Plato tractaverit (diss.), 38.148-150
- Holland, B. D., A kylix in the Fogg Art Museum, 52.41-63
- Holland, L. B., The Danaoi, 39.59-92
- Hood, T. L., Browning's ancient classical sources, 33.79-180
- Hopkins, H. M., The declension of Greek nouns in Plautus, 9.96-101
- Hoppin, J. C., Argos, Io, and the *Prometheus* of Aeschylus, 12.335-345
- Howard, A. A., On the use of the perfect infinitive in Latin with the force of the present, 1.111-138

- Howard, A. A., The *αὐλός* or *tibia*, 4.1-60
 — Notes on Suetonius, 7.205-214
 — The mouth-piece of the *αὐλός*, 10.19-28
 — Notes on a fifteenth century manuscript of Suetonius, 12.261-265
 — Valerius Antias and Livy, 17.161-182
- Howes, G. E., Homeric quotations in Plato and Aristotle, 6.153-237
 — The use of *μή* with the participle, where the negative is influenced by the construction upon which the participle depends, 12.277-285
- Hulley, K. K., Hieronymus quatenus artem criticam noverit (diss.), 52.139-141
 — Light cast by St. Jerome on certain palaeographical points, 54.83-92
 — Principles of textual criticism known to St. Jerome, 55.87-109
- Ingen, W. van, The kylix by the Foundry Painter in the Fogg Museum, 46.155-166
- Jackson, C. N., Classical elements in Browning's *Aristophanes' Apology*, 20.15-73
 — The Latin epyllion, 24.37-50
 — "Molle atque facetum," Horace, *Satires* 1.10.44, 25.117-137
 — The decree-seller in the *Birds*, and the professional politicians at Athens, 30.89-102
 — Herbert Weir Smyth, 49.1-21
- Jaeger, W., The date of Isocrates' *Areopagiticus* and the Athenian opposition, *A.S.* 409-450
 — Publications, 1911-1959, 63.1-14
- Johnson, J. E., Roman portrait art, its source and realism (diss.), 43.173-175
- Jones, L. W., De deis Dacicis (diss.), 36.179-180
- Jones, T. T., De sermone Celsiano (diss.), 40.200-202
- Keaney, J. J., The structure, dating, and publication of Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia* (diss.), 65.362-365
 — The structure of Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia*, 67.115-146
- Kennedy, G. A., Theophrastus and stylistic distinctions, 62.93-104
 — Prolegomena and commentary to Quintilian 8, Pr. and 1-3 (diss.), 62.143-146
 — Aristotle on the period, 63.283-288
- Kirchner, J., Archon Diomedon, *A.S.* 503-507
- Kittredge, G. L., James Bradstreet Greenough, 14.1-16
 — Chaucer's *Lollus*, 28.47-133
- Knowles, R., Phonetic tendency in the Romance languages (diss.), 42.181
- Knox, B. M. W., The *Ajax* of Sophocles, 65.1-37
- Kroymann, J., Die Stellung des Königtums im I. Buch von Ciceros Staat, zur Interpretation von Cicero, *De re publica* 1.50, 63.309-332
- Kuhn, H., The true tragedy, on the relationship between Greek tragedy and Plato, (1), 52.1-40
 — (2), 53.37-88
- Kustas, G. L., Photius' idea of history (diss.), 61.170-172
- Ladd, G. E., The eschatology of the *Didache* (diss.), 61.173-175
- Lane, G. M., Notes on Quintilian, 1.89-92
 — Memoir of, 9.1-12
 — Posthumous papers, 9.13-26
- Langerbeck, H., *Margites*, Versuch einer Beschreibung und Rekonstruktion, 63.33-63
- Larsen, J. A. O., The constitution and original purpose of the Delian League, 51.175-213
- Leacock, A. G., De rebus ad pompas sacras apud Graecos pertinentibus quaestiones selectae, 11.1-45
- Lee, R. E., Ancient Roman curb bits, 11.151-157

- Lefkowitz, M. R., Pyrrhus' negotiations with the Romans, 280-278 B.C., 64.147-177
 — τῶ καὶ ἐγώ: a study of first-personal statements in Pindar (diss.), 66.259-262
 — τῶ καὶ ἐγώ: the first person in Pindar, 67.177-253
- Leon, H. J., De Iudeorum antiquorum sepulcretis Romae repertis quaestiones selectae (diss.), 38.147-148
- Levin, D. N., Ethical implications of the πέρας-ἄπειρον dichotomy as seen particularly in the works of Aeschylus (diss.), 63.519-522
 — Quaestiones Erinneanae, 66.193-204
- Levine, P., On the question of mediaeval writing in Vercelli (diss.), 61.175-178
 — The original design and the publication of the *De natura deorum*, 62.7-36
 — Two early Latin versions of St. Gregory of Nyssa's περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου, 63.473-492
- Levy, B. E., The Bari type of Beneventan script: manuscripts from Apulia (diss.), 66.262-265
- Lindsay, W. M., The Nonius glosses (prefatory note), 9.67-69
 — Varia Plautina, 9.126-132
- Litchfield, H. W., Quibus virtutum vitiorumque moralium exemplis ex suorum annalibus sumptis scriptores Latini antiqui usi sint (diss.), 22.181-182
 — The Attic alphabet in Thucydides: a note on Thucydides 8.9.2, 23.129-154
 — Cicero's judgment on Lucretius, 24.147-159
 — National *exempla virtutis* in Roman literature, 25.1-71
- Little, A. M. G., Plautus and popular drama, 49.205-228
- Lloyd, R. B., Republican authors in Servius and the Scholia Danielis, 65.291-341
- Lockwood, D. P., The Sicilian translators of the twelfth century and the first Latin version of Ptolemy's *Almagest*, 21.75-102
 — De Rinucio Aretino Graecarum litterarum interprete, 24.51-109
- Longrigg, J., Philosophy and Medicine, 67.147-175
- Luce, S. B., Jr., Quomodo pictores vasorum Graecorum facta Herculis illustraverint quaeritur (diss.), 24.161
- Luck, G., Palladas, Christian or pagan, 63.455-471
 — Notes on the language and text of Ovid's *Tristia*, 65.243-261
- Lynch, C. A., De verbis alienarum basium adiumento suppletis in lingua Graeca (diss.), 47.218-219
- Mach, E. von, The death of Ajax: on an Etruscan mirror in the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, 11.93-99
- MacKendrick, P. L., De gente Attica Eumolpidarum (diss.), 49.271-273
- MacMullen, R., Roman imperial building in the provinces, 64.207-235
- Macomber, H. M., De licentiis metricalis quae in canticis Sophocleis reperiuntur (diss.), 48.203-204
- Manning, R. C., On the omission of the subject-accusative of the infinitive in Ovid, 4.117-141
 — On a supposed limitation of the law of *breves breviantes* in Plautus and Terence, 9.87-95
- Mason, C. C., The ethics of wealth in early Greek thought (diss.), 56-57. 251-252
- Mather, M. W., Quo modo iaciendi verbi composita in praesentibus temporibus enuntiaverunt antiqui et scripserint, 6.83-151
- Matteucig, G., Poggio Buco: the necropolis of Stationia (diss.), 54.117-119
- May, C. H., De motibus animi apud poetas epicos Homerum Apolloniumque expressis (diss.), 24.162-163

- McDaniel, W. B., Conjectural emendations of the Homeric Hymns, 11.73-91
- McDiarmid, J. B., Theophrastus on the Presocratic causes, 61.85-156
- McDonough, J. A., S.J., The treatise of Gregory of Nyssa *Contra fatum*, a critical text with prolegomena (diss.), 61.179-180
- McGregor, M. F., The pro-Persian party at Athens from 510 to 480 B.C., *A.S.* 71-95
- McKinlay, A. P., Stylistic tests and the chronology of the works of Boethius, 18.123-156
- Studies in Arator (1), 43.123-166
- A fragment of Juvenal in a manuscript of Orléans, 49.229-263
- Studies in Arator (2), 54.93-113
- McMahon, A. P., On the second book of Aristotle's *Poetics* and the source of Theophrastus' definition of tragedy, 28.1-46
- Seven questions on Aristotelian definitions of tragedy and comedy, 40.97-198
- Sextus Empiricus and the arts, 42.79-137
- Meiggs, R., The crisis of Athenian imperialism, 67.1-36
- Meritt, B. D., A revision of Athenian Tribute Lists, (1), 37.55-98
 — (2), 38.21-73
- Athens and Carthage, *A.S.* 247-253
- Messenger, H. K., De temporum et modorum apud Salvianum usu (diss.), 36.180-182
- Messing, G. M., De consonantibus quae laryngophoni vocantur praecipue quod ad linguam Graecam attinet (diss.), 53.176-177
- Selected studies in Indo-European phonology, 56-57.161-232
- Mitchell, C., Stylistic problems in Greek and Roman archaic reliefs, 61.73-84
- Mitten D. G., Ancient lamps in the McDaniel Collection, 64.247-258
- Mitten, D. G., An archaic bronze relief of a hoplite in the McDaniel Collection, 67.303-306
- Terracotta Figurines from the Isthmian Sanctuary of Poseidon (diss.), 67.308-309
- Moore, C. H., Oriental cults in Britain, 11.47-60
- Notes on the tragic hypotheses, 12.287-298
- On the origin of the taurobolium, 17.43-48
- Latin inscriptions in the Harvard Collection of Classical Antiquities, 20.1-14
- Prophecy in the ancient epic, 32.99-175
- Moore, R. E., Quales vocales ex Indo-germanicis ь et ъ in lingua Graeca exortae sint (diss.), 44.239-244
- Morgan, M. H., De ignis eliciendi modis apud antiquos, 1.13-64
- Some constructions in Andocides, 2.57-69
- Notes on Lysias, 5.49-56
- Notes on Persius, 7.191-203
- Memoir of George M. Lane, 9.1-12
- Hidden verses in Livy, 9.61-66
- Miscellanea, 12.231-248
- Notes on Vitruvius, 17.1-14
- Critical and explanatory notes on Vitruvius, 21.1-22
- Morris, E. P., An examination of the theories regarding the nature and origin of Indo-European inflection, 16.63-122
- Müller, F., Die blonde Bestie und Thukydides, 63.171-178
- Murphy, C. T., Quae ratio inter fabulas satyricas et comoediam antiquam intercedat (diss.), 46.206-209
- Aristophanes and the art of rhetoric, 49.69-113
- Murphy, P. R., De lingua antiqua Illyrica (diss.), 53.177-180
- Must, G., The problem of the inscription on helmet B of Negau, 62.51-59

- Mylonas, G. E., Athens and Minoan Crete, *A.S.* 11-36
- Newberry, J. S., The prehistory of the alphabet, 45.105-156
- Newhall, S. H., Quid de somniis censuerint quoque modo eis usi sint antiqui quaeritur (diss.), 24.163-164
- Nicolson, F. W., Greek and Roman barbers, 2.41-56
- The use of *hercle* (*mehercle*), *edepol* (*pol*), *ecastor* (*mecastor*) by Plautus and Terence, 4.99-103
- The saliva superstition in classical literature, 8.23-40
- Nock, A. D., σύνναος θεός, 41.1-62
- Mysterion, 60.201-204
- A cult ordinance in verse, 63.415-421
- Norton, R., Greek grave-reliefs, 8.41-102
- Notopoulos, J. A., The meaning of *εἰκασία* in the divided line of Plato's *Republic*, 44.193-203
- Movement in the divided line of Plato's *Republic*, 47.57-83
- Oertel, H., An examination of the theories regarding the nature and origin of Indo-European inflection, 16.63-122
- Oliver, J. H., Julia Domna as Athena Polias, *A.S.* 521-530
- Onions, J. H., The Nonius glosses, 9.67-86
- Otis, B., De Lactantii qui dicitur *Narrationibus Ovidianis* (diss.), 46.209-211
- The *Argumenta* of the so-called Lactantius, 47.131-163
- Owen, E., De ratione civili Aeschylea (diss.), 43.175-176
- Owens, C. R., Quo modo tragici Graeci res naturales tractaverint (diss.), 28.230-231
- Parker, C. P., Musonius the Etruscan, 7.123-137
- Parker, C. P., Musonius in Clement, 12.191-200
- "Sacra inter nos spiritus," 17.149-160
- The historical Socrates in the light of Professor Burnet's hypothesis, 27.67-75
- Parry, A. M., *Logos* and *ergon* in Thucydides (diss.), 63.522-523
- Parry, M., Studies in the epic technique of oral verse-making: (1) Homer and Homeric style, 41.73-147
- (2) The Homeric language as the language of an oral poetry, 43.1-50
- Pascal, C. B., The cults of Cisalpine Gaul (diss.), 63.514-516
- Paton, J. M., The *Antigone* of Euripides, 12.267-276
- Patzer, H., Die dramatische Handlung der *Sieben gegen Theben*, 63.97-119
- Peabody, H. B., Jr., Hesiod's *Works and Days*: an exemplar of the ancient Greek oral style (diss.), 66.265-268
- Peachy, F., The Homeric story of the Cyclops (diss.), 61.180-181
- Pease, A. S., Notes on some uses of bells among the Greeks and Romans, 15.29-59
- A Harvard manuscript of St. Augustine, 21.51-74
- Medical allusions in the works of St. Jerome, 25.73-86
- Latin inscriptions in the Virgin Islands, 50.85-88
- Some aspects of invisibility, 53.1-36
- The son of Neptune, 54.69-82
- Publications 1901-1950, 60.1-10
- Botanical explorer, 60.11-21
- Peebles, B. M., De Sulpici Severi operum Martinianorum textus priscis fontibus (diss.), 51.322-325
- Peek, W., Die Kämpfe am Eurymedon, *A.S.* 97-120
- Peters, J. A., On short vowels before mute and liquid in Plautus: can they act as *breves breviantes*? 9.115-120

- Petersen, H. E., Governorship and military command in the first three centuries of the Roman Empire (diss.), 61.181-184
- Peterson, R. M., *De vaticiniis apud poetas Graecos* (diss.), 23.170-171
- Phillips, H., Jr., *De vocis ἀμαρτίᾳ vi et usu apud scriptores Graecos usque ad annum CCC. ante Christum natum* (diss.), 44.244-246
- Phoutrides, A. E., *De choro Euripideo* (diss.), 26.175-176
- The chorus of Euripides, 27.77-170
- Pingree, D. E., Materials for the study of the transmission of Greek astrology to India (diss.), 65.365-367
- Pöschl, V., *Die Einheit der ersten Römerode*, 63.333-346
- Post, C. R., The dramatic art of Aeschylus, 16.15-61
- The development of motion in archaic Greek sculpture, 20.95-164
- The dramatic art of Sophocles, 23.71-127
- The dramatic art of Menander, 24.111-145
- The dramatic art of Sophocles as revealed by the fragments of the lost plays, 33.1-63
- Power, G. J., S.J., Richer's utilization of his sources (diss.), 65.367-369
- Prescott, H. W., The scene-headings in the early recensions of Plautus, 9.102-108
- A study of the Daphnis-myth, 10.121-140
- Three *puer*-scenes in Plautus, and the distribution of roles, 21.31-50
- Prindle, L. M., *Quaestiones de libello quem Iulius Firmicus Maternus scripsit de errore profanarum religionum* (diss.), 33.181-182
- Pulgram, E., The theory of proper names (diss.), 56-57.252-255
- The origin of the Latin *nomen gentilicium*, 58-59.163-187
- Pusey, N. M., Alcibiades and τὸ φιλόπολι, 51.215-231
- Putnam, M. C. J., *The art of Catullus* 64, 65.165-205
- Patterns of personality and imagery in the poetry of Catullus (diss.), 65.369-371
- Unity and design in *Aeneid* 5, 66.205-239
- Quain, E. A., A stylistic study of the works of John the Scot (diss.), 52.141-144
- Rand, E. K., On the composition of Boethius' *Consolatio philosophiae*, 15.1-28
- Catullus and the Augustans, 17.15-30
- Young Virgil's poetry, 30.103-185
- A new approach to the text of Pliny's *Letters*, (1), 34.79-191
- (2), 35.137-169
- (3), 36.1-41
- On the history of the *De vita Caesarum* of Suetonius in the early Middle Ages, 37.1-48
- Once more Virgil's birthplace, 44.63-93
- A fragment of Juvenal in a manuscript of Orléans, 49.229-263
- An unrecognized sacramentary of Tours (prepared for publication by J. A. McDonough, S.J., and T. J. Wade, S.J.), 60.235-261
- Reckford, K. J., Horace, Augustan and Epicurean (diss.), 63.524-526
- Reiche, H. A. T., A history of the concepts Θεοπρεπές and ἱεροπρεπές (diss.), 62.148-151
- Reid, J. R., The expression of future time: from Indo-European to Romance (diss.), 55.111-114
- Reid, J. S., Lucretiana, notes on Books 1 and 2 of the *De rerum natura*, 22.1-53
- Renehan, R., Some Greek textual problems, 67.269-283
- Richards, J. F. C., *De dialecto Milesia* (diss.), 45.256-260

- Richards, J. F. C., Final *vū* in Herodotus and Ionic inscriptions, 46.37-41
- Richardson, G. M., Vitruviana, 1.153-158
- Riddehough, G. B., The text of Joseph of Exeter's *Bellum Troianum* (diss.), 61.184-186
- Robert, L., ἀμφιθαλής, *A.S.* 509-519
- Robinson, D. N., Quibus temporibus religiones ab Oriente ortae et Romae et in provinciis Romanis floruerint desierintque quaestiones (diss.), 22.182-183
- Robinson, E. A., The date of Cicero's *Brutus*, 60.137-146
- The date of Cicero's *De legibus* (diss.), 60.299-301
- Robinson, G. W., Notes on the fourth and fifth centuries, 26.165-173
- Joseph Scaliger's estimates of Greek and Latin authors, 29.133-176
- Rogers, F. M., The pronunciation of the Madeira and Azores dialects as compared with standard Portuguese (diss.), 51.326-328
- Rolfe, J. C., An inscribed kotoylos from Boeotia, 2.89-101
- The tragedy *Rhesus*, 4.61-97
- The preposition *ab* in Horace, 12.249-260
- Ropes, J. H., An observation on the style of St. Luke, 12.299-305
- Rose, H. J., Some passages of Latin poets, 47.1-15
- Rosenmeyer, T. G., The isle of Critias (diss.), 60.302-304
- Runciman, W. G., Plato's *Parmenides*, 64.89-120
- Sanborn, C. A. R., An emendation of Vitruvius, 20.165-169
- Sanford, E. M., Quibus rationibus auctorum Latinorum opera in libris manuscriptis collecta sint (diss.), 34.195-197
- Nero and the East, 48.75-103
- Savage, J. J. H., De Scholiis in Turonensi Vergili Codice scriptis (diss.), 35.173-174
- Savage, J. J. H., The Scholia in the Virgil of Tours, Bernensis 165, 36.91-163
- The manuscripts of the commentary of Servius Danielis on Virgil, 43.77-121
- The manuscripts of Servius's commentary on Virgil, 45.157-204
- Schadewaldt, W., Der Prolog der *Odysee*, 63.15-32
- Schauroth, E. G., The *ὑποζώματα* of Greek ships, 22.173-179
- Schlaifer, R., Greek theories of slavery from Homer to Aristotle, 47.165-204
- Notes on Athenian public cults, 51.233-260
- The cult of Athena Pallenis, 54.35-67
- Schnittkind, H. T., De praepositionis *sub* usu (diss.), 25.205-206
- Scramuzza, V. M., Claudius Soter Euergetes, 51.261-266
- Searle, A., Note on the Battle of Pharsalus, 18.213-218
- Segal, C. P., *ὕψος* and the problem of cultural decline in the *De sublimitate*, 64.121-146
- The character and cults of Dionysus and the unity of the *Frogs*, 65.207-242
- Gorgias and the psychology of the *logos*, 66.99-155
- Reason, emotion, and society in the Sophists and Democritus (diss.), 66.268-271
- Seymour, T. D., On the Homeric caesura and the close of the verse as related to the expression of thought, 3.91-129
- Sheldon, E. S., *H* as a mute in Latin, 5.167-168
- Sherman, C. L., Quo modo ingenia moresque personarum descripsert Aeschylus (diss.), 39.113-115
- Shorey, P., Plato, Lucretius, and Epicurus, 12.201-210
- Smith, C. L., On "egregium publicum" (Tacitus, *Annales* 3.70.4), 1.107-110

- Smith, C. L., Catullus and the phaselus of his fourth poem, 3.75-89
 — Cicero's journey into exile, 7.65-84
 — A preliminary study of certain mss. of Suetonius' *Lives of the Caesars*, (1) 12.19-58; (2) 16.1-14
- Smith, K. K., The use of the high-soled shoe or buskin in Greek tragedy of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., 16.123-164
- Smith, S. B., De sortitione apud Athenienses (diss.), 33.182-184
 — The economic motive in Thucydides, 51.267-301
- Smith, W. D., Dramatic structure and technique in Euripides' *Suppliants* (diss.), 62.152-154
- Smith, W. F., De Ovidii *Metamorphoseon* aliquot codicibus recente sendis (diss.), 36.183-184
- Smyth, H. W., Notes on the ana paests of Aischylos, 7.139-165
 — Aspects of Greek conservatism, 17.49-73
 — The commentary on Aeschylus' *Prometheus* in the Codex Neapolitanus, 32.1-98
 — Catalogue of the manuscripts of Aeschylus, 44.1-62
 — Biography and bibliography of, 49.1-21
- Snowden, F. M., Jr., De servis libertisque Pompeianis (diss.), 56-57.255-258
- Solmsen, F., Aristotle and Presocratic cosmogony, 63.265-282
- Spring, E., A study of exposition in Greek tragedy, 28.135-224
- Stewart, Z., Democritus and the Cynics, 63.179-191
 — The song of Silenus, 64.179-205
- Stocker, A. F., De novo Codicum Servianorum genere (diss.), 50.123-126
 — A new source for the text of Servius, 52.65-97
- Stroock, R. L., Notes on history and value, 51.310-314
 — Memoir on, 51.303-309
- Struthers, L. B., Quo modo Claudius Claudianus praeceptis rhetoricae in laudationibus scribendis usus sit quaeritur (diss.), 27.171-172
 — The rhetorical structure of the encomia of Claudius Claudian, 30.49-87
- Syme, R., Livy and Augustus, 64.27-87
- Tarn, W. W., Phthia-Chryseis, *A.S.* 483-501
- Tenney, M. C., The quotations from Luke in Tertullian as related to the texts of the second and third centuries (diss.), 56-57.258-260
- Thompson, G. H., Quo modo mythis Graeci in rebus publicis gerendis usi sint (diss.), 42.182-183
- Thompson, H. A., A golden Nike from the Athenian Agora, *A.S.* 183-210
- Thomson, J. A. K., The religious background of the *Prometheus Vinctus*, 31.1-37
- Todd, O. J., Quo modo Aristophanes rem temporalem in fabulis suis tractaverit (diss.), 25.206
 — Quo modo Aristophanes rem temporalem in fabulis suis tractaverit, 26.1-71
- Toland, J. M., De vocalium mutatione illa apud Graecos antiquos quae hodie sandhi dicitur (diss.), 46.212-216
- Travis, A. H., De Servii carminum Vergilianorum interpretis dicendi rationibus (diss.), 51.328-329
 — Donatus and the Scholia Danielis: a stylistic comparison, 53.157-169
- Turnbull, L. C., Some aspects of Greek geometric bronzes (diss.), 65.372-375
- Turyn, A., On the Sophoclean Scholia in the manuscript Paris 2712, 63.161-170
- Upson, F. S., The kernos in ancient cult (diss.), 53.180-181

- Upson, H. R., Mediaeval *Lives* of Virgil (diss.), 51.330-331
- Usmiani, M., Marcus Marulus, life and works (diss.), 62.154-159
- Wade-Gery, H. T., The Peace of Kallias, *A.S.* 121-156
- Waites, M. C., Some features of the allegorical debate in Greek literature, 23.1-46
- Walden, J. W. H., *Nedum*, 2.103-127
— Stage-terms in Heliodorus's *Aethiopica*, 5.1-43
— A point of order in Greek and Latin, 7.223-233
— The date of Libanius's λόγος ἐπιτάφιος ἐπ' Ἰουλιανῷ, 10.33-38
- Waldrop, G. B., Donatus, the interpreter of Vergil and Terence, 38.75-142
— Evidences of relationship in certain manuscripts of Servius, 45.205-212
- Wallace, M. V. T., The epic technique of Silius Italicus (diss.), 62.159-162
- Walton, F. R., A problem in the *Ichneutae* of Sophocles, 46.167-189
— De dis Syris apud Graecos cultis (diss.), 49.274-275
- Walzer, R., On the Arabic versions of Books *A*, *a*, and *A* of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 63.217-231
- Ward-Perkins, J. B., The problem of Etruscan origins, some thoughts on historical method, 64.1-26
- Warren, M., Epigraphica, 11.163-170
— Unpublished Scholia from the Vaticanus (C) of Terence, 12.125-136
— On five new manuscripts of the commentary of Donatus to Terence, 17.31-42
- Watson, J. C., The relation of the scene-headings to the miniatures in manuscripts of Terence, 14.55-172
- Webb, R. H., An attempt to restore the γ archetype of Terence manuscripts, 22.55-110
- West, A. B., A revision of Athenian Tribute Lists (1), 37.55-98
- West, A. B., A Revision of Athenian Tribute Lists (2), 38.21-73
- Westermann, W. S., Athenaeus and the slaves of Athens, *A.S.* 451-470
- Westervelt, P., Pindar's poetic craft and purpose (diss.), 66.271-273
- Westgate, R. I. W., De casibus Indo-germanicis, praecipue sociativo, in lingua Graeca usque ad Thucydidem, summotis (diss.), 46.216-218
- Weston, K. E., The illustrated Terence manuscripts, 14.37-54
- Whatmough, J., The Lepontic inscriptions and the Ligurian dialect, 38.1-20
— On a new fragment of Dorian farce, 39.1-6
— The Osi of Tacitus-Germanic or Illyrian? 42.139-155
— The calendar in ancient Italy outside Rome, 42.157-179
— "Quemadmodum Pollio reprehendit in Livio Patavinitatem?" 44.95-130
— New Keltic inscriptions of Gaul, 44.227-231
— A new Raetic inscription of the Sondrio group, 47.205-207
— "Tusca origo Raetis," 48.181-202
— A new Umbrian inscription of Assisi, 50.89-93
— The neural basis of language and the problem of the "root," 52.99-123
— Root and base in Indo-European, 54.1-23
— Κελτικά, being prolegomena to a study of the dialects of ancient Gaul, 55.1-85
— "Alpes populique Inalpini" (Pliny, *N.H.* 3.47), 60.175-185
— Degrees of knowing, 63.255-263
- Wheeler, J. R., The participial construction with τυγχάνειν and κυρεῖν, 2.143-157
- Coronelli's maps of Athens, 7.177-189
- Notes on the so-called Capuchin plans of Athens, 12.221-230

- Wheeler, F. M., De Probi *Commentariorum Vergilianorum* textu re-censendo (diss.), 44.247-250
 — The manuscript tradition of Probus, 46.85-153
 — Leto's hand and Tasso's Horace, 52.99-123
 White, J. W., The "stage" in Aristophanes, 2.159-205
 — The opisthodomus on the Acropolis at Athens, 6.1-53
 — Tzetzes's notes on the *Aves* of Aristophanes in Codex Urbinas 141, 12.69-108
 — An unrecognized actor in Greek comedy, 17.103-129
 — "Logaoedic" metre in Greek comedy, 18.1-38
 — Collations of the manuscripts of Aristophanes' *Aves*, 29.77-131
 — Collations of the manuscripts of Aristophanes' *Vespae*, 30.1-35
 Whitman, C. H., The religious humanism of Sophocles (diss.), 58-59.228-231
 Whitmore, C. E., On a passage in Pindar's fourth *Nemean* ode, 21.103-109
 Wiesen, D. S., St. Jerome as a satirist (diss.), 66.273-277
 Wilcox, S., The scope of early rhetorical instruction, 53.121-155
 Wills, G., *Agamemnon* 1346-71, 1649-53, 67.255-267
 Witke, E. C., Latin satire: the classical genre and its medieval development (diss.), 66.277-279
 Wolff, E., Die Entscheidung des Eteokles in den *Sieben gegen Theben*, 63.89-95
 Wolfson, H. A., The knowability and describability of God in Plato and Aristotle, 56-57.233-249
 — The plurality of immovable movers in Aristotle and Averroës, 63.233-253
 Woodbury, L. E., Quomodo risu ridiculoque Graeci usi sint (diss.), 55.114-117
 — Parmenides on names, 63.145-160
 Woodcock, E. C., Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, 39.93-108
 Woodward, A. M., Two Attic treasure-records, *A.S.* 377-407
 Wright, J. H., The date of Cylon, 3.1-74
 — Herondaea, 4.169-200
 — A votive tablet to Artemis Anaïtis and Mén Tiamu in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, 6.55-74
 — Five interesting Greek imperatives, 7.85-93
 — Studies in Sophocles, 12.137-164
 — The origin of Plato's Cave, 17.131-142
 Wyatt, W. F., De scripturae Hibernicae fontibus (diss.), 26.176-179
 Wyatt, W. F., Jr., Metrical Lengthening in Homer (diss.), 67.310-312
 Young, A. M., Poetae Graeci comici in comoediis quatenus Sophoclem tragicum poetam respexisse videantur (diss.), 41.189-190
 Zipf, G. K., Relative frequency as a determinant of phonetic change, 40.1-95
 Zuntz, G., Zum Kleanthes-Hymnus, 63.289-308

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

VOLUMES 1-67 (1890-1963)

The supplementary volume of *Athenian Studies* is referred to as *A.S.*

- Ab*, in Horace, 12.249-260
Acropolis: opisthodomus, 6.1-53; old temple of Athena, 12.319-326
Aeschylus: *Agamemnon* 1346-71, 1649-53, 67.255-267; *Agamemnon*, dramatic and ethical motives, 54.25-33; *Agamemnon*, plot, 7.95-121; *Oresteia*, as illustrated by Greek vase-painting, 21.111-159; *Prometheus*, 12.335-345; *Prometheus*, commentary in Codex Neapolitanus, 32.1-98; *Prometheus*, religious background, 31.1-37; *Seven against Thebes*, dramatic action, 63.97-119; *Seven against Thebes*, Eteocles, 63.89-95; anapaests, 7.139-165; characterization, methods of (diss.), 39.113-115; dramatic art, 16.15-61; manuscripts, catalogue of, 44.1-62; political ideas (diss.), 43.175-176
Aetolia, and Athens, *A.S.* 471-481
Ajax, death of, on Etruscan mirror, 11.93-99
Alcibiades, patriotism, 51.215-231
Alcmeonidae, trial, 8.1-22
ἀλιτήριος, use, 19.157-162
ἀλιτρός, use, 19.163-165
Allegorical debate, in Greek literature, 23.1-46
Alphabet: Attic (Thucydides 8.9.2), 23.129-154; prehistory, 45.105-156
Alpine Regions, grammar of ancient dialects, 60.175-185
ἀμφιθαλής, *A.S.* 509-519
Amphora, with new καλός-name, 17.143-148
Anagraphis, Athenian, 67.37-54
Andocides, some constructions, 2.57-69
Androton, *Atthis*, *A.S.* 341-355
Anonymous Iamblichus, 65.127-163
Antigonids, Heracles, and Beroea, 45.213-246
ἀντιγραφῆς, in Ostrogothic kingdom, 21.23-29
Apollo, Delphian Hymn to, 9.55-60
Apollonius Rhodius, and Homeric epic (diss.), 60.294-296
Appearance, personal, Roman descriptions in history and biography, 41.192-195 (diss.); 46.43-84
Apple, symbolism in antiquity, 10.39-55
ἀράῖος, use, 19.165-169
Arator: studies, 43.123-166; studies in manuscripts of, 54.93-113
Argos, and *Prometheus* of Aeschylus, 12.335-345
Aristonikos of Karystos, Athenian honors for, 67.77-92
Aristophanes: *Acharnians*, manuscript tradition, 18.157-211; *Birds*, decree-seller in, and professional politicians at Athens, 30.89-102; *Birds*, manuscripts, collations of, 29.77-131; *Birds*, notes on, 10.115-120; *Birds*, Tzetzes' notes on, in Codex Urbinas 141, 12.69-108; *Frogs*, unity of, 65.207-242; *Wasps*, manuscripts, collations of, 30.1-35; boyhood and youth in days of, 18.73-122; Browning's *Aristophanes' Apology*, 20.15-73; comedy of issues (diss.), 65.343-345; dramatic time, 25.206 (diss.); 26.1-71; manuscript, un-

- Aristophanes—*continued*
 known, Vat. Gr. 2181, 66.241-248; rhetoric, art of, 49.69-113; Scholia, mythical problems in, 6.83-166; his "stage," 2.159-205; women, position of, 1.159-186
- Aristotle: *Athenaion Politeia*, structure of, 67.115-146; *Constitution of Athenians* (diss.), 65.362-365; *Metaphysics*, Arabic versions of Books A, α, and Α, 63.217-231; *Metaphysics*, *Codices Recentiores* of (diss.), 64.259-262; *Poetics*, Book 2, 28.1-46; *Posterior Analytics*, mediaeval versions of, 25.87-105; and the dikasteria (diss.), 63.526-528; and God, 56-57.233-249; Homeric quotations, 6.153-237; immovable movers, 63.233-253; kleroteria, and courts, 50.1-34; knowing, degrees of, 63.255-263; on the period, 63.283-288; Presocratic cosmogony, 63.265-282; and Theophrastus' *Nomoi*, A.S. 355-376; tragedy, on beauty of, 49.179-204; tragedy and comedy, definitions of, 40.97-198
- Artemis Anaïtis, votive tablet, 6.55-74
- Asteris, geographical identification, 33.65-77
- Astrology, transmission of Greek to India (diss.), 65.365-367
- Athena: old temple on the Acropolis, 12.319-326; tribal cycles of treasurers of, A.S. 157-182
- Athena Pallenis, cult, 54.35-67
- Athenaeus: on Athena Pallenis, 54.35-67; and slaves of Athens, A.S. 451-470
- Athenian: decrees (diss.), 58-59.223-226; decrees, of 216-212 B.C., 48.105-126; decrees, three, 67.55-75; institutions, influence upon Plato's *Laws*, 44.131-192; public cults, 51.233-260; Tribute Lists, revision, (1) 37.55-98; (2) 38.21-73
- Athens: Acropolis, opisthodomus on, 6.1-53; and Aetolia, A.S. 471-481; Capuchin plans, 12.221-230; and Carthage, A.S. 247-253; and Delphi, A.S. 37-69; exegetes, 62.37-49; hemlock, A.S. 299-302; kleroteria and courts, 50.1-34; Law Code, Eleusinian sacrifices in (diss.), 66.256-259; the lot in political affairs (diss.), 33.182-184; maps by Coronelli, 7.177-189; and Minoan Crete, A.S. 11-36; Nike, golden, from Agora, A.S. 183-210; Peace of Kallias, A.S. 121-156; pro-Persian party 510 to 480 B.C., A.S. 71-95; place in early age of Greece, A.S. 1-9; professional politicians, decree-seller in *Birds*, 30.89-102; slaves, A.S. 451-470; Tribute Lists, revision, (1) 37.55-98; (2) 38.21-73
- Atomists, ancient, and English literature of seventeenth century, 45.1-79
- Attic: alphabet (Thucydides 8.9.2), 23.129-154; demes (diss.), 28.225-227; treasure-records, A.S. 377-407
- Augustan poets, and Catullus, 17.15-30
- Augustine: Harvard manuscript, 21.51-74; theory of time, 63.437-454
- Augustus, and Livy, 64.27-87
- αὐλός: 4.1-60; mouth-piece, 10.19-28
- Averroës, on Aristotle's immovable movers, 63.233-253
- Barbers, Greek and Roman, 2.41-56
- Basil of Caesarea, Augustine's theory of time, 63.437-454
- Bells, uses among Greeks and Romans, 15.29-59
- Beneventan script, Bari type, manuscripts from Apulia (diss.), 66.262-265
- Bentley, Richard, 67.285-302
- Beroea, Antigonids, and Heracles, 45.213-246
- Boethius: *Consolatio Philosophiae*, composition of, 15.1-28; style and chronology of works, 18.123-156
- Boston Museum of Fine Arts, amphora with new καλός-name, 17.143-148

- Boyhood, in days of Aristophanes, 18.73-122
 Brick-stamps: Roman, 56-57.1-128; Roman, indices, 58-59.1-104
 Bronze Age, in Peloponnesus, 34.1-62
 Browning, *Aristophanes' Apology*: classical elements in, 20.15-73; classical sources, 33.79-180
 Buskin, use in Greek tragedy, 16.123-164
 Byzantine: accounting practices, 51.11-33; tax records from Egypt, 51.35-60
 Caesura, in Homer, 3.91-129
 Calendar, in ancient Italy outside Rome, 42.157-179
 Capuchin plans of Athens, 12.221-230
 Carthage, and Athens, A.S. 247-253
 Catullus: art of 64, 65.165-205; and Augustans, 17.15-30; vs. Horace, 12.7-17; personality and imagery (diss.), 65.369-371; the phaselus of the fourth poem, 3.75-89; poetic unity and subconscious elements, 60.101-136
 Celsus, his language (diss.), 40.200-202
 Celtic, in Gaul, 55.1-85
 Censors, Roman, 51.71-110
 Chachrylion, and his vases, 35.75-136
 Chaucer: and Lollius, 28.47-133; tragedy and comedy, definitions of, 40.145-150
 $\chi\rho\eta\nu$, and $\epsilon\delta\epsilon i$, with infinitive, 1.77-88
 Christ, and Socrates, 60.205-233
 Chryseis: mother of Philip V, 48.127-180; identification with Phthia, A.S. 483-501
 Church councils, and patristic authority, 63.493-505
 Cicero: *Brutus*, date of, 60.137-146; *De legibus*, date of (diss.), 60.299-301; *De natura deorum*, 62.7-36; *De republica*, 1.50, kingship, 63.309-332; *Orator*, and Horace's *Ars Poetica*, 35.1-74; *Pro Roscio*, date of, 12.237-248; historiography (diss.), 61.167-169; $\pi\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\pi\pi\tau\epsilon\rho\pi\pi$ Ομηρικῶς; (*Ad Att.* 1.16.1), 31.39-62; journey into exile, 7.65-84; judgment of Lucretius, 24.147-159; prooemia (diss.), 60.297-299
 Cisalpine Gaul, cults (diss.), 63.514-516
 Classics: in New World, 62.119-139; and Walt Whitman, 60.263-289
 Claudian, rhetorical structure of his encomia (diss.), 27.171-172; 30.49-87
 Claudian gens, their politics, 13.1-59
 Claudius, provincial administration, 51.261-266
 Cleanthes, hymn, 63.289-308
 Cleisthenes, constitutional reforms, 8.1-22
 Clement of Alexandria, treatise of Musonius, 12.191-200
 Codex: Augiensis, and Codex Boernerianus, Pauline epistles, 60.187-199; Boernerianus, and Codex Augiensis, Pauline epistles, 60.187-199; Neapolitanus, commentary on *Prometheus*, 32.1-98; Urbina 141, Tzetzes' notes on the *Birds*, 12.69-108; Ursinianus, and Codex Vetus of Plautus, 9.109-115; Vetus, and Codex Ursinianus of Plautus, 9.109-115
 Coins, of Greek cities, with animals (diss.), 43.167-168
 Comedy: Aristotelian definition, 40.97-198; Greek, unrecognized actor, 17.103-129; Greek, logaoedic meter, 18.1-38; Greek and Roman definitions, 40.98-130
 Comic poets, Greek, as literary critics, 15.121-240
Commentum Einsidense, on Donatus's *Ars grammatica*, 56-57.129-160
 Compounds, form of nominal, in Latin, 11.61-72
 Conditions, subjunctive and optative in Greek and Latin, 12.109-123
 Conservatism, among Greeks, 17.49-73
 Contrary to fact construction, 7.13-20
 Copula, in Greek and Latin, 7.223-233
 Corbulo, and Nero's Eastern policy, 45.81-104

- Corinth: inscriptions, 53.89-119; inscriptions, Latin elegiacs, 60.81-100
- Coronation ceremonies, imperial, fifth and sixth centuries A.D., 30.37-47
- Coronelli, maps of Athens, 7.177-189
- Corpuscular theories, Greek, antecedents of, 22.111-172
- Courts, dikastic, at Athens, 50.1-34
- Cratinus the Younger, *Nemesis*, 15.61-75
- Crete, and Athens, *A.S.* 11-36
- Critical notes, 7.215-222
- Criticism, ancient literary, 27.1-65
- Cult: image, of rulers in temples, 41.1-62; of the nymphs, 15.77-119; ordinance, verse inscription from sanctuary of Dionysus at Smyrna, 63.415-421; of the Roman emperors, origin (diss.), 38.143-147
- Cults: oriental, in Britain, 11.47-60; oriental, in Graeco-Roman world (diss.), 22.182-183
- Curb bits, ancient Roman, 11.151-157
- Curium in Cyprus, arena bath area (diss.), 63.513
- Cylon, date, 3.1-74
- Cynics, and Democritus, 63.179-191
- Cyril of Jerusalem (diss.), 58-59.227-228
- Dacian: gods (diss.), 36.179-180; inscriptions (diss.), 51.321-322
- Danaid myth, 13.129-173
- Danaoi, 39.59-92
- Danielis Scholia: 53.157-169; and Servius, republican authors in, 65.291-341
- Dante, definitions of tragedy and comedy, 40.140-145
- Daphnis myth, 10.121-140
- Dative case, sociative sense, from Homer to Thucydides (diss.), 46.216-218
- Debates, allegorical, in Greek literature, 23.1-46
- Decrees, Athenian: 216-212 B.C., 48.105-126; method in the restoration of preambles, 67.55-75
- Delian League, 51.175-213
- Deliberative construction, in Greek relative clauses, 7.1-12
- Delphi, and Athens, *A.S.* 37-69
- Delphian Hymn to Apollo, 9.55-60
- Demetrius, and Perseus, sons of Philip V, 46.191-202
- Democritus: and Cynics, 63.179-191; and English literature of seventeenth century, 45.1-79
- Demosthenes, *De Chersoneso* and *Philippica quarta* (diss.), 61.164-166
- Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, 39.93-108
- Didache*, eschatology (diss.), 61.173-175
- Diomedon, the archon, *A.S.* 503-507
- Dionysus, character and cults, 65.207-242
- Donatus: *Commentum Einsidlene* on *Ars grammatica*, 56-57.129-160; interpreter of Vergil and Terence, 38.75-142; *Scholia Danielis*, 53.157-169; Terence commentary, five new manuscripts of, 17.31-42; *Vita Vergi iana* (diss.), 37.99-100
- Dorian farce, new fragment, 39.1-6
- Dreams, influence among ancients (diss.), 24.163-164
- Duenos inscription, 9.53-54
- Dulichium, geographical identification, 36.43-90
- E*, and *o* vowels in Greek (diss.), 49.268-271
- Ecastor*, use by Plautus and Terence, 4.99-103
- εδει, and χρην, with infinitive, 1.77-88
- Edepol*, use by Plautus and Terence, 4.99-103
- "Egregium publicum," Tacitus, *Anales* 3.70.4, 1.107-110
- Egypt, early Byzantine tax records, 51.35-60
- Einsiedeln eclogues, 63.363-385
- Elizabethan Age, definitions of tragedy and comedy, 40.184-198
- Ellipsis, in some Latin constructions, 12.1-5

- Emotion, in Homer and Apollonius of Rhodes (diss.), 24.162-163
 $\epsilon\nu\gamma\eta\varsigma$, use, 19.169-172
 Enkomis, *Jēsōn* tablet, 65.39-107
 Ennius, and Roman tragedy (diss.), 60.291-294
 $\epsilon\nu\theta\mu\mu\sigma$, use, 19.172-175
 Entrance-techniques, of Euripides and Menander (diss.), 43.170-173
Epheboi, oī περὶ τὸ Διογένειον, 63.423-436
 Ephorus, in Plutarch's *Lives* (diss.), 63.510-513
 Epic: poetry, Greek, political environment (diss.), 44.233-238; prophecy in ancient, 32.99-175; technique of oral verse-making, (1) 41.73-147; (2), 43.1-50
 Epicurus: and English literature of seventeenth century, 45.1-79; Plato and Lucretius, 12.201-210
Epigraphica, 11.163-170
 Epithets, in Latin epic poets (diss.), 47.209-211
 Epyllion, Latin, 24.37-50
 Erinna, studies, 66.193-204
 Eteocles, *Seven against Thebes*, 63.89-95
 Etruscan: small bronzes of Archaic period (diss.), 50.126-127; mirror, death of Ajax, 11.93-99; origin of Raeti? 48.181-202
 Etruscans, origins, 64.1-26
 Etymologies: 9.47-53; Latin, 1.93-105; Latin, 4.143-149
 Eumolpidai, history of the Attic clan (diss.), 49.271-273
 Euripides: *Alcestis*, thanatos scene, 9.37-40; *Antigone*, 12.267-276; *Bacchae*, notes, 5.45-48; *Orestes*, 66.157-192; *Rhesus*, 4.61-97; *Suppliants* (diss.), 62.152-154; choruses (diss.), 26.175-176; 27.77-170; three notes, 9.41-44; and Thucydides, 49.23-68
 Erymedon, battles at, A.S. 97-120
 Evil, Good, and Fate: in early Greek poetry, 46.1-36; in Presocratic philosophy, 47.85-129
 Exegetes, of Athens, 62.37-49
Exempla, use of Roman personalities by Latin writers (diss.), 22.181-182
Exempla virtutis, in Roman literature, 25.1-71
 Exposition, in Greek tragedy, 28.135-224
 "Facetum," Horace, *Satires* 1.10.44, 25.117-137
 Farce, Dorian, new fragment, 39.1-6
 Fate, Good, and Evil: in early Greek poetry, 46.1-36; in Presocratic philosophy, 47.85-129
Fauces, of Roman house, 1.1-12
 Fearing, Greek verbs of, followed by infinitive, 12.327-334
 Fire, methods of producing among ancients, 1.13-64
 Firmicus Maternus, Julius, on pagan cults (diss.), 33.181-182
 Fleury, Abbey of (diss.), 34.193-195
 Fogg Art Museum: a kylix, 52.41-63; kylix by Foundry Painter, 46.155-166; lekythos, red-figured, with καλός name Φαινηππος, 41.63-72; sarcophagus with Amazonomachy (diss.), 47.216-218
 Forms, doctrine of literary, 27.1-65
 Fortunatus, metrical *Life* of St. Martin, 43.51-76
 Foundry Painter, kylix in Fogg Art Museum, 46.155-166
 Fourth and fifth centuries, notes, 26.165-173
 Frequency, relative, as a determinant of phonetic change, 40.1-95
 Friendship, in Greek tragedians (diss.), 41.186-189
 Future time, from Indo-European to Romance (diss.), 55.111-114
 Gajus, or Gaius, 2.71-87
 Gaul: new Celtic inscriptions, 44.227-231; dialects, 55.1-85; Romanization, 55.52-68
 Geometric bronzes, Greek (diss.), 65.372-375
Germana patria, and Roman citizenship, 60.147-174

- God, in Plato and Aristotle, 56-57.233-249
 Good, Evil, and Fate: in early Greek poetry, 46.1-36; in Presocratic philosophy, 47.85-129
 Gorgias, and psychology of *logos*, 66.99-115
 Grave-reliefs, Greek, 8.41-102
 Greek city-state patriotism, 51.215-231
 Gregory of Nyssa: *Contra fatum* (diss.), 61.179-180; *In illud: tunc et ipse filius* (diss.), 58-59.221-223; περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου, early Latin versions, 63.473-492; psychology (diss.), 58-59.219-221
- H*, mute in Latin, 5.167-168
 Hadrian, letters and speeches, 49.141-177
 ἀμαρτία, use from Homer to Menander (diss.), 44.244-246
 Heliodorus, stage-terms in *Aethiopica*, 5.1-43
Hellenica of Oxyrhynchus, authorship, A.S. 303-341
 Helmet: B of Negau, 62.51-59; Greek (diss.), 35.172-173
 Hemlock, use in Athens, A.S. 299-302
 Hendecasyllable, law of, 25.107-115
Hercle, use by Plautus and Terence, 4.99-103
 Hercules: Antigonids, and Beroea, 45.213-246; in Greek vase-paintings (diss.), 24.161; and his successors, study of heroic ideal and heroic type, 38.7-58
 Herodotus, final *vñ*, 46.37-41
 Herondas, papyrus manuscript of Mimambi, 4.169-200
 Hesiod: *Works and days*, ancient Greek oral style (diss.), 66.265-268; and Parmenides, 66.93-98
Hippocratea, 25.139-203
 $\text{oī περὶ τὸ Διογένειον}$, 63.423-436
 Homer: *Iliad*, catalogue device in (diss.), 65.351-353; *Odyssey*, identification of Asteris, 33.65-77; *Odyssey*, identification of Ithaca, Dulichium, Same, and Zacynthus, 36.43-90; *Odyssey*, myth in (diss.), 65.353-355; *Odyssey*, prologue, 63.15-32; caesura, 3.91-129; Cyclops (diss.), 61.180-181; Homeric evidence in Ithaca, 31.125-166; Homeric language as language of an oral poetry, 43.1-50; and Homeric style, epic technique of oral verse-making, 41.73-147; νότερον πρότερον 'Ομηρικῶς (Cicero, *Ad Att.* 1.16.1), 31.39-62; metrical lengthening in (diss.), 67.310-312; Odysseus, raft of, 37.49-53; quotations in Plato and Aristotle, 6.153-237; youthful characters (diss.), 61.159-161
 Homeric Hymns, conjectural emendations, 11.73-91
 Horace: *Ars poetica*, and Cicero's *Orator*, 35.1-74; *Ars poetica*, Lucilius, Persius, 24.1-36; first Roman Ode, 63.333-346; *Satires* 1.10.44, on Vergil's *Bucolics*, 25.117-137; *ab in*, 12.249-260; Augustan and Epicurean (diss.), 63.524-526; vs. Catullus, 12.7-17; and Milton, 48.29-73
 ὑπεκκανότρια at Soli, identification, 36.165-177
 Hypotheses, of Greek tragedies, 12.287-298
 ὑποζώματα: of ancient ships, 34.63-77; of Greek ships, 22.173-179
 νύφος, in *De sublimitate*, 64.121-146
 νότερον πρότερον 'Ομηρικῶς (Cicero, *Ad Att.* 1.16.1), 31.39-62
- Iacio* compound verbs, pronunciation and written form, 6.83-151
 Iamblichus, anonymous, 65.127-163
 Illyria, language (diss.), 53.177-180
 Imperatives, five Greek, 7.85-93
 Imperialism: ancient justifications, 58-59.105-161; Athenian, 67.1-36
 Indo-European: laryngeal consonants (diss.), 53.176-177; inflection, nature and origin of, 16.63-122; phonology, 56-57.161-232; root and base, 54.1-23; short vowels, treatment in Greek of reduced grade of (diss.), 44.239-244

- Infinitive: in Greek after verbs of fearing, 12.327-334; use of perfect, in Latin with force of present, 1.111-138
- Inflection, nature and origin in Indo-European, 16.63-122
- Inscription: Duenos, 9.53-54; Phaistos Disk, 66.1-91; new Raetic, of Sondrio group, 47.205-207; new Umbrian, of Assisi, 50.89-93
- Inscriptions: 11.163-170; Celtic, from Gaul, 44.227-231; from Corinth, 53.89-119; Ionic, final *vū*, 46.37-41; Latin, in Harvard collection, 20.1-14; Latin, in the Virgin Islands, 50.85-88; Latin metrical, 9.133-168; Lepontic, 38.1-20; Minoan hieroglyphic, 32.177-183
- Invisibility, Greek and Roman beliefs, 53.1-36
- Io, and *Prometheus* of Aeschylus, 12.335-345
- Ionia, role in early history, 61.1-37
- Ionic capitals in Asia Minor, 10.29-31
- Irish script, sources (diss.), 26.176-179
- Isocrates, *Areopagiticus*, A.S. 409-450
- Ithaca: Homeric evidence, 31.125-166; geographical identification, 36.43-90
- Jerome: *De viris illustribus*, manuscript of, belonging to General Theological Seminary in New York, 23.47-69; medical allusions, 25.73-86; on palaeography, 54.83-92; as satirist (diss.), 66.273-277; textual criticism (diss.), 52.139-141; textual criticism, 55.87-109
- Jēsōn* tablet of Enkomi, 65.39-107
- Jewish catacombs, at Rome (diss.), 38.147-148
- John, Old Testament quotations in the gospel (diss.), 65.359-362
- John the Scot (diss.), 52.141-144
- Joseph of Exeter, *Bellum Troianum* (diss.), 61.184-186
- Julia Domna, as Athena Polias, A.S. 521-530
- Julian the Apostate, his librarian, 26.165-168
- Juvenal, fragment in manuscript of Orléans, 49.229-263
- καλός-name: a new, on amphora, 17.143-148; *Φαίνηππος*, on red-figured lekythos, 41.63-72
- Kernos, in ancient cult (diss.), 53.180-181
- Kingship, Cicero, *De re publica* 1.50, 63.309-332
- Kleroteria, courts, and Aristotle, 50.1-34
- Knowing, degrees of, 63.255-263
- κόπταθος κατακτός, recent investigations, 5.73-82
- Kotylos, inscribed, from Boeotia, 2.89-101
- Kylix: in Fogg Art Museum, 52.41-63; in Fogg Art Museum, by Foundry Painter, 46.155-166
- κυρεῖν, with participial construction, 2.143-157
- Lactantius: so-called, *Argumenta* (diss.), 46.209-211; 47.131-163
- Laetus, Pomponius, 52.99-123
- Lamps, Roman, prototypes of designs (diss.), 46.204-206
- Language, neural basis, 52.125-137
- Latin, accentual rhythm, 4.105-115
- Latin elegiacs, in Corinthian inscriptions, 60.81-100
- Laughter and the ridiculous, in Greek (diss.), 55.114-117
- Lekythos, red-figured, with καλός-name *Φαίνηππος*, 41.63-72
- Lepontic inscriptions, 38.1-20
- Lexicography, studies in Greek, 19.157-186
- Libanius, date of λόγος ἐπιτάφιος ἐπ' Ἰουλιανῷ, 10.33-38
- Liberty, in early Roman Empire, 67.93-113
- Libri manuales, mediaeval manuscripts (diss.), 34.195-197
- Ligurian dialect, 38.1-20
- Literary criticism, among Greek comic poets, 15.121-240

- Livy: and Augustus, 64.27-87; hidden verses, 9.61-66; his "Patavinity," 44.95-130; and Valerius Antias, 17.161-182
- Logaoedic meter, in Greek comedy, 18.1-38
- Logos*, psychology of, in Gorgias, 66.99-155
- Lollius, in Chaucer, 28.47-133
- Longinus, *De sublimitate*, and *ὕψος*, 64.121-146
- Lucian, 12.181-190
- Lucilius, Persius, and Horace's *Ars poetica*, 24.1-36
- Lucretius: *De rerum natura*, Books 1 and 2, 22.1-53; and aesthetic attitude, 41.149-182; Athenian plague, 62.105-118; Cicero's judgment, 24.147-159; and English literature of seventeenth century, 45.1-79; Epicurean poet (diss.), 66.254-256; Plato, and Epicurus, 12.201-210; text, 7.21-36
- Luke, style, 12.299-305
- Lycophron, date, 6.75-82
- Lydia, myth and archaeology, 63.65-88
- Lysias, notes, 5.49-56
- Macedonia, inscriptions, 51.125-136
- Magistri*, Roman, in civil and military service of Empire, 26.73-164
- Magistri scriniorum*, in Ostrogothic kingdom, 21.23-29
- Manus consertio*, and *πειραπ ἐλέσθαι* ($\Sigma 501$), 4.151-167
- Maps of Athens, by Coronelli, 7.177-189
- Margites*, 63.33-63
- Marriage, under Roman Empire (diss.), 66.249-252
- Martin of Tours, metrical and prose *Lives of*, 43.51-76
- Marulus, Marcus (diss.), 62.154-159
- McDaniel Collection: ancient lamps, 64.247-258; archaic bronze relief of a hoplite, 67.303-306; phylax vase, 64.237-245
- μή*: with the participle, 12.277-285; in questions, 12.307-317
- Medicine and philosophy, 67.147-175
- Mēn Tiamu, votive tablet, 6.55-74
- Menander: dramatic art, 24.111-145; irony (diss.), 35.171-172
- Messapic, vocalism (diss.), 45.250-256
- Metaphony, in Latin (diss.), 53.171-174
- Meter, logaoedic, in Greek comedy, 18.1-38
- Metrical: construction of some recently discovered Greek lyric poems (diss.), 38.109-111; inscriptions, Latin, 9.133-168
- Middle Ages, definitions of tragedy and comedy, 40.131-139
- Miletus, its dialect (diss.), 45.256-260
- Milton, and Horace, 48.29-73
- Minoan, hieroglyphic inscriptions, Phaestos whorl, 32.177-183
- "Molle atque facetum," Horace, *Satires* 1.10.44, 25.117-137
- Mongolian, postpositions (diss.), 61.186
- Motion, in archaic Greek sculpture, 20.95-164
- Music, ethical force in Hellenic period (diss.), 63.507-510
- Musonius: 7.123-137; in Clement of Alexandria, 12.191-200
- Mysterion, 60.201-204
- Myth, use by Greeks in public life (diss.), 42.182-183
- Names: Latin family, 58-59.163-187; proper (diss.), 56-57.252-255; proper, of Dacia and Moesia (diss.), 47.211-274; Roman, 8.102-184
- Nature, and Greek tragedians (diss.), 28.230-231
- Nedum*, 2.103-127
- Negau, helmet B, 62.51-59
- Neptune, sons of, 54.69-82
- Neque*, uses in Latin, 2.129-141
- Nero: and the East, 48.75-103; eastern policy and Corbulo, 45.81-104
- New Comedy, and religious conditions of Greeks, 10.141-180
- Nominal compounds, form in Latin, 11.61-72

- Nonius glosses, 9.67–86
 $\hat{\nu}$, final, in Herodotus and Ionic inscriptions, 46.37–41
 Nymphs, cult of, 15.77–119
 Oars, arrangement in trireme, 44.205–225
 Odysseus: and Parmenides, 63.133–143; raft of, 37.49–53
Odyssey: and *Aeneid*, patterns of imagination (diss.), 65.348–351; omens and dreams (diss.), 63.517–519; prologue, 63.15–32
 Old Comedy, and free state (diss.), 65.345–348
 Oligarch, the Old, *A.S.* 211–245
 Olympia, council house and council, 19.1–60
 Omens, and augury, in Plautus, 7.235–247
 Opisthodomus, on Athenian Acropolis, 6.1–53
 Optative conditions, origin in Greek and Latin, 12.109–123
 Oral verse-making, epic technique, (1) 41.73–147; (2) 43.1–50
Os columnatum, and ancient instruments of confinement, 7.37–64
 Osi, of Tacitus, Germanic or Illyrian? 42.139–155
 Ostrogoths, *magistri scriniorum*, ἀντιγραφῆς, and βεβερενδάρτοι, 21.23–29
 οὐ μή , origin with subjunctive and future indicative, 1.65–76
 Ovid: *Heroides*, authorship and date of double letters in, 19.121–155; *Metamorphoses*, manuscripts (diss.), 36.183–184; *Metamorphoses*, manuscript tradition (diss.), 47.215–216; 50.95–123; *Tristia*, language and text, 65.243–261; amatory poems, textual history (diss.), 23.168–170; exile, and Plato, 63.347–361; omission of subject-accusative of infinitive, 4.117–141
 Palaeography, St. Jerome on, 54.83–92
 $\pi\alpha\lambda\mu\nu\alpha\iota\sigma$, use, 19.175–180
 Palladas of Alexandria, Christian or pagan, 63.455–471
 Palmette design, in Greek art (diss.), 39.111–113
 Parmenides: and Hesiod, 66.93–98; on names, 63.145–160; and Odysseus, 63.133–143
 Participial construction, with $\tau\upsilon\chi\alpha\nu\epsilon\iota\omega$ and $\kappa\rho\epsilon\hat{\nu}$, 2.143–157
 Patristic authority, and church councils, 63.493–505
 Pauline epistles, Codices Augiensis and Boernerianus, 60.187–199
 Paulinus, metrical *Life of St. Martin*, 43.51–76
 Peace of Kallias, *A.S.* 121–156
 $\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\pi\alpha \dot{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha (\Sigma 501)$, and Roman *manus consertio*, 4.151–167
 Peisistratus, dates of exiles, 7.167–175
 Peloponnesus, in Bronze Age, 33.1–62
 $\pi\epsilon\rho\pi\alpha\ddot{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\pi\pi\alpha$, in Aeschylus (diss.), 63.519–522
 Perfect infinitive, in Latin with force of present, 1.111–138
 Pericles, in Thucydides, 62.79–92
 Perseus, and Demetrius, sons of Philip V, 46.191–202
 Persius: Lucilius, and Horace's *Ars poetica*, 24.1–36; notes, 7.191–203
 Petronius, 2.1–40
 Phaistos Disk, Hygieia, Tharso, and Iaon, 66.1–91
 Pharsalus, Battle of, 18.213–218
 Philodemus, poetic theory (diss.), 62.146–148
 Philosophy and Medicine, 67.147–175
 Phonetic change, relative frequency as a determinant of, 40.1–95
 Phonology, Indo-European, 56–57.161–232
 Photius, ideas of history (diss.), 61.170–172
 Phthia, identification with Chryseis, *A.S.* 483–501
 Pindar: *Nemean* 4, 21.103–109; *Paeonian* 6 and *Nemean* 7, date of, 60.61–80; *Pythian* 2, 48.1–28; *Pythian* 5, $\sigma\gamma\pi\eta\pi\delta\phi\theta\alpha\lambda\mu\sigma$, 11.141–149; first person in, 67.177–253; first-personal statements (diss.), 66.259–262;

Pindar—continued

Persian invasion, 63.121–132; poetic craft and purpose (diss.), 66.271–273; Scholia dates for Pythian odes, 62.61–78; *Scholia Vetera*, 42.1–78

Plato: *Apology* and *Symposium* (diss.), 67.307–308; *Laws*, influence of Athenian institutions upon, 44.131–192; *Parmenides*, 64.89–120; *Republic*, meaning of *εἰκασία* in divided line of, 44.193–203; *Republic*, movement in divided line of, 47.57–83; *Republic*, paradoxes of, 63.199–216; Cave, origin of, 17.131–142; comedy, spirit, 31.63–123; and God, 56–57.233–249; goodness, natural character of, 63.193–198; Homeric quotations, 6.153–237; Ideas, terminology, 47.17–55; Ideas, theory (diss.), 45.247–250; island of Critias (diss.), 60.302–304; Lucretius, and Epicurus, 12.201–210; and Ovid's exile, 63.347–361; as playwright, 12.165–180; poetry, view of (diss.), 28.227–230; 29.1–75; sin, origin of (diss.), 38.148–150; and tragedy, Greek, (1) 52.1–40; (2) 53.37–88; virtue, notion of, in the dialogues, 3.131–180

Platonism, modern critics, 61.39–71

Plautus: *breves breviantes*, short vowels before mute and liquid as, 9.115–120; *breves breviantes*, supposed limitation of law of, 9.87–95; Codices Vetus and Ursinianus, 9.109–115; Greek nouns, declension of, 9.96–101; use of *hercle*, *edepol*, and *ecastor*, 4.99–103; notes, 9.13–15; notes, 9.126–132; omens and augury, 7.235–247; and popular drama, 49.205–228; three *puer*-scenes and distribution of roles, 21.31–50; scene-headings in early recensions, 9.102–108; words and word-groups, 9.121–125

Pliny the Younger: *Letters*, new approach to text of, (1) 34.79–191; (2) 35.137–169; (3) 36.1–41; government, views on, 49.115–140

Plutarch: *De virtute morali*, extra-Peripatetic Aristotelianism (diss.), 66.252–254; *Life of Pericles*, chapter 13, 12.211–220; *περὶ εὐθυμίας*, 1.139–152

Poetry: early Greek, fate in, 46.1–36; Plato's view of, 29.1–75

Poets, Latin, some passages, 47.1–15

Poggio Buco, Necropolis of Statonia (diss.), 54.117–119

Poema and *poiesis*, in Hellenistic poetic criticism, 65.263–289

Politicians, at Athens, decree-seller in *Birds*, 30.89–102

Pollio, and Livy's "Patavinity," 44.95–130

Polybius, political theory and sources (diss.), 65.356–359

Pompeii, slaves and freedmen (diss.), 56–57.255–258

Portraiture: in classical epic, 58–59.189–217; Roman (diss.), 43.173–175

Portuguese, standard and insular (diss.), 51.326–328

Poseidon, sons of, 54.69–82

Praenomina, origin, 8.102–184

Presocratics: cosmogony of, and Aristotle, 63.265–282; Fate, Good, and Evil in their philosophy, 47.85–129; and Theophrastus, 61.85–156

Probus: *Commentary on Vergil* (diss.), 44.247–250; manuscript tradition, 46.85–153

Processions, religious, among Greeks, 11.1–45

Prometheus, in Attic legend, 10.103–114

Prophecy: in ancient epic, 32.99–175; in Greek poets (diss.), 23.170–171

Propitiation, of Zeus, 19.61–120

Prosody, early Latin, 5.57–71

προστρόπαιος, use, 19.180–186

Pseudo-Plutarch, *De liberis educandis*, 63.387–399

Ptolemy, first Latin version of *Almagest*, 21.75–102

Pyrrhus, negotiations with Romans, 64.147–177

Pythaïs, Delian, 51.111–124

- Quintilian: *elocutio*, account of (diss.), 62.143-146; grammatical and interpretative notes, 1.89-92
- Raeti, Etruscan origin? 48.181-202
- Raetic inscription, new, of Sondrio group, 47.205-207
- Religious condition, of Greeks at time of New Comedy, 10.141-180
- Religious processions, among Greeks, 11.1-45
- Renaissance, definitions of tragedy and comedy, 40.150-184
- ῥεφερενδάριοι, in Ostrogothic kingdom, 21.23-29
- Rhesus*, 4.61-97
- Rhetoric: and Aristophanes, 49.69-113; early Greek instruction, 53.121-155
- Rhythm, accentual, in Latin, 4.105-115
- Richer, utilization of sources (diss.), 65.367-369
- Rinucius Aretinus, as commentator on Greek literature, 24.51-109
- Roman: brick-stamps, 56-57.1-128; brick-stamps, indices, 58-59.1-104; citizenship, and germana patria, 60.147-174; emperors, worship in Spain, 11.101-139; house, *fauces*, 1.1-12; speech, syllabification, 7.249-271
- Roman Empire: administration (diss.), 61.181-184; *magistri* in civil and military service, 26.73-164; provincial building, 64.207-235
- Romance languages, phonetic tendency (diss.), 42.181
- Romanos, his Christmas kontakion (diss.), 41.191-192
- Rome, censors, 51.71-110
- "Root," and language, 52.125-137
- Ruler-worship, 41.1-62
- Sacramentary, of Tours, 60.235-261
- Salamis, Battle of, 17.75-101
- Saliva, superstition in classical literature, 8.23-40
- Salvian, his verb-syntax (diss.), 36.180-182
- Same, geographical identification, 36.43-90
- Sandhi*, external vocalic in Greek (diss.), 46.212-216
- Sarapis, a head from Corinth, 51.61-69
- Satire, Latin, classical genre and medieval development (diss.), 66.277-279
- Saturnian verse, 9.44-47
- Satyrical drama, and Old Comedy (diss.), 46.206-209
- Scaliger, Joseph, estimates of Greek and Latin authors, 29.123-176
- Sculpture: archaic reliefs, 61.73-84; motion in archaic Greek, 20.95-164
- Seneca: *Medea*, 18.39-71; "sacer intra nos spiritus," 17.149-160
- Septimius Severus, Roman bureaucrat, 51.137-173
- Servius: commentary on Vergil, manuscripts of, 45.157-204; commentary on Vergil, new family of manuscripts (diss.), 50.123-126; Daniel commentary (diss.), 51.315-318; manuscripts, relationship of certain, 45.205-212; and Scholia Danielis, republican authors, 65.291-341; style (diss.), 51.328-329; text, 52.65-97
- Servius Danielis, manuscripts of commentary on Vergil, 43.77-121
- Sette Bassi, 63.401-414
- Sextus Empiricus, and the arts, 42.79-137
- Shield devices, of Greeks, 13.61-127
- Ships: ancient, ὑποζώματα, 34.63-77; Greek, ὑποζώματα, 22.173-179
- Shoe: Greek, in classical period, 10.57-102; high-soled, use in Greek tragedy, 16.123-164
- Sicilian translators of twelfth century: 21.75-102; further notes, 23.155-166
- Silenus, *Eclogue* 6, 64.179-205
- Silius Italicus, epic technique (diss.), 62.159-162
- Slavery, Greek theories, 47.165-204
- Socrates: and Christ, 60.205-233; the historical, 27.67-75

- Soli, ὑπεκκαθατρία at, 36.165-177
 Sophists and Democritus, reason, emotion, and society (diss.), 66.268-271
 Sophocles: *Ajax*, 65.1-37; *Ichneutae*, 46.167-189; comic poets, treatment by (diss.), 41.189-190; dramatic art, 23.71-127; dramatic art, as revealed by fragments of lost plays, 33.1-63; iambic composition, 12.59-68; metrical study of strophic cantica (diss.), 48.203-204; religious humanism (diss.), 58-59.228-231; Scholia in manuscript Paris 2712, 63.161-170; studies, 12.137-164
 Spoken word, and written word, 60.23-59
 "Stage," in Aristophanes, 2.159-205
 Stem formation, Latin, 10.1-17
Sub, temporal use (diss.), 25.205-206
 Subjunctive conditions, origin in Greek and Latin, 12.109-123
 Suetonius: *Lives of the Caesars*, history of, in early Middle Ages, 37.1-48; *Lives of the Caesars*, manuscripts of, (1) 12.19-58; (2) 16.1-14; hidden verses, 9.17-24; manuscript, fifteenth century, 12.261-265; manuscripts, six (diss.), 23.167; manuscripts from Z (diss.), 41.183-186; notes, 7.205-214; *Vita Vergiana*, attributed to Aelius Donatus (diss.), 37.99-100
 Sulpicius Severus: *Life of St. Martin*, 43.51-76; writings on St. Martin (diss.), 51.322-325
 Suppletion, in Greek verbs (diss.), 47.218-219
 Syllabification, in Roman speech, 7.249-271
 $\sigmaύνναος \thetaεός$, 41.1-62
 Syntax, notes on Latin, 9.25-26
 Syrian gods, among Greeks (diss.), 49.274-275
 Tacitus: *Annales* 3.70.4, "egregium publicum," 1.107-110; Osi, Germanic or Illyrian? 42.139-155
 Taurobolium, origin, 17.43-48
 Terence: *Phormio*, notes on, 11.159-161; *breves breviantes*, supposed limitation of law of, 9.87-95; and Donatus, 38.75-142; Donatus commentary, five new manuscripts of, 17.31-42; *hercle*, *edepol*, *ecastor*, use, 4.99-103; manuscripts, γ archetype of, 22.55-110; manuscripts, illustrated, 14.37-54; scene-headings, relation of, to miniatures in manuscripts, 14.55-172; Scholia from Vaticanus (C), 12.125-136
 Terracotta figurines from Isthmian Sanctuary of Poseidon (diss.), 67.308-309
 Tertullian, quotations from Luke (diss.), 56-57.258-260
 Text-books, list from close of twelfth century, 20.75-94
 Textual problems, Greek, 67.269-283
 Theophrastus: *Nomoi*, *A.S.* 355-376; on Presocratic causes, 61.85-156; on style, 62.93-104; tragedy, source of definition of, 28.1-46
 $\Theta\epsilon\pi\rho\pi\acute{e}\varsigma$ and $\iota\epsilon\pi\rho\pi\acute{e}\varsigma$, concepts (diss.), 62.148-151
 Thucydides: Attic alphabet (note on 8.9.2), 23.129-154; economic motive, 51.267-301; and Euripides, 49.23-68; *logos* and *ergon* (diss.), 63.522-523; Nietzsche's "blonde Bestie" and funeral oration, 63.171-178; and Pericles, 62.79-92; style, origins, 50.35-84; unity, *A.S.* 255-297; veracity (diss.), 62.141-143
Tibia, 4.1-60
 Tragedy: Aristotelian definition, 40.97-198; Aristotle on beauty of, 49.179-204; Greek, exposition in, 28.135-224; Greek and Roman definitions, 40.98-130; and Plato, (1) 52.1-40; (2) 53.37-88
 Tribute Lists, Athenian, revision, (1) 37.55-98; (2) 38.21-73
 Trireme, arrangement of oars, 44.205-225
 $\tauυγχάνειν$, with participial construction, 2.143-157
 Tyrrhenians, in Pisa and Triphylia, and their conquerors, the Minyan Pelopes (diss.), 46.203-204

- Tzetzes, notes on *Birds* in Codex Urbinas 141, 12.69-108
- Valerius Antias, and Livy, 17.161-182
- Vase-painting, Greek, illustrating *Oresteia*, 21.111-159
- Vatican mythographer, first (diss.), 53.174-176
- Venetic, phonology (diss.), 49.265-268
- Verbs, copula and colorless ancillary in Greek (diss.), 61.157-159
- Vercelli, medieval writing (diss.), 61.175-178
- Vergil: *Aeneid* 5, unity and design, 66.205-239; *Bucolics*, judgment by Horace, *Satires* 1.10.44, 25.117-137; *Eclogue* 4, 14.17-35; *Eclogue* 6, 65.109-125; birthplace, 44.63-93; Daniel commentary, manuscripts, 43.77-121; and Donatus, 38.75-142; manuscript of Tours (diss.), 40.199-200; medieval *Lives* of (diss.), 51.330-331; Scholia in Tours manuscript, Bernensis 165 (diss.), 35.173-174; 36.91-163; Servius commentary, manuscripts, 45.157-204; song of Silenus, 64.179-205; *Vita Vergiliana*, authorship (diss.), 37.99-100; youthful poetry, 30.103-185
- Verse-making, oral, epic technique, (1) 41.73-147; (2) 43.1-50
- Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga (diss.), 43.168-170
- Virtue, in dialogues of Plato, 3.131-180
- Vitruvius: emendation, 20.165-169; grammatical points, 1.153-158; notes, 17.1-14; notes, 21.1-22
- Votive tablet, to Artemis Anaïtis and Mén Tiamu, 6.55-74
- Vowel lengthening in Homer (diss.), 67.310-312
- Walter of Châtillon, *Alexandreis* (diss.), 61.162-164
- Wealth, in early Greek thought (diss.), 56-57.251-252
- Whitman, Walt, and the Classics, 60.263-289
- Women, position in Aristophanes, 1.159-186
- Written word, and spoken word, 60.23-59
- Youth, in days of Aristophanes, 18.73-122
- Zacynthus, geographical identification, 36.43-90
- Zeus, propitiation of, 19.61-120

VOLUMES AND YEARS PUBLISHED

Volume 1, 1890	Volume 34, 1923
2, 1891	35, 1924
3, 1892	36, 1925
4, 1893	37, 1926
5, 1894	38, 1927
6, 1895	39, 1928
7, 1896	40, 1929
8, 1897	41, 1930
9, 1898	42, 1931
10, 1899	43, 1932
11, 1900	44, 1933
12, 1901	45, 1934
13, 1902	46, 1935
14, 1903	47, 1936
15, 1904	48, 1937
16, 1905	49, 1938
17, 1906	50, 1939
18, 1907	51, 1940
19, 1908	<i>A.S.</i> 1940
20, 1909	52, 1941
21, 1910	53, 1942
22, 1911	54, 1943
23, 1912	55, 1944
24, 1913	56-57, 1947
25, 1914	58-59, 1948
26, 1915	60, 1951
27, 1916	61, 1953
28, 1917	62, 1957
29, 1918	63, 1958
30, 1919	64, 1959
31, 1920	65, 1961
32, 1921	66, 1962
33, 1922	67, 1963

PHILLIPS ACADEMY

3 1867 00072 4653

DATE DUE

APR 25 '84

Li-2

93734

THIRIARD
STUDIES IN
CLASSICAL
MUSIC

480
H26
v.67

